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SUMMARY 
The introduction of the first democratic Constitution and the land reform programme in South 
' Africa provided the impetus for the development of a new perception of property. In terms of the 
traditional private law perception property rights are reduced to abstract, scientific concepts 
which form part of a hierarchical system of rationally and logically related concepts and 
definitions, the relationships between which remain largely unaffected by social and political 
realities. In this view the constitutional property clause is interpreted as a guarantee of existing 
individual property rights against unwarranted state interference. Proponents of the traditional 
private law view argue that this perception of property need not be replaced by a new 
constitutional perception of property, because the traditional private law perception is legitimated 
by the fact that it developed in an uninterrupted, linear line from Roman law. It is regarded as 
flexible enough to adapt to new and different social and political circumstances. However, the 
truth is that the development of property rights was disrupted by a number of discontinuities or 
fundamental breaks in different periods of its development. It is argued in this thesis that the 
introduction of the new constitutional order in South Africa can be regarded as another of these 
discontinuities, and that the strict adherence to the private law perception of property may be 
abandoned in favour of a new debate on property where the social and political function of 
property is emphasised more strongly. 
Land reform promotes the public interest in that it ensures the equitable use, distribution and 
exploitation of property. In most cases the implementation of land reform necessitates the 
limitation of property rights. A conservative judiciary's adherence to the traditional private law 
perception of property may lead to a constitutional conflict between the judiciary (that aims to 
afford existing property rights strong constitutional protection) and the legislature (that aims to 
promote the public interest by implementing land reform). Such a constitutional conflict can be 
avoided if the South African courts adopt an approach in terms of which the social and political 
role and function of property in society is recognised. 
Key terms: Property; Ownership; Land reform; Redistribution; Restitution; Tenure reform; 
Constitutional property; Property guarantee 
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INTRODUCTION 
Background 
The introduction of the first democratic Constitution and the land reform programme in 
South Africa heralded a new era in South African property law. Prior to the 1993 
Constitution property law was dominated by private law. In terms of the traditional 
private law view, property rights were reduced to abstract, scientific concepts which 
formed part of a hierarchical system of rights, the relationships between which were 
largely neutral and unaffected by social and political realities. This approach to property 
rights was untenable in a society characterised by inequalities and the maldistribution 
of land, and became impossible to maintain in view of the new constitutional order. The 
implementation of the new Constitution necessitates the abandonment of the 
conceptual, private law approach to property rights and the initiation of a totally new 
debate on the role and function of property in society. In the new constitutional order 
property rights can no longer be approached as socially and politically neutral 
concepts. The way in which the law structures and protects property rights has to 
account for and contribute to the aim and function of the new Constitution, namely to 
facilitate the creation of an open and democratic society based on freedom, equality 
and human dignity. In order to ensure that land reform can be effected, it is important 
that a properly constitutional perception of property be developed. Adherence to the 
traditional, private law perception of property ~s a fundamentally unrestricted and 
inviolate right may lead to the notion that the purpose of the constitutional property 
clause is to entrench and insulate existing property rights from all socially or politically 
inspired, policy-oriented state interference. If the traditional, private law perception of 
property is accepted and applied in the constitutional context, land reform, which aims 
to change the way in which land is held and used, may be severely impeded. 
In terms of the traditional, private law perception property law is perceived as an 
abstract science. All property rights are reduced to abstract, scientific concepts which 
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form part of a hierarchical system of rationally and logically related concepts and 
definitions. The free will and autonomy of the individual is regarded as a moral force 
which underlies and informs this approach to property. Inviolate, private property rights 
that are clearly and strongly protected against state interference are seen as essential 
for the realisation of the individual's sphere of personal freedom and autonomy, and the 
nature and extent of a property right is determined by the potential and ability of the 
right to assist the individual to take control of his/her own life in the patrimonial sphere. 
In line with the abstract, scientific and conceptual approach, social, political and 
religious circumstances are regarded as subjective factors which are peripheral to the 
science of law and as such the social function of property is largely disregarded. The 
standard view is that existing, vested or acquired private property rights may not be 
infringed upon for social and/or political reasons. Due to the fact that property is seen 
as a means to secure for the individual an area of personal freedom and autonomy in 
the patrimonial sphere, property rights (especially ownership) are regarded as absolute, 
in principle unrestricted rights. Although these rights may be limited by the state, 
limitations may be imposed only with the consent of the property owner or, in 
exceptional cases, against compensation. All limitations are regarded as exceptional 
and temporary. 
The strong moral force of the traditional, private law view of property is said to be 
derived directly from Roman law. The apparent reliance on Roman law for the 
development of the current concept of ownership (and in a wider sense all property 
rights) is based upon the idea that the tradition~!. private law perception of property 
rights developed in an uninterrupted, linear line from the sources of South African law 
in Roman law. Vulgar and feudal law were seen as the corruption of Roman law, and 
the Pandectists created the fiction that they removed the influence of feudal law and 
as such re-established the uninterrupted line of development of Roman law. Once it 
was realised that medieval divided ownership was not of Roman origin the German 
Pandectists 'reverted' to what was supposed to be a Roman concept of unitary 
ownership and a concomitant hierarchical system of property rights. For this they relied 
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on (their own interpretation of) Roman law. In terms of the traditional view the only 
difference between the current private law concept of ownership and the Roman law 
'concept' of ownership (dominium) is the fact that the current concept of ownership is 
described in an abstract and scientific manner. 
The private law concept of property is regarded as flexible enough to adapt to different 
social and political circumstances. In line with this way of reasoning it is said that 
dominium in Roman law survived and withstood the challenges of all societal changes 
throughout history. It was flexible enough, so the theory goes, to adapt to changing 
circumstances and retain its character regardless of the role it had to fulfill in different 
periods of its development. The proponents of this view hold that the current private law 
perception of property rights need not be abandoned in favour of a new constitutional, 
socially conscious approach to property rights in order to meet the needs of post-
apartheid South African society. It is argued that the concept of property rights, and 
with that the conceptual, scientific approach to property law, withstood much bigger 
challenges in its development and it is said to be flexible enough to adapt to the new 
constitutional order in South Africa as well. It is argued that the traditional private law 
approach derives its authority from its scientific objectivity, just as it is legitimated by 
the fact that it is founded on Roman law. In this view the proper application of the 
objective, neutral, scientific method is trusted to yield just and equitable results. The 
development of post-apartheid property law can, according to this view, proceed on the 
basis of the traditional Roman-Dutch law, and large-scale modifications or adaptations 
are unnecessary. 
However, the traditional view and the Roman-Dutch law of property are not necessarily 
compatible with the needs and requirements of the new constitutional order. For one 
thing, if the traditional, private law perception of property is accepted and applied in the 
constitutional context, it might lead to the idea that the constitutional property clause 
entrenches and insulates existing property rights from regulatory interferences by the 
state. In this view the state may not impose regulatory measures to control the use of 
property without compensating the individual property holder. The state would thus be 
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forced to either leave existing rights unaffected or expropriate them against just 
compensation. 
Furthermore, in terms of the traditional private law perception, land reform does not 
' 
constitute a legitimate reason for state interference with existing property rights. For the 
main part, land reform entails the limitation or restriction, for social and/or political 
reasons, of existing individual property rights to land in the form of control over the use, 
distribution and exploitation of land. Land reform can be described as publicly 
controlled measures aimed at the eradication of inequalities with regard to the way in 
which land is held and used, and may include measures aimed at the redistribution of 
land, the restitution of land to those people who were unjustly dispossessed of the land, 
the provision of security of tenure, the imposition of a land tax and land consolidation. 
If the traditional private law perception of property is not abandoned in favour of a 
fundamentally wider debate on the role and function of property in society, the 
implementation of land reform measures might lead to a constitutional conflict between 
the judiciary (that wants to protect existing individual property rights against 
unwarranted state interference) and the legislature (that imposes land reform measures 
to control the use of property). The constitutional battle in India, which took place 
between 1950 and 1978, illustrates the possible danger of accepting and applying the 
traditional private law perception (in terms of which the property clause is seen as 
entrenching and insulating existing private property rights from state interference for 
social or political reasons) in a constitutional context. The scientific, context-neutral 
method of the traditional private law approach to property does and can not account for 
the importance of the social role and function of property, and especially in South 
Africa, where the new Constitution aims to facilitate the creation of a freer and more 
equal society, the traditional private law perception of property can effectively prevent 
the government from promoting land reform. 
The initiation of a proper debate on the social and political role and function of property 
in society could avert a constitutional conflict between the protection of existing 
property rights and the promotion of the public interest through land reform. The 
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recognition of the social role and function of property would amount to much more that 
the mere adaptation of the traditional private law perception of property. It would rather 
constitute a total and fundamental break with the traditional private law perception of 
property. The emphasis on individual freedom and autonomy would be replaced by the 
principle of establishing an equitable balance between the interests of the individual 
and the public interest, and between the protection of existing property rights and the 
promotion of the public interest. In terms of such a new constitutional perception 
property rights would assume a completely different meaning. The social function of 
property would be recognised and accounted for, and the public interest would fulfill a 
central function in the determination of the extent of individual property rights. In a new 
constitutional context the courts would ensure that the protection and limitation of 
property rights reflect an equitable balance between the interests of the individual 
property holder and the public interest. Although the individual property holder would 
be protected against unwarranted interferences by the state, the extent of the 
protection would be determined with reference to the public interest. This does not 
mean that individual property rights would necessarily always be subject to the common 
interest, but rather that the extent and the protection of these rights would be 
established with due regard to the public interest. 
In a constitutional context property rights should not be seen as absolute, in principle 
unrestricted rights, but rather as relative rights which may be limited in the public 
interest. The extent of the limitation would be determined in terms of an equitable 
balance between the interests of the affected individual and the public interest. As a 
result of the recognition of the social function of property the state would be able to limit 
existing property rights for social and/or political reasons. 
Constitutional analysis accentuates the need to take cognisance of and account for the 
social and political context within which property rights function. The establishment of 
an equitable balance between the individual's interests and the public interest 
necessitates the recognition of the social function of property. The introduction of a 
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constitutional property guarantee does not necessarily lead to contextual sensitivity. 1 
In order to ensure that cognisance is taken of the social context within which property 
functions the traditional, abstract and scientific approach to property needs to be 
abandoned in favour of a new, overtly constitutional approach in terms of which the 
social role and function of property play a central role. 
The traditional view is based on the pretence of an abstract, conceptual, objective 
science in terms of which the social role and political function of property is not 
supposed to play any significant role. The nature, acquisition and protection of property 
rights are supposed to be solely dependent on the logic of the different concepts. 
However, the injustices committed in terms of the apartheid-system (which relied on the 
abstract, scientific approach to property law) have shown that the social and political 
function of property is indeed relevant and important to ensure that the common interest 
is served by the just and equitable use, distribution and exploitation of property. The 
introduction of the new Constitution has forced property lawyers to recognise the 
importance of the social role and political function of property, and to change the law 
relating to property accordingly. At first glance the official recognition of the social role 
and function of property might seem to be in conflict with the protection of existing 
property rights, but in reality it is in conflict with the abstract, scientific approach to 
property. 
The traditional private law perception of property is described and explained with 
reference to the abstract, scientific, conceptual approach to property rights, the concept 
of absolute property, the continuous development of property rights and the apparent 
flexibility of property rights. Although these topics are related and form part of the larger 
problem, they can be distinguished from one another. In terms of the abstract scientific 
approach property rights are reduced to abstract, context-neutral concepts. The 
different concepts form part of and fit into a hierarchical system of stronger and weaker 
The constitutional conflict in India illustrates this proposition. Adherence to the traditional, 
private law perception of property implied that the social role and function of property were 
disregarded and existing individual property rights were protected to the detriment of the 
common interest. 
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rights. These concepts are rationally and logically related. All limitations or restrictions 
of property rights are explained and justified, and all legal problems solved, in terms of 
the relationships between the different concepts. In view of. the abstractness of this 
approach the content and protection of a right are determined with reference to the 
definition of a particular concept and its place within the system. Soci'al and political 
realities are regarded as peripheral to the science of law and the different concepts are 
therefore seen as largely unaffected by the social and political context within which they 
function. 
The abstract, scientific approach to property law is manifested in the concept of 
absolute, in principle unrestricted property rights. Property rights are regarded as 
essential to ensure for the property holder a sphere of personal freedom and autonomy, 
and consequently the property holder is protected against unwarranted state 
interferences for social and political reasons. In this view property rights can endure 
limitations or restrictions, but all limitations are seen as unnatural, exceptional and 
temporary. The continued acceptance of the concept of absolute property rights is 
justified by the assumption that it is based on Roman law dominium and that it enjoyed 
continuous and uninterrupted development from Roman law to the present. In line with 
this way of thinking the concept of abstract, context-neutral, absolute property (as the 
manifestation of the abstract, scientific, conceptual approach to property rights) is 
regarded as flexible enough to adapt to changing social and political circumstances, 
and therefore it is able to adapt to suit the needs of post-apartheid South African 
society. The development of property is investigated and discussed in an effort to 
determine whether there is any substance in the argument that the modern civilist 
concept of abstract property rights is based on Roman law dominium, and that it has 
always been flexible enough to adapt to different social and political circumstances, 
and need therefore not be replaced by a new contextual, socially conscious approach. 
The origin of the current private law concept of absolute ownership is investigated in 
an attempt to determine in what stage of its development did property rights acquire its 
absolute character. It is generally accepted that property rights changed throughout 
history in an attempt to adapt to different social and political circumstances. The nature 
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and extent of these changes are investigated to determine whether property rights did 
indeed develop in an uninterrupted, linear line from Roman law dominium, or whether 
the natural development was subject to such dramatic and fundamental change that it 
cannot be said that Roman law dominium withstood the challenges of the past and 
merely adapted to different circumstances. 
A comparative analysis of the scope, protection and limitation of property in a 
constitutional context in other jurisdictions aims to guide the South African courts when 
they interpret the property clause in the new South African Constitution. Special 
attention is paid to the contextual approach and the weight attributed to the social and 
political role and function of property in society. The importance of the establishment 
of an equitable balance between the interests of the individual property holder and the 
common interest in order to ensure the effective implementation of social reform is also 
investigated. 
The treatment of land reform in other jurisdictions is investigated in order to create a 
framework within which the courts can approach and treat the different land reform 
measures introduced as part of the South African land reform programme to ensure that 
an equitable balance is established between the protection of existing individual 
property rights and the promotion of the public interest through land reform. 
Content 
Section 1 of this thesis investigates the historical development of the current private law 
perception of property rights and the contention that property rights (and the conceptual 
approach to property) developed in an uninterrupted line form the sources of South 
African law in Roman law and the argument that property rights have always been 
flexible enough to adapt to new social circumstances. An attempt is not made to provide 
a complete analysis of the historical development, but this section rather concentrates 
on specific historical periods where the nature of property rights, the social function of 
property, or the approach to property changed to suit the needs of a particular society. 
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The emphasis in this section is on the developments in Roman law, feudal law, and 
Roman-Dutch law, the influence of the French Revolution and German Pandectism 
' 
and developments in South African law prior to the implementation of the first 
democratic Constitution in 1994. The nature of dominium in Roman law is discussed 
' 
in an effort to determine whether there is any substance in the assumption that the 
current private law concept of ownership is similar to dominium in Roman law, and 
whether the abstract, conceptual approach to property originated in Roman law. The 
effect of the introduction and abolition of the feudal law distinction between different 
forms of dominium on the development of property rights and on the social function of 
property are discussed in the chapters on medieval law and Roman-Dutch law. The 
development of the scientific approach to property and the development of the current 
concept of absolute ownership are discussed in the chapters on Roman-Dutch law, the 
civilist concept of ownership in German law and South African law prior to the 
implementation of the 1993 Constitution. An effort is made to determine whether 
property did indeed develop in an uninterrupted line from Roman law and whether it is 
true that the current concept of property is flexible enough to adapt to new social and 
political circumstances in post-apartheid South Africa. In other words, the question is 
whether the abstract, scientific approach should be abandoned in favour of a new, 
constitutional approach to property according to which the social role and function of 
property play a decisive role to determine the scope, protection and limitation of 
property. 
In most jurisdictions from the civil law tradition (notably Germany, the Council of Europe 
and South Africa) the constitutional order has strongly accentuated the need for a 
socialised or social-sensitive approach to property law. In a constitutional context the 
social and political role and function of property are emphasised, and this heralded the 
end of the traditional private law tradition (at least as far as the social and political 
function of property is concerned). 
The position in modern Dutch private law is discussed as a representative example of 
a civil-law system where property rights are not protected in a constitutionally 
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entrenched guarantee. The traditional private law approach to property is still adhered 
to in the Netherlands, and an attempt is made to determine how the Dutch account for 
the social function of property. Attention is paid to efforts to change the private law 
concept of property so as to accommodate its social role and function within the post-
World War II Dutch society. 
Due to the fact that constitutional property is dealt with in terms of (mainly) public law, 
the discussion in section 2 is not limited to jurisdictions from the civil law tradition. In 
section 2 a comparative analysis is made of the scope, protection and limitation of 
constitutional property in Germany, the United States of America and the Council of 
Europe. In an effort to develop a framework within which the courts can adjudicate 
property (and especially land reform related) cases it is necessary to determine how 
constitutional property is treated in other jurisdictions, and to what extent provision is 
made for the social function of property. The discussion in this section is limited to the 
scope, protection and limitation of constitutional property in Germany, the United States 
of America and the Council of Europe because the position in these jurisdictions 
provides a representative overview of the position in foreign jurisdictions. Although the 
position in a number of other jurisdictions might also have a bearing on the position in 
South Africa, it generally corresponds with the trends and different approaches followed 
in Germany, the United States of America and the Council of Europe, and as such it 
does not add anything significant to the discussion. 
The position in German law is of special significance because German and South 
African property law shared a similar process of.development, and the constitutional 
guarantee of property in Germany had a substantial influence on the concept of 
absolute ownership in private law. In the constitutional context property is not dealt with 
in terms of abstract, scientific concepts, and an effort is made to determine how the 
approach to property in a constitutional context differs from the traditional private law 
approach. The extent of the influence of the social function of property on the 
interpretation and protection of property rights are also investigated. 
xx 
Although the protection and limitation of constitutional property in the United States of 
America to some extent reflect the nature of property rights in Anglo-American systems, 
the meaning of the wide term 'takings', the essentially ad l)oc approach to takings 
cases, and the recognition of so-called 'per se' takings make the position in US law 
unique. The US has one of the oldest written Constitutions in the world and as such it 
had considerable influence in most western countries. It may be assumed that the 
treatment of property in the US will inevitably have an influence on the treatment of 
constitutional property in South Africa. Therefore, it is of special importance to study 
the US approach to the protection and limitation of property. 
In view of the provision in section 39 of the South African Constitution that the courts 
must consider international law when interpreting the bill of rights, the position within 
the Council of Europe is discussed as a representative example of the protection and 
limitation of property by international institutions. The weight attributed to the social 
function of property and the establishment of a fair balance between the interests of the 
individual property holder and the public interest enjoy special attention in the chapter 
on the Council of Europe. 
The scope, protection and limitation of constitutional property in terms of section 25 of 
the South African Constitution are discussed in the last chapter of section 2. The dual 
function of the property clause, namely to protect existing property rights and to 
authorise and control the implementation of land reform, is investigated and discussed. 
Section 3 deals with land reform. An overview is p~ovided of the nature, different forms 
of and reasons for the implementation of land reform. The treatment of land reform by 
the courts in jurisdictions without an official land reform programme (mostly developed 
countries) and jurisdictions with an official land reform programme ·(mostly developing 
countries) is discussed in this section. The discussion does not aim to provide an 
exhaustive analysis of land reform in foreign jurisdictions, but aims to provide an 
overview of general trends in foreign jurisdictions with regard to the possible conflict 
and interaction between the protection of existing property rights and the promotion of 
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the public interest through the implementation of land reform measures. The approach 
to property rights in a constitutional context, the weight attributed to the public interest 
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in land reform cases, and the importance of the social function of property are 
investigated to determine how a constitutional conflict can be avoided. With reference 
to the position in jurisdictions with an official land reform programme, the discussion is 
limited to the positions in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana and Mexico. Whereas the 
respective positions in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana are representative of post-
colonial African countries who, as is the case in South Africa, had problems of racial 
discrimination and the maldistribution of land as a result of this, the position in Mexico 
is discussed as a representative example of the nature and scope of land reform in 
South America. The land reform programme in Mexico is one of the most successful 
land reform programmes in Latin America, and for this reason a discussion of the 
nature and extent of the Mexican land reform programme is provided. 
The implementation of the land reform programme in South Africa is discussed in the 
last chapter of section 3. The different forms of land reform (redistribution of land, 
restitution of land and tenure reform) and the measures enacted to effect land reform 
are discussed. Special attention is paid to the possible conflict between the two 
different functions of the constitutional property clause, namely the protection of 
existing individual property rights and the promotion of the public interest through the 
implementation of land reform measures. 
Terminology 
Different terms are used to describe the rights under investigation in this thesis. 
Whereas the term 'dominium' best describes the rights in Roman and feudal law, the 
terms 'ownership' and 'property' (in the sense of a system of rights) are used with 
reference to Roman-Dutch law and the subsequent periods of development. 
It should be noted that, depending on the nature of the development in a specific 
period, the emphasis shifts between the concept of ownership or property rights in 
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general, and the social function of ownership or property. The function of property in 
society played an important role in both the introduction and abolition of feudal law. The 
conceptual approach to property, in terms of which property rights are reduced to 
scientific concepts in a hierarchical system of rationally and logically related rights, 
concepts and definitions, disregarded the social function of property because the 
concept of property is seen as a scientific, neutral concept unaffected by social and 
political realities. The importance of the social role and function of property is 
accentuated in developments in property law in post-World War II Europe and in post-
apartheid South Africa. Property, especially land, is seen as a finite resource and its 
use, distribution and exploitation should serve to benefit the common interest. 
Reference is often made to the absoluteness of ownership. The term 'absolute' is used 
with reference to the content of ownership, and indicates that ownership is in principle 
unrestricted. 'Uniformity' of ownership refers to the fact that only one type of ownership 
is recognised, and 'exclusivity' indicates that there is only one owner with regard to a 
specific object. 
The term 'limitation' refers to all forms of state interferences with the rights of a property 
holder, and includes both expropriation or the actual acquisition of property by the state 
(against compensation}, and regulatory measures to control the use of property. In US 
law the term 'taking' is used to refer to all state interferences for which compensation 
is required. This is a wide term and includes both expropriation or actual acquisition of 
property by the state and regulatory measures which resemble expropriation in the 
sense that they affect the individual property holder's rights to such an extent that they 
require the payment of compensation. 
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SECTION 1 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRADITIONAL PRIVATE LAW 
PERCEPTION OF PROPERTY 
At the time of the introduction of the first democratic Constitution in 1994 South African 
property law was dominated by the traditional private law perception of property. In 
·terms of the traditional private law perception property law is regarded as an abstract, 
objective science, largely unaffected by subjective factors such as social and/or political 
realities. The nature and content of property rights are to a large extent determined with 
reference to a scientific, hierarchical system of rationally and logically related abstract 
concepts. The free will and autonomy of the individual is seen as the moral basis of the 
scientific, conceptual approach, and consequently property rights are characterised by 
absoluteness, exclusivity and individualism. The paradigmatic weight of this concept 
depends on the assumption that these characteristics have always been associated 
with private ownership of property. The traditional private law perception of and 
approach to property derive its authority from the apparent scientific objectivity of the 
abstract, scientific, conceptual system of concepts and definitions, and the assumption 
that the system and its characteristics are based on Roman law. It is argued that the 
current private law concept of property, as well as the abstract, scientific, conceptual 
approach to property, developed in an uninterrupted, linear line from its inception in 
Roman law. In terms of the traditional private law view property rights are flexible 
enough to adapt to different social and political circumstances. In this view there is no 
need or justification for the abandonment of the abstract, scientific approach to property 
law in favour of a totally new debate on the social role and function of property in 
society. This section aims to contradict the popular view that there is a basic continuity 
in the development of property rights from its inception in Roman law to its current 
position in South African law. Instead, it is argued that the development of property law 
is characterised by a number of discontinuities, that the private law concept of absolute 
ownership is of relatively recent origin, and that the abstract, scientific approach to 
property law, in terms of which property is dealt within terms of objective, socially and 
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politically neutral concepts and definitions, was only developed in the nineteenth 
century. There does not seem to be a valid justification for the argument that the 
abstract, scientific approach to property may not or should not be replaced by a 
completely new debate on the social role and function of property in society. 
This section does not attempt to give a complete account of the development of 
ownership or property, but rather looks at different periods during which property rights 
underwent fundamental change or was developed in an interesting way. 
This section starts by giving an overview of the development of dominium in Roman 
law. The nature and characteristics of dominium are discussed and the influence of 
vulgar Roman law is investigated. The introduction of feudal law constitutes a definite 
break in the logical development of dominium. The nature of the distinction between 
dominium directum and dominium utile is investigated and the role and function of 
property in society are discussed. It was during this period that the first formal definition 
of dominium was formulated, and the extent and meaning of this definition is 
investigated. This will be followed by a chapter on Roman-Dutch law. Grotius' influence 
oh and perception of Roman-Dutch law is emphasised in this regard. Grotius' 
classification of rights started a process of scientification of property law. He created 
a hierarchical system of rights and laid the foundation for the development of the 
current private law perception of property. The importance of medieval divided 
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ownership in Roman-Dutch law is also looked at. The official abolition of feudalism as 
a result of the French Revolution constitutes another discontinuity in the natural 
development of property rights. The impact of the. abolition of the medieval distinction 
between different forms of ownership on the social function of property is investigated 
in this chapter. This is followed by a chapter on the development of the civilist concept 
of ownership in Germany during the nineteenth century. Special attention is paid to the 
development of the abstract, scientific approach to property rights as rationally and 
logically related, socially and politically neutral concepts within a hierarchical system. 
The scientific approach to property law meant that concepts fulfilled a central function 
in the property debate, ownership acquired its absolute character, and that all 
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questions concerning the social and political role and function of property were 
regarded as irrelevant. 
In each of the different periods of development it is indicated that either the approach 
to property law, the nature of property rights or the social function of property 
underwent fundamental change. It is indicated that the traditional view, according to 
which ownership developed in an uninterrupted line from its origin in Roman law to the 
current South African private law concept of ownership, seems to be historically 
unsound. It is argued that the development of the concept of ownership is characterised 
by numerous discontinuities which had a direct influence on the concept as we know 
it today. These discontinuities include the impact of the vulgar Roman law, the 
implementation and abolition of the feudal system, the influence of the French 
Revolution, the influence of Grotius' structure and hierarchy of rights and the 
scientification of property law in the nineteenth century on the basis of Grotius' work. 
Pandectism replaced the Roman and Roman-Dutch traditions to a large extent when 
the South African law underwent a process of scientification in the twentieth century. 
Finally, the position in modern Dutch private law is looked at. Unlike Germany and 
South Africa (where the private law concept of ownership has the same development 
history as in the Netherlands), the Netherlands do not have a constitutionally 
entrenched property guarantee and as such the development of the private law concept 
of ownership and other property rights differ from that in Germany and South Africa. 
Unsuccessful attempts were made in the Netherlands to effect the same changes to 
property law in private law than the changes effected to property law in other 
jurisdictions via the constitutional route. The nature of the proposed changes and the 
reasons for their failure are investigated in the last chapter of section 1. 
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1 
DOMIN/UM IN ROMAN LAW 
1.1 Introduction 
Throughout history the institution of property was construed and interpreted to suit the 
needs of the times. In almost every period of its development property played a central 
role in society and was adapted to fit the social, economic, political and cultural needs 
of society. This is also true of the role of dominium in the long history of Roman law. 
It is often said that the development of the South African concept of ownership 
originated in Roman law, but the view that current private law concept is similar to 
Roman law dominium 1 cannot be supported. Although lmmink2 says: 
"Niets is gevaarliker in de geschiedbeoefening dan af te gaan op de klank 
van een woord . . . . . Waar de historicus veral en steeds op bedag dien te 
zijn, is de omstandigheid, dat achter een constant blijvend woordgebruik 
een hele begripsontwikkeling schuil kan gaan. Houdt men zich in dergelijk 
een geval aan de woorden, dan blijft men van inzicht in de ontwikke/ing, 
dat wil zeggen van historisch inzicht, ten enemale verstoken" 
he comes to the conclusion that ownership has the same meaning in Roman law and 
in modem Dutch law. lmmink reaches this conclusion by asking whether the ownership 
in modern law and dominium in Roman law fulfil the same function in the different 
societies, and assumes that if they do they must have the same meaning and content. 
2 
See Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 171; Cowen New Patterns of Landownership 68 and 70. Both 
these authors make their statements with reference to specific characteristics, but even so, their 
view cannot be supported. See also Kunst Historische ontwikkeling van het recht 192. Kunst is of 
the opinion that the concept of ownership as it existed in the classical period amounts to the same 
concept known today. 
lmmink 1959 TR 36 at 41. 
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Van den Bergh,3 however, does not share this view. According to him one should pay 
close attention to the sense in which terminology is used. The same term can have 
completely different meanings, depending on the period and context in which it is used. 
F eenstra4 criticizes Imm ink because, although ownership plays an important role in 
both Roman law and modern Dutch law (the same applies to South African law), one 
should always keep the social function of and the restrictions on ownership in mind. 
Van den Bergh5 supports this view: 
"Het is fantastisch, te veronderstellen dat eigendom presies dezelfde 
plaats en functie sou hebben in twee maatschappij-stelsels die zo 
hemelsbreed van elkaar verschillen". 
Van den Bergh also draws attention to an important difference between the modern and 
the Roman classification of rights: Instead of the current classification of rights, Gaius 
never distinguished between real and personal rights, nor between ownership and 
limited real rights. 
Dominium in Roman law cannot be said to be identical to either the South African 
concept of ownership or the modern civil law concept of ownership. However, 
Gilissen's6 statement that both medieval and modern jurists built the modern concept 
of ownership on notions they found in Roman texts can be supported. While the 
modem concept of ownership is not identical to Roman law dominium, one can identify 
similar characteristics in the modern concept of ownership and dominium ex iure 
Quiritium as it was applied in classical Roman law. Both are seen as the most 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Van den Bergh Eigendom 8. To prove his point he shows that dominium had different meanings 
in classical Roman law and Justinian law and neither of these fit the modern description of 
ownership. 
Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at254. 
Van den Bergh Eigendom 33. 
Gilissen Historische inleiding tot het recht 603. 
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comprehensive right that an individual can have with regard to a thing and both are 
described as absolute rights in the sense that they are enforceable against the whole 
world. 7 However, this observation must immediately be qualified by pointing out that the 
much wider concept of "property" seems to be in the process of becoming more 
important than the more limited "ownership", thereby again reducing the apparent 
similarities between classical and modern South African law. 
1.2 Dominium in Roman law 
Any attempt to determine the nature of dominium in Roman law is complicated by the 
fact that the Roman jurists never defined dominium as a juridical concept. 8 Terminology 
used to refer to the institution of dominium changed through the centuries, as did the 
perception of dominium as an institution. 
The reason why no definition of dominium is found in the sources probably lies in the 
fact that the Romans followed a casuistic approach to law. They were more interested 
in solving legal problems than in defining and systematizing legal concepts. 9 Roman 
law consisted of a system of actions and not of rights or concepts.10 The question was 
always who had the action (or vindicatory remedy) in a specific case and not who had 
the right or what its content was. Dominium was thus never defined as a right. 11 This 
makes it difficult to trace the development of dominium in Roman law, and in the 
following sections observations are based on deductions from the practical use of 
7 
8 
9 
Feenstra Grondslagen 81. 
D 50.17.202: "Omnis de'finitio in iure periculosa est: parum est enim, ut non subverti posset.'' See 
Thomas Textbook of Roman Jaw 133; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 at 257; Feenstra Gronds/agen 35; 
Van den Bergh Eigendom 44; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 
at218; Van derWalt 1986 THRHR 305; Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 309; Diosdi Ownership 
in ancient and prec/assical Roman law 51. 
Schultz History of Roman legal science 69; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history 
of/aw213 at219. 
10 Jolowicz Roman foundations of modem law77. 
11 Van den Bergh Eigendom 44. 
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dominium rather than just on terminology. 
1.2.1 Ancient Roman law ( up to 250 BC12) 
In ancient Roman law the term "ownership" was never used in a technical sense. 13 The 
term meum esse, 14 as used during vindicatory proceedings in ancient Roman law, only 
identified the entitled party. 15 It had no exact, precisely defined meaning - it merely 
meant "master" or "belong to". The ancient Romans never defined or distinguished 
terminologically between concepts such as ownership, possession and other family 
relationships. 16 
The most important method of transfer in ancient Roman law, mancipatio, 17 did not 
describe ownership in a technical sense either. Gaius 18 gives a detailed description of 
the transaction: Mancipatio was originally seen as a unilateral act of acquisition, later 
as a sale and eventually as an act of conveyance. Mancipatio in ancient Roman law 
was not seen as a way of transferring ownership, but rather as a way to transfer 
protected use and control.19 According to Diosdi20 mancipatio was used to transfer legal 
power and a warranty against eviction. 
12 This classification is according to Feenstra Gronds/agen 3. 
13 Feenstra 1976 RMT258. 
14 Meum esse originated in the in iure phase of the /egis actio per sacramento procedure. 
15 Van der Walt Houerskap 20; Kaser Eigentum und Besitz im alteren r6mischen Rechf 6. 
16 Diosdi Ownership 124; Kaser R6misches Privatrecht- ein Studienbuch 92; Feenstra Gronds/agen 
36. 
17 Mancipatio is the method used to transfer res mancipi. According to Gaius (see G 2.14a) res 
mancipi includes slaves, beasts of draught and burden - more specifically, horses, donkeys, mules 
and oxen - land in Italy and the rustic praedial servitudes. All other things were res nee mancipi. 
18 G 1.119. 
19 Feenstra Grondslagen 53; Van der Walt Houerskap 23. 
20 Giosdi Ownership 83. 
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It must, however, be borne in mind that perceptions regarding ancient Roman law 
largely amount to speculation, since sources are often scarce or ambiguous, and it is 
thus difficult to determine the exact meaning and content of the terms that were used 
to refer to proprietary relationships. 
1.2.1 Preclassical Roman law (250 BC to 27 BC) 
In the preclassical period dominium was distinguished from possession and other 
power relations with respect to things. During this period the notion of dominium21 
acquired a somewhat more specific meaning. Determination of the exact meaning of 
this notion is, however, complicated by Roman casuistry. According to later Romanists, 
dominium nevertheless had a more or less technical content. Some of the 
characteristics most commonly associated with dominium of the late preclassical period 
are: 
Dominium was absolute in the sense that it was enforceable against the 
whole world. 22 Everybody had to respect the dominium of the dominus 
and if anyone interfered with it, the dominus had an action to defend his 
"right". 
Dominium was absolute in the sense that it was the most comprehensive 
real relationship. 23 
Dominium was reserved for Roman citizens and applied to Italian land 
only.24 
Other forms of ownership (bonitary ownership, ownership of the peregrini, 
21 According to Diosdi. Ownership 135 the term dominus in the technical meaning of "owner" was 
used by authors in the first century BC. The word dominium, in its technical meaning, appeared 
even later. According to Kaser Eigentum und Besitz im lilteren r6mischen Recht 309 the word was 
first used by Labeo. Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 258 is of the opinion that the term dominium was 
first used in the second century BC. 
22 Kaser Das r6mische Privatrecht 401. 
23 Buckland Text-book of Roman law 188; Kaser Das r6mische Privatrecht 373. 
24 Kaser R6misches Privatrecht- ein Studienbuch 94; Feenstra Gronds/agen 38; G 1.54; G 2.7. 
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ownership of provincial land and ownership of the dos) existed alongside 
dominium. 25 
Dominium did not apply to all things equally. Dominium of res maneipi 
could only be transferred by maneipatio and in iure eessio. Traditio was 
used to transfer res nee mancipi. 26 
1.2.3 Classical Roman law (27BC to 250) 
During the classical period (the first two and a half centuries AD) dominium did not 
change much from the preclassical period. Dominium was still distinguished from 
possession and other real relations. Important distinctions were also still made 
according to actions (or remedies) and not rights. Gaius's classification27 of objects is 
the first step towards the later classification of rights, but dominium was never defined 
or classified as a right. As in preclassical law, dominium was not a uniform right - at 
least five different types of ownership can be distinguished and the possibility of dual 
ownership was recognized.28 It was thus possible that more than one person could be 
owner of the same object, each having a different type of ownership. Maneipatio and 
in iure cessio were still used as modes of transfer of res maneipi and traditio was used 
to transfer res nee maneipi. 
1.2.4 Vulgar Roman law (350 to 550) 
After the classical period, Roman law became "vulgarized" in the Western Roman 
empire in a process that is often described as the deterioration of and the infiltration of 
Roman law by Germanic law. In vulgar Roman law the distinction between dominium, 
25 See 1.3.1. 
26 Diosdi Ownership 137. 
27 G 2.1-14. 
28 See1.3.1. 
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possession and other rights, 29 as we know them, became blurred.30 Only one type of 
proprietary right was recognised in vulgar Roman law, 31 and the discription of this right 
was vague enough to include possession and other real rights. There was no use for 
more than one type of dominium, and this notion was not developed further in vulgar 
law. 
1.2.5 Justinian law (450 to 550) 
Justinian returned to the classical concept of dominium. The distinction between 
dominium, possession and other proprietary rights as it existed in classical law was re-
established in the Justinian codification, which later became known as the Corpus Juris 
Civilis.32 Justinian abolished the difference between res mancipi and res nee mancipi 
(and therefore also mancipatio and in iure cessio) and traditio became the only method 
of transfer. The notion of dual dominium was thus also abolished. 33 
1.3 The characteristics of dominium in Roman law 
1.3.1 Uniformity 
In view of the fact that South African law is acquainted with a uniform concept of 
ownership - that is to say we know only one type of ownership beyond which there exist 
no other forms of ownership - the fragmentation of dominium, as it existed in Roman 
law, remains an interesting and peculiar phenomenon. 
29 Although the Romans did not use the term "rights", it will be used here to indicate what we regard 
as a real relation between persons and things. 
30 Feenstra 1976 RMT 261; Kaser R6misches Privatrecht- ein Studienbuch 95; Kunst Historische 
ontwikkeling van het Recht 193. 
31 Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 307. 
32 Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 220. 
33 Kaser R6misches Privatrecht- ein studienbuch 95; Feenstra 1976 RMT260; Van der Walt and 
Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 220; Thomas Textbook of Roman law 137. 
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Gaius34 stated that dominium was exclusive - you either are the owner or you are not. 
He did, however, go further by adding that there were more than one kind of ownership. 
The following types of ownership are discussed below: 
(i) Dominium ex iure Quiritium 
(ii) Bonitary ownership 
(iii) Ownership of peregrini 
(iv) Ownership of provincial land 
(v) Ownership of the dos 
(vi) Functionally divided ownership 
(i) Dominium ex iure Quiritium 
Dominium ex iure Quiritium, which can be described as Roman civil-law ownership of 
a Roman thing acquired according to a Roman procedure or formality, was the most 
important right that a person could have with respect to res corpora/es - it was the 
ultimate legal title beyond which there was no other.35 It provided the owner with the 
most comprehensive control over a thing. 36 
In classical Roman law, dominium of res mancipi was transferred by way of the formal 
procedures of mancipatio or in iure cessio.37 Dominium of res nee mancipi was 
transferred by informal traditio. To acquire dominium ex iure Quiritium the correct 
34 G 2.40. 
35 Thomas Textbook of Roman law 133; Buckland Textbook of Roman law 186. 
36 In order to acquire dominium ex iure Quiritium the holder of the right had to have the ius commercii 
(the rightto acquire rights and duties in Roman law) and the thing had to be in commercio (capable 
of being owned). Only Roman citizens had the ius commercii. See Gilissen Historische inleiding 
tot het recht 602. 
37 G 1.119. 
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method of transfer had to be used. 38 Dominium ex iure Quiritium cannot be described 
as the ius utendi fruendi abutendi, because with the development of in bonis it was 
possible that one person could exercise all the normal attributes of ownership (ius 
utendi fruendi abutend1), while another is the true dominus (thus without the ius utendi 
fruendi abutend1). Dominium ex iure Quiritium was protected by the ref vindicatio. 39 
(ii) Bonitary ownership 
It often happened that res mancipi was transferred by informal traditio. In such a case 
the transferor remained the dominus ex iure Quiritium and the transferee was said to 
have the thing in bonis. He could only become dominus ex iure Quiritium through 
usucapio. 40 This situation, which is sometimes described as bonitary ownership, 41 led 
Gaius42 to the conclusion that there were more than one kind of ownersh1p. One 
person could be dominus ex iure Quiritium while another could have the same thing in 
bonis. 44 Gaius described this situation as duplex dominium or double ownership. He 
38 If res mancipiwas transferred by informal traditio, the transferee only became the true dominus 
ex iure Quiritium through usucapio. 
39 Feenstra Grondslagen 41; Thomas Textbook of Roman law 133; Buckland Textbook of Roman 
law186. 
40 G 2.41 ; Thomas Textbook of Roman law 136; Kunst Historische ontwikkeling van het recht 193. 
41 The term "bonitary ownership" does not appear in the Roman sources. See Diosdi Ownership 169; 
Birks 1985 Acta Juridica 1 at 37 n176; Buckland Textbook of Roman law 191 n2; Feenstra 
Grondslagen44 Van Zyl Geskiedenis en Beginsels van die Romeinse Privaatreg 128 n25; Kunst 
Historische ontwikkeling van het recht 193. But see Ankum and Pool in Birks New perspectives 
on the Roman law of property 5 et seq. 
42 G 1.54. 
43 Nicholas An introduction to Roman law 125 says "Gaius does recognize that ownership is divided, 
but he seems to have been alone in this." It has been proven by numerous authors that there did 
indeed existed double ownership in Roman law. See Diosdi Ownership 169; Birks 1985 Acta 
Juridica 1 at 37 n176; Buckland Textbook of Roman law 191 n2; Feenstra Grondslagen 44; Van 
Zyl Geskiedenis en beginsels van die Romeinse privaatreg 128 n25; Kunst Historische 
ontwikkeling van het recht 193. But see Ankum and Pool in Birks New perspectives on the Roman 
law of property 5 et seq. 
44 G.2.40: 'Sequitur ut admoneamus apud peregrinos quidem unum esse domomium: nam aut 
dominus quisque est aut dominus non intellegitur. quo etiam populus Romanus olim utebatur: aut 
enim ex iure Quiritium unusquisque dominus erat aut non inte/legebatur dominus. sed postea 
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explained this by pointing out that a slave could be in the potestas of the master who 
has him in bonis, while another person could be the bare owner ex iure Quiritium. 
Diosdi45 is of the opinion that Gaius did not regard in bonis habere as ownership: 
"but the word dominus does not mean 'owner' in this case. It denotes 
'master' with respect to the slave". 
Gaius,46 however, specifically used the term duplex dominium, and it is clear from the 
rest of the text that he included in bonis. In a later text Gaius47 contrasted divisio dominii 
(or duplex dominium) with unum dominium. He also contrasted dominium ex iure 
Quiritium with in bonis habere while still including in bonis in the notion of dominium. 48 
Bonitary ownership is the most important form of ownership that existed apart from 
dominium ex iure Quiritium in Roman law, 49 and according to Feenstra it did not differ 
much from quiritarian ownership.50 
The bonitary owner was protected in two ways: If the quiritarian owner tried to recover 
diuisionem accepit dominium, ut alius possit esse ex iure Quiritium dominus, a/ius in bonis 
habere. '; De Zulu eta The Institutes of Gaius Part II: Commentary. 
45 Diosdi Ownership 172. 
46 G 1.54. 
47 G 2.40. 
48 Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 260; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 
at 230. But see Ankum and Pool in Birks New perspectives on the Roman law of property 5 et seq. 
Bonitary ownership has often been described as transitional ownership in the sense that bonitary 
ownership changes into quiritarian ownership as soon as usucapio is completed. See Berger 
Encyclopaedic dictionary of Roman law; Thomas Textbook of Roman law 136; Stein Legal 
institutions 156. Wubbe Res aliena pignori data - De verpanding van andermans zaak in het 
klassieke Romeinse recht 14 and 267, however, points out that even after usucapio the thing 
stays in bonis of its possessor despite his becoming civil owner as well. See also G.2.40. But see 
Ankum and Pool in Birks New perspectives on the Roman law of property 5 et seq. 
49 Thomas Textbook of Roman law 136. 
50 Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 260. 
14 
the thing his vindicatory action would be met by the exceptio rei venditae et traditae, 51 
and if the holder lost possession he could recover it with the actio Publiciana. 52 If the 
quiritarian owner defended himself by claiming that he was the true dominus - with the 
exceptio iusti dominii - the bonitary owner could reply with the replicatio rei venditae et 
traditae. 53 
Justinian abolished the difference between res mancipi and res nee mancipl54 and 
therefore also the differentia inter dominos. 55 In principle this left only one kind of 
dominium. Justinian, however, never abolished the actio Publiciana or the exceptio rei 
venditae et traditae, and this has led some authors to doubt Justinian's doctrine of 
uniformity and exclusivity of ownership. 56 
51 If the dominus attempted to recover his property by instituting the rei vindicatio against the bonitary 
owner, the bonitary o~ner could refute this action with the exceptio rei venditae ettraditae. That 
is, he was allowed to plead that the plaintiff sold and delivered the thing to the defendant and proof 
of this was a complete defence. See Buckland Textbook of Roman law 191; Thomas Textbook of 
Roman law 136; Feenstra Grondslagen 89. 
52 Buckland Textbook of Roman law 191. Gaius never mentioned the remedies by which bonitary 
ownership was protected. In G 4.36 where the actio Publiciana is treated, it is stated in general 
terms that it is granted to anyone who had been delivered a thing ex iusta causa and had not yet 
completed usucapio. If this is read with G. 2.41, it is clear that the bonitary owner qualified for this 
action. The praetor probably created the actio Publiciana during the first century BC. This action 
was used to protect someone that held a thing in bonis, but had lost possession and could not 
prove dominium, and who could prove that, had he not lost possession, he would have become 
dominus by usucapio. In other words, this action was based on the assumption that usucapio was 
completed. Thus, the bonitary owner had complete protection, for even if he lost possession to the 
dominus, he could still claim the thing with the actio Publiciana. See Feenstra Grondslagen 88; 
Thomas Textbook of Roman law 137; Van der Walt'and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of 
law213 at 229; Feenstra 1976 RMT259; Buckland Textbook of Roman law 192; Kunst Historische 
ontwikkeling van het recht 193. 
53 Thomas Textbook of Roman law 137; Feenstra Grondslagen 88 et seq that points out that the 
exceptio rei venditae et traditae and the replicatio rei venditae et traditae were available only with 
regard to res mancipi, but also with regard to res nee mancipi. 
54 c 7.31.1.5. 
55 c 7.25.1. 
56 Feenstra Grondslagen 90; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 
231. 
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(iii) Ownership of the peregrini 
Gaius57 mentions that peregrini were acquainted with only one kind of ownership ( unum 
dominium). Peregrini did not have the ius commercii and were thus not able to acquire 
dominium ex iure Quiritium.58 In 212 AD the constitutio Antoniniana gave Roman 
citizenship to all free inhabitants of the empire, resulting in the disappearance of this 
kind of ownership. 
(iv) Ownership of provincial land 
No individual, not even a Roman citizen,59 was able to acquire dominium over provincial 
land,00 because it belonged either to the populus or to the emperor. However, this does 
not mean that individuals were not able to have any rights over provincial land. The 
rights that could be acquired were described as habere frui possidere licere.61 The 
method by which these rights were asserted is not certain, though it is believed to have 
been an action similar to the rei vindicatio. Justinian abolished the difference between 
provincial and Italian land62 and, consequently, between quiritarian and provincial 
landownership. 
57 G 2.40. 
58 It is not known what the content of the ownership which peregrini did acquire was or how it was 
protected - it is believed that an action similar to the rei vindicatio was at their disposal. See 
Feenstra Grondslagen 38; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 at 260; Thomas Textbook of Roman law 135; 
Buckland Textbook of Roman law 190; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of 
law 213 at 228; Van der Walt Houerskap 54. 
59 Certain provincial communities were granted the ius italicum which meant that they could have 
dominium over provincial land. 
60 Feenstra Grondslagen 38; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 at 260; Thomas Textbook of Roman law 135; 
Buckland Textbook of Roman law 190; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of 
law 213 at 232; Van der Walt Houerskap 54. 
61 Lex Agraria 50, 81. 
62 Inst. 11.1.40; C 7.31.1. 
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(v) Ownership of the dos 
Another example of divided ownership is the ownership .of the dowry or dos.63 
Tryphonius64 said that although the dowry is part of the husband's estate, it 
nevertheless belongs to the wife. Thus, the dowry was simultaneously bwned by both 
the husband and the wife. 
(iv) Functionally divided ownership 
Some authors65 hold that ownership was functionally divided in instances apart from the 
forms of ownership mentioned above. This is especially true for the old praedial 
servitudes,66 pignus~7 accessio of movables to immovab~s. emphytheusis and 
63 Van den Bergh Eigendom 44; Thomas Textbook of Roman law 428. 
64 D 23.3.75. 
65 Kaser Eigentum und Besitz im ii/teren romischen Recht 17; Kaser Das romische Privatrecht 38; 
Diosdi Ownership 107; Jolowicz and Nicholas Historical introduction to the study of Roman law 
158. 
66 This applied to the old praedial servitudes iter, actus, aquaeductus and via. According to Kaser 
Kaser Eigentum und Besitz im alteren r6mischen Recht 44 7; Kaser Das r6mische Privatrecht 143 
the holder of the servitude was considered owner of that part of the land over which the road or 
watercourse passed, so that the holder of the servitude had the Nutzeigentum and the owner of 
the servient estate had the Haupteigentum. Kaser bases his theory on the fact that the old praedial 
servitudes were regarded as res mancipi (G 2.14a) that had to be transferred by mancipatio, which 
originally applied to corporeals only. Thus, according to Kaser the ownership and not the right was 
transferred. Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 226, however, 
pointed out that already in the Twelve Tables servitudes were conceived as rights and not as a 
form of ownership of the land itself. 
67 With reference to pignus, Justinian (C 8.33.3) stipulated that if a debt was not discharged, the 
emperor could grant the creditor ownership of the pignus, two years after judgement. This would 
only happen if the creditor could not find a purchaser. Even after the emperor granted ownership 
to the creditor, the debtor could still recover the pignus if he paid the debt within two years after the 
ownership was granted to the creditor. During this period ownership of the pignus was divided - the 
creditor did not have exclusive ownership and the debtor retained a claim to the thing for two years. 
This means that ownership was functionally divided between the debtor and the creditor. See Van 
der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 227. 
68 According to the principle superficies solo cedit (G 2.73; Inst 2.1.29; D 41.1. 7 .10.), if someone built 
on his land with the materials of another, the movables became part of the land. The owner of the 
movables could not claim his material back from the owner of the immovables. (He could use the 
actio de tingo iuncto to claim double the value of the materials.) The owner of the movables would 
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superficies. 69 
Each of the different forms of ownership discussed above had its own role and function 
in Roman society. Unlike the modern concept of ownership Roman law did not try to 
accommodate different functions or purposes into one single right. The reason for this 
most probably lies in the fact that the Romans followed a casuistic approach to law. 
1.3.2 Absoluteness 
Much has been said on the absoluteness70 of dominium in Roman law. Some authors 
suggest that the Roman dominium either knew no restrictions or was seen as in 
principle unrestricted although it could tolerate restrictions, while others are of the 
opinion that dominium has always been restricted. 71 
Dominium in Roman law was never absolute in the sense that it was unrestricted. 
According to Kunst72 dominium was unrestricted in principle, thol.Jgh it could endure 
restrictions in the public interest and to prevent misuse. However, this formulation is not 
only be able to claim his materials - that is, if he did not make use of the actio de tingo iuncto -
when the building was demolished (Inst 2.1.29; D 6.1.23.6; D 41.1.7.10.) Thus, the owner of the 
material had a dormant ownership that was capable of revival. The rule that superficies solo cedit 
therefore did not provide the owner of the land with exclusive ownership of the accessories. See 
Buckland Textbook of Roman law 212. 
69 During the fourth and fifth centuries BC the development of real rights, such as emphytheusis (this 
is the perpetual lease of land that could not be terminated as long as the rent was paid. It was 
alienable (C 4.66.3) and hereditary (D 30. 71.5) and was protected by the actio in rem (D 6.3.1.1)) 
and superticies (the right to build on a piece of land Which also is alienable and hereditary. See D 
43.18.1 ), signalled a further division of ownership. See Gilissen Historische inleiding tot het recht 
603; Thomas Textbook of Roman Jaw 142; Buckland Textbook of Roman law 275. The medieval 
concepts of dominium directum and dominium utile were based on the distinction between 
landownership and emphyteusis. This development is discussed in chapter 2. 
70 Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 39 at 48 remarks "By this is meant the notion that ownership is in 
principle unrestricted, although it 'tolerates' restrictions (by way of exception), for no one suggests 
that ownership has ever been totally unrestricted and the debate about the absoluteness or 
otherwise of ownership centres around the debate whether it is fundamentally restricted or not". 
71 Birks 1985 Acta Juridica 1. 
72 Kunst Historische ontwikkeling van het recht 192. 
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of Roman origin and reveals pandectist rather that classical views. Van den Bergh73 
and others have pointed out that restrictions have always been an unexceptional part 
of dominium. 
Dominium was restricted either by the state, 74 by neighbour relations75 or voluntarily. 76 
In the Twelve Tables we find public-law restrictions relating to building, public health, 
and considerations of a religious character. 77 Later legislation continued in this 
direction. Duties were also placed on the owner with reference to the maintenance of 
roads, aquaducts, buildings, and so on. 
Although there were not many restrictions on dominium in Roman law, it was not 
uncommon to place restrictions on dominium and there also was no legal theory to set 
a limit beyond which legislative interference could not go. 78 
1.3.3 Exclusivity 
According to Diosdi79 meum esse (as the term was used in ancient Roman law) 
73 Van den Bergh Eigendom 40; Birks 1985 Acta Juridica 1; Buckland Textbook of Roman law 187; 
Gilissen Historische inleiding tot het recht 602; Watson Rome of the XII Tables 157; Van Acht 
Burenrecht 4; Thomas Textbook of Roman law 133. 
74 Kaser Das rCimische Privatrecht 125. These restrictions either had a religious character or they 
were aimed at regulating land use. 
75 A few examples of restrictions on ownership by neighbour relations are: the law relating to 
overhanging branches where the neighbour was entitled to have the branches cut off up to a height 
of 15 feet-see the Twelve tables Tab.vii.9 and D.43.27.1.2; the dangerous flow of rainwater from 
a neighbour's land - see Tab.vii.8; where one neighbour interferes with the natural flow of water 
to the detriment of another- D.39.3.1; way of necessity- D.8.6.14.1. 
76 Probably the best examples of these kind of restrictions are servitudes (iter, aqua, via and aquae 
ductus) granted by the owner to his neighbour. 
77 Kaser Das rCimische Privatrecht 125. The Twelve Tables placed restrictions on burials in the city, 
cremations in the vicinity of the city (10.1 ff), provisions relating to clearances between buildings 
and with regard to duties of road construction of owners of houses facing the street (7.6 ff). 
78 Birks 1985 Acta Juridica 1 at 31. 
79 Diosdi Ownership in ancient and preclassical Roman law 124. 
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provided the claimant with exclusive power - you either were owner of the thing in 
question, or you were not. There were no intermediate degrees of ownership. 80 
However, the mere fact that there were more than one kind of ownership in classical 
Roman law implies that ownership could not have been exclusive. GaiuS81 said that "in 
olden times"82 the principle was followed that you were either considered to be owner 
ex iure Quiritium or you were not considered owner at all. Ownership was thus 
considered to be exclusive - there could only be one owner of a specific object. 
However, he continues to say that ownership was made divisible so that one man may 
be one owner by Quiritary title and another by bonitary title. 
The mere fact that the Romans knew more than one form of ownership (up to the 
reforms of Justinian) means that ownership - no matter what specific form of ownership 
- could not have been exclusive. The possibility that someone else could have a claim 
to the object in question always existed. This means that the notion or characteristic of 
exclusivity (as viewed by Gaius) meant something else than we understand under it. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Dominium in Roman law changed throughout the history of the Roman empire to suit 
80 There is some academic dispute as to whether meum esse - as the term was used in ancient 
Roman law - had the character of a relative or an absolute claim. Kaser Eigentum und Besitz im 
alteren romischen Recht6 is of the opinion thatmeum esse amounted to a relative claim regarding 
a specific object. The reason for this lies in the fact that the claimant could only enforce his claim 
against a specific respondent. The respondent had to prove a better claim with regard to the object 
in question, and if he failed, the claimant would succeed. This theory entails that meum esse was 
only judged with regard to one specific respondent and not with regard to the whole world 
(absolutely) - thus against anybody that might possibly interfere with that relationship in future. 
According to Diosdi Ownership 94 et seq however, meum esse had an absolute character. This 
he bases on the fact that meum esse provided the claimant with exclusive power - you either were 
owner of the thing in question, or you were not - there were no intermediate degrees of ownership. 
Kaser can be supported as this does not mean that meum esse was enforceable against the whole 
world. The exclusiveness of ownership does not prove that ownership is absolute. The fact that 
there can only be one owner of a thing does not mean that the owner can enforce his right against 
the whole world. 
81 G.2.40. 
82 Ancient and preclassical Roman law. 
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the needs of a changing society. Although it might be true that some of the 
characteristics of the South African concept of ownership originated in Roman law, it 
cannot be said that the South African concept of ownership is similar to Roman law 
dominium. The absolute, uniform and exclusive concept of ownership as we know it in 
South Africa today was never part of Roman law. In fact, there was hardly a real 
"concept" of ownership as such. Roman law dominium cannot be described as an 
absolute or in principle unrestricted right, and it was never regarded as a uniform right 
or equated with individual ownership as we know it today. 
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2 
DOMIN/f}M IN FEUDAL LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
It is pointed out in the previous chapter that dominium was construed in Roman law to 
fit the needs of a specific society. It is shown in this chapter that both dominium in 
feudal law and the structure of society were completely different from that in Roman 
times and that dominium was developed and changed to suit the needs of medieval 
society. This chapter must be seen as a slice of history and not as an attempt to give 
a detailed account of the development of dominium since the fall of the Western Roman 
empire in 476 BC. 1 
It was during this period of the development of dominium that the distinction between 
dominium directum and dominium utile was created. The concept of divided ownership, 
especially as it has become associated with the medieval distinction between these two 
forms of dominium, has captured the minds of jurists for centuries and continued to 
influence the development of ownership until the early 1900s.2 
This chapter concerns the social function of ownership in feudal law and the changes 
in ownership that reflect the special social function of ownership in medieval (feudal) 
society. 
2 
Roman law did not develop uninterrupted since Justinian, but it did not disappear either. For the 
reasons for the continued existence of Roman law see Feenstra Romeins recht 102. 
The concept of divided ownership was finally rejected in all civil law systems. In South Africa the 
idea of divided ownership was finally rejected in 1910 in Johannesburg Municipal Council v Rand 
Townships Registrar 1910 TPD 1314. See chapter 6 in this regard. 
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2.2 Feudalism in the middle ages 
Society in the middle ages had a feudal structure. It is difficult to define feudalism. 3 
Maitland4 describes feudalism as a state of society in which all or a great part of public 
rights and duties are inextricably interwoven with the tenure of land, in which the whole 
governmental system - financial, military, judicial - is part of the law of private property. 
According to GanshoF feudalism was a body of institutions. This system was based on 
the personal relation between a free man, the vassal, who has the duty to obey and 
serve (usually in the form of military service) another free man, the feudal lord, who in 
his turn had the obligation to protect the vassal and to provide him with a fief. The fief 
could take different forms, 6 but the most important was land tenure. This included not 
only the land itself, but everything that was attached to or associated with the land: 
people bound to the land, jurisdiction over the inhabitants, the right to gather tax, to 
hunt, to fish and a range of other rights, privileges and duties. 7 
Feudalism had its origin in the merger of two institutions, beneficium and vassalage. 8 
Beneficium9 was similar to usufructus in many ways. The right to use something was 
granted to a person as a gift and no counterperformance was necessary. Vassalage, 
on the other hand, originally had no connection with land tenure. It was the personal 
relation between two men. They were bound by the mutual obligation to protect and 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Van den Bergh Eigendom 17; Stair The laws of Scotlandvol 18 53. 
Maitland Constitutional law of England 23. 
Ganshof Qu'est-ce que la feodalite. Also see Van de Kieft 1974 Bijdragen en mededelingen 
betreffende de geschiedenis der Nederlande 193 at 194. 
Such as the post of ranger or the right to the periodic payment from the user of a specific piece of 
land. 
Van den Bergh Eigendom 17. 
Gilissen Historische inleiding tot het recht 605; Stair The laws of Scotland vol 18 par 55. Also see 
Cairns in Birks New perspectives on the Roman law of property 75 et seq. 
Beneficium originally ended with the death of either the usufructuary or the owner. Beneficia 
became hereditary in 877. 
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support each other. In the politically uncertain medieval society a weaker party, the 
vassal, sought the protection of a stronger party, the feudal lord. In turn the vassal was 
obliged to serve and support the feudal lord. In order to make this possible the personal 
vassals usually received their beneficia in the form of land. Vassalage was almost 
always coupled to a beneficium with a military character: the vassal had to render 
military service to the feudal lord. The feudal lord would have had many vassals and 
they could all count on each other in time of need. These two institutions began to 
merge in the eighth century so that all those who held beneficia - usually in the form of 
land - became vassals to the owner. This system continued to develop and reached its 
zenith in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. 
One of the characteristics of feudalism was that there was no distinction between public 
and private law.10 The system of feudalism applied widely in the middle ages and this 
led to the decentralisation of state authority. 11 The feudal state formed a pyramid with 
the king at its top. In this network of feudal relations the king, as the ultimate feudal 
lord, would grant land to his noblemen, as vassals. They in their turn would act as 
feudal lords to their subjects, and so on. Each feudal lord would have jurisdiction over 
all his vassals. 
2.3 Dominium directum and dominium utile 
The concepts of dominium directum and dominium utile were introduced in medieval 
law by the glossators. Pillius, who wrote towards the end of the twelfth century, was the 
first to use the term dominium utile. He, like many other jurists in the middle ages, was 
confronted by the question of how to explain feudal land tenure: did the vassal have 
any form of ownership in the feudal land? Pillius asked the question "utrum vassalus 
habeat aliquod dominium feudl' (whether the vassal had any dominium of his fief) and 
10 The distinction between public and private law played an important role in Roman law and 
continues to influence modem law. 
11 Van den Bergh Eigendom 17; Gilissen Historische inleiding tot het recht 606; Van der Walt and 
Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 242. 
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he answered this question in the affirmative. According to him the vassal had dominium 
utile as opposed to the dominium directum of the feudal lord.12 
The origin of dominium directum and dominium utile is controversial and is the source 
of a debate in which three arguments can be distinguished.13 Lautz 14 based his view on 
acquisitive prescription in Roman law. He argued that dominium utile was derived from 
the actio utilis granted to the praescriptor of immovables. This created the impression 
that both the praescriptor and the owner had dominium - the praescriptor had beneficial 
dominium, while the owner had direct dominium. According to Lautz this situation was 
extended to feudal law. 
Meynial15 held the view that dominium utile was the result of the introduction of 
Germanic principles into Roman terminology. Germanic law placed much more 
emphasis on the welfare of the group, rather than that of the individual. Ownership was 
not individualistic, as was the case in Roman law. The right to use a thing played a very 
important role in Germanic law and usufructwas on the same level as dominium. It was 
thus logical to regard the vassal (who had a right to use the feudal land) as owner. This 
fragmentation of ownership (a Germanic idea) was, according to Meynial, introduced-
into Roman terminology. The right to use of the vassal was described as dominium 
(dominium utile), while the true owner was described as dominus directus. 
Feenstra16 criticises both the abovementioned arguments. According to him Lautz's 
argument that dominium utile was the direct result of the treatment of acquisitive 
prescription in Roman law does not hold wat~r. It is illogical to assume that the 
12 For a discussion see Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 265 et seq; Feenstra in Fata iuris Romani 215 et 
seq; Van den Bergh Eigendom 36 et seq; Meijers 1934 TR 129 et seq. 
13 See Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 236 where the argument 
of Lautz is discussed as part of the debate between Meynial and Feenstra for the first time. 
14 Lautz Enfwicklungsgeschichte des dominium utile 16 et seq. 
15 Meynial in Melanges Fitting vol 2 409 et seq. 
16 Feenstra in Fata iuris Romani 215 et seq. 
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Glossators, who were obviously conversant with feudal law, would ignore feudal law 
completely in developing dominium utile. With regard to Meynial's argument Feenstra 
points out that feudal law was much closer to Roman law than was previously thought 
and that dominium utile was much more than a mere translation of Germanic custom 
into Roman terminology. It must rather be seen as an attempt to resolve the apparent 
. 
contradiction between texts which seem to regard both the true owner and the 
emphyteuticarius as owners. 17 The Glossators argued that both were owners, but that 
the types of ownership differed from one another. The one was direct ownership while 
the other was beneficial (indirect) ownership. 
The arguments in the debate on the origin of dominium directum and dominium utile are 
based on the writings of Pillius. Pillius 18 based this division of dominium on a text of 
Justinian where he (Justinian) refers to the emphyteuticarius as a dominus.19 The 
quitrent-holder had the actio in rem utilis to protect his claim, whereas the dominus 
protected his claim with an actio directa (which was used in Roman law as the opposite 
of the actio utilis). Pillius20 applied this situation to feudal law. According to him the 
feudal lord had direct ownership or dominium directum, while the vassal had indirect 
ownership or dominium indirectum. The only difference between these two forms of 
dominium was that each had a different content - whereas dominium directum provided 
the dominus with the power of disposal, dominium indirectus merely provided the 
dominus with the power to use the property. 
17 c 11.62.2; c 11.62.4; c 11.70.4; c 11.68.2; c 11.62.12.1. 
18 Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 265; Feenstra in Birks New perspectives on the Roman law of property 
111 at 112; Van den Bergh Eigendom 36; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history 
of/aw213 at235. 
19 D 6.3.1; C 11.62.12. 
20 Pillius gloss "De suis rebus" on Libri feudorum 2.3 "respondeo fa/sum est imo dominium a/ienat: 
scilicet utl7e. Retinet tamen directum: Unde utilis: et non directa vindicatio datur". See also the 
gloss "Tertiam personam" on Ubri feodorum 2.34.3: "Dominium utile penes vassa/os: directum 
penes dominium", and the gloss "Dominium distincta" on D 1.1.5: "vet die dominium distincta, 
scilicet directa ab utilibus et e contra". Also see Feenstra in Fate /uris Romani 215 et seq and 
Meijers in 1934 TR 129 et seq. 
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2.4 Bartolus' definition of dominium 
Bartolus de Saxoferrato (1313-1357) was responsible for the first formal definition of 
dominium in the history of the development of Roman law. Bartolus defined dominium 
as: 
"Dominium est ius de re corporali perfecte disponendi nisi lege 
prohibeatur''. 21 
This definition, which is most probably based on the definition of freedom (of persons) 
of the classical jurist Florentinus,22 has been studied extensively throughout history and 
played a very important role in the later formulation of definitions of ownership. 23 
At a first glance the definition can create the impression that Bartolus regarded 
dominium as an absolute, unlimited right. A detailed analysis shows, however, that this 
is not the case. Bartolus did not use the term perfecte disponendi to imply that 
dominium was an absolute, unlimited right.24 Disponere was used to distinguish 
between dominium and possessio. Whereas the dominus had the ius de re disponendi 
(the power to dispose of a thing), the possessor had the ius de re insistendi and could 
merely control the thing.25 Disponere was used in the wide sense to include the power 
21 BartolusonD41.2.17.1 no4. 
22 D 1.5.4: "naturalis facultas eius quod cuique facere libet, nisi vi aut iure prohibetur" See Feenstra 
1976 RMT 248 at 253; Van den Bergh Eigendom 45; Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 305 at 31 O; 
Coing 1953 Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung far Rechtsgeschichte 348 et seq. 
23 See section 544 Code civil; section 625 BW; section 5.1 NBW. 
24 Van den Bergh Eigendom 44; Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 251 ; Feenstra in Birks New perspectives 
on the Roman law of property 111 et seq; Coing 1953 Zeitschri'ft der Savigny-Stiftung far 
Rechtsgeschichte 348 et seq; Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 305 at 31 O; Van der Walt and Kleyn in 
Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 242. 
25 Van den Bergh Eigendom 44; Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 251; Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 305 at 
310. 
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to use, consume, alienate, and so on.26 Bartolus refers to another passage where he 
distinguishes between dominium and possessio.27 Here he defines dominium as the ius 
disponendi vet vindicandi (the power to dispose of and vindicate the thing). It ought to 
be clear from the above that Bartolus' only intention was to draw a distinction between 
the power of the dominus to dispose and power of the possessor to c6ntrol property. 
The word perfecte must not be misinterpreted either. It simply signifies the full power 
to dispose. The "full power" is, however, much more limited than the absolute 
entitlement to dispose of the modern concept of ownership. 28 Perfecte merely implies 
that the dominus can decide (within the limits of the law) what will be in his best 
interest. 
Nisi lege prohibeatui29 puts the entitlement to dispose of the dominus in perspective. 
The dominus had no unlimited entitlement and had to exercise his powers within the 
limits of the law and of other rights. 
2.5 Shifting of landownership 
Land played a very important role in the feudal system. The feudal lord had a social, 
political and legal bond with the land. As is pointed out above, feudalism was a land 
tenure system with a military character. The more land a feudal lord had, the more 
vassals he could have and this naturally meant that his army was stronger and that he 
had more power. Land also played an important role in the running of the feudal state. 
Only nobility could own land and only landowners could vote. The size of the territory 
26 Van den Bergh Eigendom 45. 
27 Bartolus on D 41.2.1 no 6. 
28 Bartolus refers to C 4.35.21 and states that the owner may dispose of a thing freely, as opposed 
to the mandatary, who must act with caution. See Van den Bergh Eigendom 45; Van der Walt 1986 
THRHR 305 at 310. 
29 The inspiration for this part of the definition most probably comes from C 4 38.14 which deals with 
the freedom of a seller to look for a buyer, or from the definition of freedom of persons in D 1.5.4. 
See Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 253; Van den Bergh Eigendom 45. 
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a feudal lord controlled determined the weight of his vote. 30 
As the social situation in the middle ages became more secure, the need for a strong 
military power was diminished and the obligation of the vassals to lend military support 
to the feudal lords became less important. The purpose and nature of the feudal 
relation between the vassal and the feudal lord changed. Seen in a modern 
perspective, we can say that the feudal lord was owner, and the person using the land 
had a limited real right. 
The relation between the parties was initially expressed in the payment of an annual 
amount of money. This amount is often referred to as rent, quitrent, interest or land 
tax. 31 Over the years the bond between the feudal lord and the land became more and 
more tenuous, while the vassal's bond with the land grew ever stronger - the right to 
live on and use the land became perpetual and hereditary, and the amount to be paid 
annually became fixed. The only connection the dominus directus had to the land, was 
that he could collect the yearly payment, but with the devaluation of money the annual 
amount payable to the feudal lord eventually became so insignificant it barely had any 
value at all. 
According to De Blecourt and Van lterson this situation amounts to a shift in 
landownership or eigendomsverschuiwing. 32 Van lterson33 states that the amount 
30 Van den Bergh Eigendom 20; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 
at240. 
31 Van den Bergh Eigendom 60. 
32 De Blecourt originally used the term rolverwisse/ing, but Van lterson has shown that the dominus 
directus and dominus indirectus did not change roles in the true sense of the word. De Blecourt 
consequently adopted eigendomsverschuiwing, the term used by Van lterson. See De Blecourt 
Kort begrip van het oucJ..vaderlandsch burgerlijk recht (1939) 261 ; Van lterson 1971 Vers/agen en 
mededelingen van de Vereniging tot uitgawe van het oud-vaderlands recht 407 at 418; Van den 
Bergh Eigendom 61. 
33 Van lterson 1971 Vers/agen en mededelingen van de Vereniging tot uitgawe van het oud-
vader/ands recht 407 at 418. Also see Fockema Andreae Het oud-Nederlansch burgerlijk recht 
(1906) 173, 207 and 328; Gramata Het beklemrecht in zijne geschiedkundige ontwikkeling (1895) 
84, 95; De Blecourt Kort begrip van het oud-vaderlandsch burgerlijk recht 1 ed (1922) 124, 2 ed 
30 
payable to the dominus directus was originally seen as a land tax, but over the years 
this changed to ground rent (grondrente)34 paid by the user of the land. In modern 
terms it could be said that whereas the owner (dominus directus) originally collected 
tax from the user of the land (dominus indirectuslutilis), the situation has changed so 
that the original owner now only had a limited real right (the right to receive ground 
rent), while ownership of the land vested in the user of the land. Ownership has thus 
shifted from the dominus directus to the dominus indirectus. 
This theory is criticised by lmmink35 and Van der Linden. 36 lmmink37 states that it is hard 
to believe that all the true owners treated their ownership with such a degree of 
disinterest that it was possible for them to be reduced to "grondrenteheffers" and for the 
shift in landownership to take place. 
This so-called common-sense argument of lmmink does not convince. It has never 
been suggested that all owners were reduced to "grondrenteheffers" by the 
eigendomsverschuiwing. Every case has to be proven individually. Besides, history has 
(1924) 97, 3 ed (1932) 210, 4 ed (1932) 210, 5 ed (1939) 258; Fischer De Blecourt Kort begrip van 
het oud-vaderlandsch burgerlijk recht6 ed and 7 ed (1950 and 1959) 176; Van der Walt and Kleyn 
in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 240; Van den Bergh Eigendom 59. 
34 Translation according to Van Dale Groot woordenboek Nederlands-Engels. Ground rent is a 
limited real right according to which the entitled person could receive an annual amount from the 
owner. This amounted to a positive obligation to the effect that the owner had to pay a annual 
amount to the entitled person - as opposed to a negative obligation to endure something or to 
refrain from doing something. Ground rent was orginally used when the owner was in need of 
capital. He would sell the right of ground rent to another person and would then have to pay a fixed 
amount to the the buyer. This limited real right was included in the first drafts of the NBW (5.9), but 
was excluded in the final text. See Beekhuis et al Asser293. 
35 lmmink 1959 TR 36. 
36 Van der Linden De cope - bijdrage tot de rechtsgeschiedenis van de op/egging der Hollands-
Utrechtse laagvlakte 336. 
37 lmmink 1959 TR 36 says: "Men za/ het mij eens zijn, dat de hedendaagse eigenaar, die so weinig 
orde op zijn zaken weet te stet/en dat hij het eigendomsrecht op zijn grond kwijtraakt aan zijn 
erfpachter, tot de uitzonderingen behoort. Zou dit dan in vroeger eeuwen niet evenzo zijn geweest? 
Het kost mij moeite dit te geloven. Maar het is mij vo/strekt onmogelijk, aan te nemen dat enige 
eeuwen geleden alle eigenaren van een zo verregaande verontachtzaming van hun rechten 
zouden hebben blijk gegeven, dat zij a.h.w. en bloc genoegen gingen nemen met het recht van 
een simpele grondrenteheffer". 
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shown that what we believe not to be possible, often does happen. lmmink goes further 
to say that a shift in landownership could not have taken place, since both parties 
involved were already owners (one being dominus directus and the other dominus 
indirectus). It was thus unnecessary for one of the parties to become owner. Van den 
Bergh,38 however, points out that although this might be true, it is also true that 
according to modern measures the position of the dominus indirectus can be equated 
with ownership. Van lterson39 has also shown that land that was given in quitrent in the 
seventeenth century, was regarded in the nineteenth century as ownership burdened 
with ground rent. 
An important argument to refute the theory of eigendomsverschuiwing was made by 
Van der Linden.40 He states that the amount payable to the feudal lord does not 
necessary imply a quitrent relation. It must rather be given a public law character and 
seen as an acknowledgement of the authority of the feudal lord over the land in 
question. If it should appear that the user of the land indeed acts as owner, it must not 
be assumed that this is the result of the eigendomsverschuiwing: he has been owner 
(dominus) from the start. 
The criticism levelled against the theory of eigendomsverschuiwing does not disprove 
the theory in its entirety41 - it merely shows that the theory is not watertight and that 
some arguments need closer scrutiny. According to Van den Berg42 one should be 
careful not to study and evaluate history with modern dogma in mind. The phenomenon 
of dominium directum and dominium utile was not solely a private law construction, it 
was definitely influenced by public law. Eigendomsverschuiwing must thus be judged 
38 Van den Bergh Eigendom 62. 
39 Van lterson 1971 Verslagen en mededelingen van de Vereniging tot uitgawe van het oud-
vaderlands recht 407 at 433. 
40 Van der Linden De cope; bijdrage tot de rechtsgeschiedenis van de op/egging der Hollands-
Utrechtse /aagvlakte 366. See also Van den Bergh Eigendom 62. 
41 Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 241. 
42 Van den Bergh in Streefkerk and Faber Ter recognitie 9 at 17. 
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with this in mind. 
2.6 Conclusion 
' 
The importance of the middle ages for the development of ownership is the fact that it 
was during this period that the first definition of ownership was created. This definition 
must, however, be judged and interpreted in view of the social circumstances in which 
it originated. The purpose of this definition, namely to distinguish between ownership 
and possession, must also be kept in mind and one must be careful not to read more 
into Bartolus' definition than what he intended. Bartolus never regarded restrictions on 
dominium as exceptions and as such he never regarded dominium as absolute. The 
nature of divided ownership furthermore dictates that neither the dominus directus nor 
the dominus indirectus could have had absolute or exclusive ownership. 
The feudal system of landownership illustrates the fact that Roman ownership did not 
develop logically and undisturbed through the middle ages. The continuity of the 
development of ownership was influenced by fundamental breaks or discontinuities 
throughout its development. The feudal system represents one of these discontinuities. 
The feudal system and its differences from Roman society had the effect that the nature 
and function of ownership changed dramatically from that of Roman law. The needs 
and the character of medieval society differed from that of society in the Roman 
empire, and in order to cater for the specific needs of medieval society ownership had 
to change to suit the new environment in which it had to function. 
According to the traditional view ownership is flexible enough to undergo change in 
order to adapt to totally new circumstances. This view cannot be supported. The 
development of ownership is characterised by fundamental changes or discontinuities. 
Although it is true that ownership is flexible and capable of change, ownership did not 
always develop undisturbed in a logical manner. The particular circumstances in which 
ownership had to function in the middle ages necessitated a radical change in the 
concept and social function of ownership. The introduction of divided ownership 
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illustrates that ownership had to undergo a fundamental change to suit the needs of 
medieval society. Roman law dominium did not merely adapt to the needs of medieval 
society, but a new divided ownership was created to fulfill the needs of society. The 
particular nature and needs of feudal society necessitated the creation of divided 
ownership. The emphasis was not on the concept of ownership, but on the social and 
political function of ownership. The nature and protection of the different forms of 
dominium thus reflected the nature and needs of society. 
34 
3 
OWNERSHIP IN ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 
3.1 Introduction 
Developments in the law of ownership during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
in Holland contributed significantly to change the way in which ownership is perceived 
in civil law. Not only did it have an influence on the prevailing perceptions, but it also 
changed the course of future developments. 
A large part of this chapter is dedicated to Hugo Grotius ( 1583-1645), the reason being 
the extraordinary importance of his writings. Grotius departed from more or less 
established medieval practice and learning, and introduced new ideas on the origin of 
private ownership and the theoretical structure of the law of property. Grotius started 
a process of scientification of property law according to which a hierarchical system of 
concepts is created.and emphasised. This constitutes another discontinuity or break 
in the development of ownership in that Grotius rejected the distinction between 
dominium directum and dominium utile as it was applied in medieval law and continued 
to develop a new system of what we now call real rights. 
This chapter looks at the views of Grotius, as well as other Roman-Dutch authors, on 
the nature and origin of private ownership and the theoretical structure of the system 
of real and personal rights. The rejection of divided ownership as well as the idea of an 
absolutist view of ownership in Roman-Dutch law is also discussed. 
3.2 The nature and origin of private ownership 
Grotius' view on the origin and nature of private ownership was first discussed in De 
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iure praedae (1604)1 and developed further in De iure be/Ii ac pacis (1625) and in 
lnleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleerdheid (1620). This view is based on the 
assumption that individual ownership of property amounts to divided, separate and 
mutually exclusive rights accruing to individuals. It is pointed out in De iure praedae2 
that ownership did not originally imply proprietas as it does in the later development of 
the concept; it amounted to no more than the mere facultas or power to have usus facti 
of common property. Individual ownership only developed when ownership became 
proprietas of specific individuals. The exclusive proprietary right of an individual owner 
implied that property was separated and removed from what was formerly common 
property accessible to everybody for common use. 3 
According to Grotius4 individual ownership became separated from property for 
common use through occupatio. Grotius explains that occupatio had its origin in the 
acquisition of ownership through the use and consumption of consumables, from where 
it was extended to other movable property and finally to the occupation of immovable 
property. 
Grotius expanded on this theory of the origin of private ownership in De iure be/Ii ac 
pacis.5 He refers to this as the origin of proprietas, but states that other jurists refer to 
this as dominium. According to Grotius the origin of private ownership through 
1 The twelfth chapter of De iure praedae was published anonymously in 1609 as Mare liberum on 
request of the directors from Zeeland of the Verenigd~ Oost-lndische Compagnie for negotiations 
with South Holland on an armistice. See Feenstra 1976 Acta Juridica 269. 
2 De iure praedae (1868) 215, 215. See also Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 at 270; Feenstra 1976 Acta 
Juridica 269 at 274; Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das romisch-hollandische Recht 
486 at488. 
3 De iure praedae (1868) 214: "Nam dominium nunc proprium quid significat, quos sci/icet ita est 
alicuius, ut alterius non sit eodom modo". 
4 De iure praedae (1868) 216, 228 et seq; fnleidinge 11.3.2-3 (1952) 50. Also see Feenstra 1976 Acta 
Juridica 269 at 274; Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das romisch-hofllindische Recht 
486 at488. 
5 11.2 (1939) 186 et seq. 
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occupation was founded on the basis of a social contract - either express or tacit. 6 
While Grotius originally, in De iure praedae, presented occupatio as the only basis for 
private ownership he modified this view in De iure de be/Ii ac pacis, 7 where occupatio 
is mentioned as only one example of the kind of agreement upon which the acquisition 
of individual ownership is based. 
Van der Walt8 points out that the importance of Grotius' theory for the doctrine of 
private ownership lies in the emphasis he placed on the concept of proprium. Grotius 
makes the "belonging to" aspect the most important feature of ownership. This is 
emphasised by his definition of ownership in /n/eidinge 11.3.1 and 11.3.4.9 where the 
power to reclaim lost possession is accentuated. Feenstra10 points out that Grotius' 
definition of ownership was most probably influenced by Bartolus' definition of 
dominium as ius disponendi vel vindicandi. The proprium aspect is further emphasised 
by his classification of things in /nleidinge 11.1.16, where all things are classified as 
belonging to either all people, to a group of people, to a specific person or to nobody. 
The proprium aspect of the definition of ownership is not new - it has its roots in Roman 
law and the strong link between ownership and the rei vindicatio. What is new is the fact 
that Grotius combines the proprium aspect with another aspect of dominium according 
6 De iure be/Ii ac pacis 11.2.2.5 (1939) 189. Also see Feenstra 1976 Acta Juridica 269 at 275; Feenstra 
1976 RMT248 at 270 et seq; Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das romisch-holliindische 
Recht 486 at 489. 
7 Grotius De iure be/Ii ac pacis 11.3.19 (1939) not qnly distinguishes between occupatio by an 
individual and occupatio by the community, but in the last instance he also distinguishes between 
occupatio where the community acquires imperium (and with this the ius eminens) and occupatio 
where the community acquires dominium privatum p/enumque or full private ownership, which will 
be distributed amongst private individuals. In the last instance the individual will have dominium that 
is subject to the dominium of the community. For a discussion see Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 at 271. 
8 Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das rCJmisch-holliindische Recht 486 at 489. 
9 /nleidinge 11.3.1 (1952) 50: "Eigendom is het toebehooren van een zaeck waer door iemand, schoon 
het bezit niet hebbende, 't zelve vermag rechtelick te bekomen". The second definition in ln/eidinge 
11.3.4 (1952) 53 also accentuates the owner's power to reclaim lost possession: " .... dat den 
eigendom bestaet in dat recht om weder te bekomen het verloren bezif'. 
1° Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at272. 
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to which ownership is a facultas or potestas. This facultas or potestas is based on the 
human will and intellect which man exercises over himself and his exterior world. 11 
Ownership is thus characterised by the exercise of power and is something typically 
human.12 This perception of ownership creates the philosophical foundation 13 for 
Grotius' whole concept and system of private law rights, which is worked out in the 
lnleidinge. 14 Grotius' perception of ownership had a considerable influence on the 
concept of ownership, not only in Western European civil-law systems and in South 
Africa, but in most modern legal systems. 
3.3 Grotius' theoretical structure for real and personal rights 
This part deals with the second part of Grotius' contribution. It concerns the conceptual 
and logical analysis in which he attempts to create a science of law based on a system 
of concepts which are connected by strict logic. Ramus 15 exercised great influence 
upon the scientific, rationalistic approach to law according to which techniques such as 
definition, division and logical reasoning play a major part. According to this approach 
solutions to any problem can be produced by application of these techniques. The 
importance of this approach lies in the fact that Grotius creates a system of concepts 
that classify private law rights and in particular property rights. 16 
11 The facultas aspect of ownership is emphasised by Grotius' definition of voile eigendom in lnleidinge 
11.3.10 (1952) 54: "waer door iemand met de zake al/es mag doen nae sijn ge/ie'fte ende fsijnen bate 
dat by de wetten onverboden is". For a discussion see Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 317 et seq. 
12 Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 268 et seq; Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 6 at 17 et seq. 
13 Grotius relies heavily on Aquinas and the late scholastics in this part of his contribution. See Feenstra 
1976 RMT248 at 268 et seq. 
14 See 3.3 below. 
15 See in this regard Van der Merwe in Visser Essays on the history of law 32; Van der Walt 1995 
THRHR 396 at 402 et seq. 
16 Van der Walt 1995 THRHR 396 at 402 et seq; Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 569 at 583 et seq. 
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Although his later classification of rights in De iure belli ac pacis17 contributed to the 
development of modem perceptions of patrimonial rights, 18 Grotius' earlier classification 
of patrimonial rights in the lnleidinge had a far greater influence on Roman-Dutch law 
and the subsequent Dutch code.19 
The importance of the classification of rights in the lnleidinge lies in the fact that 
ownership is placed within a specific hierarchical system of rights. This system is not 
entirely new, although it is regarded as such by many. 20 The classification does, 
however, contain crucial new elements and emphases. 
Patrimonial rights are divided into beheering and inschuld. 21 Grotius provides two 
alternative translations in the margin for both beheering and inschuld. Beheering is 
translated as ius in rern22 and ius reale23 and inschuld is translated as ius in personam 
sive crediturn24 and ius personale.25 Beheerinif6 is defined as a patrimonial right that 
17 In De iure be/Ii ac pacis patrimonial rights are classified as being either potestas (dominium) or 
creditum. This resembles the modern distinction between ownership and personal or creditor's 
rights. Dominium is subdMded into dominium plenum and dominium minus plenum. The last category 
includes ususfructus and ius pignoris. See De iure be/Ii ac pacis 1.1.5 (1939) 32: "Facultatem 
/urisconsulti nomine Sui appeHant: nos posthac ius proprie aut stricte dictum appel/abimus: sub quo 
continentur Potestas, tum in se, quae libertas dicitur, tum in alias, ut patria, dominica: Dominium, 
plenum sive minus pleno, ut ususfructus, ius pignoris: et creditum cui ex adverso respondet 
debitum". 
18 
"Patrimonial rights" seems to be the best translation for "toebehooren". 
19 Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 271. 
2° Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 271. 
21 lnleidinge 11.1.57-59 (1952) 48. 
22 fnleidinge 11.1.58 (1952) 48. 
23 lnleidinge 1.1.8 (1952) 1. 
24 lnleidinge 11.1.59 (1952) 48. 
25 lnleidinge 1.1.8 (1952) 1. 
26 lnleidinge 11.1.58 (1952) 48: "Beheering is 't recht van toebehooren bestaende tusschen den mensch 
ende de zaecke zonder noodigh opzicht op een ander mensch". Feenstra /us in re 25 points out that 
Grotius' definition of beheering is original, as it is not found in earlier sources. It could, however, be 
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exists between a human being and a thing without reference to any other human being. 
This definition accentuates the difference between real and personal rights: in essence 
a personal right exists between two or more legal subjects. 
Grotius' distinction between beheering and inschuld was generally accepted by later 
Roman-Dutch authors. Van der Linden's27 distinction between ius in re and ius ad rem 
illustrates the fact that Grotius' division of the partimonial rights was still regarded as 
authoritative during the eighteenth century. 
According to Grotius' classification ownership is not regarded as the only real right, but 
it is rather seen as one of the real rights. Beheering is divided into bezitrecht 
(possession) and eigendom (ownership). This seems to imply that real rights must be 
either possession or ownership. Van der Walt28 points out that this impression is 
misleading in view of Grotius' treatment of gebreckelicke eigendom. Some of the rights 
that were initially defined as gebreckelicke eigendom are later redefined as 
gerechtigheden and they tum out to be neither ownership nor possession. These rights 
seem to form a category on their own and are today known as limited real rights. 
In the lnleidinge Grotius divides ownership into vo//e29 and gebreckelicke30 eigendom. 31 
This distinction as such is not new - it existed in Roman law and played an important 
role throughout the middle ages. The division refers to situations were someone else 
than the owner has a legal right to the object in question. This can occur either where 
a person has lawful use and possession of the object, based on the owner's consent 
regarded as a variation of Molina's definition of ius in re. For further discussion see Feenstra 1982 
The Juridical Review 106 at 113. 
27 Van der Linden Regtsge/eerd, practicaa/ en koopmans handboek 1.6.1 (1806) 50. 
28 Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das romisch-hollandische Recht 486 at 491. 
29 Full ownership. 
30 Incomplete ownership. 
31 lnleidinge 11.3.9 (1952) 54. 
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and effectively excluding the owner's rei vindicatio, or where different people have the 
same or different rights to the object in question. 
After discussing the acquisition and loss of full ownership, Grotius returns to incomplete 
ownership or gebreckelicke eigendom. 32 In the case of those who have incomplete 
ownership, one must distinguish between the person who has nude ownership and the 
person who has the power to use the object in question - in terms of the medieval 
concept of didivded ownership both were regarded as owners. This implies that where 
ownership is split up in title and use, both persons have gebreckelicke eigendom. 33 
Grotius explains this by referring to the situation where one person has the right of way 
over another person's land. The use right of the first person does not amount to full 
ownership because he is not entitled to sell the land or enjoy the fruits thereof. The 
second person who has to suffer the exercise of the right of way does not have full 
ownership either because he has to endure the burden on his land and may not 
exclude the first person from exercising his right of way. Each person's right is thus 
limited and diminished by the right of the other, thereby distinguishing both from voile 
eigendom. With regard to right of way, one must therefore say that both parties have 
gebreckelicke eigendom. Van der Walt points out that this is where Grotius introduces 
a theoretical sleight of hand.34 Up to here Grotius is explaining the situation in terms of 
established medieval learning, with reference to the existence of divided ownership, but 
now, he says, he wants to avoid confusion between the two forms of incomplete 
ownership (title and use). To distinguish between the two Grotius calls the one right 
eigendom or ownership and the other a gerechtigheid or right. 35 The distinction is made 
by looking at the value of the right rather than the benefit thereof - the more valuable 
32 lnleidinge 11.33.1-6(1952)151. 
33 lnleidinge 11.33.1 (1952) 151: " ... dat waer gebreckelicke eigendom is, ghemeenlick 't gunt den eenen 
ontbreekt is by iemand anders, die over-zulcks mede hee'fl: een ghebreckelicken eigendom, ... ". 
34 See in this regard Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das r6misch-ho/Uindische Recht 
486. 
35 /nleidinge 11.33.1 (1952) 151: " ... maer om onderscheidelick te spreeken noemtmen eighendom 't 
recht van den ghene die 't meerendee/ hee'fl: van den eighendom, als die 't land mag verkoopen 
ende verhuiren: ende 't minste dee/ noemtmen een gerechtigheid, a/s het recht van 't voetpad'. 
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one being ownership and the less valuable one a right. 36 It is interesting to note that in 
the feudal system the use right of the vassal was often more beneficial than the title of 
the feudal lord. By proposing that the value, rather than the benefit, should be looked 
at to determine who should be the owner, Grotius practically ensures that the feudal 
' 
lord will be regarded as owner, because his title will more often than not be more 
valuable than the use right of the vassal. 
The implications of Grotius' distinction between the different forms of gebreckelicke 
eigendom signalled a definite break with the past and introduced a new era in the way 
in which real rights are perceived. Where both rights were previously seen as 
ownership or dominium (directum and utile), only one is now regarded as dominium and 
the other as something less, namely a (limited real) right. This forms the basis of the 
current hierarchical, conceptual distinction between ownership and limited real rights. 
According to Feenstra37 it seems as if Grotius distanced himself from the medieval 
romanists and their followers as well as the natural law authors who accepted the civil 
law distinctions - at first glance, the distinction between dominium directum and 
dominium utile does not seem to be of any importance in Grotius' exposition. However, 
this impression is misleading. Grotius starts out from the medieval distinction but then 
uses the logical and terminological move set out above to destroy it completely. Grotius 
very cleary sets out the whole system of what we now call real rights: this passage is 
a clear prefiguration of the distinction between dominium and iura in re aliena. 
Feenstra38 originally attributed the origin of the current distinction between ownership 
and limited real rights to Grotius, but subsequently qualified this view,39 and pointed out 
36 /nleidinge 11.33.1 (1952) 151 : "Doch om te vinden het meerder ende minder dee/ zietmen dickmae/ 
meerop de waerde als op de baef'. Note that the Latin term for "baef' is utilitas, and that this bears 
strong resemblance to dominium utile. 
37 Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at273. 
38 Feenstra /us in re 26. 
39 See Feenstra in Birks New Perspectives 111 at 115. Feenstra states that although Grotius' division 
was not original, his ideas exercised a greater influence on legal practise than Donellus' ideas, 
specially as far as the division of dominium is concerned. 
42 
that Donellus not only used the term ius in re aliena, but also that the prefiguration of 
the Pandectist distinction is much clearer in his work than in the work of Grotius. 
According to Grotius ownership is now regarded as full ownership40 when it allows the 
owner to do with the object as he pleases for his own advantage, as long as it is not 
prohibited by law. Gebreckelicke eigendom,41 on the other hand, decsribes the situation 
where the owner lacks something that would provide that power. Feenstra42 points out 
that the definition for voile eigendom is virtually the same as Bartolus' definition of 
dominium that dates from the 14th century, but that Grotius' definition is restricted to 
dominium perfectum.43 
This development signifies another fundamental break in the normal, logical 
development of the current concept of ownership. The continuity in the development 
of ownership is disturbed by the definition of voile and gebreckelicke eigendom and by 
the structure of real rights as worked out by Grotius. His perception of real rights, and 
ownership in particular, proved to be the impetus for a change in the direction of the 
future development of these concepts. 
This section of the /nleidinge replaces the medieval perception, according to which title 
and use were regarded as forms of dominium, with a new system in which title is 
equated with ownership and use is no more than a (limited real) right, which is 
fundamentally and structurally less than ownership. The full impact of this only 
40 Jn/eidinge 11.3.1 O (1952) 54: "Volle is den eigendom waer door iemand met de zake a/Jes mag doen 
nae sijn ge/iefde ende t'sijnen bate dat by de wetten onverboden is". 
41 Jnleidinge 11.3.11 (1952) 54: "Gebreckelicke waer aen iet, om zu/cs a/Jes te moghen doen, 
ontbreecf'. Feenstra /us in re 26 points out that Grotius does not supply a latin term for 
gebreckelicke eigendom and whereas most medieval romanists would refer to these rights as 
c/ominium, Donellus rejected the term c/ominium utile and classified these rights as what would later 
be known as iura in re aliena. 
42 Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at272. 
43 Note that although Grotius uses the term dominium plenum in the margin, these two terms 
(clominium perfectum and dominium plenum) are regarded as synonyms. See Feenstra 1976 RMT 
248 at272. 
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becomes clear when one realises that the two medieval definitions of dominium44 do 
not apply to use rights (the old dominium utile) any more. As soon as the distinction 
between dominium perfectum and dominium imperfectum (full ownership and nuda 
proprietas) falls away the definition could be applied to imperfect ownership. The 
definition dealing with vindication applied to imperfect ownership straight away - it did 
not mean much except that the burden of proof was on the user. The user now loses 
the right to vindicate, because he is no longer regarded as an owner. This signifies 
another fundamental change in the development of ownership. According to Grotius' 
system of rights the user no longer has dominium imperfectum or dominium utile and 
as such the user's position cannot be upgraded to dominium by the process of 
eigendomsverschuiwing. 
Grotius' definition of eigendom and voile eigendom and his views on the nature and 
origin of private ownership were accepted by most Roman-Dutch writers. Vinnius45 
defines dominium as plena in re potestas; sive jus de re pro arbitru statuendi. Huber46 
combines Grotius' definitions of eigendom and voile eigendom and defines ownership 
as the owner's complete power over a thing together with the right to claim it wherever 
he finds it. According to Simon van Leeuwen47 ownership is the right according to which 
everybody's property belongs to himself. Van der Walt48 points out that Van Leeuwen's 
definition contains only the proprium aspect of Grotius' definition. Johannes van der 
Linden49 defines ownership as the right according to which a thing belongs to someone, 
44 See Jnleidinge 11.3.1 (1952) 50 and Jnleidinge 11.3.4 (1952) 53 where ownership is defined as the 
power to reclaim lost possession, as well as the defini~on in ln/eidinge 11.33 (1952) 151. 
45 Vinnius JV libros /nstitutionum imperialium commentarius (1659) on Inst. 2.1.3. 
46 Huber Heedendaegse rechtsgeleertheyt 2.2.5 (1768) 101: "Eygendom is een recht, waer door 
mensch vo/komen macht hee'fl: over een /ichamelijke sake, met recht om dese/ve dadelijk te 
eyschen, waer hy se ook vind'. 
47 Van Leeuwen Het rooms-ho/lands regf 22.1 (1732) 108: "Eygendom is het regt daar uit yeders zaak 
hem eygen toebehoorf'. 
48 Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das romisch-holflindische Recht 486 at 506. 
49 Van der Linden Regtsgeleerd, practicaal en koopmans handboek 1.7.1 (1806) 52: "Eigendom is dat 
recht, waar door eenige zaak aan iemand, met uitsluiting van a/le anderen, toekomf'. 
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with the exclusion of others. This definition emphasises the exclusivity or individuality 
of ownership. 
3.4 The recognition of divided ownership in Roman-Dutch law 
Grotius' classification of beheering had an important influence on later developments 
of ownership. The restriction of Bartolus' definition to voile eigendom laid the foundation 
for the unitary concept of ownership according to which only one owner is recognised 
and all other rights with regard to the object in question are reclassified as limited 
rights. 50 Grotius achieved the creation of an unitary concept of ownership by defining 
eigendom is such a manner that the user of property is no longer regarded as dominus. 
The crucial element is the combination of this definition and the system or hierarchy of 
rights which Grotius created. 
The unitary approach to ownership meant that the value of the distinction between 
dominium directum and dominium utile was diminished in Roman-Dutch law. 51 This 
distinction clearly did not form part of Grotius' theoretical structure for real rights and 
he hardly ever used the terms dominium directum and dominium utile. Although he did 
use the term dominium utile in the margin as a Latin equivalent for tocht, 52 Feenstra 53 
states that he probably intentionally avoided any direct use of the term dominium utile. 
It is also interesting to note that Grotius preferred the term opper-eigendom54 to indicate 
50 Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das romisch-hol/andische Recht 486 at 493. 
51 Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 273; Feenstra 1976 Acta juridica 269. Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 39 et 
seq holds a different view. According to Visser the unitary perception of ownership was only weakly 
developed in Roman-Dutch law, and the concept of divided ownership was an integral part of the 
Dutch legal system at the time. He also contends that Grotius reserved the term eigendom for 
dominium directum and gerechtigheden for dominium utile. For a discussion and critisism of this view 
see Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das romisch-holllindische Recht 486 at 493. Van 
der Walt is of the opinion that the concept of divided ownership was effectively destroyed by Grotius' 
approach to and structure for real rights. 
52 /n/eidinge 11.38.5 (1952) 158. 
53 Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 at 273; Feenstra in Birks New perspectives 120. 
54 lnleidinge 11.33.1 (1952) 151. 
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dominium directum as used by the Glossators. It is pointed out by Feenstra55 that it was 
not unusual for Roman-Dutch authors to display a certain ambiguity with regard to the 
use of these terms. 
' 
Huber' still distinguished between voile eygendom and bloote eygendom. This 
distinction, according to which voile eygendom57 includes the power to use and bloote 
eygendom58 exludes enjoyment (where the power to use rests with someone else), 
bears strong resemblance to Grotius' distinction between voile and gebreckelicke 
eigendom. Huber, however, also provides another distinction: Whereas the first is 
based on Roman law, the second is based on medieval law. He states that ownership 
can also be divided into beheerschende eygendom and nuttelijke eygendom. 59 It seems 
as if this distinction of Huber is meant to provide for the medieval concept of divided 
ownership,00 but it is clear that Huber regards nutlijke eygendom as gerechtigheden in 
the same sense as Grotius, and that they are no more than what we now call limited 
55 Feenstra in Birks New perspectives 121 et seq. 
56 Huber Heedendaegse rechtgeleertheyf 2.2.11 (1768) 102. 
57 Huber Heedendaegse rechtsgeleertheyt 2.2.12 (1768) 102: "Volle eygendom wordt genoemt, daer 
het vrucht gebruik mede te zamen gevoegt is". 
58 Huber Heedendaegse rechtsge/eertheyt 2.2.13 (1768) 102: "Bloote eygendom is soner genot; 
wanneer het vrucht gebruik mede te zamen is". 
59 Huber Heedendaegse rechtsge/eertheyt 2.2.14 (1768) 102. 
60 It should be borne in mind that Huber was not a humanist, and thus he would not reject the 
influence of vulgar law outright. Furthermore, there is a strong possibility that the concept of divided 
ownership survived longer in Friesland (Huber wrote mostly on Friesland law) than it did in Holland. 
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real rights. 61 Huber62 states that both these types of ownership are present in the case 
of feudal tenure, quitrent and ownership of a house built on someone else's land, and 
that ownership in these instances are classified as halve eygendom. This bears close 
resemblance to Grotius' description of gebreckelicke eigendom. 63 
After he dealt with beheerschende eygendom Huber64 returns to the other types of 
beheeringe under the heading halve or nutlijke eygendom. He names halve eygendom, 
servitude, pledge, eeuwige renten and stem-recht as the other categories of 
beheeringe. 65 Leen-recht, huis-recht and erf-pacht qualify as halve eygendom. He 
states that these gerechtigheden are called halve eygendom or nutlijke eygendom 
because it resembles ownership in that you can claim it from all possessors. 66 It seems 
as if Huber's distinction between beheersende and nutlijke eygendom is strongly 
influenced by Grotius' description of volle eigendom, gebreckelicke eigendom and 
gerechtigheden. Not only does Huber distinguish between eigendom and 
gerechtigheden, but he also describes both beheersende and nutlijke eygendom as 
halve eygendom in the case of feudal tenure, quitrent and ownership of a house built 
61 Beheerschende eygendom is defined as the case were the use of the thing is with someone else, 
while the opper-eygendom and recognition remains with the (feudal) lord (Heedendaegse 
rechtge/eertheyt 2.2.15 (1768) 102: "Beheerschende is, wanneer het voornaemste genot der sake 
by een ander is, maer de opper-eygendom, en eenige erkentenisse daer van aen den Heer is 
verb/even"). Nutte/ijke eygendom is where a person has the use of a thing, but has to pay 
something to the feudal lord as recognition of his opper-eygendom (Heedendaegse 
rechtsgeleertheyt 2.2.16 (1768) 102: "De nuttelijke in tegendeel, is by die geene, die het meeste 
genot der saken hebben, maer echter aen den Heer tot erkentenisse van opper-eygendom, yets 
beta/en"). 
62 Huber Heedendaegse rechtsge/eertheyt2.2.17 (1768) 102: "Beide dese soorten van eygendom 
komen te zamen in de Leen-goederen, Erf-pachten; en in Gebouwen, die op een anders grondt 
staen. Doch wy brengen die beneeden tot de soorten van halve eygendom". 
63 Jnleidinge 11.33.1 (1952) 151. 
64 Huber Heedendaegse rechtsge/eertheyt 2.36 (1768) 260. 
65 Huber Heedendaese rechtgeleertheyt2.36.1(1768)260: "Dus verre van eygendom en Erf-recht. 
Vo/gen nu de ander soorten van beheeringe ... Welke zijn halve eygendom, Dienstbaerheyt, Pand 
ende Stem-recht, sampt eeuwige renten". 
66 Huber Heedendaegse rechtsgeleertheyt2.36.3 (1768) 260: "Wy noemen dese gerechtigheden met 
de naem van halve eygendom, om datse naer eygendom gelijken, immers hier in, dat mense kan 
vervolgen ende eyschen van a/le ende yder bezitter. Men noemt het ook nut/ijken eygendom". 
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T 
on someone else's land. 
Although Voet67 includes dominium directum and dominium utile amongst the various 
divisions of ownership, and states that those who enjoy dominium utile is referred to as 
' 
domini, he adds that it cannot be regarded as such when dominium directum is properly 
regarded. 
Interestingly, Van der Keessel68 states that quitrent, feudal tenure, servitudes, pledge 
and similar rights can be regarded as ownership, because these rights diminish the full 
or complete ownership of another. This statement can be interpreted to mean that Van 
der Keessel does not regard Grotius' treatment of ownership as a complete 
abandonment of the medieval notion of different types of ownership. 69 Van der Keessel, 
however, continues to follow the rest of Grotius' classification, according to which a 
clear distinction is made between gebreckelicke eigendom and gerechtigheden, very 
closely. 70 Van der Linden1 does not refer to divided ownership at all, and merely 
distinguishes between volkomen eigendom and onvolkomen eigendom. Vinnius72 also 
67 Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas (1707) 6.1.1. 
68 Van der Keessel Praelectiones iuris hodiemi ad Hugonis Grotii introductionem ad iurisprudentiam 
Hollandicam (1963) on lnleidinge 11.33.1. 
69 For a discussion see Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 39 at 42; Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann 
Das romisch-hofllindische Recht 486 at 513. 
70 One can only speculate as to the reason why he continues to follow the rest of Grotius' treatment 
of ownership very closely after stating that quitrent, feudal tenure, servitudes, pledge and similar 
rights can be regarded as ownership. It might be that he did not quite appreciate Grotius' very subtle 
revolution in lnleidinge 11.33 or that he was unwilling to depart from very old authorities. 
71 Van der Linden Regtsge/eerd, practicaal en koopmans handboek 1. 7 .1 (1806) 52: "Eigendom is dat 
recht, waar door eenige zaak aan iemand, met uitsluiting van a/le anderen, toekomt. - Het is 
inzonderheid kenbaar aan deszelfs gevo/gen. Het bevat 1) het recht om te genieten de vrugten, die 
van de zaak voortkomen. 2) Het recht, om zig van de zaak te bedienen tot zoodanig betame/ijk 
gebruik, a/s men goedvindt. 3) Het recht, om de form of gedaante der zaak, naar goedvinden, te 
veranderen. 4) Het recht, om de zaak, des goedvindende, gehee/ te vemietigen. 5) Het recht, om 
aan anderen te beletten, zig van de zaak te bedienen. En 6) Het recht, om de zaak te vervreemden, 
of eenige andere zoort van recht, b. v. gebruik, aan anderen over te dragen. - Waar deze gevolgen 
alien niet gevonden worden, is de eigendom onvolkomen. - Men moet dit al/es egter opvatten met 
die bepaaling, mits het voorschrift der wetten, of het recht van een derden niet be/edigd worde". 
72 Vinnius IV libros lnstitutionum imperialium commentarius (1659) on Inst. 2.1.3. 
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follows Grotius classification closely, and only uses the term dominium utile once as a 
symonym for dominium minus plenum. The fact that Vinnius seems to reject the 
concept of divided ownership is not strange in view of the fact that he was a humanist, 
and as such he would reject any medieval influence on Roman law. 73 Van Leeuwen74 
' 
merely discusses Grotius' distinction between ownership and possession, as well as 
the distinction between voile eygendom and gebreeklijke eygendom, and makes no 
mention of either dominium directum or dominium utile. 
Grotius' distinction between eigendom and gerechtigheden placed the Roman-Dutch 
law of property on a route that differed from other European countries at the time and 
thus the effect of divided ownership was much less influential in Holland. 75 Although it 
is clear that most of the Roman-Dutch authors did not abandon divided ownership 
completely, it is equally clear that they did not emphasised it, nor did they regard it as 
the only approach to private ownership. The occassional reference to dominium 
directum and dominium utile seems to indicate that divided ownership nominally still 
formed part of Roman-Dutch law, though most Roman-Dutch authors followed Grotius' 
distinction between eigendom and gerechtigheden. According to Van der Walt76 the 
actual theoretical basis and impetus for the abandonment of the concept of divided 
ownership was already provided by Grotius' definition of gebreckelicke eigendom. 
73 See in this regard Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hol/andse reg 140 et seq. 
74 Van Leeuwen Het Rooms-ho/lands regt 2.2.1 (1732) 108: "Alie regt op enig goed bestaat, of in 
eygendom, of besit-regt: Eygendom is het regt daar uit yeders zaak hem eygen toebehoort . 
. .. . Derhalven den eygendom onderscheyden werd, in voile, of gebreeklijken eygendom. Vol/en 
eygendom is a/s yemand beneffens het regt van eygendom, ook het volkomen gebruik hee'ft. 
Gebreeklijke, so wanneer den eygendom hem we/ toekomt, maar of het gebruik een ander hee'ft of 
immers yets ontbreekt, waarom hy niet al/es daar me kan doen wat hy begeerf'. 
75 Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 at 273; Feenstra 1976 Acta Juridica 269; Van der Walt in Feenstra and 
Zimmermann Das r6misch-ho//lindische Recht 486 at 493. But see Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 39 
et seq. 
76 Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das r6misch-hol/andische Recht 486 at 493. 
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3.5 The absoluteness of ownership in Roman-Dutch law 
The way in which ownership is defined and the place it takes within the structure of 
rights in a particular system will determine whether ownership within that specific 
' 
system is regarded as absolute or relative. 
The fact that ownership in Roman-Dutch law was restricted quite severely is not 
disputed,77 but this does not necessarily imply that ownership was·regarded as relative. 
Restrictions have always formed part of ownership. Bartolus' definition78 is a clear 
example in that he defines ownership as the right of complete disposal, but with the 
express proviso that this right is limited by law. Even the German Pandectists, who 
defined ownership in absolute terms, recognised the fact that ownership will always be 
subject to restriction. 79 In order to determine whether or not ownership was perceived 
as an absolute right, it should be determined whether restrictions on ownership are 
regarded as an integral and natural part of ownership in a specific system or whether 
the unlimited nature of ownership is regarded as natural within that system. 
It is difficult to determine whether ownership had an absolute or relative character in 
Roman-Dutch law. Grotius' theory on the nature and origin of private ownership was 
widely accepted by Roman-Dutch authors. According to Grotius' theory two aspects, 
the proprium and facultas aspects, can be identified. The theory is based on the 
assumption that individual ownership of property amounts to divided, separate and 
mutually exclusive rights accruing to individuals - this is described as the proprium 
aspect. The discretionary use of an individual owner - the facultas aspect - implies that 
property is separated and removed from what was formerly property accessible to 
everybody for common use. According to this approach, ownership would be regarded 
77 For examples of various restrictions on ownership in Roman-Dutch law see Visser 1985 Acta 
Juridica 39. 
78 Bartolus on D.41.2.17.1 no 4: "Dominium est ius de re corporali perfecte disponendi nisi Jege 
prohibeatut". 
79 Savigny System des heutigen r6mischen Rechts 367; Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts 
492. 
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as absolute. It should, however, be noted that the Roman-Dutch authors never really 
theorised about or considered the possibility of the absoluteness of ownership. They 
merely made structural and terminological changes which made it possible for future 
generations to interpret ownership as an absolute right. 
Judged against the background of the hierarchy of rights - as devised by Grotius - it 
seems easier to argue that (at least full) ownership has an absolute character. 
Ownership is the strongest real right in the scientific system of logically connected 
concepts and the different definitions, divisions and logical relations place ownership 
at the pinnacle of the structure of real rights, while all the other real rights are limited 
rights and have a relative character. Grotius could only succeed in creating this new 
vision of the concept of ownership by destroying the old, medieval concept of divided 
ownership. 80 
The fact that divided ownership was not quite dead in Roman-Dutch law complicates 
this argument. Divided ownership per se implies a relative right of ownership and this 
stands in the way of simply classifying ownership in Roman-Dutch law as absolute. 
Thus, although ownership in Roman-Dutch law cannot be described as absolute, it can 
be said that there was a strong tendency towards the recognition of such a view. Van 
der Walt81 points out that although the actual absolutist formulation of ownership had 
its origin with the German Pandectists, the approach of Grotius and other Roman-Dutch 
authors, and the fact that the remnants of divided ownership were practically 
meaningless, laid the foundation for this perception of ownership. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Grotius destroyed the feudal forms of divided ownership and emphasised the 
importance of the individual by reverting to individual, uniform ownership. Although he 
80 Van der Walt 1995 THRHR 396 at 405. 
81 Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das r6misch-hollandische Recht 486 at 509. 
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started out from the medieval distinction between dominium directum and dominium 
utile, he used the logical and terminological distinction between the different forms of 
gebreckelijke eigendom to destroy it. Most other Roman:.outch authors did not 
emphasise divided ownership and to a large extent they followed Grotius' distinction 
' 
between eigendom and gerechtigheden. Most Roman-Dutch authors emphasised the 
free will and autonomy of the individual some extent, and this, coupled with the move 
away from medieval divided ownership, accentuated the individualistic nature of 
ownership and paved the way for the creation of the concept of absolute ownership in 
subsequent periods of development. 
Grotius also created a hierarchical system of property rights by defining volle eigendom 
as the most complete (real) right and all other rights with regard to property as lesser 
rights. Grotius set out the whole system of what we now call real rights. Up to this point 
in history the emphasis was on ownership or dominium, but the system of rights created 
by Grotius can be viewed as the transition of the focus from ownership to property is 
the sense of a system of rights. This indicates that the current private law perception 
of property rights is based, not on Roman law, but rather on the work and influence of 
Grotius and other subsequent influences. 
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THE INFLUENCE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE SOCIAL 
FUNCTION OF OWNERSHIP 
4.1 Introduction 
The French Revolution is often perceived as a turning point in the historical 
development of private law, especially as far as the social function of ownership is 
concerned. Before the Revolution ownership was basically still a feudal institution. 
Ownership was centred around the family or clan and the way in which the owner 
exercised his rights was determined by the needs and interests of the community in 
which the right functioned.1 Numerous burdens were placed on ownership in feudal law 
and ownership was subject to many restrictions.2 In the nineteenth century, by contrast, 
ownership was perceived as individual and absolute in the sense that the owner can 
use his property as he sees fit.3 Personal freedom and liberty were accentuated more 
strongly and the interests of society have to play second fiddle to the needs and will of· 
the individual. The French Revolution is regarded by many as the event that brought 
about this change in the function of ownership. 
4.2 The French Revolution: A brief historical overview 
In order to explain the significance and influence of the French Revolution on the 
concept of ownership, a brief historical overview of the events that led to the adoption 
of the Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (and with this the abolition of 
Van Goethem 1989 Rechtskundig Weekblad 209 at 215. 
2 See chapter 2. 
3 This development is discussed in chapter 5. Also see Van den Bergh Eigendom 51 et seq. 
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feudalism) and the Code Civil is provided in this section. 4 
4.2.1 The abolition of feudalism 
' 
The eminent threat of bankruptcy of the French state compelled Louis XVI in May 1789 
to convoke the States General (Etats-Generaux). 5 This set the stage on which the 
Revolution would unfold around a demand, not for mere fiscal reforms, but for change 
in the whole structure of government and society. 6 On 4 May 1789 Louis XVI decreed 
that the dasses (citizenry, the clerical order and the nobility) were to meet separately 
and that voting would take place per class. The citizenry consequently left the States 
General and created a new forum which they called the Assemblee Nationale 
Constituante or Constituent Assembly. The clerical order, the nobility and the citizenry 
4 
5 
6 
It is generally believed that the French revolution is the result of a class struggle between the 
nobility and the clerical order on the one hand and the citizenry on the other. See Kelly A short 
history ofwestem legal theory247 in this regard. Van Goethem 1989 Rechtskundig Weekblad 209 
et seq, however, points out that this view is not entirely correct. According to him the strict division 
between nobility and citizenry was not part of the social reality of pre-revolutionary France. It was 
not only nobility that enjoyed the privileges of the feudal system.The vast majority of the feudal 
prMleges were not in the hands of the nobility, but rather in the hands of a part of the citizenry - the 
reason being that since the eighteenth century these privileges could be sold (and indeed were 
sold to commoners). On the one hand the reason for the revolution lies in the struggle between 
the landowners and the people that had to work the land, and on the other it lies in the 
disgruntlement of the landowners with the arbitrariness of state power. 
As part of the preparations for this meeting the representatives from the different areas had to 
provide the king with Cahiers de doleances (letters in which the grievances and wishes of the 
French people were set out) to indicate what the king could expect from the meeting. Two aspects 
were present in almost all the cahiers de doleances: firstly, a call for the unification and codification 
of the law in general and secondly the need for the protection of ownership - which included 
protection against the feudal system according to which the men that actually worked the land were 
made dependant on the feudal lords. See Van Caenegem An historical introduction to private law 
7; Lokin and Zwalve Hoofstukken uit de Europese codificatiegeschiedenis 156; Van den Berg 
Codificatie en staatsvorming 230 et seq. 
It is generally believed that the French revolution is the result of a class struggle between the 
nobility and the clerical order on the one hand and the citizenry on the other. See Kelly A short 
history ofwestem legal theory247 in this regard. Van Goethem 1989 Rechtskundig Weekblad 209 
et seq, however, points out that this view is not entirely correct. According to him the strict division 
between nobility and citizenry was not part of the social reality of pre-revolutionary France. It was 
not only nobility that enjoyed the privileges of the feudal system.The vast majority of the feudal 
prMleges were not in the hands of the nobility, but rather in the hands of a part of the citizenry - the 
reason being that since the eighteenth century these privileges could be sold (and indeed were 
sold to commoners). On the one hand the reason for the revolution lies in the struggle between 
the landowners and the people that had to work the land, and on the other it lies in the 
disgruntlement of the landowners with the arbitrariness of state power. 
54 
were all represented in this new body. 7 
Before the Assembly started work on the constitution they concentrated on drafting the 
Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen. On the night of 4 August 1789 the 
' Constituent Assembly unanimouslY' abolished feudalism and the attached privileges 
of the nobility,9 and a few days later, on 26 August, the Declaration was likewise 
accepted unanimously. This meant that the citizenry not only inherited a capitalist 
system, but also a comprehensive power position.10 Political liberalism, the realisation 
of personal freedom and equality were emphasised by the Constituent Assembly. 11 The 
relation between the freedom of the individual and the freedom of landownership from 
feudal bondage are emphasised in sections 1 and 17 of the Declaration. Section 1 of 
the Dedaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen determines that all people are born 
free and equal in rights and that social distinctions are to be founded exclusively on 
their social utility. The invoilability of private ownership is guaranteed is section 17 of 
the Declaration. Ownership is described as a "droit inviolable et sacre" and can be 
taken from someone only on the clear ground of social necessity, according to statutory 
authority, and on condition of compensation. 
7 
8 
9 
10 
The main purpose of the Constituent Assembly was to draft a written constitution for France. Since 
the king was reluctant to act against the new Constituent Assembly, it gained some sort of legal 
status. See Lokin and Zwalve Hoofstukken uit de Europese codificatiegeschiedenis 158. 
The nobility agreed to the abolition of the feudal system and their privileges. According to Van den 
Bergh Eigendom 51 these privileges had outlived their historical right of existence. Lokin and 
Zwalve Hoofstukken uit de Europese codificatiegeschiedenis 158 point out that the suggestion to 
abolish feudalism came from the nobility itself - in the person of the viscount of Noailles - and was 
accepted in a gush of overexcited enthusiasm. The nobility felt that they would gain more by 
abolishing the feudal system: they would be free from the burdens of feudalism and only have to 
share their political power with the citizenry. See Van Goethem 1989 Rechtskundig Weekblad 209 
at212 
Van den Bergh Eigendom 51; Van Goethem 1989 Rechtskundig Weekblad 209 at 212; Lokin and 
Zwalve Hoofstukken uit de Europese codificatiegeschiedenis 158; Van den Berg Codificatie en 
staatsvorming 247 et seq; Kelly Historians and the law of postrevolutionary France 129. 
Van Goethem 1989 Rechtskundig Weekblad 209 at 210. 
11 Van den Bergh Eigendom 51. 
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The abolition of feudalism went to the core of the grievances of the citizenry. 12 The 
class system was rejected and with it the distinction between dominium directum and 
dominium utile was abolished.13 From this point on all citizens· would have equal rights 
and everybody would be free to acquire and hold property in full ownership. 14 According 
' 
to Van den Bergh 15 the abolition of the feudal system also meant that a clear distinction 
was drawn between public and private law. This meant that the link between political 
rights and landownership was severed16 and that government powers could no longer 
be held and controlled by private individuals and sold as personal property. 
4.2.2 The drafting of the Code Civil 
Napoleon Bonaparte17 commissioned four men to draft the French civil &de. 
12 Van Caenegem An historical introduction to private law 1; Lokin and Zwalve Hoofstukken uit de 
Europese codificatiegeschiedenis 157. One of the things that was named specifically during the 
debate on the abolition was the freedom from taxes of the nobility. See Van den Bergh Eigendom 
51. 
13 French authors tended to see the actual user of land as the real owner, even while the distinction 
between dominium directum and dominium utile was still in vogue. See Pothier in Oeuvres 
Completes 11 3. For a discussion see Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 305 at 316; Van der Walt and 
Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 246. 
14 Van Goethem 1989 Rechtskundig Weekblad 209 at 212; Van den Bergh Eigendom 51. 
15 Van den Bergh Eigendom 51. 
16 This system was, however, replaced by a system of census franchise. This meant that franchise 
was made dependant on the amount of taxes one pays or the number of hours one works. See 
Van den Bergh Eigendom 24; Kelly A short history of western legal theory 293. 
17 The first French Constitution, which included the Declaration des droits de /'homme et du citoyen, 
was officially endorsed by Louis XVI on 14 September 1791. This constitution determined that 
France would henceforth be a constitutional monarchy. This form of state, however, would not last 
long, for on 10 August 1792 the king was suspended for using his veto too often. From this point 
on the Revolution would radicalise. On 25 September 1792 France was declared a republic, "une 
et indivisible", and shortly after Louis XVI and hundreds of others were executed. The period of 
political and social turmoil that followed - and with that the French Revolution - ended on 9 
November 1799 with the coup d'etat lead by Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon himself declared: 
"Citoyens, la Revolution est fixee aux principes qui /'ont commencee. Elle est finie". During the 
period from the declaration of the republic to Napoleon's coup various attempts were made to 
codify French cMI law, but without any success. 
18 Before this three different attempts at codifying the French civil law were made by Cambaceres 
(1793, 1794 and 1796). In each of these attempts Cambaceres tried to reflect the political view of 
56 
Tronchet, Bigot-Preameneu, Portalis 19 and Maleville set to work and finished the first 
draft within four months. On 21 March 1804 the Code Civil des Fram;ais was adopted. 
Ownership is defined in section 544 Code Civil: 
"La propriete est le droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la maniere la 
plus absolue, pourvu qu'on n'en fasse pas un usage prohibe par Jes lois 
et par Jes reglements". 
According to Van Caenegem20 the Code Civil is the culmination of the evolution of 
French law. It contains both old law - some of it is directly derived from customary and 
Roman law of the middle ages - and new law, and is not as revolutionary as one might 
expect. The distant sources of the code included customs, Roman law and case law of 
the parlements - especially the Parlement de Paris. The authors of the code also 
consulted traditional commentators of French law such as Bourjon and Pothier. 
Although old law was the most important element of the code, the authors had no 
intention of re-establishing the old regime: it replaced most of old law with a single and 
uniform code for the whole of France, incorporated several ideological measures that 
stemmed from the Revolution and attempted to make the role of the legal scholar 
superfluous by prohibiting doctrinal commentary on the code. 21 
that point in time, but with the fast changing political scene each proposal was outdated by the time 
he had finished them. For a discussion see Lokin and Zwalve Hoofstukken uit de Europese 
codificatiegeschiedenis 162 et seq; Van den Berg Cocfdicatie en staatsvorrning 273 et seq. 
19 Portalis, who wrote the famous preface to the Code Civil, is considered the most important 
draughtsman of the code. See Derine Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende eeuw 
53 et seq; Van Caenegem An historical introduction to private law 7 et seq; Van Dievoet Het 
burgerlyke recht in BelgiiJ en in Nederland van 1800tot1940 5 et seq; Valkhoff 1957 RMT21 at 
24. 
20 Van Caenegem An historical introduction to private law 1 et seq. 
21 Also see Kelly A short history of western legal theory 312. 
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The general tone of the code is distinctly conservative.22 According to Portalis23 the 
essential role of the state is to ensure preservation, peace and security in law. The 
code attempts to achieve this by emphasising its respect for the family24 and absolute 
property rights25 as the basis of the social order. 
One of the characteristics of the different codes of the early nineteenth century - and 
with that the Code Civil - was the abolition of feudalism and inequality and, in doing so, 
it attempted to make the law accessible to all.26 It must, however, be said that although 
the Code Civil recognised the fundamental principle of the disburdenment of landed 
property, it did not liberate or emancipate the owner totally. Many inequalities and 
burdens (especially feudal burdens) were abolished, but the code also introduced new 
ones. 27 
The Code Civil introduced a new era in the development of private law. 28 According to 
Van Kan29 the realisation of the code in that time and under those circumstances was 
indeed an achievement. It meant that legal uniformity replaced legal diversity, legal 
simplicity replaced legal disorder and security in law replaced legal insecurity. From 
this point on all citizens would be free and equal with regard to corporeal things, subject 
to nothing but the law, and only restricted in so far as they wished to commit 
22 Van Caenegem An historical introduction to private law 7. 
23 Portalis in his Discours preliminaire (preface) to the Code Civil des Fram;ais. 
24 In Book I, whose main characteristic is submission to the power of husband and father. 
25 In Books II and Ill. For Portalis' view of the extent of the absoluteness of the property rights see par 
4.4. 
26 Robinson, Fergus and Gordon An introduction to European legal history 414. 
27 For a discussion see Van Caenegem An historical introduction to private law 9 et seq. 
28 Van Dievoet Het burgerlijke recht in Belgie en Nederland van 1800 tot 1940 3; Van den Bergh 
Eigendom 51. 
29 Van Kan 1920 TR 359 et seq. 
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themselves or acted unlawfully. 30 
4.3 The general perception regarding the influence of the French Revolution on 
the concept of ownership 
The French Revolution and the Code Civil are often regarded as the catalysts for the 
development of the modern individual and absolute concept of ownership. According 
to Kelly31 the modern character of ownership is directly derived from the French 
Revolution. The unjust legalism of the old regime was superseded by the idea of 
absolute property based on subsistence and the legitimising force of labour. Van 
Goethem32 states that with the abolition of the feudal burdens the elements of 
ownership were no longer divided among different parties, but was concentrated in the 
hands of one person who has absolute ownership. A definite break with the old regime 
is evident in the way that the owner is described by authors in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. The post-revolutionary owner is seen as an absolute lord and 
master, as a despotic sovereign that may dispose of his property with unlimited power. 
To emphasise the absoluteness and individualism of ownership, it is described as 
"individualisme absolu'', "individualisme unilateral', "individualisme abstaif' and 
"individualisme excessif'. 33 
Under the influence of the practitioners of civil law most jurists were misled to 
summarise the entitlements of the owner in abstracto. According to Savatier34 these 
entitlements included, amongst others, the power to destroy one's property. However, 
30 Van den Bergh Eigendom 51. 
31 Kelly Historians and the law in post-revolutionary France 129. 
32 Van Goethem 1989 Rechtskundig Weekblad209 at 210. 
33 Derine Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende eeuw 6 and the sources mentioned 
there. 
34 Savatier Du droit civil au droit public 53. According to Savatier the owner may even go so far as 
to destroy his house during a housing shortage. For further discussion see Derine Grenzen van het 
eigendomsrecht in de negentiende eeuw 9. 
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the second part of section 544 Code Civil mentions the fact that limitation by statute or 
regulation is possible. 
Ownership in the nineteenth century is often seen as essentially unlimited. Limitations 
' 
that do exist are not seen as something inherent to ownership, but rather something 
placed on ownership from outside. The unlimitedness of ownership is seen as a natural 
law principle so that each and every limitation needs to be justified. This unlimitedness 
is also directed at the legislature who has to refrain from measures that restrict the 
owner's freedom, in so far as these measures are not absolutely necessary.35 
This perception of ownership as an absolute, individual right is based on the 
description of ownership as "droit inviolable et sacre" in the Declaration des droits de 
l'homme et du citoyen and as a "driot de jouir et disposer des choses de la maniere la 
plus absolue" in the Code Civil. 36 A second argument that is used to support this view 
is that the Code Civil (and with that section 544 specifically) is not only the product of 
juridical work, but it is also that of a philosophical revolution that developed in the 
eighteenth century and reached its zenith in the French Revolution.37 The fact that very 
few limitations on ownership existed in the nineteenth century is also used to support 
the view that ownership became absolute.38 
35 For a discussion see Beekhuis et al Asser 21. Reehuis et al Pitlo 276 confirm this view by stating 
that the modern concept of ownership developed. from the essentially unlimited concept of 
ownership in the early nineteenth century. 
36 Derine Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende eeuw 1 O; Beekhuis et al Asser 21. 
37 The work of Grotius, Pufendorff, Rousseau and Kant are often quoted to support the argument that 
every indMdual is a sovereign with an absolute autonomy to exercise his own will. These authors 
have, however, stated that the autonomy is tempered by the interests of society and is not 
boundless. See Derine Genzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende eeuw 11 et seq; Kelly 
Historians and the law of post-revolutionary France 127 et seq; Kelly A short history of western 
legal theory 292 et seq; Morin 1929 Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale 271 et seq. 
38 Derine Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende eeuw 14 7 et seq points out that there 
did indeed exist many limitations on ownership. Also see Valkhoff 1957 RMT21 at 25. Reehuis et 
al Pitlo 276. 
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4.4 An alternative view 
Van den Bergh39 warns that the influence of the French Revolution on the development 
of ownership must not be overemphasised. In his view, historical analysis shows that 
' 
the idea that the absolute character of ownership is directly derived from the Revolution 
is not as obvious as is often believed. 
The famous description of ownership as a "droit inviolable et sacre", which is often 
quoted to summarise the liberal, capitalist, absolute concept of ownership that 
supposedly stems from the Revolution, was a principle of political rather than legal 
import. It had nothing to do with the freeing of land from feudal bondage or the 
entitlements of the owner, but rather with the question of expropriation in the public 
interest.40 Section 17 of the Declaration des droits de l'homme et du citoy~h was 
aimed at a specific abuse: that of the theory of dominium eminens, which in some 
circles meant expropriation without compensation. 42 Section 17, which was proposed 
by Duport,43 was not meant to make ownership absolute. This is evident from Duport's 
own view of the concept of ownership. In his view, which is derived from jurists such as 
Grotius,44 Pufendorff45 and Van Bijnkershoek,46 ownership is an essentially limited right. 
39 Van den Bergh Eigendom 51. Also see Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 at 256; Van der Walt and Kleyn 
in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 245. 
40 Van den Bergh Eigendom 53; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 
at245. 
41 Section 17 determines that rights of ownership are sacred and inviolable, and can be taken from 
somebody only on the clear ground of social necessity, according to statutory authority, and on 
condition of indemnity 
42 For the different interpretations of the theory of dominium eminens see Van den Bergh Eigendom 
53. 
43 Adrien Duport was a member of the moderate liberal faction in the National Assembly. See 
Sandweg Rationales Naturrecht als revolution/ire Praxis 230; Van den Bergh Eigendom 53. 
44 Grotius lnleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid (11.3) 52. 
45 Pufendorff De jure naturae et gentium 378. 
46 Van Bijnkershoek Dissertatio de domnio marls 1. II, 124. 
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Ownership, according to these authors, is not a natural right in the absolute sense and 
does not negate public interest. Rather, it is a social institution, created for the benefit 
of an orderly society. Public interest requires that ownership be protected, but 
ownership finds its limits in that same public interest.47 The description of ownership as 
' 
a sacred and inviolable right is thus directed at protecting the owner from arbitrary 
action by the state, and not to indicate that ownership is an unlimited or absolute right. 
Or put differently, the description is aimed at the state's power of eminent domain and 
not at the police power limitation of ownership. 
Section 544 Code Civil, and especially the words "de la maniere la plus absolue", has 
led many a jurist to the conclusion that ownership is an absolute right and that the 
owner has total freedom to use or abuse his property as he sees fit. Derine48 points out 
that the description of ownership in section 544 - according to which the first part sets 
out the freedom of the owner and the second part qualifies this freedom by stating that 
the freedom is subject to limitation by law and regulation - is not a product of the 
Revolution. Bartolus49 and others50 have also described ownership in this way. The 
words de la maniere la plus absolue, however, is a new addition to the definition and 
its exact origin is not known. 51 What the authors of the Code Civil tried to accomplish 
with these words is not entirely clear. What is clear, however, is what they did not 
intend to suggest that ownership is absolute in the sense that it is an unlimited right. 
Pothier,52 who is generally accepted as the jurist who had the biggest influence on the 
47 Sandweg Rationales Naturrecht a/s revolutionare Praxis 230 
48 Derine Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende eeuw 31. Also see Feenstra 1976 
RMT248 at250. 
49 Bartol us on D 41.2.17 .1 no 4. Also see chapter 2 for a discussion. 
50 Ouarenus Omnia Opera I.XVII 1348; Cujacius Opera omnia XLl.1860; Gothofredus Corpus iuris 
civilis D 41.1; Pothier Pandectae Justianeae 95. 
51 Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 250; Derine Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende eeuw 
39. 
52 Pothier De domaine de propriete 15 et seq. The examples provided by Pothier clearly indicates that 
the limitations on ownership can be quite severe. According to him a ban can be placed on the 
planting of tobacco or the exporting of grain in times of shortage. The owner can even be 
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content of the code, emphasised the fact that ownership is always subject to limitations. 
The authors of the code, including Napoleon, 53 did not view ownership as an unlimited 
right. Portalis54 emphasised this fact in his explanatory note to the ownership clause. 
' He states that, although ownership entails the freedom to enjoy and dispose of one's 
property in the most absolute manner, it must be kept in mind that ownership always 
functions within a specific society, and that the owner must exercise his freedom within 
the bounds of that society. Freedom always exists within the bounds of the law and 
must be exercised in harmony with the law and never in conflict with the law. 
Maleville55 refers to the description of ownership as the ius utendi and the ius abutendi, 
and points out that the ius abutendi must not be interpreted to mean the right to abuse 
one's property. It merely indicates that the owner can use his property in such a way 
that the property is consumed - as opposed to ius utendi where the property is not 
consumed, but remains in existence. Grenier, 56 as spokesman for the Tribunate, also 
praised the ownership clause in section 544 Code Civil for not recognising the right to 
abuse. 
It ought to be clear that the authors of the Code Civil did not intend to suggest that 
ownership was absolute by using the words de la maniere la plus absolue to describe 
the owner's right. Although it is not entirely clear, it seems that they described 
ownership as the most absolute right to enjoy and dispose of property to distinguish 
between ownership and other more limited rights such as usufruct. The texts of 
compelled to sell his products on the market, and not to influence the price of grain by withholding 
the product. 
53 Derine Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht n de negentiende eeuw 60 et seq and 79 et seq; Valkhoff 
1957 RMT21 at24. 
54 Fenet Recueil des travaux preparatoires de Code Civil XI 116. 
55 Maleville Analyse raisonnee de la discussion de Code Civil au Conseil d'Etat 29; For a discussion 
see Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 at 251; Derine Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende 
eeuw41. 
56 Fenet Recueil des travaux preparatoires de Code Civil XI 158. 
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Maleville and Grenier, that distinguish between "abut!' for ownership and "utl' for 
usufruct, point in this direction. 57 
4.5 Conclusion 
Although it is clear that the Revolution and the political, social and economical 
developments that accompanied it had a significant effect on the development of 
ownership, Van den Bergh can be supported in his view that the importance of the 
French Revolution must not be overemphasised. The liberation of land from feudal 
bondage was a strong incentive for the shift in landownership with its concomitant 
political effect on equality and freedom. The result was that the functional fragmentation 
that was recognised throughout the Middle Ages was rejected and replaced by a more 
individualistic view of the relationship between man and land.58 Feudalism, and with 
that divided ownership, was finally abolished in the Declaration des droits de l'homme 
et du citoyen. Section 544 Code Civil defines ownership as part of a whole system of 
rights. The most important influence of the French Revolution is the fact that the feudal 
system, and with that the property relations associated with that system, was abolished 
and replaced by individual ownership. 
However, the abolition of feudal ownership did not have the effect that ownership 
acquired an absolute character. Although the emphasis shifted to individualism and the 
power of the individual to make his/her own decisions with regard to the use and 
enjoyment of his/her property, this should not be seen as an implication that ownership 
is an absolute or inprinciple unrestricted right. 
The abolition of feudalism in the Dedaration des droits de /'homme et du citoyen shifted 
57 Derine Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende eeuw 42. 
58 The principle of an individualistic right was, however, limited by the its treatment in the Declaration 
des droits de fhomme et du citoyen according to the Declaration ownership is granted in order to 
promote the social objective of an orderly society. See Van den Bergh Eigendom 52 et seq; Van 
Maanen Eigendomschijnbewegingen 23; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history 
of/aw 213 at 245. 
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the emphasis to individualism, and the institution of ownership consequently acquired 
its unitary character. This created the possibility for the drafters of the Code Civil to 
define ownership as a right which forms part of a hierarchical system of rights. The 
Code provided for both ownership and limited real rights. This had a bearing on the 
institution of ownership as well as on the concept of ownership, and laid' the foundation 
for the later recognition of the concept of absolute ownership. This system, which had 
its origin in the work of Grotius, would be developed further by the German Pandectists. 
The Revolution represents another discontinuity in the natural and logical development 
of ownership. The Revolution led to the abolition of the feudal system and the creation 
of the modern state. The social and political changes brought about by the Revolution 
led to and necessitated a shift in the nature, content and protection of property rights. 
The post-Revolution society differed completely from medieval society and property 
right had to undergo fundamental change to provide for the social and political needs 
of post-Revolution society. 
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5 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN CIVILIST CONCEPT OF 
OWNERSHIP IN GERMAN LAW 
5.1 Introduction 
It was pointed out in Chapter 4 that, although the French Revolution was the catalyst 
for the removal of many restrictions on ownership, it did not lead to the creation of the 
modern unitary and civilist concept of ownership. Although many restrictions on 
ownership were removed in Roman-Dutch law, as a result of the French Revolution, 
and in German law, it is generally accepted that the most influential version of the 
modern civilist concept of ownership was created in the nineteenth century by the 
German Pandectists. 1 
This chapter looks at how the modern civilist concept of ownership was created in 
German law. The concept of ownership according to the authors in the tradition of the 
Usus Modemus Pandectarum and the followers of the Historical School is considered 
briefly, and finally the work of the German Pandectists, especially Bernhard 
Windscheid, is discussed. 
5.2 The Usus Modernus Pandectarum 
In an important phase of the development of German law during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, a group of jurists concentrated on the development of German 
national law.2 Their positivist approach to legal practice was known as the Usus 
2 
Van den Bergh Eigendom (1979) 5; V1SS0r 1985 Acta Juridica 39 at 46; Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 
569 et seq; Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das rOmisch-hollandische recht 485 at 
519; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 24 7. 
Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 160; Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse 
reg237. 
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Modernus Pandectarum. 3 The authors of the Usus Modernus gave full recognition to 
both Roman law and local law, and attempted to reconcile these two systems. After 
Conring4 refuted the Lothar legend, according to which Lothar Ill expressly imported 
Roman law into Germany in 1135 (the so-called translatio imperil), it became possible 
' for jurists to query the validity of any text or give it a heterodox meaning. No longer in 
awe of the Corpus luris, the authors of the Usus Modernus examined all the laws of all 
the different parts of Germany, whether Roman or Germanic, as actually applied in the 
higher courts. Whenever Roman law principles or rules differed from native law, the 
authors of the Usus Modernus attempted to change and adapt Roman law to such an 
extent that it corresponded to the needs of local German legal practice. 5 The authors 
of the Usus Modernus did not distinguish sharply between Roman and Germanic law.6 
With reference to property law, the authors of the Usus Modernus Pandectarum were 
not responsible for any major changes. Generally they still referred to Bartolus' 
definition of dominium and they recognised the medieval distinction between dominium 
directum and dominium utile. 7 Dominium was divided into dominium plenum and 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Wieacker A history of private Jaw in Europe 160 points out that the name Usus Modemus 
Pandectarum comes from the title of one of the main works of this movement, Samuel Stryk's 
Usus Modemus Pandectarum (1690-1712).The term Usus Modemus Pandectarum refers to the 
method applied by this group, namely the current practice of Roman law or the modern application 
of the pandects (Roman law according to Justinian's Digest). The terms nova practica and mores 
hodiemi are also used in this context. See also Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Ho/Jandse 
reg237. 
Conring De origine iuris Gennanici. See in this regard Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 
107 and 160; Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse reg 238. 
Wieacker A history of private Jaw in Europe 160 et seq; Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-
Hol/andse reg 237 et seq. 
Kroeschell in Rechtshistorische studien: Festschri'fl: H Thieme 34 at 47 et seq. See also Van der 
Walt Houerskap 294. 
It is interesting to note that the distinction between dominium directum and dominium utile played 
a far more prominent role in Germany than it did it the Netherlands at the time. The reason for this 
probably lies in the fact that German lawyers focused more on legal practice than their Dutch 
counterparts, or perhaps feudal law was much stronger in Germany than in the Netherlands during 
this period. See 3.4 above. See also Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 273. 
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dominium minus plenum.8 Dominium minus plenum was subdivided into dominium 
directum and dominium utile. The authors of the Usus Modemus, however, developed 
their own distinction on this basis. They distinguish between Obereigentum and 
nutzbares Eigentum or Untereigentum.9 This distinction differs from that of their 
Romanist predecessors in that they credited the dominus utilis with a part of the 
proprietas more explicitly10 and thus clearly accepted the possibility of the simultaneous 
existence of two distinctly separate forms of ownership. 11 The existence of dominium 
utile was also extended beyond the more traditional Roman emphyteusis, feudum and 
ususfructus to include phenomena from local customary law.12 The reason why the 
authors of the Usus Modemus recognised the distinction between different types of 
ownership probably lies in the fact that a divided ownership was recognised in practice 
and they, as legal practitioners, had to work from that assumption to explain and solve 
existing practical problems. 
5.3 Natural Law 
Because of the special significance of the natural law codes13 for the Historical school, 
8 
9 
Heineccius Elementa Juris Civilis secundum ordinem Pandectarum on D.41.1 par 161; Heineccius 
Elementa Juris Civilis secundum ordinem /nstitutionum on 1.2.1 par 290; Lauterbach Collegium 
Pandectarum theoretico-practicum on D.41.1 n 4; Brunnemann Commentarius in quinquaginta 
libros Pandectarum on D.7 .1.63. 
Heineccius Elementa Juris Civilis secundum ordinem Pandectarum on D.41.1 par 161: " ... minus 
plenum, idque hinc in utile et directum dispescitur." See also Heineccius Elementa Juris Civilis 
secundum ordinem lnstitutionum on 1.2.1 par 291 and 292; Lauterbach Col/egium Pandectarum 
theoretico-practicum on D.41.1. 
10 Heineccius Elementa Juris Civi/is secundum ordinem fnstitutionum on 1.2.1 par 291: "(dominus) 
utile, cui pars proprietatis cum iure utendi competit." See also Kroeschell in Rechtshistorische 
Studien: Festschrift H Thieme 34 at 38. 
11 Van der Walt Houerskap 296. 
12 Heineccius Elementa luris Germanici 1.2.2.33 et seq. 
13 The Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht far die Preussischen Staaten, the Austrian Allgemeines 
Bargerliches Gesetzbuch far die deutschen Erblande and the Napoleontic codes including the 
Code civil. 
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which is discussed below, 14 brief mention is made here of the natural law movement. 
The purpose of the natural law codes was to fit the whole body of law into a systematic 
order in pursuance of a comprehensive plan for society. Wieacker15 points out that the 
motive behind all these codes was the characteristic Enlightenment conviction that if 
government and people acted in a rational and moral manner the result would be a 
better society. These codes offer themselves as draft plans for a better future and seem 
to be dismissive of the past. 16 
With regard to ownership, the proponents of natural law more or less shared the views 
of the authors of the Usus Modernus. They also refer to Bartolus' perception in their 
description of dominium,17 and many of them held the view that dominium and 
proprietas are synonymous. 18 The proponents of natural law also recognised the 
distinction between dominium plenum and dominium minus plenum and thus this 
distinction was included in the first natural law code, the Allgemeines Landrecht tor die 
Preussischen Staaten (1794). 19 
14 See 5.4 below. 
15 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 257. 
16 See in this regard Voltaire's statement "Vou/ez-vous avoir de bonnes lois? BrO/ez /es votres et 
faites-en de nouvelles" ('Do you want good laws? Then burn the ones you have and make new 
ones") as quoted in Benda Dictionnaire Philosophique 566. 
17 Althusius Disputatio 1; Wolff /us Naturale 2.2.131. See also Allgemeines Landrecht far die 
Preussischen Staaten 8.1: "Eigenthlimer heisst derjenige, welcher befugt ist, liber die Substanz 
einer Sache, oder eines Rechts, mit Aussch/iessung Andrer, aus eigner Macht, durch sich selbst, 
oder durch einer Dritten, zu verfligen." 
18 Thomasius lnstitutionum 2.10.38: "Proprietas enim et dominium hie sunt synonyma, etsi 
quancloque a scriptoribus usurpentur diversimodl'; Pufendorf E/ementa 1.5.3: "Dominium plenum 
est proprietas rei et ususfructus"; Pufendorf De Jure 4.4.2: "Quid proprietas sive dominium? Sunt 
enim dominium et proprietas nobis unum et idem". 
19 Allgemeines Landrecht flir die Preussischen Staaten 8.9-8.11 states that: 
"9. Zum vol/en Eigenthume geh6rt das Recht, die Sache zu besitzen, zu 
gebrauchen, und sich derse/ber zu begeben. 
10. Das Recht, Ober die Substanz der Sache zu verfligen, wird Proprietat 
genannt. 
11. Das Recht, eine Sache zu seinem Vortheil zu gebrauchen, heisst das 
Nutzungsrecht." 
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These authors also recognised the distinction between dominium directum and 
dominium utile and, according to natural law thinking, this distinction is based on the 
law of nature itself. 20 The contribution of the proponents of natural law lies in the 
creation of a rational system in which the law, legal rights and legal relationships are 
explained in terms of well-defined and logically related concepts. The fact that 
remnants of feudal law are detected in this system indicates that the idea of an abstract 
natural law was based on historical remains and it thus was not as pure as they thought 
it to be. 
5.4 The Historical School 
Although the Historical School had no direct influence on Roman-Dutch law (the Dutch 
code was completed in 1838), it would be unwise to ignore this development in German 
law. The Historical School and the Pandectists had a substantial influence on the law 
of most European countries and on South African law.21 
The Historical School was created as an antipode for natural law and especially the 
natural law codes - in particular the Code Civil of France and Prussia's Allgemeines 
Landrecht. The codes were thought to embody revolutionary ideas and as such these 
codes were unacceptable to many German jurists. 22 Savigny, who is generally regarded 
as the founder of this school, advocated the idea that "law must be regarded as a 
20 To illustrate thatthe distinction between dominium directum and dominium utile is perceived as 
different forms of ownership the Allgemeines Landrecht contained the following provisions: 
Allgemeines Landrecht far die Preussischen Staaten 8.16: "Das Eigenthum einer Sache ist 
getheile wenn die darunter begriffnen verschiednen Rechte, verschiednen Personen zukommen"; 
Al/gemeines Landrecht fur die Preussischen Staaten 18.1: "Wenn das Eigenthum getheilt ist, so 
wird derjenige, we/chem nur ein Miteigenthum an der Proprietiit, aber kein Antheil an dem zum 
Eigenthume gehOrende Nutzungsrechte zukommt, Obereigenthamer genannf'; Allgemeines 
Landrecht far die Preussischen Staaten 18.12: "Die verschiedenen Bedingungen, unter welchen 
das Obereigenthum von dem Nutzbaren getrennt worden, bestimmen die verschiedenen Arlen des 
getheilten Eigenthums". 
21 See in this regard Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse reg 246 et seq; Visser 1985 
Acta Juridica 39 at 46. 
22 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 279 et seq; Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-
Hollandse reg 248. 
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product of the entire history of a people; it is not a thing that can be made at will, or 
even has been so made; it is an organic growth, which comes into being by virtue of an 
inward necessity and continues to develop in the same ·way from within by the 
operation of natural forces".23 Savigny held the view that law is created o,rganically (and 
not inorganically or rationally as in the case of the natural law codes) by the Volksgeist 
or popular conviction, that is by custom, scholarship and practice.24 The "Vo/I(' or 
people, in this context, is not seen as an ethnic group, but rather as a cultural concept. 
Savigny equates "people" with the intellectual and cultural community bound together 
by a common education. The country's judges and legal scholars make up this cultural 
community. Wieacker25 points out that although this equation may seem strange it must 
be kept in mind that the Historical School wanted legal scholarship to take the place of 
official codification in public life. 
According to the Historical School, Roman law and especially Justinian Roman law 
forms the foundation of the Volksgeist. 26 The Historical School's approach to Roman 
law differed from the approach of the authors of the Usus Modernus in that they did not 
concentrate on the modern (present-day) application of Roman law - for them the 
emphasis was on the finding and recognition of Roman law in its original form. 27 
Because they were not essentially practitioners, the Historical School had a different 
approach to law than the approach of the authors of the Usus Modernus. They did not 
23 Sohm The Institutes of Roman law 155. 
24 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 284; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis 116; Van Zyl 
Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Ho/landse reg 249. 
25 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 310 et seq. 
26 Roman law became a natural part of the German legal tradition through the translatio imperii of 
Justinian to Charlemagne. See in this regard Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 107 and 
160; Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Ho/landse reg 238 and 249; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis 
116. 
27 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 312; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis 116; Van Zyl 
Geskiedenis van cfre Romeins-Hollandse reg 249; Lokin and Zwalve Hoofstukken uit de Europese 
codificatiegeschiedenis 213 et seq. 
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regard the solving of practical problems as their first priority, but rather attempted to 
construct a system of legal concepts, rules and principles according to which practical 
problems could be solved. According to Wieacker28 they raised the legal doctrine of the 
Usus Modernus to the level of a science "with a firm critical and empirical base, 
' 
capable of organising the whole mass of actual law into an internally consistent 
system". 
It must be borne in mind that the Historical School did not regard law as history. They 
rather saw the science of law as a historical science. History only determines the 
material which must be organised into a whole by legal science. 29 Kant's philosophy 
played an important part in this regard. It disproved the philosophical basis of natural 
law by pointing out that ethical decisions are conditioned by the situation in which they 
are taken, and this caused the Historical School to search for a systematic, method-
conscious approach to law. Whereas history provides the material for the science of 
law, the philosophical arrangement of this material constitutes the form of the science.30 
It should be noted that the Historical School was not totally opposed to all elements of 
the idea of natural law. Although they objected to enlightened rationalism in the natural 
law codes - especially in the Code Civil and the Prussian Allgemeines Landrecht, 
certain elements of natural law thinking, inasfar as it was compatible with Kant's 
criticism, were taken over by the Historical School. These include the anachronistic 
system of the Pandects as such,31 the method of constructing concepts, deducing legal 
decisions from them in a logical manner and forming them into a system, the basic 
concepts of the natural law systems and the idea that all law is ethically determined. 32 
28 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 292. 
29 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 283 et seq. 
30 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 281-2 and 292 et seq. 
31 This system, which remained authoritative for the Pandectism of the nineteenth century, dates back 
to the natural system of Pufendorf. 
32 For a more detailed discussion see Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 296 et seq. 
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After it was proven that feudal divided ownership was not of true Roman origin, 33 it was 
abandoned and the Historical School continued to develop the idea, based on the 
philosophy of Kant, that ownership embodies the freedom and autonomy of the 
individual. (This corresponds to some extent with the position regarding the French 
Revolution and the work and influence of Grotius. Ownership was disconnected from 
feudalism and the emphasis moved to individualism. This move accentuated the social 
function of ownership.) The idea of personal autonomy is central to Savigny's treatment 
of ownership. The individual must have the freedom to exercise his rights as he sees 
fit, and the exercise of his rights must be such that the free exercise of his will can co-
exist with everybody else's freedom. The purpose of a legal relation and of a right (in 
the subjective sense) is to serve and secure the independent development of the 
personality.34 Ownership and personal rights thus enable a person to attain his 
purpose, namely moral and personal independence and development. 35 Savigny:36 
defines ownership as the lawful power to deal with the thing at will, and states that 
ownership constitutes the unrestricted and exclusive domain over an object.37 The 
arbitrariness of the owner's right is accentuated by Savigny and his contemporaries. 38 
Although Grotius defined ownership in terms of the arbitrariness of the owner's right,39 
this aspect of ownership acquired a slightly different character in view of the Kantian 
33 Thibaut Ober dominium directum und utile in Versuche Ober einzelne Theile der Theorie des 
Rechts 67 et seq. 
34 Savigny System des heutigen r(jmischen Rechts vol Ill 103. 
35 Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 569 at 587. 
36 Savigny Das Recht des Besitzes: eine civilistische Abhandlung 27: "Da namlich das Eigenthum 
die rechtliche M(jglichkeit ist, auf eine Sache nach WillkOhr einzuwirken". 
37 Savigny System des heutigen romischen Rechts vol I 367: ''Als recht erscheint es einfach und 
vollstandig in der Gestalt des Eigenthums, oder der unbeschrakten und aussch/iessenden 
herrschaft einer person Ober eine Sache". 
38 See Puchta Pandekten 207. 
39 See 3.3 above. 
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philosophy and German ldealism.40 Savigny41 thus states that the moral or immoral 
exercise of a right is of no consequence insofar as property is concerned. 
Puchta's42 description of ownership closely resembles Savigny's definition. His 
description highlights a few new elements added to the concept of ownership by the 
Historical School: ownership is limited to corporeals, all rights with regard to the thing 
are parts of ownership43 and limited real rights are seen as mere restrictions on 
ownership. 44 
Whereas the Historical School was originally politically in favour of the retention of the 
social order, including the remnants of the feudal order, the realisation that feudal 
divided ownership was not based on Roman law caused the authors of the Historical 
School to move in the direction of a more rational legal order. The emphasis moved 
from the social function of ownership to the concept and institution of ownership. 
The Germanist branch of the Historical School held the view, contrary to the view of the 
Romanist branch of the Historical School, that old Germanic law, and not Roman law, 
should form the basis of the national German culture. The Germanists were opposed 
to Savigny's attempt to accommodate the Romanist tradition in his idea of the 
40 Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 305 at 321. 
41 Savigny System des heutigen romischen Rechts vol I 371: "Dagegen wird in den 
Vennagensverha/tnissen die Herrscha'fl: des Rechtsgesetzes vollstandig durchgefuhrt, und zwar 
ohne Racksicht auf die sittliche oder unsittliche Ausabung eines Rechts". 
42 Puchta Pandekten 207: "Das Eigenthum ist die voile rechtliche Unterwerfung einer Sache, die 
vol/kommene rechtliche Herrscha'fl: uber einen korper/ichen Gegenstand. Die voile Ausabung des 
Eigenthums ist die totale factische Unterwerfung der Sache, also der Besitz. Als die Totalitat al/er 
dingliche Rechte enthalt das Eigenthum an sich die ausschliessliche Befugniss zu jeder 
Anwendung der Sache, zu jeder Verfagung aber sie". See also Puchta's description of ownership 
in Cursus der lnstitutionen 579: "Das Eigenthum ist die totale rechtliche Unterwerfung einer Sache. 
Es ist das vol/kommene Recht, theils durch seinen Gegenstand, welcher der einzige dem 
menschlichen Willen vollig hingegebene ist, theils durch seinen inneren Umfang, weil es diesen 
Gegenstand nach alien Seiten, von denen er im Recht sur Sprache kommt, unterwirff'. 
43 This is referred to as the totality of ownership. See Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 305 at 314 et seq. 
44 This implies that as soon as the restriction falls away, ownership will resume its former 
completeness. This is referred to as the elasticity of ownership. 
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Volksgeist. According to this group old Germanic and medieval sources should rather 
be consulted in the quest for an own German legal culture. 45 
5.5 The German Pandectists 
The Pandectists, the successors of the Historical School, applied the natural law 
method of constructing systems and concepts on the basis of the substantive ius 
commune. Wieacker-46 points out that the justification for this echoes Savigny's Beruf,47 
where he calls his age that of the scientification of legal study, and accorded to lawyers 
the right to develop and apply the law. This was a continuation of Grotius' conceptual 
work. The period of large scale social repositioning was over and the social function 
of ownership was no longer considered all that important. The attention now moved to 
the law as science with the emphasis on concepts and the institution of ownership. It 
was argued that the scientification of the law would serve and preserve the social and 
legal order. 
45 See in general Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 319 et seq; Van Zyl Geskiedenis van 
die Romeins-Hollandse reg 254 et seq; Kroeschell in Rechtshistorische Studien: Festschrift H 
Thieme 34 at 46 et seq.) The importance of the Germanists for this discussion is the fact that they 
concentrated on and developed a theory of ownership. This theory is based on a article by 
Albrecht Die Gewere als Grund/age des alteren deutschen Sachenrechts in which he presented 
his theory on Gewere. According to this theory Gewere is a true Germanic notion, and it is indicative 
of the unique nature of Germanic property law. The Germanists held the view that the Roman-
based concept of ownership has no place in Germany. See Beseler System des gemeines 
deutchen Privatrechts 318 et seq. They were of the opinion that the true Germanic concept of 
ownership is not fundamentally unrestricted, that ownership can be divided between different 
people, that ownership is not an abstract uniform coAcept, but that it is differentiated according to 
the object in question, and that ownership concerns both corporeal and incorporeal things. See 
Kroeschell in Rechtshistorische Studien: Festschrift H Thieme 34 at 36. See also Van den Bergh 
Eigendom 31. It has, however, since been pointed out that this perception does not originate in 
German antiquity, but was created in the nineteenth century and is often no more than a mere 
projection of what was considered as the opposite of Roman law. See Kroeschell in 
Rechtshistorische studien: Festschrift H Thieme 34 et seq; Van den Bergh Eigendom 31; Feenstra 
in Fata luris Romani 215 at 222; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248 at 262 et seq; Van der Walt 1993 
THRHR 569 at 570. 
46 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 341. 
47 Vom Beruf unserer Zeit far Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft (1814) was Savigny's reply to 
and article by Thibaut Ober die Nothwendigkeit eines al/gemeines bargerlichen Rechts far 
Deutsch/and in which he (Thibaut) pleads for the codification of German law. 
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The Pandectists perceived law as a positive science in which the law is explained 
exclusively in terms of its rules, concepts, principles and doctrines. The legal positivists 
attempted to develop a system of law into which all legal concepts, rules and principles 
fitted logically. As was the case with the Historical School, the Pandectists were not 
practitioners and as such they perceived law as a science and concentrated on 
developing a system of law, rather than solving practical problems. According to the 
legal positivist method religious, social or scientific aims and values are not supposed 
to influence the creation, alteration or application of the law, 48 and as such these aims 
and values are supposed to become more and more peripheral to the science of law. 49 
In fact, the science of law is supposed to safeguard and entrench of the status quo. As 
a result of this, the whole legal order (and the social order on the background) becomes 
dependent on a closed system of legal rules, concepts and principles. The premise of 
this method is that if a rule is conceptually logical and fits into the system it must be 
right. It would thus be possible to solve any legal problem by referring to and 
mechanically applying the system of legal principles and concepts. Wieacker5° points 
out that the system of positive legal science is both insulated and integrated. The aim 
is to create a system that is free of gaps, and although there may be gaps in fact, these 
can be filled by inventive application of the logically coherent system where every 
concept has a logical place within the conceptual pyramid. Kant's theory of law, 
according to which the law is an independent entity with the purpose not to ordain 
ethical conduct, but to render it possible, serves as the ethical justification for this 
48 Wieacker A history of private Jaw in Europe 341 et seq points out that Savigny opined that although 
considerations of ethics and politics are not the business of the jurist, it does not imply that the 
legislator is disallowed such considerations. 
49 Legal positivism is often criticised for excluding considerations of policy and society (especially 
since the social and political upheaval of the past century), but it must be kept in mind that legal 
positivism itself contained a value judgement and took a stance on policy and social ethics - it 
reflected the position of the judicature in the nineteenth century Rechtsstaat. One must also 
distinguish between positive legal scholarship and a positive approach to statutes, for it is only if 
positive legal science refuses to be subservient to statutory law that the dangerous situation can 
arise where the naked interests of the majority is served by the monstrous use of legislation. For 
a discussion see Wieacker A history of private Jaw in Europe 346 et seq. 
50 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 344. 
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approach.51 This constituted a move away from the Historical School. History was left 
behind and instead the Pandectists believed that they rely on Roman law itself. This 
move constituted the origin of the idea that the modern civilist concept of ownership 
developed in an uninterrupted line from Roman law. 
Once the feudal tradition of divided ownership was proved to be not of Roman origin52 
the Pandectists, following in the footsteps of the Romanist branch of the Historical 
School, discarded split ownership and propagated the idea of uniform ownership. 
Following German Idealism, according to which individual freedom and the autonomy 
of the individual was accentuated, ownership was seen as part of the individual's 
autonomous sphere offreedom.53 The Pandectist perception of ownership reflects this 
line of thinking and ownership is thus defined as an exclusive, absolute real right. In a 
sense this resembles the view of Grotius and the perception of ownership after the 
French Revolution - ownership is free from feudalism. However, the Pandectists went 
further and explained this within the framework of a conceptual science. 
Windscheid54 is regarded as the most important exponent of the Pandectists, because 
of his stature and influence. His view of ownership can be discussed as a 
representative example of the Pandectist perception of ownership. 
It should be noted that Windscheid was at least partially influenced by Grotius. Traces 
of Grotius' views on the distinction between eigendom and gerechtigheden and the way 
51 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 341 et seq; Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-
Hollandse reg 257 et seq; Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 569 at 586. 
52 Thibaut Ober dominium directum und utile in Versuche iiber einzelne Theile der Theorie des 
Rechts 67 et seq. See also Kroeschell in Rechtshistorische Studien: Festschrift H Thieme 34 et 
seq. 
53 Van den Bergh Eigendom (1979) 5 et seq; Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 569 at 570; Visser Acta 
Juridica 39 at 47. For the influence of the philosophies of writers such as Kant and Hegel see 
Negro Das Eigentum: Geschichte und Zukunft - Versuch eines Oberblicks 136 et seq. 
54 For more on Bernhard Windscheid see Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 351 et seq; 
Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hol/andse reg 258; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis 121. 
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in which eigendom (especially voile eigendom) is defined55 can be found in 
Windscheid's work. 56 As in the case of Grotius, Windscheid concentrated on creating 
a system of legal principles and concepts - the emphasis· was not on catering for 
specific needs of legal practice, but rather on perfecting a system into which all legal 
concepts, rules and principles fitted logically. 
The influence of Kant's theory, according to which individual autonomy and freedom is 
accentuated, can clearly be detected in Windscheid's work. In his discussion of rights, 
Windscheid emphasises individual freedom. According to his theory the law issues a 
norm or principle which permits specific acts or behaviour. It grants this norm or 
principle to an individual for his free disposal. The individual is free to decide whether 
or not to act or behave in accordance with these norms or principles, or whether or not 
to use the provided remedies to enforce his right. The will of the individual is thus 
decisive for the enforcement of the norm or principle. Windscheid57 describes this by 
saying that a right becomes your right. In view of this approach a right is defined as a 
power to exercise the will that is conferred by law. 58 Van der Walt59 points out that the 
link between Kant and Windscheid is probably to be found in Savigny, the reason being 
that Savigny was the first to create a modern civil-law system of private law based on 
the Kantian ideal of personal freedom and autonomy. Windscheid continued to develop 
this idea. 
With reference to the distinction between real and personal rights, 60 Windscheid states 
55 See 3.3 above. 
56 Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das romisch-holliindische Recht485 at 516 et seq. 
57 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 2 par 37at131. 
58 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 2 par 37 at 131 : "Recht ist eine von der 
Rechtsordnung verliehene Willensmacht oder Wil/ensherrschafl". 
59 Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 569 at 587. 
60 This is based on the second part of the work of Grotius (and with this the influence of the French 
Revolution) where a distinction is made between ownership and limited real rights. 
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that real rights are those rights where the individual's will is decisive for a thing and 
personal rights are those where the individual's will is decisive for the behaviour or 
actions of another person. It is interesting to note that Windscheid does not regard a 
real right as a right that has a thing as its object,61 because he regards all rights as 
relationships between different persons. He states that all rights exist between one 
person and another person and not between a person and a thing.62 Thus, in the case 
of real rights, the subject determines the behaviour of everybody else with regard to the 
object in question. This description of real rights ties in with Windscheid's personalist 
theory according to which real rights are absolute in the sense that they are 
enforceable against the whole world (everybody else) and personal rights are relative 
in that they are only enforceable against specific people. 63 The result of the influence 
of Grotius and the French Revolution, namely to free ownership from the shackles of 
feudalism and to create a distinction between ownership and limited real rights, is now 
explained as part of one single theory based on the individual's free will as a moral 
concept underlying the entire legal science. 
Real rights are defined as exclusive rights. A real right confers on the subject the power 
to determine the behaviour of all other people with respect to the thing. Windscheid 
states that the power conferred by a real right is negative in the sense that all other 
people must refrain from interfering with the object or with the subject's right as regards 
the object. 64 
The distinction between ownership and limited real rights is explained with reference 
61 Grotius held a different view in this regard. See 3.3 above. 
62 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 2 par 38 at 140: "Alie Rechte bestehen 
zwischen Person und Person, nicht zwischen Person und Sache". 
63 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 2 par 41 at 149. 
64 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 2 par 38 at 140: "Der inhalt das dingliche 
Recht ausmachenden Willensmacht aber ist ein negativer: die dem Berechtigten 
Gegenuberstehenden sol/en sich der Einwirkung auf die Sache - a/le oder einer bestimmten -
enthalten, und sie sol/en durch ihr Verhalten zur Sache die Einwirkung des Berechtigten auf die 
Sache - eine beliebige oder eine bestimmte - nicht verhindern". 
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to the extent of the exclusivity: ownership enables the owner to enforce his right against 
all other people in the totality of its relations,65 whereas a limited real right enables the 
holder of the right to enforce his right against all other people with regard to specific 
relations.66 Ownership thus entails total exclusivity, while limited real rights entail 
limited exclusivity. 
Ownership is defined as the most complete real right. It is described as complete 
because it confers on the owner the complete right of disposal. The owner may enforce 
his right against all other people with regard to the use and control of the object. 67 The 
element of arbitrariness in Windscheid's definition of ownership reflects the true spirit 
of German Idealism, which accentuates individual freedom. 68 According to Windscheid 
the complete right of disposal implies on the one hand that the owner may dispose of 
his property as he sees fit, and on the other hand it gives the owner the complete right 
of exclusion in the sense that no-one else may dispose of the object in a way contrary 
to the will of the owner.69 
Despite the fact that ownership is defined as the most complete right of disposal, and 
that the different entitlements of the owner can be listed, ownership will always amount 
65 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 3 par 145 at 629: "Dasjenige dingliche 
Recht, kraft deren der Wille des Berechtigten ist far die Sache in der Gesammtheit ihrer 
Beziehungen, ist das Eigentumsrechf'. 
66 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 bo~k 3par145 at 629: "Dingliche Rechte, kraft 
deren der Wille des Berechtigten far die Sache nur in einen einzelnen Beziehung (oder in einer 
Mehrheit einze/ner Beziehungen) massgebend ist, heissen Rechte an fremder Sache". Note that 
Windscheid refers to limited real rights as Rechte an fremder Sache. See vol 1 book 3 par 38. 
67 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 3 par 167 at 756: "Dass aber Jemandem 
eine Sache nach dem Rechte eigen ist, will sagen, dass nach dem Rechte sein Wille far sie 
entscheidend ist in der Gesammtheit ihrer Beziehugen". See also Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 305 
at 315. 
68 Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 305 at 322. 
69 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 3par167 at 756: "Diess zeigt sich nach 
einer doppellen Richtung: 1) der EigenthOmer darf Ober die Sache verfOgen, wie er will; 2) ein 
Anderer darf seinen Willen Ober die Sache nicht verfagen". 
81 
to more than the sum total of the owner's entitlements. 70 According to this perception 
ownership can never be described as a bundle of entitlements - it is an abstract 
concept and will always amount to more than the sum of enumerable entitlements. It 
follows that if the sum total of entitlements does not amount to ownership, just as the 
sum total of restrictions cannot have a fundamental effect on the nature of the right. 
Ownership will never cease to exist as a result of many restrictions or limitations. This 
view of ownership constitutes the origin of the idea that ownership is flexible enough 
to adapt to different circumstances. In terms of this view the development of ownership 
has never been disrupted by historical changes and discontinuities. 
Windscheid declares that ownership is fundamentally unrestricted, although it can 
accommodate restrictions or limitations. 71 The Pandectists are the first to describe 
ownership explicitly as an intrinsically unrestricted right, and as Van der Walt72 points 
out, this was a reaction against the medieval feudal system, which was regarded as a 
social and economic disaster. Here Windscheid works with the social function of 
ownership, but he casts it in the mould of a conceptual and institutional theory. It was 
thus important to emphasise the fact that ownership - especially landownership -
remains free from feudal-type restrictions.73 The rise of German Idealism also 
70 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 3 par 167 at 756: "Es /assen sich ferner 
einzefne Befugnisse namhaft machen, welche dem Eigenthamer kraft des Begriffs des Eigenthums 
zustehen, z.B. die Befugniss die Sache zu gebrauchen und zu natzen, die Befugniss jeden von 
a/fer Einwirkung auf diese/be auszusch/iessen, die Befugniss sie von jedem dritten Besitzer 
abzufordern, die Befugniss ihr rechtliches Schicksa/ zu bestimmen (Verl:iusserungsbefugniss). 
Aber man darf nicht sagen, dass das Eigenthum aus einer Summe einzelner Befugnisse bestehe, 
dass es eine Verbindung einzelner Befugnisse sei. Das Eigenthum ist die Faf/e des Rechts an der 
Sache, und die einzefnen in ihm zu unterscheidenden Befugnisse sind nur Ausserungen und 
Manifestationen dieser Faf/e". 
71 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 3 par 167 at 757: "Das Eigenthum ist a/s 
so/ches schrankentos; aber es vertragt Beschrankungen. Aus der Gesammtheit der Beziehungen, 
in welchen Kraft des Eigenthums die Sache dem Willen des Berechtigten unterworfen ist, kann 
durch eine besondere That des Rechts eine oder die andere Beziehung herausgenommen und 
elem Willen des Eigenthamers entzogen werden. Dadurch hart er nicht auf, Eigenthamer zu sein; 
denn es ist immerhin wahr, das er ein Recht hat, welches a/s so/ches seinen Willen entscheidend 
macht far die Sache in der Gesammtheit ihrer Beziehungen, und welches ihn jeder besonderen 
Rechtfertigung far irgend eine an der Sache denkbare Befugniss aberhebf'. 
72 Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 569 at 575. 
73 See Demburg Pandecten vol 1 part 2 chapter 1 par 192 at 437. 
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contributed significantly towards the creation of a fundamentally unrestricted concept 
of ownership. 74 
Windscheid regarded ownership as conceptually (but by implication also historically) 
an elastic right. The Pandectists recognised the fact that ownership can'be limited, but 
held the view that as soon as the restriction falls away, ownership returns to its former 
state and once again becomes full or complete. 75 Restrictions are regarded as 
temporary and will eventually fall away. Ownership will then resume its fullness. This 
implies that entitlements are never separated from ownership (in the case of limited real 
rights), but merely that ownership is temporarily restricted. Windscheid's theory on the 
elasticity of ownership differs from Grotius' perception. According to Grotius ownership 
is diminished by restrictions or limitations - an entitlement is separated from ownership 
and transferred to someone else. 76 
In summary it can be said that the Pandectists described ownership as the most 
complete real right and that it is characterised by the following: 
I) Uniformity: The Pandectists rejected feudalism and recognised only one type 
of ownership. This characteristic reflects the Pandectists' view of the social 
function of ownership, namely to secure for the individual a sphere of personal 
freedom and autonomy. 
ii) Absoluteness: This entails that ownership is fundamentally unrestricted, 
though it can accommodate restrictions or limitations. Absoluteness also refers 
to the complete right of disposal of the owner. The owner has the power to use 
his property as he sees fit and can enforce his right against all other people. The 
characteristic of absoluteness is based on the uniformity of ownership, but 
74 Van den Bergh Eigendom (1979) 5; Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 39 at 46. 
75 Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts vol 1 book 3 par 167 at 758: "Fa/It die 
Eigenthumsbeschrankung weg, so enfaltet des Eigenthum sofort wieder seine ganze Fa/le". 
76 See 3.3 above. 
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translated into a conceptual and institutional theory. 
iii) Exclusivity: The owner has the right to exclude all other people from disposal 
of the object and from interference with the owner's own disposal of the thing. 
This characteristic also stems from uniformity, but constitutes a expansion on 
that idea. 
iv) Abstractness: Ownership is described as abstract in that it will always amount 
to more than the sum total of the different entitlements. 
v) Elasticity: This means that ownership will automatically resume its natural 
fullness as soon as a limitation falls away. 
In essence the Pandectists did the same as what was achieved by Grotius and the 
French Revolution, in the sense that ownership was divorced from feudalism, reduced 
to a unitary individual right and distinguished from limited real rights. In the case of the 
Pandectists, however, these two results were combined in one coherent, scientific 
system of concepts with a basis in moral philosophy. 
5.6 The move towards a German civil code 
The natural law codes of the late eighteenth century never enjoyed general 
acceptance. The positivist reaction against the natural law and the rise of the Historical 
School thwarted the acceptance of these codes and it never had any significant 
influence. These codes, especially the Code Civil in France, elicited strong reaction 
against codification in Germany. The Historical School, especially Savigny, was 
vehemently opposed to the idea that a code should take the place of legal scholarship, 
and when Thibaut suggested in 1814 that Germany should codify its legal system, he 
enjoyed very little support. 77 
77 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 363 et seq; Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-
Hol/andse reg 263 et seq. For a detailed discussion of Thibaufs plea for a national German code 
in Ober die Nothwendigkeit eines al/gemeines bOrger/ichen Rechts far Deutchland and Savigny's 
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The ideal of a code for Germany never died, but it was only after Savigny's death in 
1861 that the movement really gained momentum. The move towards codification was 
helped along by the enactment of codes for specific fields of law, such as the 
Allgemeine Deutsche Wechselordnung in 1848 and the Allgemeines Deutsches 
Handelsgesetzbuch in 1861, and civil codes for specific states, such as the 
Burgerliches Gesetzbuch fur das Konigreich Sachsen in 1863. Positivism of enactments 
began to take the place of the positivism of scholarship. This shift was perceived as 
progressive in terms of civic and national politics. The move toward a national civil code 
was also strengthened by the belief on the continent of Europe that a modern nation 
must organise its legal life on a codified rational plan. 78 
On 18 August 1896 the BOrgerliches Gesetzbuch fur das Deutsche Reich was 
promulgated, but for symbolical reasons the code only came into force on 1 January 
1900.79 
5. 7 Conclusion 
It is pointed out in the next chapter that elements of the Pandectist perception of 
ownership, especially that of Windscheid, form the basis of the standard or traditional 
reply in his article Vom Beruf unserer Zeit fur Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft see Lokin 
and Zwalve Hoofstukken uit de Europese codi'ficatiegeschiedenis 312 et seq. 
78 Wieacker A history of private law in Europe 364; Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse 
reg263. 
79 The first commission to prepare the way for a civil code for Germany started work in 1874. This 
commission, under the chairmanship of Pape also included Windscheid. Windscheid's Pandekten 
had a strong influence on the spirit of the final product. When the commission tabled the first draft 
(and five volumes of Motiven) in 1887 it was met with a lot of resistance. It was said that the 
commission did not consult other jurists or business people and that the commission and the 
country were not at one. The first draft was criticised because it was doctrinal and asocial and did 
not reflect a German culture. A second commission was established in 1890. This commission 
consulted as wide as possible and when the second draft was submitted in 1895 its reception was 
much more favourable. The second draft was discussed during 1895 and 1896 and after a few 
adjustments it was promulgated as the Burger/iches Gesetzbuch fur das Deutsche Reich. See 
Wieacker A history of private Jaw in Europe 371 et seq; Lokin and Zwalve Hoofstukken uit de 
Europese codi'ficatiegeschiedenis 226 et seq; Van Zyl Geskiedenis van die Romeins-Hollandse 
reg263; De Vos Regsgeskiedenis 123. 
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civilist concept of ownership in South Africa. The Pandectist view that ownership is the 
most complete real right and that it is characterised by uniformity, absoluteness, 
exclusivity, abstractness and elasticity was received in South African law in the 
twentieth century and has since dominated the private law perception of property law. 
Although it is commonly thought that the Pandectist and Roman law views of ownership 
are basically the same, with the important difference that the Pandectists organised and 
arranged property law into a scientific structure, it must be emphasised here that the 
Pandectist view of ownership is separated from classical and Justinian Roman law by 
a few dramatic and fundamental discontinuities. These discontinuities include the 
impact of the vulgar Roman law, the implementation and abolition of the feudal system, 
the influence of Grotius' structure and hierarchy of rights and the scientification of 
property law in the nineteenth century on the basis of Grotius' work. The Pandectist 
view of ownership was thus not so much the result of a logical process of development, 
but rather the creation of a society in which individual freedom and the idea of a 
conceptual legal science played a central role. 
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6 
PROPERTY IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW PRIOR TO THE 1993 
CONSTITUTION 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to determine exactly what the South African law of ownership 
entailed prior to the implementation of the Interim Constitution in 1994. Since the 
democratisation of the South African society property law has undergone a number of 
fundamental changes, and it is important for this study to know what the perception of 
property (and in a narrow sense ownership) was prior to this event and exactly how it 
has changed since then. 1 
This chapter concentrates on the development of South African property law since the 
late nineteenth century. Early textbooks and case law are consulted in this regard. 
It is often contended that the concept of ownership in (white) South Africa prior to the 
implementation of the first democratic constitution was characterised by absoluteness, 
exclusivity and individualism. The law of ownership prior to the implementation of the 
interim Constitution is analysed in an effort to determine the nature and content of the 
right. Finally suggestions of leading property lawyers on the direction of future 
development of property law are discussed briefly. 
6.2 Developments since the late 1800's 
6.2.1 Early South African legal textbooks 
In most of the early South African legal textbooks the description of ownership 
The influence of the Interim Constitution and the final Constitution is discussed in chapter 11. 
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resembles the description of the Roman-Dutch authors. Josson2 (1897) defines 
ownership, with reference to Van der Linden,3 as the right to dispose of a thing in the 
most comprehensive way. This entails that the right of disposal includes the ius utendi, 
ius fruendi and the ius abutendi and is exercised so as to exclude all other people. 
Josson's definition provides for expropriation against compensation in certain 
circumstances and expressly states that the owner's right of free disposal is limited by 
statute and the rights of others. 
Maasdorp's4 description of ownership in 1903 also refers to Roman-Dutch authors. 5 He 
defines ownership as 
" ... the sum-total of all real rights which a person can possibly have to 
and over a corporeal thing, subject only to the legal maxim: 'Sic utere tuo 
ut alienum non laedas' (So use your own that you do no injury to that 
which is other's)." 
According to Maasdorp ownership includes the right of possession, the right of use and 
enjoyment and the right of disposition. He states that although these factors are 
essential to ownership they need not all be present in an equal degree at the same 
time. However, Maasdorp6 proceeds to give a second definition of ownership in which 
he emphasises the right of alienation: 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Josson Schets van het recht van de Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek 407: "Eigendom is het recht om 
over eene zaak, bij uitsluiting van a/le anderen, op de volstrekste wijze te beschikken, mits men 
er gebruik van make, strijdende tegen de wetten (quatenus juris ratio patitur) en mits men aan de 
rechten van anderen geen hinder toebrenge." 
Van der Linden Regtsge/eerd, practicaa/ en koopmans handboek 1.6.1. 
Maasdorp The Institutes of Cape law 31 et seq. 
Maasdorp refers to Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas, Grotius /nleidinge tot de Hollandsche 
Rechts-ge/eerdheid and Van der Linden Regtsge/eerd, practicaa/ en koopmans handboek. The 
latter is often referred to in South Africa as The Institutes of the laws of Holland. 
Maasdorp The Institutes of Cape law 32. 
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"perhaps a more correct definition of ownership would be that it is the 
exclusive right of disposing of a corporeal thing combined with the legal 
means of alienating the same and coupled with the .right to claim the 
possession and enjoyment thereof. 11 
Wessels7 (1908) voices the opinion that the South African law of ownership differs very 
little from that of the Corpus Juris. Grotius is seen as the nexus between Roman law 
and South African law. According to Wessels, 8 
"Grotius followed the Roman law when he defined ownership as that 
attribute of a thing whereby a person, though not actually in possession 
of it, may acquire the same by legal process, and that it consists in the 
right to recover lost possession. 119 
Roos and Reitz10 (1909) repeat Maasdorp's definition~ and proceeds to say that 
ownership 
" ... is the exclusive right of disposing of a corporeal thing combined with 
the legal means of alienating it and the right to claim possession and 
enjoyment thereof. Or, to sum up according to the Roman law, it is the ius 
utendi, fruendi, abutendi, alienandi et vindicandi. 11 
According to Lee12 (1915) ownership entails the right to possess, use and enjoy, and 
7 
8 
9 
Wessels History of the Roman-Dutch law 485. 
Wessels History of the Roman-Dutch law 484. Here Wessels refers to Grotius lnleidinge tot de 
Hol/andsche Rechts-ge/eerdheid 11.3.1 and 4 and D 6.1.23. 
See in this regard Grotius lnleidinge 11.3.1 and 11.3.4. See also 3.2 above. 
10 Roos and Reitz Principles of Roman-Dutch law 39. 
11 This is done without any reference to Maasdorp's definition in The Institutes of Cape Jaw. 
12 Lee An introduction to Roman-Dutch law 111 et seq. 
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alienate a thing. He states that the right to possess includes the right to vindicate, and 
he refers to Grotius for authority for his statement that the right to vindicate is the signal 
quality of ownership. Up to this point Lee's description of ownership resembles that of 
his predecessors, but he continues to make an interesting distinction that bears close 
resemblance to Grotius' exposition of full and incomplete ownership. 13 He states that 
whenever all these rights (to possess, use, enjoy and alienate) are exclusive and vest 
in one person, it amounts to full ownership. As soon as one of these rights vests in one 
person and all the others in another person, the ownership of both such persons is 
restricted or qualified. With reference to the latter instance, he states that it would be 
misleading to regard both persons as owner and in order to determine who the real 
owner is, one must determine where the residue of rights remains after the deduction 
from full ownership of some specific right or rights of greater or less extent. Neither the 
extent of the right nor the profit derived from it is decisive in this regard. Lee concludes 
that even when ownership is stripped of its most valuable incidents and is reduced to 
a mere shadow (this is referred to as bare ownership or nuda proprietas), it is still 
regarded as a right of property and is as such protected by appropriate remedies 
against all the world. 
Willa's 14 definition of ownership in 1937 reminds one of Maasdorp's definition: 
"dominium or ownership, which is the sum total of all the possible rights 
in a thing, namely the right to use it and enjoy its fruits, to alienate it, and 
destroy it. The absolute ownership, dominium plenum, of a thing, 
consequently confers all these rights in th~ thing on its owner. "15 
However, Wille places ownership within the context of real rights. A real right, 
13 Grotius lnleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-ge/eerdheid 11.3 and 33. See 3.3 above. 
14 Wille Principles of South African law 121. 
15 Wille refers to Voet on D 6.1.1 and Van der Linden Regtsgeleerd, practicaal en koopmans 
handboek 1.7.1. 
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according to Wille, 16 is a right in a thing that confers a benefit, which is indefeasible by 
any other person, on the holder of the right. Ownership is described as the most 
comprehensive real right and is contrasted with all other real rights (limited real rights). 
The conclusion can be drawn that the description of ownership and limited real rights 
in the early South African textbooks bears close resemblance to the description of 
ownership and limited real rights in the Roman Dutch law of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries rather than either classical or Justinian Roman law or Pandectism. 
This is not surprising in view of the fact that Roman-Dutch law was prevalent in South 
African case law of the time. The influence of the German Pandectists on South African 
law was only to be felt later in this century. 
6.2.2 Early South African case law 
South African case law at the turn of the century did not attempt to give an exact 
description of ownership, but concerned itself with the question of the exclusivity and 
the individuality of ownership. The main issue at this point was whether or not the 
existence of more than one type of ownership should be recognised in South African 
law. 
In 1903 the Cape court in Estate Thomas v Kerr17 expressed the view that a lease of 
more than ten years is sometimes seen as an alienation in that the dominium utile is 
transferred to the lessee. This view was, however, mentioned en passant and the 
implications thereof were not discussed by the court. The Transvaal court dealt with the 
same problem in 1905 in the case of Luca~' Trustee v Ismail and Amod. 18 Council for 
the plaintiff argued that his client had the real or beneficial ownership, while the 
respondent had no more than bare dominium or naked ownership - Lucas merely had 
16 Wille Principles of South African law 117. 
17 (1903) 20 SC 354 at 374. 
18 1905 TS 239. 
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the shell and the plaintiffs had the substance. This argument equates dominium 
directum with nuda proprietas and dominium utile with beneficial ownership. The court 
rejected this argument as being of English origin and not consistent with our law: 19 
"For to hold that Lucas was the bare dominus, and that the plaintiffs were 
beneficial owners, would, it appear to me, be subversive of the well 
established principles of our law regarding the ownership of immovable 
property; it would recognise that dominium in immovable property could 
be separated into two parts, into a legal estate, as it is called in England, 
and an equitable or a beneficial estate. Now I do not see how, 
consistently with the principles of our law, we can support such a 
contention, because it appears to me that that is one of the essential 
differences between the English law regarding the ownership of 
immovable property and our law. The English law holds that there can be 
two estates in land, the legal estate and the equitable or beneficial 
estate, and these two estates can be vested in different persons at the 
same time ... Our law, as I understand it, does not recognise that there 
can be any such division of the dominium, or that there can be two 
estates in landed property, but that the person who is registered in the 
Deeds Office as the owner of the landed property is the one dominus of 
such property." 
The Cape court took the opposite view in 1906 in Municipality of lndwe v The lndwe 
Railway Collieries and Land Co,20 when it stated that the company may still be the 
dominus directus of the land in the same way as the Crown is the dominus directus of 
the land granted by the Governor on perpetual quitrent tenure, but the practical 
ownership has passed to the lessee. 
19 1905 TS 239 at 247. 
20 1906 SC 219 at 229. 
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In 1910 the Transvaal court explicitly rejected this decision in Johannesburg Municipal 
Council v Rand Township Registrar & others21 on the basis of the result reached in the 
Lucas' Trustee case. The court held that there is only one owner and that a long-term 
lease does not amount to a separate form of ownership apart from the ownership of the 
lessor. The court accepted Savigny's definition of an individual and exclusive concept 
of ownership:22 
"Savigny's definition may be accepted as of high authority. 'Dominium is 
the unrestricted and exclusive control which a person has over a thing.' 
Inasmuch as the owner has full control, he also has the power to part with 
so much of his control as he pleases. Once the owner, however, he 
remains such until he has parted with all his rights of ownership over the 
thing." 
It is interesting to note that the court does not refer to Roman-Dutch law as authority 
for its decision. The court rejected divided ownership because they viewed it as an 
English phenomenon, while it is trite that this kind of ownership was part and parcel of 
Roman-Dutch law. On the other hand they accepted the unrestricted, individual and 
exclusive view of ownership on the authority of the German Pandectists, specifically 
Savigny, while this view of ownership was also part of Roman-Dutch law.23 Van der 
Walt and Kleyn24 point out that the reason for choosing a concept of absolute, exclusive 
ownership over the concept of divided ownership probably lies in the fact that it was in 
line with philosophical approach which was at the order of the day in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century. The continued acceptance of divided ownership would 
have been untenable in an era where the social, economical and political spheres of 
21 1910 TPD 1314. 
22 1910 TPD 1314at1319. 
23 See 3.3 above. 
24 Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 248 et seq. See also Visser 
1985 Acta Juridica 39 at 43 et seq. 
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life were dominated by liberalist capitalism and individualism. 
The owner's entitlement to use his property was another point of contention in early 
South African case law. The English law concept of nuisance exerted some influence 
on early case law in this regard. The principles of the English law of nuisance differs 
from that of Roman-Dutch law in that the duties of the owner are emphasised in 
English law, 25 whereas the Roman-Dutch law concerns itself with the rights of the owner 
to use his property. Although the law of nuisance is not the same in the two systems, 
it was stated in Bloemfontein Town Council v Richtei26 that 
" ... the counterpart of an English statement of claim founded on nuisance 
would, in our law, be a declaration by the plaintiff that he is the owner (or 
occupier) of land and that his legal rights of enjoyment of it are being 
infringed by another." 
The Roman-Dutch law approach to the law of nuisance was confirmed in Prinsloo v 
Shaw 27 where it was held that 
II a resident in a town, and more particularly in a residential 
neighbourhood, is entitled to the ordinary comfort and convenience of his 
home." 
25 According to Hahlo and Kahn The Union of South Africa, The development of its laws and 
constitution 557 the English law of nuisance denotes any unreasonable use of land which 
injuriously affects the use or enjoyment of neighbouring land. The English law approach was 
applied in Holland v Scott (1882) 2 EDC 307 and Van der Westhuizen v Du Toit 1912 CPD 184. 
26 1938 AD 195 at 229. 
27 1938 AD 570 at 575. The confirmation of the Roman-Dutch law principle of nuisance in Prinsloo 
v Shaw was preceded by a number of earlier cases in which the civil law approach, according to 
which the owner's rights and not his duties are accentuated, was put to the fore. See in this regard 
Union Government v Marais 1920 AD 240; Levin v Vogelstruis Estates and Co 1921 WLD 66; 
Kirsch v Pincus 1927 TPD 199; Leith v Port Elizabeth Museum Trustees 1934 ELD 211. 
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In Regal v African Supers/ate (Pfy) Ltc/28 the Appellate Division confirmed that the 
English law doctrine of nuisance did not replace our own law (Roman-Dutch law) in this 
regard. Problems concerning the owner's entitlement to use his property is thus 
approached by emphasising the owner's rights, rather than his duties, as is the case 
in English law. 
The South African case law of the early 1900's does not provide an exact description 
or definition of ownership. The most important achievement of this period is the fact that 
the courts rejected divided ownership in favour of exclusive and individual ownership. 
This decision was in line with the existing social, economic and political trends of the 
time where capitalism and individualism were emphasised, and it prepared the way for 
the introduction and acceptance of the Pandectist concept of absolute ownership in 
South African law. 
The position with regard to limited real rights up to this point in South African law 
remained essentially the same as in Roman-Dutch law. 
6.3 Ownership in South Africa during the second half of the twentieth century 
Statements about the concept of ownership are not very common in South African case 
law, but the statements that do exist describe ownership mainly in terms of its 
absoluteness and exclusivity. Visser29 pointed out that the acceptance of the concept 
of an absolute, exclusive and in principle unrestricted ownership in South Africa is due, 
not to the influence of the Roman-Dutch law ~f the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, but rather to the influence of the German Pandectists of the nineteenth 
28 1963 (1) SA 102 (A). 
29 Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 39. See also Feenstra 1976 RMT248 at 273; Van der Walt and Kleyn 
in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 247 et seq; Van der Walt in Feenstra and 
Zimmermann Das romisch-ho//andische Recht 486 et seq; Van der Walt 1993 THRHR 569 et seq; 
Van der Walt 1991 R&K 329 at 353; Van der Walt 1987 SALJ 469 at 475; Van den Bergh 
Eigendom 31 et seq; Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 et seq; Pienaar 1988 TSAR 184 at 192. 
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century. According to Visser> there was a tendency - especially during the first half of 
the twentieth century - to quote the views of the Pandectists and read them as if they 
counted among our institutional writers. As a result of this the Pandectists' perception 
of ownership as an absolute and exclusive right found its way into South African 
property law. This formed part of our own process of scientification in which Roman-
Dutch law was replaced by Pandectist theory. It should, however, be mentioned that 
almost every statement concerning the absoluteness of ownership is qualified by a 
statement that recognises the fact that ownership can be restricted and that the scope 
and content of the owner's right exists within the limits of the law.31 
Mention was made of the statement in Johannesburg Municipal Council v Rand 
Township Registrar32 where ownership was defined, with reference to Savigny, as the 
unrestricted and exclusive control which a person has over a thing. Steyn CJ referred 
to Dernburg33 for his statement in Regal v African Supers/ate (Pfy) Ltd34 that: 
"As algemene beginsel kan iedereen met sy eiendom doen wat hy wil, al 
strek dit tot nadeel of misnoee van 'n ander, maar by aangrensende 
30 Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 39 at 47. 
31 It is generally accepted that ownership has always been subject to restrictions and limitation, but 
this does not mean that ownership was never regarded as absolute and in principle unrestricted. 
See Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 39; Van der Walt in Feenstra and Zimmermann Das romisch-
ho/Uindische Recht 486; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248. It must be noted that the mere existence of 
restrictions on or the limitation of ownership does not imply that ownership is not absolute and in 
principle unrestricted. To determine whether or not the concept of ownership is regarded as 
absolute and in principle unrestricted one must determine whether restrictions or limitations are 
viewed as an intrinsic part of the concept or whether it is seen as exceptions. Van der Merwe's 
statement must be seen against this background. See Van der Merwe Sakereg 111: "Uit die 
voorafgaande moet nie afgelei word dat eiendom in enige stadium van sy ontwikkeling as abso/uut 
of onbeperk beskou is nie. Selfs in die laissez faire peroide is privaat- en publiekregte/ike 
beperkings ten aansien van eiendom erken. Omskrywings wat abso/uutheid, onbeperktheid of 
volstrektheid as primere kenmerk aandui, is dus onsuiwer." Van der Merwe seems to imply that 
the description "absolute and unrestricted" means that no restriction what so ever is recognised 
or allowed. 
32 1910 TPD 1314at1319. See 6.2.2 above. 
33 Dernburg System 1 par 162. 
34 1963 (1) SA 102 (A) at 106 et seq. 
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vasgoed spreek dit haas vanse/f dat daar minder ruimte is vir onbeperkte 
regsuitoefening. "35 
In Chetty v Naidoo36 Jansen JA said: 
"It may be difficult to define dominium comprehensively ... but there can 
be I ittle doubt . . . that one of its incidents is the right of exclusive 
possession of the res, with the necessary corollary that the owner may 
claim his property whenever found, from whomsoever holding it. It is 
inherent in the nature of ownership that possession should normally be 
with the owner, and it follows that no other person may withhold it from 
the owner unless he is vested with some right enforceable against the 
owner." 
In Gien v Gien37 it was declared that our law's point of departure is the so-called 
absoluteness of ownership, although it recognises the fact that ownership can be 
restricted. It was said, with reference to Regal v African Supers/ate (Pfy) Ltd, that: 
"Eiendomsreg is die mees volledige saaklike reg wat 'n persoon ten 
opsigte van 'n saak kan he. Die uitgangspunt is dat 'n persoon, wat 'n 
onroerende saak aanbetref, met en op sy eiendom kan maak wat hy wit. 
Hierdie op die oog at ongebonde vryheid is egter 'n ha/we waarheid. Die 
absolute beskikkingsbevoegdheid van 'n eienaar bestaan binne die perke 
wat die reg daarop plaas. "38 
35 As a general principle everyone can do with his property what he likes, even if it is detrimental to 
others, but where neighbouring immovables are concerned, it is obvious that there exists less 
freedom for the unlimited exercise of one's rights. 
36 1974 (3) SA 13 (A) at20. 
37 1979 (2) SA 1113(T)at1120. 
38 Ownership is the most complete real right that a person can have with regard to a thing. The point 
of departure is that a person, as far as an immovable is concerned, can do with and on his property 
as he likes. However, this apparent unlimited freedom is a half-truth. The absolute entitlements of 
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It can thus be said that the general starting point in South African case law is to 
describe ownership with reference to the comprehensiveness of the owner's right to use 
his property and, although the existence of restrictions is recognised, according to case 
law ownership can nevertheless be described as fundamentally unrestricted and 
absolute. 39 
The importance of the absolute concept of ownership in our law is stressed by the 
declaration of Holmes JA in Oakland Nominess v Gelria Mining & Investment Co (Pty) 
Ltd:40 
"Our law jealously protects the right of ownership and the correlative right 
of the owner in regard to his property, unless, of course, the possessor 
has some enforceable right against the owner." 
Ownership is described in different ways in legal textbooks. The first method of defining 
ownership is to draw up a catalogue of the different entitlements of the owner. 
According to Erasmus, Van der Merwe and Van Wyk the list of entitlements includes 
the ius utendi, ius fruendi, ius abutendi, ius disponendi, ius vindicandi and the ius 
negandi.41 While some jurists provide only a catalogue of entitlements or incidents of 
ownership,42 others provide a description of ownership in conjunction with such a 
an owner exists within the boundaries of the law. 
39 Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 305 at 320; Van der Walt 1991 R&K 329 at 353; Visser 1985 Acta 
Juridica 39 at 47; Kroeze 1993 De Jure 42 at 47. 
40 1976 (1) SA441 (A) at452. 
41 Erasmus, Van der Merwe and Van Wyk Lee and Honore - Family, things and succession 260. 
42 The list of entitlements or incidents of ownership often also includes some responsibilities. See 
Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 241 et seq where the following incidents of ownership are listed: the right 
to use the property, the rightto manage the property, the right to the income from the property, the 
right to capital which includes the right to destroy the property and the right to dispose of the 
property, the right to security, the incident of absence of term, the incident of transmissibility, the 
prohibition against harmful use of the property, liability to execution, the right to possess the 
property and lastly mention is made of the residuary character of ownership. See also Honore in 
Guest Oxford essays in jurisprudence 107 et seq and Gibson Wilie's principles of South African 
law 198 et seq. 
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catalogue. 43 The method of only drawing a catalogue of the different entitlements of 
ownership is rejected by most jurists because it is felt that ownership is an abstract 
concept and it is impossible to compile a comprehensive list of. entitlements. 44 The view 
according to which ownership is regarded as a "bundle of rights"45 or a "composite right 
consisting of a conglomerate of rights, powers and liberties"46 is also rejected. The 
prevailing view in this regard is that ownership will always amount to more than the sum 
total of the different entitlements. 47 
Van der Walt48 regards Van der Merwe's49 definition, according to which ownership is 
defined with reference to the comprehensiveness of the owner's right, as representative 
and authoritative in the South African law: 
"Om eiendom van beperkte saaklike regte te onderskei, word dit omskryf 
as die saaklike reg wat die mees volkome en omvangrykste heerskappy 
oor 'n saak verleen. 'n Eienaar kan binne die grense deur die publiek- en 
43 See in this regard Van der Merwe Sakereg 112 et seq; Silberberg The law of property 37 and 226; 
Delport and OIMer Sakereg vonnisbundel 135 et seq; Erasmus, Van der Merwe and Van Wyk Lee 
and Honore - Family, things and succession 260; Oosthuizen The law of property 27; Hahlo and 
Kahn The Union of South Africa - The developments of its laws and constitution 578; Sonnekus 
Sakereg vonnisbundel 130. 
44 Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of property 162; Van der Walt 1988 De 
Jure 16at18; Van der Merwe Sakereg 112; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 174; Schoeman 
Silberberg and Schoeman - The law of property 162; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 
249; Kroeze 1993 De Jure 42 at 47. 
45 Silberberg The law of property 37 et seq. According to Silberberg "the creation of a limited real 
right thus amounts to a reduction of the sum total of the real rights which are said to make up the 
universal right of ownership or to the removal of one or more of the powers of the owner over a 
thing if one prefers to regard the right of ownership as a 'bundle of powers'." 
46 Hahlo and Kahn The Union of South Africa - The development of its laws and constitution 578. 
47 Van der Merwe Sakereg 112; Schoeman Silberberg and Schoeman - The law of property 162; Van 
der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 18; OIMer, Pienaar and Van der Walt Law of property - Students' 
handbook 32; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel249; Kroeze 1993 De Jure 42 at 47. 
48 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16at19. 
49 Van der Merwe Sakereg 110. 
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privaatreg gestel na geliewe met die saak handel. "50 
Van der Merwe51 states that his definition is in accordance with Grotius' definition of full 
ownership. 52 
It is pointed out by Van der Walt53 that the words "omvangrykste heerskappy'' or most 
comprehensive sovereignty, as used by Van der Merwe in his definition, have a dual 
meaning. Firstly it signifies the most comprehensive collection of entitlements with 
regard to the thing, and secondly it indicates that ownership provides the owner with 
the widest possible scope within which these entitlements with regard to the thing can 
be exercised. The first meaning, which is referred to as the identity aspect of the 
absolutist concept of ownership, says something about the content of the right (the 
different entitlements of the owner) and the way in which the right is structured, while 
the second meaning gives an indication of how ownership is exercised. This is referred 
to as the exercise aspect of the absolutist concept of ownership. 
6.3.1 The identity aspect of ownership 
With reference to the identity aspect of ownership, Van der Walt54 points out that the 
majority of definitions in this category describes ownership in such a way as to 
50 In order to distinguish between ownership and limited real rights, ownership is described as the real 
rightthat confers the most complete and comprehensive sovereignty over a thing. An owner can, 
within the limits set by public and private law, act fre~ly with regard to the thing. 
51 Van der Merwe Sakereg 110. 
52 Van der Merwe quotes Grotius /nleidinge 11.3.10 (1952) 54: "Volle is den eigendom waer door 
iemand met de zake al/es mag doen nae sijn geliefde ende t'sijnen bate dat by de wetten 
onverboden is". He also refers to Van Leeuwen Cencura Forensis, theoretico-practica 1.2.13.1, 
Van der Keessel Praelectiones iuris hodiemi ad Hugonis Grotii lntoductionem ad iurisprudentiam 
Hollandicam 11.3.1 O, Lee and Honore The South African law of property, family relations and 
succession par 29 and Johannesburg Municipal Council v Rand Townships Registrar & others 
1910 TPD 1314at1319. 
53 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 19. See also Kroeze 1993 De Jure 42 at 47. 
54 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16at19. 
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distinguish it from limited real rights. A distinction is made here between the 
distinguishing characteristics and the distinguishing entitlements. 
(i) Characteristics that distinguish ownership from limited real rights 
The following characteristics of the South African concept of ownership can be listed 
as characteristics that distinguish ownership from limited real rights: 
(a) Ownership is described as the mother right, because all limited real rights 
are derived from ownership. 55 
(b) Ownership is an abstract right. Ownership is described as such, because 
the exact content of the right is indeterminable and ownership will always 
remain with the owner no matter how many entitlements are disposed of 
by transferring it to others as limited real rights.56 
(c) Ownership has a residuary character - this is also referred to as the 
elasticity of ownership. This implies that all limited real rights are 
regarded as unnatural, temporary encumberments on ownership and 
once the limited real rights are extinguished it will automatically revert 
back to the owner and ownership will resume its natural fullness and 
become unencumbered again. The owner thus retains a reversionary 
right with regard to the entitlements he disposes of as limited real rights. 57 
55 Van der Merwe Sakereg 113; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 175; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg 
and Schoeman's The law of property 162; Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 20; Sonnekus and 
Neels Sakereg vonn/sbundel 249. 
56 Van der Merwe Sakereg 112 refers to this characteristic as the indefiniteness of ownership. Also 
see Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 174; Van der Walt 1992 SAJHR 431 at 433; Van der Walt 
1988 De Jure 16 at 20; Sonnekus Sakereg vonnisbundel 130; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg 
vonnisbundel 249; Schoeman Silberberg and Schoeman - The law of property 162. 
57 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 20; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of 
property 163. Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 241 at 257 states that "this is the characteristic of 
ownership that distinguishes it from all other rights which one may have in a thing." Contra Van der 
Merwe Sakereg (1989) 175; Van der Merwe Sakereg 113; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg 
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(d) Ownership is a comprehensive right in the sense that it confers on the 
owner the most comprehensive control over a thing. 58 This is also 
referred to as the total_ity of ownership. Van der Walt59 points out that the 
characteristic of comprehensiveness not only implies that ownership 
constitutes the most comprehensive collection of entitlements, but also 
that ownership will always amount to something more than such a 
collection. 
(e) Ownership is an exclusive or individualistic right. This implies firstly that 
there can be only one owner and secondly that the owner can exclude all 
others from interfering with his right.60 
(f) Ownership is a independent right in that it is neither dependent on nor 
derived from any other right. 61 
(g) Ownership is unlimited in duration and not subject to a time limit. 62 
(h) Ownership is an absolute right. The absoluteness of ownership implies 
vonnisbundel 249. 
58 Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of property 162; Schoeman Silberberg and 
Schoeman -The law of property 162; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 171 et seq; Van der Merwe 
Sakereg 11 O; Oosthuizen The law of property 27; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 
249; Sonnekus Sakereg vonnisbundel 130; Erasmus, Van der Merwe and Van Wyk Lee and 
Honore Family, things and succession 260; Hahlo and Kahn The Union of South Africa - The 
development of its laws and constitution 578. See also Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 (T) at 
1120C. . 
59 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 20. 
60 Van der Merwe Sakereg 11 O; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 171; Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 
at 21; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of property 162. 
61 According to Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 176 the independence of ownership can be regarded 
as the distinguishing characteristic of ownership. See also Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and 
Schoeman's The law of property 163; Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 21. 
62 Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of property 163. Van der Merwe Sakereg 
(1989) 175 points out that there are exceptional cases where ownership will be subject to a time 
limit (eg the fideicommissum). 
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that it is an (in principle) unrestricted right and that restrictions, no matter 
how many or how exhaustive they are, 63 are seen as exceptions to the 
rule.64 It has been suggested that the severity of the restrictions has led 
to the erosion or limitation of the traditional concept of ownership so that 
ownership can no longer be described as absolute. 65 It is however 
pointed out by Van der Walt and Kleyn66 that ownership has always been 
subject to limitation and that even if the limitations have increased in 
number, it is not necessarily true that ownership is now a more limited 
right. Ownership is thus still perceived as a right which is in principle 
unrestricted and therefore absolute. 
(ii) Entitlements that distinguish ownership from limited real rights 
According to Van der Walt67 the premise of this category is also the fact that ownership 
will always amount to something more than the mere sum-total of the different 
entitlements of the owner. The entitlements that are listed in this category are peculiar 
63 For a discussion on how ownership has been limited by legislation see Cowen New patterns of 
landownership: the transformation of the concept of ownership as plena in re potestas Paper read 
at the University of the Witwatersrand on 26 April 1984 and Pienaar 1986 TSAR 295 with regard 
to new forms of land ownership and ownership of air space, Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 241 with 
regard to mining and mineral laws and political land legislation, Milton 1985 Acta Juridica 267 with 
regard to town planning, Rabie 1985 Acta Juridica 289 with regard to nature conservation and Van 
der Walt 1987 SAW 469 and Van der Walt 1987 CILSA 209 with regard to conservation of the 
cultural environment. 
64 Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 39 et seq; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of 
property 163; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 258 et seq; Van 
der Walt 1991 R&K 329 at 353; Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 24; Sonnekus and Neels 
Sakereg vonnisbundel 249; Oosthuizen The law of property 27; Hahlo and Kahn The Union of 
South Africa - The development of its laws and constitution 578; Kroeze 1993 De Jure 42 at 4 7. 
65 See in this regard Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 241; Cowen New patterns of landownership: the 
transformation of the concept of ownership as plena in re potestas Paper read at the University of 
the Witwatersrand on 26 April 1984; Pienaar 1986 TSAR 295. 
66 Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 259. See also Van Maanen 
Eigendomschijnbewegingen 26 et seq; Deline Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende 
eeuw. 
67 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 21. 
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to ownership and as such it cannot be alienated or transferred to someone who has a 
limited real right. Since these entitlements cannot be alienated and will always remain 
with the owner, it serves as distinguishing entitlements. 
(a) The right to dispose of the property. Although this entitlement may be 
interpreted to include the right to use and enjoy the property68 or the right 
to alienate the property,69 it is used here only to indicate the owner's right 
to decide how and by whom the property shall be used. The owner thus 
has the power to grant limited real rights to others. This entitlement is 
also referred to as the power to manage. 70 
(b) The right to alienate the property. Since only the owner may manage the 
property it follows that only the owner may alienate the property. 71 
(c) The right to vindicate. The owner will always have the power to claim his 
property from any unlawful possessor. 72 It follows that no-one may 
withhold property from the rightful owner, unless he is vested with some 
enforceable right against the owner. 
(d) The right to use and enjoy the property. Van der Walt73 points out that 
68 Van Zyl and Van der Vyver lnleiding tot die regswetenskap 422. 
69 Sonnekus Sakereg vonnisbundel 130; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 248. 
70 Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 241 at 250. See also Honore in Guest Oxford essays in jurisprudence 
107 at 116; Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 21 et seq. 
71 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 22; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of 
property 162; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 173; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 
248; Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 241 at 250; Oosthuizen The law of Property 27. 
72 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 22; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of 
property 162; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 173; Erasmus, Van der Merwe and Van Wyk Lee 
and Honore - Family, things and succession 260; Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 241 at 254. See also 
Chettyv Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13 at 206; Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross 1979 (1) SA 603 (A) at 
615H; Oakland Nominees v Gelria Mining and Investment Co 1976 (1) SA 441 at 452A. 
73 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 22. 
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while some authors include the right to use and enjoy the property in this 
category of untransferable entitlements, 74 this is pre-eminently an 
entitlement that can be transferred to others as.a-limited real right. 
6.3.2 The exercise aspect of ownership 
According to Van der Walt75 this approach to describing ownership emphasises the 
possibilities for the exercise of the owner's entitlements, rather than the entitlements 
itself. Most jurists who describe ownership in this way qualify the exercise aspect of 
ownership by stating that the scope of the owner's right to do with his property as he 
deems fit is always subject to limitation by law. 76 The best known example of a 
description where the exercise aspect of ownership is emphasised is to be found in 
Gien v Gien: 77 
"Die uitgangspunt is dat 'n persoon, wat 'n onroerende saak aanbetref, 
met en op sy eiendom kan maak wat hy wil. Hierdie op die oog af 
ongebonde vryheid is egter 'n ha/we waarheid. Die absolute 
beskikkingsbevoegdheid van die eienaar bestaan binne die perke wat die 
74 See in this regard Van Zyl and Van der Vyver lnleiding tot die regswetenskap 422. According to 
these authors the right to use and enjoy the property can be used to distinguish between ownership 
and limited real rights in that the thing directly qualifies as the object of ownership, while it only 
indirectly qualifies as the object of a limited real right. 
75 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 22. 
76 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 23; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 171; Kleyn and Boraine 
Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of property 161; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 
249; Hahlo and Kahn The Union of South Africa - The development of its laws and constitution 
578; Oosthuizen The law of property 27; Erasmus, Van der Merwe and Van Wyk Lee and Honore 
- Family, things and succession 260; Schoeman Silberberg and Schoeman - The law of property 
162. See also Gien v Gien 1979 (2) SA 1113 at 1120; Regal v African Super Slate (Ply) Ltd 1963 
(1) SA 102 at 106. 
77 1979 (2) SA 1113 at 1120C. See also in this regard Regal v African Super Slate (Ply) Ltd 1963 (1) 
SA 102 at 106; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 171; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and 
Schoeman's The law of property 161 ; Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 249; Hahlo and 
Kahn The Union of South Africa - The development of its laws and constitution 578; Oosthuizen 
The law of property 27; Erasmus, Van der Merwe and Van Wyk Lee and Honore - Family, things 
and succession 260; Schoeman Silberberg and Schoeman - The law of property 162. 
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reg daarop plaas... Ons reg gaan ook uit van die stand punt van die 
sogenaamde abso/uutheid van eiendomsreg maar terselfdertyd met 
erkenning van die beperking daarvan. "78 
The premise of this type of description is that the owner has total freedom'to do with his 
property as he wishes. Ownership is regarded as an absolute right in the sense that it 
is in principle unrestricted, although it tolerates restrictions. Restrictions are regarded 
as unnatural and exceptional. 79 The fact that ownership can be limited by public and 
private law to such an extent that very little of the right remains, 80 does not infringe 
upon the principle of an absolute ownership. 81 
In discussing or describing the exercise aspect of ownership, reference is often made 
to the ius abutendi.82 The exact content and meaning of the ius abutendi in South 
African law is uncertain. While some jurists think that the ius abutendi merely entails 
the right to consume one's property,83 others contend that it also confers on the owner 
78 The point of departure is that a person, as far as an immovable is concerned, can do with and on 
his property as he likes. However, this apparent unlimited freedom is a half-truth. The absolute 
entitlements of an owner exists within the boundaries of the law ... Our law's point of departure is 
also the so-called absoluteness of ownership, but at the same time it recognises the limitation 
thereof. 
79 Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 39 et seq; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of 
property 163; Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213 at 258 et seq; Van 
der Walt 1991 R&K 329 at 353; Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 24; Sonnekus and Neels 
Sakereg vonnisbundel 249; Oosthuizen The law of property 27; Hahlo and Kahn The Union of 
South Africa - The development of its laws and constitution 578; Kroeze 1993 De Jure 42 at 4 7. 
80 Cowen New patterns of landownership: the transformation of the concept of ownership as plena 
in re potestas Paper read at the University of the Witwatersrand on 26 April 1984; Pienaar 1986 
TSAR 295; Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 241; Milton 1985 Acta Juridica 267; Rabie 1985 Acta Juridica 
289; Van der Walt 1987 SAW 469; Van der Walt 1987 CILSA 209. 
81 Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of Jaw 213 at 259; Van der Walt 1988 De 
Jure 16 at 23. But see Lewis 1985 Acta Juridica 241 . 
82 Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16 at 23. 
83 Hahlo and Kahn The Union of South Africa - The development of its laws and constitution 578; 
Schoeman Silberberg and Schoeman - The law of property 178. 
106 
the right to abuse his property.84 According to Kleyn and Boraine the ius abutendi 
includes the right to destroy one's property. 85 
Prior to the implementation of the interim Constitution in 1994 ownership was therefore 
perceived as an absolute, exclusive, individualistic, in principle unlimited right that 
confers on the owner the most comprehensive right to dispose of his property. The 
autonomy of the owner is central to the concept of ownership in this period and is 
emphasised by the exclusivity and absoluteness ascribed to ownership. The owner's 
consent fulfills a central role in both the notions of exclusivity and absoluteness. As was 
stated above, the fact that ownership is regarded as absolute or in principle 
unrestricted implies that all restrictions or limitations are perceived as exceptions. The 
owner may, however, consent to restrict his right by granting limited real rights to 
others. All others may also only interfere with the owner's right if he consents to such 
an interference. 
In South Africa all questions on property law centred around the process of 
scientification of property law. On the one hand the property debate in South Africa 
concentrated on the content of ownership and the system of real rights. The definition 
of these rights and their place within the hierarchical system were all institutional 
questions. This amounted to a 'scientific' continuation of the distinction made by Grotius 
and the German Pandectists between ownership and limited real rights. On the other 
hand South African property lawyers concerned themselves with the exercise of 
property rights. The exercise aspect concerned the relationship between the owner and 
third parties as well as the public at large. 
84 Sonnekus and Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel249; Sonnekus Sakereg vonnisbundel 130. Although 
Erasmus, Van der Meiwe and Van Wyk Lee and Honore - Family, things and succession 260 state 
that the owner has the right to abuse his property, they also mention the view held by Hahlo and 
Kahn that the word abuti does not imply the stigma of abusing or misapplying the thing. See also 
Van der Meiwe Sakereg (1989) 173 and Silberberg The law of property 227 where it is pointed out 
that although the ius abutendi may include the right to abuse one's property, this entitlement is 
curtailed to a large extent. 
85 Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of property 162. See also Oosthuizen The 
law of property 27. 
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The property debate in South Africa prior to the implementation of the first democratic 
Constitution did not really change the direction of the development of property initiated 
by Grotius and the German Pandectists. In essence all questions about property rights 
were answered in terms of a conceptual, institutional and hierarchical system based on 
an abstract, scientific system of concepts, definitions and logic. 
6.4 Changing the face of the concept of ownership in South Africa 
Cowen86 set the stage for the debate on the future relevance of the traditional concept 
of (land)ownership in South Africa. His thought-provoking paper on new patterns of 
landownership and the transformation of ownership as plena in re potestas proved to 
be an incentive to many jurists to ponder the different possibilities of how this concept 
should change and/or adapt in order to secure its future existence. Cowen questioned 
the validity and future relevance of many of the traditional characteristics of ownership 
and the rules governing the application of this concept, and suggested that the 
traditional perception of ownership should be re-evaluated and, where necessary, 
adjusted to suit the current needs of the entire South African society. What is 
suggested here is not that South African property law break with tradition and re-think 
and re-evaluate the application, social function and role of property within society, but 
merely that the system of concepts be amended to suit the needs of the particular 
situation in South Africa. In this sense Cowen still perceives ownership (and other 
property rights) as a flexible concept that is able to change and adapt to new 
circumstances. However, at this point in history property law in South Africa was on the 
doorstep of another discontinuity in its development. What was needed was a total 
break with the traditional view of property rights as concepts within a hierarchical 
system. The political role of these rights had to be recognised and the rights 
themselves were in need of fundamental change to be able to cater for the specific 
needs of South African society. 
86 Cowen New patterns of landownership: the transformation of the concept of ownership as plena 
in re potestas Paper read at the University of the Witwatersrand on 26 April 1984. 
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Cowen points out that the introduction of the Sectional Titles Act87 effectively amended 
some of the common law principles regarding ownership of immovables. The principle 
of accession, as expressed in the Roman maxim superficies ·solo cedit, was repealed 
in the case of sectional titles in that the co-owners of the land (or common property) are 
not owners of everything that is attached to the land, but each of these co-owners is 
owner of a part (his section) of the building.88 Likewise the cuius est so/um-rule was 
repealed in the case of sectional titles. The owner of a section in a sectional title 
scheme will not be owner of everything under and above his property, but only of the 
specific section. This was achieved by describing the section not only in terms of 
vertical boundaries (as is usually the case), but also in terms of horizontal boundaries.89 
The common law concept of co-ownership was also adapted by the introduction of the 
Sectional Title Act in that the co-owner in a sectional title scheme does not have the 
freedom to use or dispose of his undivided co-ownership share as he deems fit. The 
exercise of this right is limited by the rules governing sectional titles and linked to the 
rights of the other co-owners. According to Cowen90 the individualistic character of 
common law co-ownership was changed in the case of sectional title schemes by 
87 66 of 1971. Cowen's arguments also apply to the new Sectional Title Act 95 of 1986 and the 
Property Timesharing Control Act 75 of 1983 and ownership of airspace. Also see Pienaar 1988 
TSAR 184 at 192 et seq; Pienaar 1989 THRHR 216; Pienaar 1986 TRW 1; Pienaar 1987 CILSA 
94; Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 1 at 38; Van der Walt and Pienaar Introduction to the Jaw of 
property 79 et seq. 
88 Cowen New patterns of landownership 57 et seq. See also Cowen 1973 C/LSA 1 at 19 et seq; 
Pienaar 1988 TSAR 184 at 193; Pienaar 1983 THRHR 62 at 70; Van der Merwe 197 4 THRHR 113 
at 115 et seq; Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 396; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's 
The law of property 323 et seq; Van der Walt and Pienaar Introduction to the Jaw of property 81. 
89 Cowen New patterns of landownership 54 et seq. See also Cowen 1985 Acta Juridica 333; 
Pienaar 1989 THRHR 216; Pienaar 1987 C/LSA 94; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and 
Schoeman's The law of property 325 et seq; Van der Walt and Pienaar Introduction to the Jaw of 
property 81. 
9° Cowen New patterns of landownership 63 et seq. Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 407 et seq 
states that the Sectional Title Aci has created a new type of common ownership (gemeenskaplike 
eiendom) that differs from the traditional co-ownership (mede-eiendom). Whereas co-ownership 
has a individualistic character, the Sectional Title Act creates a concept of common property with 
an universal basis according to which the rights of the individual are managed by the body 
corporate. See also Van der Merwe 197 4 THRHR 113 at 120 et seq; Pienaar 1983 THRHR 62 at 
72 et seq. 
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eliminating the right of any of the co-owners to terminate the relationship at will by 
means of the actio communi dividundo. The control, management and administration 
of the common property under a sectional title scheme is entrusted to a statutory body 
corporate, and is no longer in the hands of the co-owners themselves. 
Lastly, and most importantly, Cowen91 points out that ownership as plena in re potestas 
is obviated in the case of sectional title schemes by the joint exercise by the sectional 
owners of the entitlements of use and control regarding the common property. 
Cowen voices the opinion that the perception of ownership as plena in re potestas has 
become obsolete and that it is in dire need of change in view of the needs of the 
modern South African society. He makes three submissions in this regard: 
(i) The traditional concept fails to distinguish, as it should, between what 
attributes are appropriate for different objects of ownership. 92 
(ii) The idea of plena in re potestas is incompatible with the fragmentation of 
ownership; but such fragmentation is a need of our time.93 
(iii) The fact that the idea of ownership as p/ena in re potestas is 
unsatisfactory from the point of view of general jurisprudence. 94 
Cowen does not discuss his firsts two submissions in any detail, but merely provides 
91 Cowen New patterns of landownership 67 et seq. De Wet 1972 De Rebus 205, however, severely 
criticised the Sectional Titles Act. According to him.the rights of the sectional owner cannot be 
described as common law ownership. He states that: "Die man wat 'eienaar' is van 'n woonstel is 
nie werklik 'eienaar' van die grond nie, ... maar inderwaarheid het hy slegs 'n newelagtige iets 
onderworpe aan die gebreke waarmee hierdie Wet ryk bedeeld is." Van der Merwe Sakereg 
(1989) 406 et seq, however, points out that De Wet's arguments are untenable in view of the 
development of the concept of ownership in modem times. Social realities necessitate the limitation 
of ownership, and as such ownership should be utilised for the benefit of society. See also Van der 
Merwe 197 4 THRHR 113 at 123 et seq; Pienaar 1988 TSAR 184 at 193; Pienaar 1986 TRW 1 at 
3. 
92 Cowen New patterns of landownership 70 et seq. 
93 Cowen New patterns of landownership 71 et seq. 
94 Cowen New patterns of landownership 72 et seq. 
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examples to explain what is meant by each. With reference to the third submission 
Cowen mentions three points of criticism against the method of analysing ownership 
according to the different rights, privileges, powers and immunities. According to him 
this method is unsatisfactory and potentially misleading. He firstly states that95 
" ... analyses which stress the fact that ownership is as extensive as the 
possibility of use and enjoyment boils down to the proposition that 
ownership consists of the maximum combination of rights, powers, 
privileges and immunities in respect of the object owned that are legally 
possible from time to time in a given system of law, a one-sided 
proposition which leaves what is legally possible unexplained." 
Secondly, he contends that while the different attributes of ownership96 are often listed 
as essentialia of ownership, they are at best naturalia.97 He concludes in this regard 
that amongst the naturalia, the elasticity of ownership can be regarded as its 
distinguishing characteristic.98 Cowen's99 third and last point of criticism is the fact that 
the second part of the traditional definition of ownership, which deals with the limitation 
of ownership, is often negated or at least not emphasised enough. Cowen suggests 
that the limitation of ownership should be regarded as an integral part of the concept, 
and that the imposition of social duties and responsibilities should be considered. This 
would not mean that the traditional concept of ownership, which emphasised 
individualism, should be abolished in toto, but rather that a balance should be struck 
between individual self-assertiveness and social responsibility. According to Cowen 100 
this will result in 
95 Cowen New patterns of landownership 7 4. 
96 Such as the ius utendi, possidendi, abutendi etc. 
97 Cowen New patterns of landownership 7 4 et seq. 
98 Cowen New patterns of landownership 77. 
99 Cowen New patterns of landownership 77 et seq. 
100 Cowen New patterns of landownership 80. 
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"a concept of ownership suited to our day and age; specifically adapted, 
in all cases, to the nature of what is owned; and adapted also to the 
overriding fact that every owner of a thing is at the same time a member 
of a community, or of several communities." 
Cowen thus did not advocate a break with the traditional view of property rights as 
concepts within a hierarchical system of rights, but merely suggested that the concept 
of ownership should be adapted so as to meet the needs of South African society. He 
therefore accepts the conceptualist premise that property law can be seen as flexible 
enough to adapt to new social and political circumstances. 
Cowen's work was the catalyst for many property lawyers to re-think and re-evaluate 
the future existence and role of the concept of absolute, exclusive and individualistic 
ownership that was still in existence in the 1980's and early 1990's.101 This perception 
of ownership had become untenable in a society characterised by social injustice and 
racially based land tenure. 102 The civilist concept of ownership contributed to the 
existing problems and made land reform virtually impossible in a time when the majority 
of the South African population was without land - 85% of the land was owned by 
whites (13% of the population). Ownership was used as a tool in the hands of the 
apartheid government to enforce and entrench racial segregation. The reduction of 
property law to a scientific system of rights and concepts contributed to the problems 
relating to property rights and land in South Africa. On the one hand the scientific 
approach to property rights negated questions relating to the social function of property 
rights and the relevance of reasonableness within .an abstract, scientific system. Moral 
issues were kept out of the debate on property rights. On the other hand the hierarchy 
of stronger and weaker property rights enabled the government to manipulate the 
101 See 6.3 above. 
102 For an exposition of the history of black land tenure and the apartheid legislation in respect to land 
see Van der Merwe 1989 TSAR 663; Olivier, Du Plessis and Pienaar 1990 SAPL 266, Van der Walt 
1990 Stell LR 26; Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 1; Davenport 1985 Acta Juridica 53; Schoombee 
1985 Acta Juridica 77; Van der Post 1985 Acta Juridica 213; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and 
Schoeman's The law of property 493 et seq. 
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situation by degrading certain rights (for instance the property rights of some groups 
were degraded to permits). The problem was that the scientific and non-political 
approach to ownership and other property rights completely negated the debate on the 
social function of these rights. However, property rights (and land) are essentially 
political issues and as such ownership specifically, and property rights in general, 
needed to be evaluated and adapted in view of their social role and function in order 
to create a property regime that would be acceptable to the South African society as 
a whole. 103 
In order to appease the immense land hunger, property law had to adapt in order to 
enable it to cater for the pressing needs of society. It became clear at this time that the 
apartheid system would not survive for long, and this prompted many jurists to consider 
different possibilities to change property rights so that they can effectively deal with the 
needs of a post-apartheid society. Some of these jurists saw the political nature and the 
social function of property rights behind the pretence of scientific concepts and 
extended the property debate to include these issues. They did not aim to change the 
concepts, but rather to change the nature of the property debate and to return to the 
debate on the social function of property rights in society (as it existed before Grotius). 
Cowen did not go this far. He still concentrated on the concepts and their place within 
the system of property rights. He did, however, provide the impetus for many jurists to 
re-think the whole property question by looking beyond the scientific concepts and 
extending the property debate to look at the social function of property. 
Most of the initial debate on the transformation of the concept of ownership centred 
around the issues mentioned by Cowen. Cowen's thesis that the concept of ownership 
as plena in re potestas is being transformed into a socially responsible and limited right 
was the theme of many subsequent papers. On the one hand there are a few 
103 Van der Walt 1990 Stell LR 26; Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 1; Van der Merwe 1989 TSAR 663; 
Van der Merwe 1990 Stell LR 321; Marcus 1990 SAJHR 178; Skweyiya 1990 SAJHR 195; Sachs 
in Sachs Protecting human rights in a new South Africa 104; Davis 1991 SALJ 453 at 468. 
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publications which picked up on the technical aspects of Cowen's paper. 104 It is pointed 
out in these publications that the common law concept of ownership was not always 
perceived as absolute or unlimited, but that it acquired this characteristic due to the 
influence in South African law of the German Pandectists of the nineteenth century. On 
the other hand there are publications in which the political implications of Cowen's 
paper are emphasised.105 These publications suggested that the debate on ownership 
should take cognisance of the social and political environment in which it functions. It 
is argued that ownership should be socialised. In doing so, a socially responsible 
perception of ownership will be created - a perception that recognises the fact that the 
definition, nature, content, characteristics and protection of ownership are influenced 
by the social and political function and implications of individual ownership. A 
socialised concept of ownership necessarily recognises the fact that ownership not only 
entails rights and entitlements that accrue to the owner, but also that duties, limitations 
and responsibilities towards society form an inherent part of ownership. 
Cowen's submission that attention should be given to the possible fragmentation of 
ownership was mooted and explored in subsequent publications. Although some 
authors hinted at the possibility of a move backwards to divided ownership, the 
fragmentation of ownership was never worked out in any detail. It was, amongst others, 
suggested that divided ownership be implemented with regard to individual and 
communal title, movables and immovables, objects used for consumption and 
production, and so on. 106 
104 Birks 1985 Acta Juridica 1; Visser 1985 Acta Juridica 39. These papers were followed up by a 
number of publications that concentrated on the origins of the South African concept of ownership. 
See Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 305; Pienaar 1986 TSAR 295; Van der Walt 1988 De Jure 16; 
Van der Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213. 
105 Van der Walt 1986 THRHR 305; Van der Walt 1987 SALJ 469; Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 1 ; Van 
der Walt 1990 Stell LR 26; Van der Walt 1991 R&K 329; Van der Walt 1992 SAJHR 431; Lewis 
1992 SAJHR 389; Pienaar 1986 TSAR 295; Pienaar 1988 TSAR 192; Kroeze 1993 De Jure 42; 
Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of property 163 et seq. 
106 Kroeze 1993 De Jure 42; Pienaar 1986 TSAR 295 at 306; Van der Walt 1987 SALJ 469; Van der 
Walt 1988DeJure16;Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 1 at 36 et seq; Van der Walt 1990 Stell LR 26 
at 42 et seer. Van der Walt in Van der Walt Land Reform 21; Van der Walt 1992 TSAR 40; Van der 
Walt and Kleyn in Visser Essays on the history of law 213; Domanski 1989 THRHR 433; Marcus 
1990 SAJHR 178; Budlender and Latsky 1990 SAJHR 155; Skweyiya 1990 SAJHR 195; Robertson 
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6.5 Conclusion 
In brief it could be said that the South African law pertaining to ownership early this 
century corresponded with Roman-Dutch law. In the second half on the nineteenth 
century South African property law underwent a process of scientification on the basis 
of Pandectism. Divided ownership was finally rejected and a unitary concept of 
ownership was accepted. Property law was treated in terms of a scientific, hierarchical 
system of abstract concepts, largely uninfluenced by social and political realities. The 
personal freedom and autonomy of the individual was accentuated and ownership was 
consequently described as an absolute, in principle unrestricted right. 
Cowen's article on the new patterns of landownership in South Africa raised interesting 
questions concerning the future viability and continued acceptance of the common law 
concept of absolute, individual ownership, and the 1980's and early 1990's were 
consequently characterised by numerous publications in which the unjust property 
regime and the influence of the common law and of the modern civilist concept of 
ownership on this regime were criticised and suggestions were made for ways in which 
the political questions raised by Cowen could be answered. 
Although the concept of absolute, exclusive and individual ownership was still accepted 
as the law of the day in the early 1990's, dramatic change regarding the way in which 
ownership is perceived and applied was inevitable. 
The lack of a debate on the social and political function of property rights and the 
continued acceptance and application of the concept of absolute, individual ownership 
became untenable in a society characterised by racial segregation and an unjust 
distribution of land and rights to land. It was pointed out in the previous chapters that 
the modern civilist concept of ownership is associated with absoluteness, individuality 
and exclusiveness due to the influence of the nineteenth century German Pandectists. 
1990 SAJHR2i15; Olivier, Du Plessis and Pienaar 1990 SAPL 266 at 275 et seq; Van der Merwe 
1989 TSAR 6~3; Van der Merwe 1990 Stell LR 321; Davis 1991 SALJ 453 at 468. 
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In terms of the traditional view property rights developed in an uninterrupted line from 
Roman law. As a result of the influence of the German Pandectists South African 
property law was characterised by an abstract, hierarchical system of stronger and 
weaker rights, and ownership was regarded as an absolute, exclusive and individual 
right. The scientification of property law meant that the property debate was dominated 
by conceptualism and questions on the social function of property were negated. The 
abstract concepts were seen as flexible enough to adapt to different social and political 
circumstances. However, it is pointed out that the abstract, conceptual approach to 
property law is not the result of the logical, uninterrupted development of Roman, 
medieval or Roman-Dutch law, and as such a strong case can be made for discarding 
the strong emphasis on conceptualism in favour of socialised property rights. It is 
pointed out that South African property law was characterised by many inequalities, 
and although property rights were seen as abstract, socially and politically neutral 
concepts, these inequalities were the result of changes to property law for social and 
political reasons. These changes were technical in nature and fitted into the abstract, 
scientific system of rights. The inequalities emphasised the need for change, and it was 
pointed out that socialised property rights would be able to cater for the needs of a non-
racial, post-apartheid society. The implementation of the first truly democratic 
Constitution, which includes a Charter of Fundamental Rights, provided the ideal 
backdrop against which change could be effected.107 
107 For a discussion of the influence of the interim Constitution and the final Constitution on the 
common law concept of ownership see chapter 11 below. 
116 
7 
OWNERSHIP IN MODERN DUTCH LAW 
7 .1 Introduction 
The development of ownership in modern Dutch law provides a very interesting 
example of recent developments in a legal system in which judicial review is not 
recognised in the constitution. Although a variety of rights, including ownership, are 
protected by the Dutch Constitution, parliament has the power to determine the extent 
of these rights and may limit the rights as they see fit. The idea of an entrenched 
constitutional property right is therefore unknown in this system and the private-law 
concept of ownership dominates the treatment and nature of property rights. On the 
other hand judicial review does exist with regard to international treaties. This provides 
the Dutch owner with wider protection because eigendom or ownership is interpreted 
much wider in this context than in private law and includes limited real rights as well as 
personal rights. 
A broad discussion of ownership in private law is necessitated by the fact that the 
Dutch theorists tried to accomplish certain socializing developments in private law itself, 
rather than through constitutional law. Before the NBW was finalised the nature and 
role of ownership in society was the topic of a lively debate. It was contended that the 
nature of ownership should reflect the character and the needs of Dutch society and 
that, in order to achieve this, a concept of pluriform ownership had to replace the then 
current concept of absolute, exclusive and individual ownership. The different 
suggestions as to how ownership should be functionalised and the criticism of these 
suggestions are discussed in this chapter. 
Finally the constitutional protection of ownership is analysed and compared to the 
private-law development. 
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7 .2 Ownership in the Dutch legal system 
According to Dutch theory ownership can be described as a basic institution of law. 
This means that the true meaning of ownership cannot be derived from positive law. 
Positive law can determine who the owner is and it can limit ownership, but it cannot 
determine the exact meaning of the concept of ownership.1 The ownership clause in the 
NBW has been described as very conservative. Ownership is central within the system 
of law and is characterised by absoluteness, totality and abstractness.2 The starting 
point still is that the owner has the freedom to use his property, within the limits of law, 
as he sees fit. 3 No positive obligation is placed on the owner,4 no provision has been 
made for the extension of ownership to incorporeals (or the so-called new property) and 
no specific social philosophy has been adopted or incorporated by 5.1.1 NBW.5 
Ownership is described by Beekhuis et afas the most comprehensive right a person 
can have with regard to a thing, and as such it is said to be the mother right from which 
all limited real rights - as daughter rights - are derived. It can also be said that all 
limited real rights are contained within ownership. 7 Rights such as usufruct, quitrent, 
servitudes, hypothec, are, in a manner of speaking, present within the seed of 
ownership 
Ownership is described as a relation between a person and a thing on the one hand, 
Beekhuis et al Asser 13. 
2 Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 at 337 et seq; Grosheide Eigendom in de overgang? 62. 
3 Beekhuis et al Asser20. 
4 Slagter 1976 RMT276 at 291. 
5 Grosheide Eigendom in de overgang? 55 et seq. 
6 Beekhuis et al Asser 16; Reehuis et al Pitlo 274. 
7 Reehuis et al Pitlo 27 4. 
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and the relation between one person and other persons on the other hand. 8 It is also 
described as an absolute right in the sense that it is enforceable against all third 
parties, as opposed to personal or relative rights that are enforceable only against 
certain third parties. 9 
Ownership is said to be characterised by exclusivity, 10 elasticity~ 1 uniformity~ 
abstractness13 and absoluteness.14 In principle it is of undetermined duration, and it 
normally lasts for an indefinite time, although it can be subjected to a resolutive 
condition. 15 Ownership can be transferred16 and vindicated. 17 
Ownership contains all possible entitlements - with regard to the thing that is the object 
of the right - that are recognised by the existing legal order. The power of the owner to 
exercise these entitlements is relative in the sense that it is limited by the protected 
8 Beekhuis et al Asser 17. 
9 Reehuis et al Pitlo 275 and 281. 
10 The p(>wer of the owner to exclude all third parties from interfering with his ownership. See Reehuis 
et al Pitlo 282; Grosheide Eigendom in de overgang? 62; Reehuis and Slob Parlementaire 
geschiedenis van het Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek 1218. 
11 With this is meant that as soon as a limited real right expires, that right falls back to the owner and 
ownership is automatically extended. See Beekhuis et al Asser 16 who point out that this is not an 
essential characteristic of ownership since this phenomenon is inherent to all mother rights. 
12 Uniformity entails that there is only one type of ownership. This is also described as the totality of 
ownership. See Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 at 338; Slagter in Hondius Quod licet 357 at 365; 
Reehuis et al Pitlo 276; Grosheide Eigendom in de overgang? 62. 
13 The entitlements of the owner are not defined, need not be justified and do not relate to social 
goals. See Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 at 338. 
14 With the absoluteness of ownership is meant that ownership is unlimited in principle and the owner 
can exercise his entitlements as he sees fit. All limitations are regarded as exceptions. See Van 
den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 at 338. 
15 Beekhuis et al Asser 18. 
16 Section 3.83 NBW. Also see Reehuis et al Pitlo 280. 
17 Section 5:2 NBW. Also see Reehuis et al Pitlo 280 that points out that revindication means that the 
owner demands the thing - the object of ownership - back, and not the right as such. 
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interests of society and others. According to 5.1.1 NBW ownership can be limited by 
rights of others, statutory provisions and the rules of unwritten law. 
The owner's free use of his property can be limited by limited real rights 18 and certain 
personal rights 19 that he grants to third parties. If the owner violates someone else's 
right and this violation amounts to a wrongful act, this will also result in a limitation of 
ownership. 20 
Ownership can be limited in different ways by statutory provisions. The Dutch 
Constitution determines that the owner can be expropriated in the public interest and 
that ownership can be destroyed or made unusable by an authorised authority, against 
compensation. 21 It is also possible that property is not expropriated or taken from the 
owner, but that his rights are violated by a state authority and he is expected to endure 
this violation of his rights.22 The owner's freedom to use his property as he sees fit can 
also be limited. 23 Ownership can furthermore be limited by lower legislatures that are 
authorised by the Constitution. These legislatures do not have the same powers as the 
national legislature, and seeing that their acts can be tested against the Constitution 
18 This can include usufruct, quitrent and servitudes. See Reehuis et al Pitlo 283; Nieuwenhuis, 
Stolker and Valk Nieuw Burger/ijk Wetboek text en commentaar 287; Beekhuis et al Asser 27. 
19 Such as rent and lease. See Reehuis et al Pitlo 283; Nieuwenhuis, Stolker and Valk Nieuw 
Burgerlijk Wetboek text en commentaar 289; Beekhuis et al Asser 27. 
20 Nieuwenhuis, Stolker and Valk Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek text en commentaar 289. 
21 Section 14. Property can also be expropriated in terms of the Onteigeningswet, the Deltawet of 8 
May 1958, Stb. 246 and the Landinrichtingswet 1985. 
22 This can be done in accordance with the Belemmeringenwet of 13 May 1927, Stb 159, the Wet 
Militaire lnnundatiiin of 15 April 1894, the Waterstaatwet of 10 November 1900, Stb 176, the 
Rivierenwetof 9November1908, Stb 339, the Telegraaf- en Telefoonwetof 31 January 1930, Stb 
342, the Leegstandwetof21May1981, Stb 337, the Wegenwetof 31 January 1930, Stb 342, and 
the Grondwaterwet of 22 May 1981, Stb 392. 
23 See the Monumentenwet of 22 June 1966, Stb 200, the Wet op Ruimtelijke Ordening of 5 July 
1962, Stb 286, the Boswet of 20 July 1961, Stb 256 and the Wet Voorkeursrecht Gemeenten of 
22 April 1981, Stb 236. 
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by the courts, they are only given limited authority. 24 
The owner's rights can also be limited by the rules of unwritten law. 25 According to 
section 3: 14 NBw26 a right that stems from private law can be limited by an unwritten 
public law principle. Limitations can also result from unwritten private iaw in terms of 
section 6:162 NBW.27 
7.3 The argument for a concept of pluriform ownership in the Netherlands 
7.3.1 Ownership and its social context 
As a result of the influence of the work of Grotius and the German Pandectists 
ownership is traditionally regarded in most western European countries as an absolute, 
individualistic and abstract right. Ownership is approached conceptually and little 
attention is paid to the social context or function of ownership. However, after World 
War 11 the whole of western Europe was characterised by a greater social 
consciousness and as such the social function of ownership and the social context 
within which it is applied now enjoys more attention. This tendency to emphasise the 
social function of property was especially strong in the Netherlands in the first three 
24 Beekhuis et al Asser 25; Reehuis et al Pitlo 283; Nieuwenhuis, Stolker and Valk Nieuw Burgerlijk 
Wetboek text en commentaar 289; Van Oven 1975 WPNR 85 at 87. 
25 Beekhuis et al Asser 27; Reehuis et al Pitlo 283; Nieuwenhuis, Stolker and Valk Nieuw Burgerlijk 
Wetboek text en commentaar 290. 
26 3:14 NBW: "Een bevoegdheid die iemand krachtens het burgerlijk recht toekomt, mag niet warden 
uitgeoefend in strijd met geschreven of ongeschreven regels van publiekrecht." (A right which a 
person has pursuantto private law, may not be exercised contrary to the written or unwritten rules 
of public law. (Translation according to Haanappel and Mackaay Nieuw Nederlands Burgerlijk 
Wetboek - Het vermogensrecht 6)). 
27 6:162 -2 NBW: "Als onrechtmatige daad warden aangemerkt een inbreuk op een recht en een 
doen of laten in strijd met een wettelijke plicht of met hetgeen volgens ongeschreven recht in het 
maatschappelijk verkeer beaamt, een en ander behoudens de aanwezigheid van een 
rechtvaardigingsgrond." (Except where there is a ground of justification, the following acts are 
deemed to be unlawful: the violation of a right, an act or omission violating a statutory duty or a rule 
of unwritten law pertaining to proper social conduct. (Translation according to Haanappel and 
Mackaay Nieuw Neder/ands Burgerlijk Wetboek - Het vermogensrecht 298)). 
121 
decades after World War II. 
It has been argued in Dutch legal literature that, although the description of ownership 
has not changed much over the last few centuries, the social order in which ownership 
functions today is visibly different from that of previous centuries. According to this 
argument, the modern concept of ownership is subjected to more limitations than was 
the case in the nineteenth century. This is known as the socialisation or erosion 
( vermaatschappe/ijking or uitholling) of ownership, 28 and is regarded as a reaction 
against the pretence of political neutrality as a result of the influence of Pandectism and 
legalism in Dutch private law.29 
Slagter<> has shown that the social function of ownership has changed since the 
beginning of this century. The modern function of ownership is (a) to preserve value, 
(b) to provide creditworthiness, (c) to act as instrument for the decentralisation of 
decision making, (d) to serve as instrument of power and (e) to protect privacy. 
According to him these functions of modern ownership distinguish ownership from 
limited real rights and from ownership in earlier periods (including Roman-Dutch law 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries). 
No provision has been included in the NBW to compel the owner to exercise his rights 
in such a way as to promote social interests.31 It must, however, be kept in mind that 
the nature and extent of ownership are determined by the legal and social order within 
which it functions. The Dutch form of government since World War II is based on a 
28 Valkhoff Een eeuw rechtsontwikkeling; Valkhoff 1957 RMT 21 at 22; Couwenberg 1982 
Economisch statistische berichten 38; Van Goch 1982 R&K 82 at 83; Grosheide Eigendom in de 
overgang? 45; Schut 1981 RMT329 at 330; Van Maanen Eigendomschijnbewegingen 26. But see 
Deline Grenzen van het eigendomsrecht in de negentiende eeuw who shows that ownership has 
always been subjected to numerous limitations. 
29 See in general Kop Legisme en Privaatrechtwetenschap 5 et seq and 29 et seq. 
30 Slagter 1976 RMT276 at 282. 
31 Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 at 335 et seq; Slagter in Hondius Quod licet 357 at 364; Van 
Maanen 1981R&K5at16; Van Goch 1982 R&K 82 at 83. 
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verzorgingstaat or welfare state. This implies that the state guarantees certain basic 
material and immaterial benefits to the citizens.32 In order to achieve this, the state 
often has to limit the owner's right to use, enjoy and control his property. Thus the 
Dutch courts found it necessary in the past to place extraordinary limitations on the 
owner, in the social interest, by balancing the rights of the owner with public interest.33 
Within the context of the verzorgingstaat or welfare state in the Netherlands, ownership 
is subjected to numerous limitations which are foreign to most other jurisdictions. The 
Leegstandwef4 provides a good example of the influence of the social interest on the 
nature and extent of ownership. This act determines that whenever a building is left 
unused or empty by its owner, the state may use that building to house the homeless. 
The existing needs of society acts as the incentive to change the owner's entitlements -
in this instance the owner's entitlement to use his property as he sees fit. The fact that 
no positive duty is imposed on the owner in the final text of the NBW to exercise his 
right so as to serve the public interest does not mean that such a duty cannot be 
implied tacitly. The code does not provide the final word on the nature and extent of 
ownership or any other right. It is rather determined by the complete legal fabric of the 
society in which it functions. In the Netherlands, as in numerous other jurisdictions, the 
legal fabric consists not only of the civil code, but also of case law and statutes. By 
emphasising the social function of ownership, Dutch private law moves away form 
Pandectism and legalism. 
32 Van Goch 1982 R&K 82 at 83; Meijs and Jansen 1990 R&K 115. 
33 See Arrest Rechtbank Amsterdam, 9-3-1978 and Hof Amsterdam 26-10-1978, N.J. 1980 no 70 
and 71. This is the case of the so-called "Batco-affaire". In this case the court said that the business 
had all the financial reasons to want to close itself down. It nevertheless held that social factors had 
to be taken into account - such as the fact that many people may lose their jobs - and therefor the 
business could not close down. The power of disposal of the owner is limited in favour of the public 
interest. According to the court social factors had to play a definite role in the decision making 
process of any business. Also see arrest Rechtbank Amsterdam, 7-7-1981. Kort Geding 1981, no 
95. In this case Ford-Nederland wanted to retrench 1225 workers because the company was 
running at a loss. The court held that the company could not do this and had to continue employing 
the said workers until certain procedures were completed. This decision was overturned on appeal, 
but not on the ground of the reasoning of the court a quo. 
34 Leegstandwet of 21 May 1981, Stb 337. For a discussion of this act see Balk 1980 R&K 390; Van 
der Walt 1991 R&K 329; Kleyn et al Leegstandbestrijding. De Leegstanclwet, tijdelij/ce verhuur, 
vorderen en kraken; Van Maanen Eigendomschijnbewegingen 148 et seq. 
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As has been pointed out,35 the concept of absolute, individualistic and abstract 
ownership is the creation of a society that emphasised individualism and freedom. The 
rights of the owner are accentuated and the needs and interests of society are hardly 
ever taken into account when the extent of the owner's rights are determined. This, 
however, changed in the post-World War II society. Common interest and the needs 
of society started to play a more important role in the determination of the nature and 
extent of the concept of ownership. Most modem western constitutions emphasise and 
value the common interest, equality and democracy. The social function of ownership 
was increasingly accentuated as a result of a reaction against the emphasis placed on 
the absolute character of ownership in the nineteenth century. The traditional 
perception of ownership now has to be balanced with the newly acquired political and 
social dimension.36 This is true throughout most of western Europe after World War II, 
and it is particularly strong in the Netherlands. 
A lively debate has developed during the 1970's and 1980's in the Netherlands 
regarding the nature of the concept of ownership in modem Dutch law. This debate 
reached a crescendo shortly before the Nieuwe Burgerlijk Wetboek (NBW) came into 
operation in 1992. It was contended by some authors37 that the concept of ownership -
as it existed in the Burger/ijk Wetboek (BW) and as it was formulated in the suggestions 
for the ownership clause in the NBW - does not reflect the needs of the modem Dutch 
society and that the concept of ownership needed to reflect the pluriform nature of 
ownership to fulfil these needs. 
35 Chapter 4. 
36 Couwenberg 1982 Economisch statistische berichten 38. 
37 Van Maanen Eigendomschijnbewegingen; Van Maanen 1981 R&K 5; Schut 1981 RMT 329; Van 
Goch 1982 R&K 82; Van Neste 1983 Tijdschrift voor privaatrecht 479; Couwenberg 1982 
Economisch statistische berichten 38; Grosheide Eigendom in de overgang?; Meijs and Jansen 
1990R&K115;Valkhoff1957 RMT21. See also Van den Bergh Eigendom; Van den Bergh 1987 
R&K 327; Slagter in Hondius Quod /icet 357; Feenstra 1976 RMT 248; Van der Ven 1976 RMT 
237. 
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According to Van Maanen38 the traditional approach towards ownership as an absolute, 
individual and abstract right39 should be replaced by a more refined and differentiated 
concept of ownership that provides for and reflect the complicated social reality in 
which ownership functions today. The social purpose of different objects of ownership 
necessitates a different treatment of these objects. A concept of pluriform ownership 
would be much more suitable to treat different objects according to their different social 
functions. 
The different suggestions of Dutch authors on how the concept of ownership should be 
adapted or changed to fulfill the needs of modern society will now be scrutinised. 
Although not everyone agrees that ownership needs to be differentiated, there is 
consensus on two aspects.40 Firstly, there is consensus about the plurality of 
ownership. Plurality is recognised - although not formally - within the existing ownership 
construction with reference to the distinction between different subjects, 41 objects42 and 
functions43 of ownership. Secondly, most authors agree that the concept of ownership 
is flexible or adaptable, and because of this flexibility many authors contend that the 
current concept of ownership is able to adapt and to accommodate the challenges of 
·modern society. 
7.3.2 Arguments for a concept of pluriform ownership 
The arguments for a concept of pluriform ownership are all conceptually based. The 
first approach regarding the differentiation of the concept of ownership suggests that 
38 Van Maanen 1981 R&K 5 at 14; Van Maanen Eigendomschijnbewegingen 151. 
39 Van den Bergh Eigendom 34; Feenstra 1976 RMT248. 
40 See Van der Ven 1976 RMT 237 at 241. Van der Ven makes this statement with reference to the 
authors that contributed to the 1976 edition of RMTwith the theme Eigendom a/s rechtsinstituut. 
41 Natural and juristic persons. 
42 Movable and immovable things; corporeal and incorporeal things. 
43 Personal or public benefit. 
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the definition of ownership must be changed in order to bring it in line with the 
understanding and application of ownership in practice. This includes a differentiation 
between different objects of ownership and between limitation of the owner's 
entitlements with regard to the different objects. 
Van Maanen44 suggests two reasons why there is a need for a concept of pluriform 
ownership. He firstly argues that there are factual differences in the legal reality 
regarding the treatment of different objects of ownership (companies, houses, 
consumer goods) and to make provision for this in the concept of ownership would lead 
to legal clarity. A concept of pluriform ownership would contribute to a better and 
clearer description and analysis of the legal reality. Secondly a concept of pluriform 
ownership would contribute to legal reform. Not only would it give recognition to the fact 
that consumer goods and housing facilities are and should be treated differently from 
personal property, but it would also stimulate further reform.45 Van Maanen states that 
he cannot see how fundamental social reform can take place without redefining 
ownership. By introducing a concept of pluriform ownership the courts would be able 
to adopt a much more flexible approach in decisions regarding kraken (squatting), the 
power of and the power within big corporations and the use of nature reserves and 
wildlife areas. 
Van Maanen46 suggests the following definition of ownership: 
"1. Eigendom is de door de rechtsorde erkende bevoegdheid van een 
of meer persone om, met inachtneming van de wettelijke en 
maatschappelijke beperkingen, een zaak uit eigen macht te 
bezitten, te gebruiken en erover te beschikken. 
2. Er zijn drie soorten van eigendom: 
44 Van Maanen Eigendomschijnbewegingen 154. 
45 Also see Meijs and Jansen 1990 R&K 115; Meijs and Jansen Eigendom tussen politiek en 
economie 14 7. 
46 Van Maanen Eigendomschijnbewegingen 157. 
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maatschappelijke eigendom, is de eigendom van 
produktiemiddelen, algemene produktievoorwaarden, 
kommunikatiemidde/en, grond, /ucht en water. Het gebruik hiervan 
dient in overeenstemming te zijn met de belangen van de 
gemeenschap. 
- wooneigendom, is de eigendom van woonruimte. Het gebruik 
hiervan is onderhewig aan de beperkingen die daaraan door het 
recht en een rechtvaardige verdeling van woonruimte worden 
gesteld. 
- persoonlijke eigendom, is de eigendom van goederen die 
gebruikt worden ter bevrediging van materiele en kulturele 
behoeften. Het gebruik hiervan is in beginsel vrij. "47 
According to Van Goch48 the traditional concept of ownership is outdated because it 
does not take cognisance of the interdependence of personal and public interests and 
no longer provides for the specific needs of the society. Ownership cannot be 
separated from the needs of the community and should always be judged and 
interpreted in a social context. The absolute power of disposal of the owner should be 
kept in check and the limits of ownership should be determined according to the 
damage caused to society - this includes social, economic and ecological damage. 
According to Van Gocha distinction should be made between (a) ownership of means 
of production and (b) ownership of the results or products of (a). Means of production 
would inevitably have a social function. With reference to (b), Van Goch states that this 
47 1. Ownership is the power, recognised by the legal order, of one or more persons, with due 
consideration of statutory and social restrictions, to possess, use and dispose of a thing out of own 
accord. 
2. There are three types of ownership: 
- social ownership, is ownership of means of production, general conditions of production, means 
of communication, land, air and water. The use hereof must be in accordance with the interests 
of society. 
- housing ownership, is ownership of housing facilities. The use hereof is subject to the limitations 
set out by law and by the equitable distribution of housing facilities. 
- personal ownership, is ownership of things that are used to satisfy material and cultural needs. 
The use hereof is free in principle. (Own translation). 
48 Van Goch 1982 R&K 82. 
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would mainly include consumer goods and the owner of such goods would in principle 
have absolute power of disposal, subject to the limits mentioned above. Van Gach does 
not make special or separate provision in his definition for housing facilities, but states 
that the extent of ownership of housing should be determined socially - the power of 
' disposal of the owner should be limited in order to accommodate the existing demand 
for housing. 
Van Neste49 states that ownership has two functions: on the one hand it must provide 
for personal needs, and on the other it has a social function. For this reason he draws 
a distinction between personal or individual ownership and social ownership. Personal 
ownership corresponds with the traditional approach to ownership and the owner is 
able to use, dispose of and control personal property as he sees fit. Personal 
ownership applies to, among others, personal income, other money, an own house and 
so on. Social ownership should be expressly limited by statute, and although social 
ownership ultimately provide for personal needs, it would also have a social function. 
Valkhoff50 also shares the opinion that a distinction should be made between means 
of production and consumer goods. According to him this distinction is necessary 
because the purpose, function and importance of these categories of things differ 
economically, socially, ethically and psychologically. 
Schut51 advocates a different approach. He voices the opinion that a distinction should 
be made between ownership of movables and immovables. He bases this argument on 
the fact that, according to him, this distinction has been made throughout the history 
of the development of the concept of ownership and stems from the treatment of 
ownership in primitive societies. Even today a distinction is made between real and 
personal property in Anglo-American systems. Schut also points out that this distinction 
49 Van Neste 1983 Tijdschri'ft voor privaatrecht 4 79. 
50 Valkhoff 1957 RMT 21. 
51 Schut 1981 RMT329. Also see Grosheide Eigendom in de overgang? 44. 
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is implied by the treatment of ownership in the NBW.52 
According to Meijs and Jansen53 ownership has a dual meaning: it includes both the 
right to exclude and the right not to be excluded. The right to exclude refers to personal 
property and the right not to be excluded refers to the use of (part of) common property. 
The right to use a thing (not to be excluded) plays an increasingly important part in 
modem property relations and it often happens that, when exclusive ownership and the 
right to use are weighed against each other, ownership has to make way for the right 
to use. This happens as a result of state intervention and because of such intervention, 
social relations - both ownership and power relations - are interfered with. Thus, 
according to Meijs and Jansen, the concept of ownership needs to be differentiated in 
order to reflect the true nature and practical application of the modern concept. A 
distinction needs to be drawn between ownership on the one hand and the right to use 
on the other. Furthermore, Meijs and Jansen suggest that the power of disposal should 
be defined according to the function of the object. 
A further distinction is that between the power to use or control property and the power 
of disposal. The authors that advocate this distinction do not suggest a definite 
differentiation of the concept of ownership, but they propose that the way in which the 
concept of ownership is approached and treated should be changed.54 They point to 
the fact that in practice an owner does not always control his own property: in a 
company the shareholders are the true owners, but the company is controlled by its 
managers. In principle the general assembly of shareholders has sovereignty and the 
executive board of managers are the representatives of the general assembly. But in 
practice, the policy of the company is determined by management, who has a definite 
task and responsibility - determined by law or statute - and they are accountable to the 
52 Title 1 deals with ownership in general, but titles 2 and 3 deal with ownership of movables and 
immovables respectively. 
53 Meijs and Jansen Eigendom tussen politiek en economie; Meijs and Jansen 1990 R&K 115. 
54 Grosheide Eigendom in de overgang? 47 et seq; Couwenberg 1982 Economisch statistische 
berichten 38 et seq; Valkhoff 1957 RMT21 at 34; Schut 1981 RMT 329 at 331. 
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general assembly of shareholders for their actions. This situation implies that 
management has an autonomous economic position of power. Because of their 
expertise and skill, management is able to manipulate the general assembly.ss Modern 
industrial society is increasingly dominated by management instead of the owner. The 
power and enjoyment aspects of property have become divorced. Ownership is no 
longer decisive for power - authority is often separated from ownership. ss 
Grosheides7 states that the modern concept of ownership is as pluriform as it is uniform. 
Ownership is uniform, because in theory we know only one type of ownership - an 
absolute, abstract and individual ownership. On the other hand ownership is pluriform 
because a distinction is made between the power to dispose of and the power to control 
or manage the property. As was pointed out above, the manager of property can often 
have a far greater and more direct influence on society as a whole than the owner (who 
has the power of disposal). This leads to a hierarchy in property relations. The position 
in the hierarchy is determined by the optimal exercise of all ownership functions in the 
social sphere. At the top of the hierarchy one finds ownership, which has the greatest 
impact on society. The private or individual owner of consumer goods is at the bottom 
of the hierarchy. The way in which the owner is perceived, the extent of the limitations 
placed on ownership and the extent of the power of disposal are determined by the 
position of the owner in the hierarchy. 
Couwenbergss follows more or less the same line of thinking. He points out that the 
need for a distinction between the power to use and the power of disposal is 
recognised by neo-marxists, but they have also recognised the fact that this distinction 
would not have an impact on the capitalist system. Couwenberg alleges that consensus 
ss Couwenberg 1982 Economisch statistische berichten 38 at 40; Grosheide Eigendom in de 
overgang? 48; Valkhoff 1957 RMT21 at 34. 
56 Friedmann Changes in property relations 177; Valkhoff 1957 RMT21 at 35; Couwenberg 1982 
Economisch statistische berichten 38 at 40. 
s7 Grosheide Eigendom in de overgang? 4 7. 
ss Couwenberg 1982 Economisch statistische berichten 38. 
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has been reached by supporters of the socialist and liberal property models on the 
desirability of a plural ownership system. Forms of ownership in this system would 
include personal ownership, corporate ownership, private individual foundations, mixed 
enterprises with a measure of government participation, and public ownership. Public 
interest is used as a criterium to determine the mutual relations between the different 
forms of ownership within the plural ownership system. When this is interpreted in a 
political sense, it gives rise to different approaches: the socialists place the emphasis 
on public ownership, while the liberals prefer to emphasise private ownership. 
Another approach to the problem at hand is the suggestion that a clear definition and 
explanation of the different entitlements of the owner should be given.59 The power to 
use, control or dispose of property should be defined with reference to the nature of the 
specific object it concerns. By doing this many uncertainties concerning the content and 
extent of ownership would be clarified. Schut60 points out that the function and purpose 
of ownership should be kept in mind when the entitlements of ownership are split up. 
The content of the entitlements differ when a thing is used to provide in personal needs 
or when it is used as an investment, when it is used for consumption or for commercial 
purposes, or when it has a personal or a public function, and specific provision should 
be made for each case. This would help to determine the limits of ownership and its 
protection. 
A theme that runs throughout the discussion of the differentiation of ownership, is that 
the needs of society and the social context in which ownership functions should always 
be kept in mind when evaluating the way in which the owner exercises his right and the 
protection of that right.61 Public interest determines the extent of the owner's rights, and 
59 Valkhoff 1957 RMT21 at 27; Meijs and Jansen Eigendom tussen politiek en economie 147 et seq; 
Schut 1981 RMT21 at 331; Van Neste 1983 Tijdschrifl: voor privaatrecht479 at 487. 
60 Schut 1981 RMT329 at 331. Also see Van Goch 1981 R&K 82 et seq; Van Neste 1983 Tijdschrifl: 
voor privaatrecht 479 et seq. 
61 Van Goch 1982 R&K 82 at 86; Schut 1981 RMT 329 at 331; Van der Neste 1983 Tijdschrifl: voor 
privaatrecht 479 at 486; Meijs and Jansen 1990 R&K 115 at 134; Couwenberg 1982 Economisch 
statistische berichten 38 at 39; Van Maanen Eigendomschijnbewegingen 151 et seq; Van der Ven 
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when the owner exercises these rights, he should always take cognisance of the 
existing social circumstances and the effect that his actions would have on the 
community. The purpose of ownership is not only to satisfy personal needs, but also 
to satisfy the needs of society. Van den Bergh62 criticises this approach. According to 
him the public interest never was and never should place a burden on' the owner. An 
owner may exercise his rights as he sees fit within the limits of the law. If someone 
alleges that the owner acted to the detriment of society, the onus of proof is on that 
person. 
The arguments for a concept of pluriform ownership are mainly based on suggestions 
for a new definition of ownership where provision is made for different objects of 
ownership and a distinction is made with regard to the owner's power to use and enjoy 
those objects. The arguments are all formulated within the confinements of the 
conceptual approach to property law, and amount to no more that attempts to formulate 
the definition of the concept of ownership in such a manner that it reflects and 
accommodates the social context within which ownership functions. 
7.3.3 Balancing of private law interests 
Another, related development in modern Dutch property law that also attempted to 
provide for the social function of ownership has to do with the weighing (balancing) of 
the rights and/or interests of the different parties concerned (belangenafweging). 63 The 
balancing of interests and rights can occur whenever the interests of other parties 
concerned are in conflict with the rights of the owner, and when the enforcement of the 
latter's rights will amount to abuse of law. In the case of the grensoverschrijdende 
1976 RMT 237 at 246. Van der Ven, however, states that the owner needn't exercise his right 
exclusively in the public interest, because such an interpretation would frustrate the owner's 
freedom. 
62 Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 at 335 and 337. 
63 Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 at 335 et seq; Slagter in Hondius Quod licet 357 at 364; Van 
Maanen 1981R&K5 at 16; Van Goch 1982 R&K 82 at 83. 
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garage64 the court held that the limits to rights of the owner are determined on the basis 
of a proportional weighing of the interests of the owner against the interests of other 
parties concerned. This is a new development in the approach to ownership. Ownership 
has always been seen as the most comprehensive right a person could have with 
' 
regard to a thing and that the whole world (all third parties) had to be respect this right. 
Van Maanen65 pleads for the implementation of the concept of belangenafwegingen in 
cases where the rights of the owner are in conflict with the interests of the unlawful 
kraker (squatter). He contends that the active use of this concept would lead to the 
equitable treatment of the kraker. This concept can be used to keep the absolute right 
of the owner in check and would ensure a socially equitable and justifiable concept of 
ownership. 66 
No provision was made for a belangenafweging in the definition of ownership in the 
NBW.67 Meijers68 points out that the owner has the freedom to use his property as he 
sees fit within the limits of the law. According to section 5.1.1 NBW the freedom of the 
owner is the rule, and limits to this freedom are seen as exceptions. Snijders,69 the 
government commissioner, said during the debate on the new ownership section in the 
Dutch parliament, that the limits to the right of the owner cannot be determined by the 
proportional weighing of the owner's rights against the rights of others. De Gaay 
64 H.R. 17-04-1970, N.J. 1971, 89. Also see N.J. 1952, 114; Arrest Rechtbank Amsterdam, 9-3-1978 
and Hof Amsterdam 26-10-1978, N.J. 1980 no 70 and71; Arrest Rechtbank Amsterdam, 7-7-1981 
Kort Geding 1981, no 95. 
65 Van Maanen 1981R&K5at16. 
66 Also see Van Goch 1982 R&K 82 at 84. 
67 Section 5.1.1 NBW. 
68 Meijers De a/gemene begrippen van het burgerlijk recht 73. Also see Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 
327 at 337. 
69 Quoted by Van Zeben Parlementaire geschiedenis van het nieuwe Burger/ijk wetboek - Boek 5 
Zakelijke rechten 30. 
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Fortman,70 however, suggests that it would be in the owner's (and society's) best 
interest if the owner always keeps the public interest in mind when exercising his rights. 
This, however, is only a suggestion and there is no legal obljgation to do so. 
Slagter71 agrees that the concept of belangenafweging cannot be used to determine the 
extent of the owner's right. According to Slagter there is no place for a balancing of 
interest where it is clear that ownership has been infringed and that abuse of the right 
is out of the question, just as there is no place for a balancing of interests when it is 
certain that a breach of a competition clause has occurred. A balancing of interests can 
only occur in the answer to the question whether a claim for prohibition or injunction 
after an unlawful act can be substituted by a claim for damages, if according to section 
6:168 NBW "such a cause of action should be allowed on grounds of important social 
interests". 
There seems to be general agreement in Dutch law that the concept of 
belangenafweging cannot be used to determine the extent of the owner's right. The 
owner has the freedom to use his property as he deems fit. No legal obligation was 
placed on the owner in the NBW to take public interest into account when he exercises 
his right. It does, however, seem strange that the Dutch government did not - in light 
of the principles governing the welfare state - use the new code to implement a more 
restricted approach to the concept of ownership. 
It is interesting to note that the idea of the weighing of interests was nevertheless 
introduced into Dutch private law. This idea is usually part of public law where 
constitutionally protected fundamental rights are concerned. The public interest is taken 
into account when the extent of the protection afforded by the specific right is 
determined. Although the application of this principle is criticised by Dutch authors, it 
is nevertheless interesting that the balancing of interests came into play where private-
70 De Gaay Fortman in Par/. Hand., 2e K., 1976-77, 4001. 
71 Slagter in Hondius Quad /icet 357 at 364. 
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law rights are concerned. The drive amongst some Dutch authors to introduce a 
concept of pluriform ownership had some purpose in this regard. It drew attention to the 
fact that whenever ownership is interpreted, the focus should be on the interpretation 
within a new (social) context. The idea throughout is to interpret and apply private law 
in such a way so as to get the same results that are reached via constitutional law in 
other jurisdictions (for example in Germany72), namely to create a balance between the 
private and public interest in the use and limitation of property. 
7.3.4 Criticism against the idea of pluriform ownership 
The "new definition" of ownership in the NBW does not provide for a pluriform concept 
or approach to ownership. The different pleas for a new differentiated concept of 
ownership were not heeded. Perhaps the reason for this is the fact that the 
recodification was not seen as a renewal, but as a technical improvement.73 
The ownership clause in the NBW can be regarded as very conservative. With the 
confirmation of the Bartolian orthodoxy any possibility of further development has been 
mooted. This decision is regarded as commendable by, amongst others, Slagter and 
Van den Bergh.74 Van den Bergh points out that if a concept of pluriform ownership is 
to be introduced or implemented in Dutch law, this would have to be done by way of 
statute. 
72 See chapter 8 in this regard. 
73 Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 at 338. According to Van Zeben Par/ementaire geschiedenis van 
het nieuwe Burgerlijk wetboek. Algemene dee/ - voorgeschiedenis en a/gemene inleiding 39 
Zeelenberg remarked that: "het nieuwe Burgerlijk wetboek [heeft] geen revolterende tendenties. 
Het gaat uit van dezelfde maatschappijvorm als die van 1838 en waarin wij nog /even, een 
maatschappijvorm met eigendom en vererving, met contractenrecht en ouder/ijke macht. Het zou 
ook niet van een andere maatschappijvorm kunnen uitgaan, want die heeft zich niet, of nog niet 
voldoende gemanifesteerd'. (The new code has no revolutionary tendencies. It starts out from the 
same type of society than the one that was in existence in 1838 and in which we still live, the type 
of society with ownership and inheritance, with the law of contract and parental control. It cannot 
start out from any other type of society, because that we do not have, or it has not been manifested 
sufficiently). 
74 Slagter in Hondius Quod /icet 357 at 363; Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 et seq. 
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Van den Bergh75 criticises the idea of pluriform ownership. According to him the idea 
has no or at least insufficient historical backing. He does not deny the fact that the 
society in which ownership functions today is different from the society of the 
nineteenth century, or that there are changes to the way in which ownership is 
perceived, but according to Van den Bergh these changes are not of such a magnitude 
that the definition of ownership needs to be changed. He argues that the first definition 
of ownership, that of Bartolus de Saxoferrato, 76 and various subsequent definitions, 77 
were formulated in such a way that they make provision for changes in society. The 
qualification that ownership must be exercised subject to the limits and constraints 
place on it by law, ensures that the needs of society will always be taken into account 
when the extent of the ownership is determined. Van den Bergh thus advocates the 
retention of the scientific, politically neutral definition of ownership. According to 
Meijers78 it is virtually impossible to formulate a definition of ownership that once and 
for all determines the exact content and limits of ownership. It is better to formulate the 
definition in such a way that the content and limits, as it is required by a specific 
society, can be determined by statute or existing positive law. In this way the content 
and limits can be changed if society so requires. Van den Bergh79 points out that the 
concept of ownership, as the right to use and dispose of property freely within the limits 
of the law, withstood much bigger challenges than those put to it in the twentieth 
century, and there is thus no need to formulate a different definition. It is possible that 
the purpose and function of a right can change without changing the form of the right. 
75 Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 et seq. 
76 Bartoluson 041.2.17.1 no4. 
77 Section 544 Code Civil; section 625 BW; section 439 Wetboek Napoleon voor het Koningrijk 
Holland (1809); section 11.1.1.1 Ontwerp- van der Linden (1807); section 1.8.26 Pruisische 
Allegemeine Landrecht (1794). 
78 Meijers Verzamelde privaatrechte/ijke opstellen 179 et seq. 
79 Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 at 340. 
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Van den Bergh80 also points out that the majority of proposals for a concept of pluriform 
ownership are politically inspired. He criticises this approach to law. According to him 
jurists should not translate political ideologies into law. The law, especially private law, 
should be and should remain apolitical. 
Van Maanen's proposal for a definition of a concept of pluriform ownership is also 
criticised by Slagter.81 He points out that Van Maanen's definition does not amount to 
the differentiation of the concept of ownership, but rather a recognition of the fact that 
the limitations with respect to ownership are pluriform. According to Kottenhagen82 the 
differences in the quantitative limitations on ownership do not and should not influence 
the qualitative determination of ownership. 
It is pointed out in the previous chapters that the process of scientification of property 
law had the effect that the social function of property was negated. The movement in 
the 1970's and 1980's in the Netherlands was inspired by the desire to 'reintroduce' the 
importance of the social function of property, but the different authors of this movement 
approached this question within the framework of conceptualism. They attempted to 
redefine ownership so as to reflect the importance of its social function. In order to 
effect radical change a totally different approach is needed. This approach should take 
cognisance of the social function of property, but should not be dependent on the idea 
of the concept of ownership within a hierarchical system of rights. 
7.4 Constitutional protection of ownership 
The constitutional validity of Dutch statutes or treaties is not subject to judicial review. 83 
80 Van den Bergh 1987 R&K 327 at 339. 
81 Slagter in Hondius Quod licet 357 at 361. 
82 Kottenhagen 1990 Kwartaa/bericht Nieuw BW 86 et seq. 
83 Section 120 Dutch Constitution: "De rechtertreed niet in de beoorde/ing van de grondwettigheid 
van wetten en verdragen". 
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The 1983 Constitution adheres to the principle of the dominant role of legislation in a 
formal sense. The Netherlands, unlike most other European countries, 84 does not have 
a constitutional court and judges do not have the authority to test the constitutionality 
of legislation. It is left to the legislature to test its own legislation against the 
Constitution.85 The Constitution authorises the legislature to determine the extent of the 
basic rights, but prohibits judicial review of these acts. 86 This means that, whereas in 
most other countries the courts play an integral part in the development and 
determination of the nature and extent of the fundamental rights, the Dutch courts can 
play no active role in this regard and therefore section 14 does not provide a 
constitutional or fundamental property guarantee. 87 
Judicial review does, however, exist regarding the compatibility of statutes or laws to 
international treaties.88 The Dutch Constitution stipulates that the state is bound by all 
international treaties and that it must abide by and implement the provisions of these 
treaties. 89 Among others, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms00 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights91 provide 
84 Such as France, Italy, Spain and Germany. 
85 Kortmann Constitutioneel recht 82. 
86 Alkema 1995 HNJV5 at99; Prakke etal1992 HNJV3 et seq. 
87 Jeukens Grondrechten en rechterlijke toetsing 66 et seq. 
88 Section 94 Dutch Constitution: "Binnen het Koninkrijk geldende wettelijke voorschriften vinden 
geen toepassing, indien deze toepassing niet verenigbaar is met eenieder verbindende bepa/ingen 
van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke organisaties." Also see Slagter in Hondius 
Quod licet 357 at 365; Slagter 1976 RMT 276 at 279; Beekhuis et al Asser 14; Reehuis et al Pitlo 
278. Kortmann De Grondwetsherziening 1983 258 points out that no judicial review exists 
regarding unwritten public international law. 
89 Section 93 Dutch Constitution: "Bepalingen van verdragen en van besluiten van volkenrechtelijke 
organisaties, die naar haar inhoud eenieder kunnen verbinden, hebben verbindende kracht nadat 
zij zijn bekendgemaakt'. 
90 Protocol no. 1 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms section 1: "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject 
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The 
preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws 
as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to 
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an entrenched guarantee of ownership, and this provides the Dutch citizen with 
stronger protection than the protection in terms of the Constitution, because these 
provisions are subject to judicial review. 92 These provisions are, however, formulated 
widely and are subject to limitations - the entitled person can be deprived of property 
in the public interest93 and the protection is subject to the provisions of national and 
international law.94 The assertion of international treaties and European Union law rest 
partly with national and partly with international judges. The result of this judicial control 
is that the constitutional interpretation by the government and the Dutch parliament 
competes with and is limited by the judicial interpretation of the said international law.95 
The Dutch Constitution contains a negative guarantee of ownership in the sense that 
it prohibits the irregular expropriation of property. 96 Section 14 of the Constitution 
states: 
"1. Onteigening kan alleen geschieden in het algemeen belang en ten 
tegen vooraf verzekerde schadeloosstelling, een en ander naar bij of 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties." It was determined by the 
European Court for Human Rights that "civil right" - as the term is used in section 6 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms - amounts to 
ownership. See European Court for Human Rights 23 September 1982, NJ 1988, 290. 
91 Section 17: "1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property". 
92 Slagter 1976 RMT276 at 279; Slagter in Hondius Quod licet 357 at 365; Beekhuis et al Asser 14; 
Alkema 1995 HNJV5 at 99; Reehuis et al Pitlo 278; Couwenberg Liberale democratie als eerste 
emancipatiemodel 69 et seq. 
93 Public interest is interpreted widely by the European Court of Human Rights so as to provide the 
national legislature with as much freedom as possible to determine what falls within the ambit of 
public interest. See Snijders In het nu, wat worden zal 260 et seq; Reehuis et al Pillo 278. 
94 Kortmann Constitutioneel recht 368 and 419. 
95 Kortmann Constitutioneel recht 82. 
96 Reehuis et al Pitlo 278; Couwenberg 1982 Economisch statistische berichten 38 at 44. During the 
debate on the ownership clause - when the Constitution was revised - a proposal for the inclusion 
of a positive guarantee was rejected by the second chamber because it was felt that such a 
provision would create expectations that were impossible to meet. See Slagter in Hondius Quod 
licet357 at 365 in this regard. 
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krachtens de wet te stellen voorschriften." 
Algemeen belang or public interest is a very wide term. This, however, does not mean 
that the owner can be deprived of his property whenever government sees fit. ExacUy 
what falls within the ambit of algemeen belang should be determined in accordance 
with the principle of the prohibition against arbitrariness.97 Schadeloosstelling 
(compensation) is usually interpreted to mean market-value, but it can also be 
interpreted to mean use-value. 98 
It should be noted that the protection of eigendom as a basic norm includes much more 
than the limited to corporeals only interpretation of 5.1.1 NBW. All property rights -
including limited real rights and personal rights - are included in the term eigendom as 
it is used in the Dutch Constitution and the international treaties. 99 
7.5 Conclusion 
The concept of ownership within Dutch law is affected by the strict division between 
private and public law. Ownership is guaranteed and protected by the Dutch 
Constitution, but because judicial review is not recognised by the Constitution this has 
no bearing or influence on the private-law concept of ownership as it is set out in the 
civil code. Within the context of Dutch private law, ownership is limited to corporeal 
things and is characterised by absoluteness, exclusivity and individualism. The 
description of ownership in 5.1.1 NBW does not embody a socially bound concept of 
ownership and places no positive duty on the owner to exercise his rights in such a way 
as to promote or serve the public interest. However, although the NBW does not 
contain any goal or obligation to serve the public interest, certain authors argue that 
97 HR 25-04-1988, NJ 927. Also see Kortrnann Constitutionee/ recht 418. 
98 Kortrnann De Grondwetsherziening 1983 101; Kortrnann Constitutionee/ recht 418. But see 
Donner Handboek van het Neder/andse staatsrecht 496. 
99 Kortrnann Constitutionee/ recht 418; Reehuis et al Pitlo 278; Slagter 1976 RMT276 at 279; Van 
Maanen 1993 R&K 298 et seq. 
140 
such a goal can be inferred when one considers that the nature and extent of 
ownership is inevitably determined by the existing social and legal order in which it 
functions. Thus, although the NBW does not mention any specific social responsibility 
on the owner, the mere fact that the NBW is interpreted and applied within the context 
of the verzorgingstaat is regarded as an indication that ownership has a definite pro-
social character. 100 It is said, therefore, that the characteristics of ownership -
absoluteness, exclusivity and individualism - must be judged against this background. 
It is interesting to note that, notwithstanding the absence of a specific social 
responsibility on the owner in the civil code, ownership is nevertheless interpreted in 
such a way that a balance is struck between the protection of the individual owner's 
rights and the interests of the society in which these rights are exercised. 
The public law perception of eigendom differs from the private-law perception in that 
it is interpreted to mean "property", rather than ownership, and it thus includes much 
more than merely corporeal things, as is the case in private law. Although statutes are 
not subject to judicial review, the power of the state to determine the extent of the 
owner's rights is toned down by the fact that statutes are subject to judicial review in 
terms of international treaties. This provides the individual owner with the necessary 
protection against unfair interference by the state. 
Since the 1970's the treatment and interpretation of ownership in the Dutch legal 
system is characterised by continued attempts to subject the private law tradition to 
social control. Within private law itself it is contended that ownership should be 
interpreted in view of the goals of the welfare state and that the interests of society at 
large should form an integral part of the interpretation process when the nature and 
extent of ownership are determined. This view is strengthened by the fact that the code 
determines that the rules of unwritten law forms part of the nisi lege prohibeatur 
provision in 5.1 .1. 
100 The limitations on ownership in the Netherlands proves that the nature and extent of ownership is 
determined socially. 
141 
The endeavours of the functionalists to create a concept of pluriform ownership can be 
described as an attempt to subject the private law traditions to social control. Each and 
every different model proposed by the functionalists is aimed at incorporating the social 
interests in the concept of ownership. The very essence of the concept of pluriform 
ownership is the fact that ownership is differentiated according to the importance of the 
social interests for different objects of the right. The functionalists attempted to effect 
these changes by changing the private law definition of ownership. 
The belangenafweging or balancing of interests when the extent of ownership is 
determined is yet another attempt to subject ownership to some form of social control. 
It was pointed out earlier that the balancing of interests usually forms part of public law 
and is applied to determine the extent of constitutionally protected fundamental rights, 
but that it was applied in a private-law context in the Netherlands. 
The move towards recognition of a concept of pluriform ownership was not supported 
by all academics and lawyers in the Netherlands. Van den Bergh and Slagter, amongst 
others, criticised the functionalists. These authors recognise the fact that society has 
changed since Bartolus defined ownership as dominium est ius de re corporali perfecte 
disponendi nisi lege prohibeatur, 101 but they hold that Bartol us' definition (as it was 
received in the Code Civil, the BW and the NBW) withstood much bigger changes in 
the course of its development without having to change. They also hold that the 
description of ownership in the BW (and NBW) is wide and flexible enough to 
accommodate current demands. According to these authors the interests of society 
should be catered for in terms of the nisi lege prohibeatur provision, and that there 
exists no need to redefine ownership in order to provide for the public interest. 
The reason for the different attempts to subjects the private law tradition to social 
control lies in the fact that the Dutch Constitution does not provide for judicial review 
of statutes. Social control can thus not be effected through the Constitution, and 
lawyers had to devise a different method of ensuring that the public interest is served 
101 Bartolus on D 41.2.17 .1 no 4. 
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when the extent of different rights is determined. The route chosen by the functionalists 
to achieve this goal was to subject the private law tradition to social control. Various 
attempts were thus made to redefine ownership so as to ensure that the owner takes 
cognisance of the public interests whenever he exercises his rights. As ought to be 
clear from the above, these attempts were not nearly as successful a;s it might have 
been if social control was effected via the constitutional route as was done in various 
other jurisdictions. 
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SECTION 1 
CONCLUSION 
In this section an attempt is made to prove that the current private law perception of 
property is not the result of the continuous, uninterrupted and logical development of 
Roman law in one line. The development of property rights, as well as the private law 
approach to property, was influenced by numerous discontinuities and modern property 
law is not the product of a logical or linear development. Each of the discontinuities had 
the effect that the nature of property rights or the social function of property underwent 
dramatic change in order to be able to cater for societal needs and the new 
circumstances under which it had to function. It can thus be said that the current private 
law perception of property did not evolve logically from dominium in Roman law. The 
abstract, scientific, conceptual approach to property and the concept of absolute or in 
principle unrestricted ownership, which were prevalent in South Africa prior to the 
implementation of the first democratic Constitution, had its origin in the nineteenth 
century with the German Pandectists. An attempt is also made to refute the assumption 
that the concept of absolute ownership and the abstract, scientific approach to property 
originated in Roman law, and that it is flexible enough to adapt to new social and 
political circumstances. In view of the fact that the current perception of and approach 
to property rights did not develop in an uninterrupted line from Roman law, and are 
therefore not of Roman origin, there seems to be no valid reason why the traditional 
private law perception of property may not be aba~doned in favour of a new debate on 
the social role and political function of property. 
In summary it can be said that the dominium in Roman law changed throughout the 
history of the Roman law and although it might be true that the same terminology is 
sometimes used to describe some of the characteristics of Roman and South African 
law, it cannot be said that the two concepts are identical. The concept of absolute, 
uniform and exclusive ownership as we know it in South Africa today was never part of 
Roman law or any other subsequent period in its development. The abstract, 
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conceptual approach to property according to which property law is dealt with in terms 
of objective, socially and politically neutral concepts and definitions is not founded on 
Roman law either. This view of property was only created in the nineteenth century by 
the German Pandectists. 
It is pointed out that vulgar law constituted a break in the natural development of 
Roman law dominium. Dominium in vulgar law had a completely different meaning than 
in classical Roman law. In vulgar law the distinction between dominium, possession 
and other proprietary rights became blurred and only one proprietary right was 
recognised. 
The middle ages is important for the fact that it was during this period that two major 
discontinuities in the development of dominium (later property rights in general) 
occurred. The implementation, as well as the abolition of the feudal system of land 
ownership, had a dramatic influence on the direction of the development of property. 
In view of the social and political circumstances in the middle ages divided ownership 
developed to deal with the practical and social distinction between the feudal lord and 
the vassal. This distinction, as well as the social function of property in view of this 
distinction, constitutes a fundamental break with Roman law. Although this notion was 
described in Roman terms, it cannot be said that it is based on Roman law dominium 
or that it originated in Roman law. It was also during this period that the first definition 
of dominium was formulated. Although it is sometimes said that Bartolus' definition 
indicates that ownership is absolute, Bartolus never regarded ownership as such. The 
nature of the concept of divided ownership, which was in existence at the time when 
Bartolus formulated his definition, indicates that neither the dominus directus nor the 
dominus indirectus could have absolute or exclusive ownership. 
Divided ownership was initially received in Roman-Dutch law, but it was later 
abandoned in view of Grotius' work. Grotius used the Roman distinction between volle 
and gebreckelicke eigendom. He differentiated between different forms of gebreckelicke 
eigendom. In terms of this distinction the value of the right held by the different holders 
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of gebreckelicke eigendom was used to distinguish between the different forms of 
gebreckelicke eigendom. The more valuable one was called eigendom or ownership 
and the less valuable one was referred to as a gerechtigheid or a right. This distinction 
practically destroyed divided ownership, because the position of the vassal was 
degraded from ownership (dominium utile) to a mere (limited real) right. Grotius' work 
is important for the creation of a hierarchical system of rights and the foundation for the 
distinction between ownership and limited real rights. 
It is common cause that the French Revolution and the political, social and economic 
developments that accompanied it had a significant effect on the social function of 
property rights. Although the French Revolution had an influence on the nature of 
property rights as such, the importance of the Revolution must not be over-emphasised 
in this regard. The liberation of land from feudal bondage was a strong incentive for the 
shift in land ownership with its concomitant political effect on equality and freedom. The 
result was that the functional fragmentation that was recognised throughout the middle 
ages was rejected and replaced by a more individualistic view of the relationship 
between man and land, but the notion that ownership acquired its absolute character 
as a direct result of the Revolution, seems to be unsubstantiated. The abolition of 
feudal law and divided ownership constituted another discontinuity in the development 
of ownership (and also other property rights). It was during this period that the 
emphasis shifted from social relations to the individual, and consequently ownership 
acquired an individualistic character. 
The German Pandectists, under the influence of Kant's theory according to which 
individual freedom and personal autonomy is emphasised, described ownership as the 
most complete real right. According to this school ownership is characterised by 
absoluteness, uniformity, exclusivity, abstractness and elasticity. Property law 
underwent a process of scientification in terms of which a hierarchical system of 
rationally related rights, concepts and definitions was created. The debate on the social 
function of property was eliminated by the scientific, conceptual approach to property 
law. The abolition of feudal divided ownership and the distinction between ownership 
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and limited real rights were combined in a single theory of property with the concept of 
freedom and autonomy of the individual as its moral basis. 
In the latter half of twentieth century the South African courts treated the Pandectists 
as if they were institutional writers and as such their views became part of the South 
African law through case law. Although the conceptual approach to property and the 
recognition of a concept of absolute, in principle unrestricted ownership were criticised 
for perpetuating the unjust social policy of apartheid, this perception of property was 
accepted as law until the early 1990's. It was, however, clear that this concept of 
ownership and the abstract, scientific approach to property were untenable in a society 
characterised by social injustice and it was in dire need of change. The implementation 
of the first democratic Constitution provided the perfect impetus for such change and 
placed South African property law on the doorstep of another discontinuity or 
fundamental break. 
The development of ownership is characterised by numerous discontinuities which had 
a direct influence on the concept as we know it today. These discontinuities include the 
impact of the vulgar Roman law, the implementation and abolition of the feudal system, 
the influence of Grotius' structure and hierarchy of rights and the scientification of 
property law in the nineteenth century on the basis of Grotius' work. Pandectism 
replaced the Roman and Roman-Dutch traditions to a large extent when the South 
African law underwent a process of scientification in the twentieth century and it can 
thus be concluded that we no longer have a true Roman or Roman-Dutch tradition. The 
discontinuities also refute the assumption that concept of ownership (or property rights 
in general) developed in an uninterrupted line and is flexible enough to adapt to new 
social and political circumstances. These discontinuities amounted to much more than 
mere adaptations of Roman law dominium. Property rights were rather changed 
completely to cater for the needs of the particular society in which it had to function, 
and there is no reason why it cannot be changed again to cater for the needs of post-
apartheid South Africa. 
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Attempts in modern Dutch law to change the concept of absolute and exclusive 
ownership to take cognisance of the social function of property proved to be 
unsuccessful. These attempts were all made within the confinements of the conceptual 
framework, and indicate the need for South African property law to abandon the 
abstract, scientific approach to property in order to ensure that the use, distribution and 
exploitation of property reflect its social role and function. 
The introduction of the democratic Constitution in South Africa provided the ideal 
opportunity to break with the traditional, conceptual, private law approach to property 
law, and for a completely new debate on the role and function of property within society 
to supersede the conceptual approach. 
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SECTION 2 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
This section deals with the interpretation and protection of property in a' constitutional 
context. It is pointed out that, in contrast to the situation in private law where property 
rights are approached conceptually, the social function of property has always been 
emphasised in the constitutional context and the focus on and importance of the private 
law concepts are diminished. The private law concept of property rights is not amended 
to comply with the requirements set in the constitutional context, but property rights are 
rather interpreted and protected within a new context. This approach to property 
constitutes another fundamental break or discontinuity in the logical development of 
property rights. The traditional private law perception of abstract, scientific and 
objective concepts which are unaffected by social and political realities, is replaced by 
a new perception of property. Unlike the situation in terms of private law, the social role 
and political function of property fulfill a central role in the constitutional context. In the 
constitutional context recognition is given to the fact that property rights are creatures 
of their socio-political context and are therefore themselves political in nature. Each 
property decision (whether to create, reinforce or protect a right) is a political question 
that has to be taken and justified for each case with full recognition of the context within 
which the decision is made and the implications of the decision. The social function of 
property plays an essential role when the court has to determine whether a particular 
right should be afforded constitutional protection, and exactly what the extent of the 
protection should be. In a constitutional context individual freedom and autonomy are 
not emphasised to the exclusion of the common interest, but an equitable balance has 
to be established between the interests of the individual and the public interest. 
The emphasis in this section is on the interpretation, the scope, and the limitation of 
constitutional property. The different aspects are investigated with reference to the 
situation in Germany, the United States of America, the Council of Europe and South 
Africa. The comparative analysis in this section is limited to the positions in German 
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law, US law and the protection and limitation of constitutional property in terms of the 
European Convention, because the protection and limitation of constitutional property 
in these jurisdictions provide an extensive overview of the treatment of constitutional 
property in most foreign jurisdictions. The treatment of constitutional property in 
Germany is of special importance to the South African situation, because property 
rights these two systems shared the same historical development, and prior to the 
introduction of the national constitutions the emphasis in both systems was on the 
concept of property and the place of the different property rights within a scientific, 
hierarchical system of rights. The interpretation and protection of constitutional property 
in the US provide an example of the nature and extent of constitutional property in an 
Anglo-American system. To some extent the protection and limitation of property in the 
US differ from the position in other Anglo-American jurisdictions. The meaning of the 
wide term 'takings', the essentially ad hoc approach to takings cases and the 
recognition of so-called 'per se' takings make the position in US law unique. In terms 
of section 39 of the 1996 South African Constitution the courts have to consider 
international law when interpreting the bill of rights. The position in terms of the 
European Convention is discussed as a representative example of the treatment of 
property by international institutions. In the Council of Europe the property guarantee 
is interpreted in such a manner that an equitable balance is struck between the 
interests of the individual property holder and the public interest. The exact 
phraseology of the property clause is negated to some extent and it is rather interpreted 
to provide the individual with the strongest possible protection while still protecting the 
common interest. 
The comparative analysis of the interpretation and protection of property in a 
constitutional context is necessitated by the fact that the introduction of the 
constitutional order in most jurisdictions (including Germany, the Council of Europe and 
South Africa) has emphasised the need for a social-sensitive approach to property, and 
consequently it brought an end to the private law tradition in terms of which property 
rights are reduced to abstract, scientific and context-neutral concepts. 
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8 
PROPERTY IN GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
8.1 Introduction 
The German legal system serves as an example of a civil law system where property 
is protected separately in an entrenched constitutional property clause. In contrast with 
the Dutch legal system, where property law is dictated by civil law (in the Nieuw 
Burgerlijk Wetboek) and the influence of the Dutch Constitution is minimised by the 
absence of judicial review, 1 a distinction is made in German law between the nature 
and protection of ownership in the German civil code (BOrgerliches Gesetzbuch - BGB 
1900) and the function of the Grundgesetz tor die Bundesrepublik Deutchlancf ( GG -
1949) in controlling the nature and effect of property. 
Due to the influence of German Pandectism, the face of German private-law property 
bears substantial resemblance to its South African and Dutch counterparts. In both 
systems private-law property is based on the distinction between ownership and limited 
real rights. Ownership is regarded as the most complete real right that enables the 
owner to use his/her property as he/she sees fit. Ownership is furthermore regarded as 
a fundamentally unrestricted right and restrictions or limitations are viewed as 
exceptions. As in Dutch law and South African law, German private law did not move 
fundamentally away from the traditional view of property. However, in German law the 
Grundgesetz embodies a different spirit and, unlike the Netherlands, the unchanged 
private-law tradition is influenced by the Constitution and judicial review. The effect of 
the Constitution and the constitutional guarantee of property on the traditional view of 
property is looked at in this chapter. 
See chapter 7 in this regard. 
2 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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8.2 Interpretation of the Grundgesetz 
Before the nature and implications of the property guarantee can be evaluated, brief 
mention has to be made of the principles that underlie constitutional interpretation in 
German law. 3 
The Grundgesetz contains a set of constitutional principles that have to be taken into 
account whenever meaning is given to its content. The principles of the German state 
are enumerated in articles 20 and 28 Grundgesetz. 4 According to article 20: 
"(1) The Federal Republic of Germany shall be a democratic and social 
state." 
Article 28 states: 
"(1) The constitutional order in the Lander shall conform to the principles 
of the republican, democratic and social state governed by the rule of law 
within the meaning of this Basic Law." 
3 
4 
Although the normal principles of statutory interpretation apply in Germany, the Federal 
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht- BVerfG) has developed rules that apply 
specifically to the interpretation of the Grundgesetz. Certainly the most important of these 
is that the Basic Law must be interpreted as a whole. The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
states emphatically that no constitutional provision may be taken out of context and 
interpreted on its own. Every constitutional provision must be interpreted in such a way that 
it remains compatible with the fundamental ·principles of the Grundgesetz. Fundamental 
rights must thus not be judged in isolation, but must be interpreted against the background 
of the Basic Law as a whole with specific reference to the underlying constitutional 
principles and the place which a particular right takes with regard to other fundamental 
rights. See BVerfGE 1, 14 at 32. For a discussion see Kommers The Constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 45; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 405. 
Whenever a conflict of rights exists, the meaning of these rights should be harmonised in 
order to offer each the greatest possible relative protection. See Blaauw-Wolf and Wolf 
1996 SALJ 267 at 27 4; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 405. It must, however, be kept in mind 
that the general idea is not merely to limit the meaning and protection of the fundamental 
rights, but rather to provide for the widest possible scope of application. 
All quotations are from Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, the official 
translation published in June 1994 by the Press and Information Office of the Federal 
Government, Bonn. 
154 
These principles, namely republicanism, democracy, social state, federalism and 
Rechtsstaat, 5 form the foundation of the Basic Law and as such they play an integral 
part in the everyday workings of all parts of government. According to Foster' they 
influence the direction of all state tasks and give legitimacy to the use of state power 
and the exercise of government on a daily basis. For the purposes of this study it is 
important to note that the principles of state must be taken into account when the 
meaning and the scope of the protection afforded by the fundamental rights are 
determined. These principles assure that no right is negated or overshadowed by any 
other right in the process of harmonisation of conflicting rights, and all of these 
principles work towards the social state principle. 
All these principles enjoy equal status in the interpretation process, but for the 
purposes of this study republicanism, democracy and federalism need not be 
discussed. 7 It is, however, necessary to provide a brief discussion of the idea of a 
Rechtsstaat and the social state principle. 
The idea of a Rechtsstaat (Rechtsstaatprinzip) is based on the premise that all state 
authority derives from the people, and that no action taken by the state my exceed the 
boundaries of this authority. A Rechtsstaat can be described as a state where the state 
derives it authority form statutes that are in line with the constitutional principles and 
where the state strives to protect freedom, justice and legal certainty.8 Various 
principles have been derived from the Rechtsstaat idea. 9 Amongst these is, firstly, the 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
The terms Rechtsstaat and rule of law do not carry the exact same meaning and for this 
reason the term Rechtsstaat will be used in this chapter. See in this regard Currie The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 18 et seq; De Waal 1995 SAJHR 1 et 
seq; Kruger 1994 ste// LR 15at16. 
Foster German legal system and laws 146. 
For a discussion see Foster German legal system and laws 146 et seq. 
Stem Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutchland vol 1 615. Also see Blaauw-Wolf 
and Wolf 1996 SALJ 267 at 268 et seq. 
See in general Foster German legal system and laws 149 et seq; Currie The Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Germany 309 et seq; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 406 et seq; 
Blaauw-Wolf and Wolf 1996 SALJ 267 at 268 et seq. 
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separation of powers. Secondly, the Rechtsstaat principle determines that the Basic 
Law is supreme and that it is binding on all three branches of the state. Thirdly, it 
implies legal certainty (Rechtssicherheit or Bestimmtheit). Legal rules and measures 
must be clear and applied consistently. This principle also includes the ban on 
retroactive or retrospective laws. Fourthly the existence of a Rechtsstaat encompasses 
the trust principle ( Vertrauensschutzprinzip). This principle bears close resemblance 
to the principles of legitimate expectation or estoppal. In the last place proportionality 
(VerhaltnismaBigkeit) is regarded as an integral part of the Rechtsstaat. Proportionality 
requires that an equitable balance be struck between the interests of an individual and 
the social interest. According to Foster10 the principle of proportionality implies that 
laws, actions and measures of public bodies must not go beyond those strictly required 
to achieve the legal purpose or objective. Although the principle of proportionality is not 
specifically mentioned in the Grundgesetz, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has derived 
it from the Basic Law and regards it as an indispensable part of a Rechtsstaat. 11 
Foster12 summarises the characteristics and principles of a Rechtsstaat eloquently 
when he states: 
11 
••• a Rechtsstaat is a state which has a fixed and certain hierarchy of 
laws binding on all and respected by all organs, the separation of powers, 
and the provision of accessible courts which are independent and seek 
to protect the citizen. Notions of legal clarity and security of law are also 
within the guarantee of the Rechtsstaat, that government action must be 
predictable and measurable. It encompasses the provision and protection 
of basic rights. 11 
Articles 20(1) and 28(1) Grundgesetz commit Germany to the social state principle 
10 
11 
12 
Foster German legal system and laws 150. Also see Van der Walt The constitutional 
property clause 88 et seq; Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative 
analysis chapter on Germany; Blaauw-Wolf and Wolf 1996 SALJ 267 at 268 et seq. 
BVerfGE 19, 342 at 348. Also see Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the 
Federal Republic of Germany 46. 
Foster German legal system and laws 151. 
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(Sozialstaatprinzip). This principle is founded on the premise that the state should not 
only protect citizens from one another and from the state, but that it should also be 
required to promote the public interest. By doing so the state is obliged to provide a 
element of social balance in society and to correct the unfortunate effects of the market 
economy. According to De Waal13 the social state principle entails that the state is 
obliged to guarantee a dignified existence for all and to control or eliminate 
relationships of dependence in society. Although the social state principle has as yet 
never been used to invalidate government action, it is understood to impose a duty on 
the state to affirmatively promote the public welfare and social justice. The effect of the 
Sozialstaatprinzip is clearly seen in social security provisions with regard to 
unemployment, illness, old age insurance and benefits and legal aid. 
The different principles that underlie constitutional interpretation in German law create 
a framework for property law which relativises the traditional view of property law. 
8.3 The property guarantee 
Article 14 of the Grundgesetz states: 
"(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their 
substance and limits shall be determined by law. 
(2) Property entails obligations. Its use should also serve the public 
interest. 
(3) Expropriation shall only be permissible in the public interest. It may 
only be ordered by or pursuant to a law which determines the nature and 
extent of compensation. Compensation shall reflect a fair balance 
between the public interest and the interests of those affected. In case of 
dispute regarding the amount of compensation recourse may be had to 
13 De Waal 1995 SAJHR 1 at 8. Also see Currie The Constitution of the Federal Republic 
ofGennany20 et seq, Foster German legal system and laws 151; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 
at 407; Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 35. 
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the ordinary courts. "14 
The property guarantee in the Grundgesetz raises a few issues that will be discussed 
in this section. These include, firstly, the tension between the freedom of the individual 
and the interests of society (or the social function of property), secondly the interaction 
between and scope of the individual and institutional guarantees, and thirdly the 
meaning and scope of property in a constitutional context. 
8.3.1 The tension between personal liberty and the social interest 
It is apparent from the wording of article 14 that the property clause embodies both the 
guarantee of the individual's right to property and the notion that property has a social 
function and has to serve (or at least be compatible with) the public interest. Article 
14(1) states that property (and the right of inheritance) shall be guaranteed. Property 
may, however, be limited according to article 14(1) and may be expropriated (against 
compensation) according to article 14(3). The social function of property is set out in 
article 14(2), which states that property entails duties (or obligations) and that its use 
must serve the public interest. According to Van der Walt15 the tension between the 
rights of the individual and the social function of property forms the backbone of the 
article as it is interpreted by the courts. 
Kleyn 16 points out that this tension reflects the tension that exists between the 
14 
15 
16 
"( 1) Das Bgentum und das Erbrecht werden -gewahrleistet. lnhalt und Schrank en werden 
durch die Gesetze bestimmt. 
(2) Eigentum verpflichtet. Sein Gebrauch soil zugleich dem Wohle der Al/gemeinheit 
dienen. 
(3) Eine Enteignung ist nur zum Wohle der Allgemeinheit zulassig. Sie darf nur durch 
Gesetz. oder auf Grund eines Gesetz.es erfolgen, das Art und Ausmaf3 der Entschadigung 
regelt. Die Entschiidigung ist unter gerechter Abwagung der lnteressen der Allgemeinheit 
und der Beteiligten zu bestimmen. Wegen der Hohe der Entschiidigung steht im Streitfall 
der Rechtsweg vor den ordentlichen Gerichten offen." 
Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on 
Germany. Also see Currie The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 290; 
Schuppert in Karpen The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 108. 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 409. See also De Waal 1995 SAJHR 1 at 8. 
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principles of the Rechtsstaat and the social state. The protection of the individual's 
rights against interference by the state corresponds with the principle of the 
Rechtsstaat, according to which personal freedom is to be protected. On the other hand 
the social function of property ties in with the aim of the social state, namely the 
advancement of equality. It was pointed out earlier that the 1courts attempt to harmonise 
the tension between the Rechtsstaat and the social state by interpreting the Basic Law 
as a whole, and the same principle applies as far as the property clause is concerned. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht17 has stated that there is a close relationship between 
the property guarantee and the guarantee of personal liberty in article 2 of the 
Grundgesetz.18 The court stated that property is a fundamental right which is meant to 
secure, for the holder, an area of personal liberty in the patrimonial sphere, to enable 
him/her to take responsibility for the free development and organisation of his/her own 
life within the larger social context. The protection of property serves to secure personal 
liberty and enables the individual to lead a self-governing life by protecting the 
individual from unwarranted state interference with his/her property. This creates a 
sphere in which the individual can have and hold property, which in turn ensures the 
free exercise of autonomy and self-realisation. As such property is associated with 
liberty and personhood and thus enables the individual to engage in responsible, self-
defining activity and to realise his/her own life and personality. The property guarantee 
is thus not primarily a material guarantee, but rather a personal guarantee. 19 
The implications and application of the property guarantee should, however, not be 
distorted by a one-dimensional approach to article.14 by focusing only on the personal 
17 
18 
19 
BVerfGE24,367 at389; BVerfGE68, 193 at 222; BVerfGE78, 58 at 73; BVerfGE79, 292 
at 303; BVerfGE 83, 201 at 208. 
Article 2 Grundgesetz. "Rights of liberty (1) Everyone has the right to the free development 
of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offends against the 
constitutional order or the moral law." 
For a discussion see Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic 
of Gennany252; Currie The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 290; Van der 
Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on Germany; Kleyn 
1996 SAPL 402 at 41 O; Schuppert in Karpen The constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 108. 
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I iberty aspect. The Bundesverfassungsgerichf0 stated very clearly that the property 
guarantee creates an area of personal liberty in the patrimonial sphere within which the 
individual can take responsibility for free development and self-realisation, but that the 
exercise of this freedom always has to take place within the larger social context. The 
property guarantee does not create an island for the individual to exist apart from the 
rest of society. Article 14(2) clearly states that property entails obligations and that its 
use must serve the public interest. The personal space of freedom created by the 
guarantee must be utilised to assist in the formation of the whole social and economic 
order. The guarantee entrenches private-law rights which must also further the interests 
of society at large. The individual has an active role to play in society and must, while 
pursuing the realisation of personal autonomy, work towards the building of a social, 
legal and economic order. The principles of personal liberty and the social state are 
therefore reconcilable and not mutually exclusive.21 The Bundesverfassungsgericht22 
placed personal liberty within a social context when it stated that the property 
guarantee in a social state should also serve the poor, because they are the ones that 
are most in need of protection to ensure their freedom. The mere fact that the property 
clause guarantees property on the one hand while allowing for the limitation of property 
in the public interest on the other hand illustrates the fact that property rights do not 
exist in a vacuum and have to be applied and exercised within a social context. 23 
Limitations in the public interest form an inherent part of property.24 
8.3.2 The personal and institutional guarantee of property 
Article 14 of the Grundgesetz guarantees property and the right of inheritance. Two 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
BVerfGE24,367 at 389; BVerfGE68, 193 at 222; BVerfGE 78, 58 at 73; BVerfGE 79, 292 
at 303; BVerfGE 83,201at208. 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 412. 
BVerfGE 42, 64 at 77. 
The social function of property is, among others, illustrated by BVerfGE 24, 367 
(Deichordnung case) BVerfGE 87, 114 (Kleingarten case) and BVerfGE 58, 300 
(NaBauskiesung case). 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 412. 
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separate but related guarantees are derived from this provision. The first is a 
subjective, material or personal guarantee that secures individual property rights 
(Bestandsgarantie or lndividualgarantie) and the other an institutional guarantee that 
secures the institution of property (lnstitutionsgarantie or Einrichtungsgarantie) against 
the abolition of the institution of private property. 
The Bestandsgarantie25 enables the individual to be the holder of property rights and 
protects the individual's property from undue or improper interference by the state. The 
individual may have and hold property and has the power to use the different objects 
as he/she sees fit. He/she also has the power to dispose of and alienate his/her 
property. 26 The Bestandsgarantie guarantees personal freedom within the economic 
order. This freedom does, however, have a social dimension which limits both the 
individual's power to use his/her property as he/she sees fit and the power of the state 
to interfere with the individual's rights. The individual must always use his/her property 
to serve the public interest. Any use of the property that is to the detriment of society 
is not included in the personal guarantee. 
Although the Bestandsgarantie protects the individual against interference from the 
state, the social dimension of the guarantee determines that the protection is not 
absolute. The guarantee does not imply that the state may never interfere with personal 
property rights - it merely lays down the requirements for valid interferences. The state 
may only interfere with the individual's rights, through either regulation or expropriation, 
if the interference is justified by the public interest. And even if an interference is in the 
25 
26 
See in general Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 250 et seq; Currie The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 291; 
Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparatlve analysis chapter on 
Germany; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at413 et seq. Also see BVerfGE24, 367; BVerfGE58, 
300. 
It is unclear whether article 14 also includes the power to obtain property. It is generally 
held that article 14 only protects existing property and that the power to obtain property is 
derived from article 2. See Kleyn 1995 SAPL 402 at 414 in this regard. The power to 
obtain property must not be understood as being the same as a positive claim right against 
the state to provide property. No such a positive claim right is recognised in German law. 
See Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on 
Germany. 
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public interest, the interference will only be valid if the public purpose is more important 
than the individual's guaranteed property rights. 
It is important to note that, although article 14 guarantees the payment of compensation 
in the case of expropriation, this does not mean that the guarantee of property is 
replaced by a guarantee of the value of the property in question (Wertgarantie). The 
guarantee of the exchange value of property in the expropriation clause (article 14(3)) 
is lower in status than the Bestandsgarantie and does not replace the guarantee of the 
property.27 According to the Bundesverfassungsgericht article 14 guarantees property 
itself and not just its value.28 Because of the fact that article 14 guarantees property 
itself, and not merely the value thereof, property that was expropriated for a specific 
public purpose that was never realised should be returned to the original property 
holder, even if compensation was paid. 29 
The institutional guarantee, on the other hand, protects property as a human right in 
the objective sense. It protects the core of norms that ensure the existence of private 
property and not any individual's rights as such. The purpose of the institutional 
guarantee is to ensure that the state does not eliminate or reduce the potential sphere 
of personal liberty which is guaranteed by article 14. The institutional guarantee entails 
that the state may not remove whole categories of property from the sphere of private 
property and in doing so suspend or curtail substantial areas of the protected sphere 
of liberty protected by this fundamental right. 30 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on Germany 
points out that the guarantee of value should not be identified with the Bestandsgarantie, 
because the guarantee of value does not justify an expropriation. An expropriation must 
be valid in terms of the Bestandsgarantie before the guarantee of value comes into play. 
Also see Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 414. 
BVerfGE 38, 175at1884; BVerfGE 56, 249 at 260; BVerfGE 58, 300 at 323; BVerfGE 78, 
58 at 75. 
See BVerfGE 38, 175. 
Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 251 et 
seq; Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on 
Germany; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 414 et seq. Also see BVerfGE 24, 367; BVerfGE 58, 
300; BVerfGE 42, 263. 
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Kleyn31 points out that, although article 14 does not create a positive claim right against 
the state to provide individuals with property, the institutional guarantee imposes a duty 
on the state actively to promote the creation of wealth. The equal distribution of private 
property will protect the constitutional and societal order in general. 
The regulation of property may, however, be adjusted to social and economic 
conditions. The state is thus not completely prevented from interfering with the system 
of private property and may remove specific categories of property if doing so is 
compatible with the public interest. The Bundesverfassungsgericht32 holds the view that 
the nature and social function of certain categories of property is such that exclusive 
individual rights in that property are irreconcilable with the importance and potential 
dangers which the private use and exploitation of that property might have for society 
as a whole. In these cases the removal of certain categories of property from the 
sphere of private rights, or the transformation of a category of rights into public-law 
rather than private-law rights, is justified by the social importance and function of that 
category of property. The institutional guarantee, therefore, legitimises state action to 
prevent harmful concentrations of private property. In the Deichordnung case,33 the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht found a federal statute that removed dyke land from the 
sphere of private-law rights, in order to create a more effective system of flooding 
control, to be constitutional. The court reiterated that the protection of property ensures 
the protection of personal liberty and that the institutional guarantee serves to secure 
this basic right. If lawmakers were allowed to replace private property with something 
no longer deserving the label "ownership", property could not be effectively protected. 
The institutional guarantee prohibits the legislature from changing the private legal 
order in such a way that fundamental categories of constitutionally protected activities 
relating to the area of property would be removed, which would diminish the sphere of 
liberty protected by this right. However, the court continued that the statute in question 
was constitutionally valid because the public purpose served by removing the dyke land 
31 
32 
33 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 415. 
BVerfGE 24, 367; BVerfGE 58, 300; BVerfGE 42, 263. 
BVerfGE24, 367. 
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from the sphere of private property for more effective flooding control was in the public 
interest, and in this case the public interest outweighed the interests of the individual 
owners. 
The Contergan case34 is a good example of a case where the state transformed private 
rights into public-law rights for a legitimate public purpose. This case deals with the 
private claims for damages of German Thalidomide victims against the manufacturer 
of medicine (Contergan) which caused physical handicaps. The claims were created 
by private agreement between the victims and the manufacturer. The state, however, 
created a statutory foundation to manage the compensation fund for the sake of all 
claimants and potential beneficiaries. The private claims of the victims who had an 
agreement with the manufacturer were changed into public-law rights against the 
statutory foundation in order to provide better control over funds for the sake of all 
claimants. The court found that the legislature has the authority to change the nature 
of these constitutionally guaranteed claims and, in doing so, to realise the social 
function of property. Thus, although these private claims were removed from the sphere 
of private property by transforming them into public-law claims, the statute which 
effected this transformation was found not to be in conflict with the institutional 
guarantee because it was justified by an overpowering public interest. In the 
NaBauskiesung case, 35 where the mining of gravel below the level of groundwater was 
restricted, the court stated that 
"the institutional guarantee of private property does indeed bar the 
lawmakers from modifying or undermining the core of the right to property 
embedded in private law in such a way as to remove or substantially 
reduce the realm of freedom guaranteed by article 14. But the definition 
of property is not the exclusive domain of private law. The institutional 
guarantee is not adversely affected when public law intrudes to protect 
and defend aspects of property vital to the well-being of the general 
34 
35 
BVerfGE 42, 263. 
BVerfGE 58, 300. 
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~ constitutional property 
11dgesetz does not define property and consequently constitutional 
I as an open and flexible concept. It must, however, be noted that 
)t of property is open, this does not mean that it is unrestricted or 
~ law property (or ownership in this instance) is viewed as a 
d and absolute right to which restrictions are seen as exceptions. 37 
e social dimension of constitutional property, it is regarded as 
in constitutional law.38 
, r 11::: ounaesverfassungsgerichf9 declared that the meaning of constitutional property 
must be derived from the Basic Law itself. Constitutional property cannot be interpreted 
in terms of legal norms, like ordinary statutes and private-law regulations, tower in rank 
than the Basic Law or from private law. A distinction is thus made in German law 
between private-law property and constitutional property. 40 It is important in this regard -
to note that although the Grundgesetz uses the same term Eigentum (ownership) used 
for private-law ownership in the BGB, it is interpreted in the constitutional context to 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Translation according to Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal 
Republic of Germany 259. 
903 BGB: "Der Eigenfiimer einer Sache kann, soweit nicht das Gesetz oder Rechte Dritter 
entgegenstehen, mit der Sache nach Belieben verfahren und andere von jeder Einwirkung 
ausschliellen". (The owner of a thing may, to the extent that it is not contrary to law or the 
rights of third parties, deal with the thing as he pleases and exclude others from any 
interference.) Also see chapter 5 in this regard. 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 419; Van der Walt in Van Wyk et al Rights and constitutiona/ism 
4 70; Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 48; Currie The constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany 294. 
BVerfGE 58, 300. 
See in general Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 42 et seq; Schuppert in 
Karpen The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 108. 
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mean property in the wide sense. 41 
The Naf!,auskiesing case42 is especially important in this regard. In 1976 a statute 
determined that any use of groundwater that influenced the quality or quantity of 
groundwater was subject to permission. The plaintiff in this case operated a gravel pit 
where he extracted gravel from beneath the groundwater level. His free use of the 
groundwater was restricted when a new water conservation district was declared. The 
plaintiff's quarry was situated within the boundaries if this water district and his permit 
for the use of the water beneath his property was terminated. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht had to decide whether the statute effected a regulation or 
an expropriation and whether the statute was compatible with the guarantee of property 
in article 14 of the Grundgesetz. In its decision the Bundesverfassungsgericht stated 
that the concept of property in a constitutional sense must be derived from the Basic 
Law itself. The Basic Law determines that the content and limits of property have to be 
determined by the legislature. This has to be done in such a way that a balance is 
struck between the protection of the interests of the individual and the public. The 
legislature has to provide for private-law rules to ensure the protection of the 
individuals rights and public-law regulations to safeguard the interests of society as a 
whole. Both private and public law therefore have to contribute to the determination of 
the constitutional legal position of the owner. The civil code (BGB) does not define the 
content and limits of property exclusively. Account has to be taken of the totality of 
regulations regarding property to determine the rights of a property owner at any 
specific time. If these regulations deny the property owner of a certain control over 
his/her property, this control does not form part of his/her right to property. The civil 
code (BGB), which states that the right of an owner of a piece of land extends to the 
space above the surface and to the terrestrial body under the surface and that the 
41 
42 
The official translation of the Grundgesetz also uses the term 'property' rather than 
ownership. Also see Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 42 et seq; Van der 
Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on Germany; Kleyn 
1996 SAPL 402 at 413. The term 'property' is also used by Currie The constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany 290, Foster German legal system and laws 165 and 
Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 250. 
BVerfGE 58, 300. 
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owner may deal with his/her property as he/she pleases, 43 does not take precedence 
over regulations of public law. The court continued to say that the water law in question 
does not constitute an expropriation but merely a regulation in terms of article 14( 1) 
Grundgesetz. The statute defines the content of property with regard to groundwater. 
This constitutes a change in objective law and does not result in a deprivation of a 
concrete legal interest protected by the institutional guarantee. 
Article 14( 1) of the Grundgesetz states that the content and limits of property shall be 
determined by statute. Currie44 points out that this does not mean that the content and 
limits of property are placed wholly at legislative disposal. The meaning of property has 
to be derived from the Grundgesetz and the legislature is thus obliged to have due 
regard for constitutional values that have a bearing on the meaning of the entire Basic 
Law. These values include human dignity, personality and equality. A working balance 
has to be struck between the content and limits of property and these values. 
Furthermore, the principles of the Rechtsstaat (including proportionality) and the social 
state also have to be taken into account. 45 The role of the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
in reviewing an interference with property is to determine whether the legislature took 
all the competing values and principles into account. 46 Constitutional property consists , . 
of all the different entitlements granted to the owner by the legislature at a specific 
time.47 
Whereas the legislature has the task to determine the content and limits of property, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht48 declared that it is the task of the courts to determine, 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
903 and 905 BGB. 
Currie The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 294. Also see Kleyn 1996 
SAPL 402 at 419; Schuppert in Karpen The constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Germany 112 et seq. 
Kommers The constitutional jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 254. 
BVerfGE52, 1; BVerfGE37,132; BVerfGE 42, 263; BVerfGE 14, 263. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 49; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 419. 
BVerfGE 1, 264 at 277. 
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with reference to developments in private law and the needs of society, which objects 
qualify as constitutional property (and which will be protected in terms of the property 
guarantee). Private law was used as a starting point to determine which objects should l 
form part of constitutional property. Consequently, the starting point was that only rights 
in corporeal things were constitutionally protected, but the development of the industrial 
economic system necessitated the inclusion of other rights and interests in the range 
of constitutionally protected property.49 The function of the constitutional guarantee 1 
justifies the extension of the list of protected property.50 The protection of property in 
the Grundgesetz is judged from a perspective compatible with the protection of 
personal liberty and its function is to secure a sphere of personal liberty for the 1 
individual to take responsibility for his/her own affairs in the patrimonial sphere. The 
protection of other rights (not only real rights) as property is in line with this function of 
the property guarantee. All patrimonial rights of private law (vermogenswerte Rechte) 1 
are thus constitutionally protected. Traditional private-law rights such as servitudes, 
real security rights, hunting and fishing rights, mining and mineral rights and the 
subjective right of a lessee are all protected.51 Private-law rights with regard to 
immaterial and incorporeal property, such as shares, patent and trademark rights, 
copyrights, rights of first refusal, contractual rights of purchase and sale and so on are 
also protected in terms of the property guarantee.52 The rights relating to a business 
concern (Gewerbebetrieb) are also included in the property guarantee. Although it has 
not been decided by the Bundesverfassungsgericht, it is often argued that the 
guarantee should also include goodwill and earning possibilities based on clientele 
49 
50 
51 
52 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 32 et seq; Schuppert in Karpen The 
constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 108. 
BVerfGE 42, 263 at 293. 
See Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on 
Germany; Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 43. 
BVerfGE 31, 229 (copyright); BVerfGE 36, 281 (patent rights); BVerfGE 42, 263 
(contractual money claims); BVerfGE 51, 193 (trademarks); BVerfGE 68, 193 (debts); 
BVerfGE 53, 257 (matrimonial property claims); BVerfGE 83, 201 (right of pre-emption). 
See also Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 33. 
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1n established business. Van der Walt53 points out that benefits 
temporary existence of a favourable situation are not included in 
only those rights that the beneficiary can legally rely on, are 
property is restricted by the fact that only vested or acquired (and 
:; are protected.54 Interests thus have to be established and vested 
rder to qualify for protection in terms of the property guarantee. 
s, chances and possible future earnings are not protected. 55 Not 
lve been acquired and exercised lawfully are protected, but also 
eady been acquired legally but not yet exercised. The right to build 
part of one's property. 56 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht57 recognised the fact that modern society's wealth more 
often than "not lies in social security and as such the constitutional guarantee was 
interpreted to include public-law rights (subjektive offentliche Rechte). To determine 
whether a public-law right qualifies for protection in terms of article 14, that specific 
social security right has to serve the function of the property guarantee in the same 
manner that traditional private-law rights do. 58 The Bundesverfassungsgerichf'9 has set 
three requirements for a public-law right to qualify as constitutionally protected 
property: The right in question must be separated from state control and must be 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on 
Germany. Also see Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 422. 
BVerfGE 28, 119; BVerfGE 45, 142. 
Expectancies of adjustments of and increases in pension funds are not protected. 
BVerfGE 36, 73. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 34; Van der Walt Constitutional property 
cl~uses: a comparative analysis chapter on Germany. 
BVerfGE 53,257; BVerfGE 58,81. 
ByerfGE 89, 1. 
BVerfGE69, 272 at 300. 
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acquired by the individual; it must be based on substantial contributions of the holder 
of the right; and it must serve to ensure the holder's survival or existence. Security 
provisions based only on the state's duty of social maintenance, in other words where 
there is no contribution from the individual, are not included in the concept of 
constitutional property. Thus, social benefit grants, claims of educational grants, 
housing subsidies and so forth are not regarded as property. Kleyn60 points out that the 
protected public-law rights are dependent on a relationship of exchange between the 
state and the individual. The state assists in creating these rights and as 
counterperformance for the individual's contribution the state allocates the right to the 
individual for private use. 61 
Public-law rights are, however, regarded as weaker or more relative claims compared 
to private-law rights. Public-law property does not have the same binding effect on the 
state as private-law rights. 62 
8.4 Limitation of property rights 
The constitutional right of property is not absolute. The Bundesverfassungsgericht63 
declared that the scope and meaning of constitutional property must be derived from 
60 
61 
62 
63 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 421. Also see Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a 
comparative analysis chapter on Germany. 
Public-law rights that have been included in the constitutional concept of property include 
land-use rights of the residential lessee (note that these rights are non-proprietary rights 
that aim to protect the rights and interests of the lessee: BVerfGE 37, 132; BVerfGE 38, 
248; BVerfGE68, 361; BVerfGE 79, 292; BVerfGE 89, 1; BVerfGE 89, 237; BVerfGE 91, 
294) and the lease of a garden allotment (BVerfGE 52, 1; BVerfGE 87, 114), participatory 
rights of employees in a large firm (BVerfGE 50, 290) and claims against a socially 
important compensation fund (BVerfGE 42, 263). 
It may be argued that, whereas private-law rights serve to ensure the individual's freedom 
and to protect the individual against unwarranted interference by the state, public-law 
rights have a participatory character. These rights bind the state to the distribution of 
wealth it has committed itself to, and they are dependant on what is feasible in terms of 
financial politics. See Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 421; Van der Walt The constitutional 
property dause 34 et seq; De Wet The constitutional enforceability of economic and social 
rights 17 et seq; De Wet 1995 SAPL at 73 et seq; De Wet 1995 SAJHR at 30 et seq. 
BVerfGE 58, 300. See the discussion in 8.3.3 above. 
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the Basic Law as a whole. An absolute, inherently unrestricted concept of property is 
irreconcilable with the governing values and principles of the Basic Law (personal 
liberty and human dignity as well as the principles of the. social state). Article 14 
specifically determines that property has a social function and, if this aspect of the 
property guarantee is brought into the equation, it indicates that constitutional property 
is a relative concept ( Sozialbindung). The limitation of property thus forms an integral 
part of constitutional property. 
Limitations are defined by the Bundesverfassungsgerichf34 as general and abstract 
norms, of either public- or private-law nature, that determine the rights and duties of 
property holders. Article 14( 1) and 14(2) provide the legislature with the power and duty 
to limit property. Article 14(1) acts as a directive to the legislature to determine the 
content and limits of property. Article 14(2), moreover, indicates that property implies 
obligations and that its use must serve the public interest. Kleyn65 points out that article 
14(2) imposes both negative duties (to refrain from any action that may be detrimental 
to the public interest) and positive duties (to use property so that it serves the public 
interest). Article 14 thus instructs the legislature to establish an equitable and just 
property regime that incorporates and guarantees both the individual's liberty and the 
· social interest. 66 The interaction between the guarantee of property as personal liberty 
and the social function of property implies that property can (and must) be limited.67 
Article 14(1) and 14(2), read together, provide the legislature with the general power 
to limit property rights (Eigentumsbindung). 68 It must, however, be kept in mind that 
although there is no general limitation clause in the Grundgesetz, the legislature does 
not have unlimited powers as far as the limitati.on of property is concerned. Every 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
VerfGE 52, 1 at 27; BVerfGE 58, 300 at 330. 
leyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 424. 
VerfGE37, 132at140; 8VerfGE52,1 at 29; BVerfGE70, 191 at 200; BVerfGE79, 174 
198. 
Currie The constitution of the federal Republic of Germany 294; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 
424; Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on 
Germany. 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 424. 
171 
limitation must be judged against the background of the Basic Law as a whole and must 
reflect the values and principles intrinsic to the Basic Law. 69 
The property guarantee is characterised by the balance that has to be struck between 
the interests of the individual and the public respectively. The legislature has to create 
an equitable and just social order in which both the interests of society and the property 
rights of the individual are respected. 70 The proportionality principle71 aims at creating 
this balance. The principle of proportionality ( Verhaltnismal3igkeit), which acts as a 
prohibition against regulatory excess (0bermal3verbot), ensures that a restriction of the 
property holder's rights does not disturb the balance between the individual and the 
social interest. The courts apply the proportionality principle not only to ensure that the 
fundamental rights of the individual are protected, but also to curb excesses of state 
authority. Any limitation of property must establish a proportional balance between its 
purpose and the restrictive means resorted to. Blaauw-Wolf and Wolf72 point out that 
the proportionality principle entails three requirements for valid limitations of property: 
firstly the limitation must be appropriate or suitable (geeignet). Secondly, the limitation 
must be necessary (erforderlich) to achieve the specific purpose and lastly the limitation 
must be proportional (verhaltnismal3ig) to the importance and meaning of the protected 
right, or put differently, the limitation must not impose burdens disproportionate to its 
benefits. The third requirement, which embodies proportionality in the narrow sense, 
entails that even if a limitation is necessary, it would be regarded as disproportional if 
the burden is not in proportion to the objective pursued. The state must select the least 
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burdensome limitation to achieve the purpose of the limitation. 
Whenever the court has to judge the legitimacy of a limitation, it has to determine 
whether the limitation is to be allowed with reference to the proportionality principle. 
Where a fundamental right, which may be restricted, has to be harmonised with a 
public interest that has been provided for specifically by the Basic Law (as is the case 
in article 14(2)), the court attempts to 'optimise' the fundamental right and the public 
interest by giving protection to both without sacrificing either. The extent to which both 
conflicting interests are affected and the importance and weight each deserves in 
relation to the other has to be taken into account. 73 
The practical effect of the proportionality principle is the 'grading' of the social 
limitations of property. The grading is done with reference to the importance of different 
public interests and the different objects of individual rights. As far as the public interest 
is concerned, Kleyn74 points out that efforts to counteract harmful concentrations of 
economic powers, the prevention of exploitation of people and the upliftment of the 
poor justify limitation of a more severe nature that other public purposes of a more 
general nature. The gradation of objects of property rights is done with reference to the 
function of the property guarantee: the more an object serves to secure a sphere of 
personal liberty for the individual, the stronger the individual protection will be. On the 
other hand, the less important an object is for the securing of a sphere of personal 
liberty, the less protection is afforded to the individual and the more severe the 
limitation can be. 75 However, the gradation principle does not imply that the legislature 
has the power to arbitrarily restrict property rights whenever the purpose of the 
limitation or the object in question is of specific social importance. The requirements 
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for the proportionality principle have to be met and the conflicting interests have to be 
balanced in order to achieve a just and equitable result. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht76 has stated that land, in particular, qualifies as an 
object that is subject to stricter social limitation and regulation because of its social 
importance. Land is a limited resource that cannot be increased or multiplied and the 
restriction of the owner's power to use the land is justified by the immense social 
importance of land. Not only the owner of land, but also third parties and the state are 
dependent on land. Some of the severe social limitations of property rights with respect 
to land include the abolition of rights to groundwater,77 rent control in terms of which the 
owner is prohibited from unreasonable and unexpected rent increases or the 
cancellation of the lease, 78 and strict control of the trade in and ownership of forest 
land.79 In the post-war era state control of the use of residential property was justified 
in light of the immense public interest to solve the housing shortage.80 As was stated 
above, the mere fact that an object has an important social function does not mean that 
severe restriction with regard to that object is an obvious consequence. The individual 
and social interests have to be balanced in order to reach a just and equitable result. 
In the Kleingarten cases,81 the court found that, due to social change, the restriction of 
the owner's power to terminate the lease of an allotment garden was no longer socially 
justifiable and the court thus lifted the restriction. 
The position of land ( Situationsgebundenheit) may also have an influence on the 
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severity of limitations. It has been accepted in German law that the function and 
location of land in the environment may be a determining factor for the justification of 
limitation of property rights. Some landed property will thus be subject to more 
limitations than other. The test is whether a specific use, bearing in mind the public 
interest, will be unreasonable in light of the environmental position of the land.82 The 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht83 found that the owner of a wholesale concern that 
distributes fish products in a mixed residential area cannot claim compensation when 
he is instructed to reduce noise levels during specified hours. The instruction to reduce 
noise levels does not constitute an expropriation. When the warehouse was erected 
the street in which the warehouse is situated was undeveloped, and the noise did not 
cause any disturbance. Within a few years, however, the warehouse was surrounded 
by houses and inhabitants complained about the noise. The court held that the owner 
of the business cannot rely on the fact that his business did not change materially over 
the years. The general situation has changed and the current use, bearing in mind the 
public interest, must be reasonable in light of the nature and position of his property. 
The fact that the business is situated within a mixed residential and industrial area 
implies that the owner of the factory has to exercise his rights so as not to exceed the 
limits set by law (in this case neighbour law) for the use of his property. The nature and 
situation of the property determines that the business has to be operated so as not to 
cause a disturbance for the neighbours. The court stated that the owner will only be 
able to rely on the permanent continuation of a specific use of the property if he could 
not reasonably have foreseen that the manner in which the property was used initially 
will become unreasonable in light of the nature of the area or the probable development 
of the area. 84 In a similar case the Bundesverwaltungsgerichf5 confirmed that the 
situation of land in the environment has an influence on the severity of the limitations 
on that property. In this case the owner of land in a nature area was refused permission 
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to mine stone on the land. The court said that any regulatory limitation which restricts 
the use of the land in a conservation area merely expresses the inherent restrictions 
deriving from the particular situation of the land and the social interests in the land, and 
does not constitute any expropriation. The Deichordnung86 case also confirms this 
principle. In this case the expropriation of dyke land was justified ·in light of the 
Situationsgebundenheit of the land and the immense social importance of the purpose 
for which the action was taken, namely to create a more effective dyke system . 
Similarly, the right of a landowner to use roads adjacent to land (Anliegerrecht), as well 
as limitations on the use of property that are the direct consequence of the public use 
of such roads, are derived from the Situationsgebundenheit of the land. The owner of 
the land derives advantages from the fact that his/her property is adjacent to a public 
road and therefore has to endure, within reason, the disadvantages as well. The owner 
is obliged to endure the reasonable burden brought about by the public use of the road. 
However, if the public use of the road burdens the individual landowner 
disproportionately (in other words the benefit to the public is disproportional to the 
burden placed upon the landowner) the landowner is not expected to endure such a 
burden without relief.87 
Land-use control is also justified with reference to the nature and position of land. In 
the Grundstocksverkehrsgesetz88 case the Bundesverfassungsgericht found the refusal 
of permission to a professional forester to buy forest land justified. The permission was 
refused in terms a federal law of 1961 which aimed at preventing the unhealthy 
distribution of land. The social importance of forest (and agricultural) land justified the 
statute, as well as the actions taken in terms of the statute. The NaBauskiesung case, 89 
where the use of groundwater was restricted, also illustrates the principle that land-use 
86 BVerfGE24, 367. 
87 BGHZ64, 220. 
88 BVerfGE21, 73. 
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control is justified by the Situationsgebundenheit of the land. 
8.5 Expropriation of property 
The Grundgesetz determines that property may be expropriated by the state for a public 
purpose against the payment of just compensation. If these requirements are not met, 
the basic right to property is violated. Expropriation does not negate the individual's 
right to property, but rather serves to concretise the guarantee. If property was not 
guaranteed, the expropriation clause would not have been necessary and 
compensation for the expropriation of property would have been redundant. 90 
Article 14(3) of the Grundgesetz provides for and lays down the requirements for the 
expropriation of property. Expropriation is only permissible in the public interest and it 
has to be authorised by legislation. Expropriation may only be effected by or pursuant 
to a law that regulates the nature and extent of compensation. The validity of an 
expropriation is dependant on the requirements set in article 14, and it also has to be 
91 
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both to protect the individual's rights and to limit the state's power to infringe upon the 
individual's rights. The public purpose for which the expropriation is undertaken has to 
be of such importance that it justifies the infringement of the·individual's rights.93 
It is not exactly clear what constitutes an expropriation. 94 The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht95 described expropriation as an appropriation of individual 
property by the state in the form of a total or partial expropriation or seizure of those 
rights that are protected by article 14. The court, however, does not always require a 
transfer of property to the state.96 Cases where rights are reduced~7 limitecf8 or cut 
back99 can also amount to expropriation. 
Article 14(3) of the Grundgesetz determines that compensation is payable for 
expropriations. Expropriation is not defined in the Grundgesetz, and this has led to the 
question of exactly which limitations of property rights qualify for compensation. Initially 
expropriation entailed the transfer of land to the state. This was later extended to 
include the transfer of everything (also immovables and patrimonial rights) that qualified 
as constitutional property. The concept of expropriation was later understood to include 
not only the transfer of the property to the state, but also the excessive burdening and 
limitation thereof. These developments made it possible for a 'normal' limitation to be 
transformed into an expropriation in light of its intensity and the excessive sacrifice 
( Sonderofper) that was expected from the holder of the property rights 
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(Schwellentheorie). The civil courts, which have the duty to determine the amount of 
compensation payable in the case of expropriation, accepted this extended concept of 
expropriation under article 14(3). The Federal Court of .Justice in Civil Matters 
(Bundesgerichtshof - BGH) argued that expropriatory compensation is payable to all 
property holders who are expected to make an extraordinary sacrifice. This applies to 
both normal expropriations and excessive regulations. 100 The Bundesgerichtshof thus 
awarded compensation to property holders in cases where there were no actual 
expropriation in terms of article 14(3), but where owners were forced by a regulatory 
limitation on the use of property to make an extraordinary sacrifice. 101 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht rejected this approach of the civil courts in the 
NaBauskiesung case.102 According to the Bundesverfassungsgericht compensation only 
comes into play once it is determined that a particular limitation conforms to the 
requirements set for expropriations in article 14(3). Compensation is only payable for 
valid expropriations that meet the requirements of article 14(3). Article 14(3) states that 
an expropriation will only be valid if it is authorised by a law which provides for the 
nature and extent of compensation. This is referred to as the Junktim-Klausel (linking 
or tandem clause). The state has to decide beforehand whether a particular restrictive 
measure will amount to an expropriation. If this is indeed the case, the state has an 
obligation to inform the public accordingly. Any statute that proposes a restrictive 
measure which amounts to an expropriation but does not conform to the Junktim-
Klausel will be unconstitutional and void. Regulatory laws obviously do not foresee the 
payment of compensation and as such they do not satisfy the Junktim-Klausel. It is thus 
impossible to award compensation for actions .carried out under their authority. A 
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regulation that forces an extraordinary sacrifice on the property holder cannot be 
transformed into an expropriation and does not qualify for compensation. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht holds the view that the property holder that had to make an 
excessive sacrifice as the result of a regulatory law cannot claim compensation, but has 
to attack the validity of the law. 
Despite the decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht the civil courts insist that their 
approach is justified.103 Decisions of both the Bundesgerichtshof and the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht seem to imply that the special sacrifice required from the 
individual property holder is in conflict with the proportionality principle. The civil courts 
have subsequently made use of the notion of an equalisation right to solve the problem 
in at least some situations. An equalisation claim (Ausg/eichsanspruch) is not based 
on the Grundgesetz, but rather on civil law. In these cases the amount awarded by the 
courts does not amount to compensation for an expropriation, but it serves as an 
instrument to soften the harsh effects of an excessive regulatory measure. 104 The civil 
courts argue that the payment of a sum of money (which is not seen as compensation) 
might reduce the unacceptably heavy burden placed on a single individual. Despite the 
attempts of the civil courts to soften the burden which a regulatory taking places on the 
individual property holder, the official position in German law, according to the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht, is that no compensation is payable for regulatory 
expropriations. 105 The Bundesverfassungsgericht regards expropriations as a limited 
category of limitations that satisfy the requirements of article 14(3). 
All expropriations must be rooted in legislation.106 According to article 14(3) 
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expropriations may only be effected by or pursuant to a law. Expropriations that are 
effected 'by a law' are referred to as statutory expropriations (Legalenteignungen) and 
forms an exceptional category. This category of expropriations are only justified in 
extraordinary circumstances to create a new legal position (for instance the creation of 
new dyke system under government control). 107 Expropriations 'pursua'nt to a law' are 
referred to as administrative expropriations (Administrativenteignungen). This category 
forms the rule. These expropriations are effected by an administrative act in terms of 
a statute. 
Expropriation is only valid if undertaken in the public interest. Van der Walt108 points 
out that the public interest requirement in article 14(3) (zum Wohle der Allgemeinheit)109 
may be interpreted narrowly so that it serves to protect the interests of the individual. 
This has to be distinguished from the wider interpretation in article 14(2) (lnteressen 
der Allgemeinheit)110 and 14(3) (zum Wohle der Allgemeinheif1 1 respectively. The 
wider interpretation serves to protect the public interest. Expropriation will only be 
justified (and valid) if the public purpose for which property is expropriated constitutes 
a public necessity (and is not merely in the public interest). It follows that expropriation 
has to be strictly necessary for a public duty and that not every public action which 
serves the public interest is strictly necessary for the public interest. The public 
necessity has to be such that it takes priority over the guaranteed property rights of an 
107 
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ordinary courts.) My emphasis. 
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individual. The interests of the individual have to be balanced against the public 
interest. The proportionality principle plays an integral part in the determination of the 
justifiability and validity of an expropriation. The public necessity has to be such that 
it justifies the disturbance of the balance between the interests of the individual and that 
of society, and also to justify the fact that the interests of the individual are subjected 
to those of society.112 The scope and intensity of the expropriation must be proportional. 
The expropriation must be the last resort to achieve a particular public purpose. If the 
purpose can be achieved through any other method, the expropriation will be invalid.113 
A total expropriation will only be valid if it serves the public purpose in the long run and 
if the same result cannot be achieved by less restrictive measures (such as a partial 
expropriation). 114 
The sacrifice of the individual interest must serve the public interest directly. 
Expropriation for improper purposes, such as the enrichment of the state, the increase 
of state property or for the benefit of a third party, will be invalid. 115 Expropriations for 
private interests are in principle not allowed, but the Bundesverfassungsgericht has 
allowed private expropriations where the purpose of the private enterprise serves the 
public interest. Expropriation will, however, only be valid if it is in the public interest and 
serves a public necessity116 and not simply personal interests.117 
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8.6 Compensation for expropriation 
The purpose of compensation is not to place the affected party in the hypothetical 
economic position that he/she might have been in had the expropriation not taken place 
(in other words to award full damages as is the case with the determination of damages 
in private law), but rather to replace the expropriated object with the value thereof. The 
aim is to enable the affected individual to replace the object in question with an 
equivalent object. 118 
The nature and extent of compensation have to be determined by statute. 
Compensation can take the form of a monetary payment or it can be compensation in 
natura. The Bundesverfassungsgericht119 pointed out that the expropriating statute 
need not provide a general formula for the calculation of the amount of compensation 
(as is the general trend), but can provide a specified measure if it is justified by the 
nature of the property in question. 
Article 14(3) also states that the compensation must be determined by establishing an 
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. The 
aim of the balancing instruction (Abwagungsgebot) is to reach a fair and just result. The 
balancing instruction provides for flexibility regarding the determination of the amount 
of compensation. Although market value is regarded as the ideal, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht120 made it clear that compensation need not necessarily be 
market value, but may be less than market value. The balancing instruction ensures 
that the quantum of compensation has to reflect a fair balance between the interests 
of the public and the affected individual and nominal compensation will consequently 
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be unconstitutional. 121 Whenever the social interest is such that it outweighs the 
interests of the individual, compensation less than market value will be justified. 
Expropriation to effect land reform may qualify for compensation less than market 
value, provided that this reflects a just and equitable balance. 
Kleyn 122 points out that the equality principle also plays an integral part in the 
determination of compensation and the application of the balancing instruction. 
Because of the fact the affected party has to make a sacrifice, which is not expected 
from others, for the benefit of the public, his/her position has to be balanced not only 
with the interests of society, but also with the position of unaffected parties. The 
equality principle ensures that nominal compensation will not be allowed and as a 
general rule it does not justify compensation lower than market value. 
All relevant factors have to taken into account when the amount of compensation is 
determined.123 As far as land is concerned, the location and use thereof can be taken 
into account. The extent of own contributions will also have a bearing on the quantum. 
Where the value of property is the result of the holder's own efforts, compensation 
should be set at market value, but where the state partially contributed to the value of 
the property, compensation may be less than market value. 124 
8. 7 Conclusion 
The traditional private-law view of property as a hierarchical system of concepts, and 
with that the conceptual approach to property rights in general, is relativised by the 
Grundgesetz and the system of judicial review. Property is interpreted within a 
constitutional context in which the social function of property is emphasised. In this 
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context property is afforded a wider interpretation than in private law. Whereas 
corporeal things play a central role in private law, a wide range of different rights and 
interests are afforded constitutional protection. Within· the framework of the 
Grundgesetz property is guaranteed as a fundamental right which is meant to secure 
for the inqividual an area of personal liberty in the patrimonial sphere, to enable him/her 
to take responsibility for his/her own life. This has to take place within the larger social 
context. The personal space and freedom created by the property guarantee must be 
utilised to assist in the formation of the whole social and economic order. To ensure 
this the Grundgesetz determines that constitutional property entails obligations and that 
its use must serve the public interest. 
The social function of property is also accentuated whenever the individual's property 
rights are limited. Constitutional property is not absolute, but relative in the sense that 
the limitation of property forms part of the concept of constitutional property. In terms 
of the proportionality principle any limitation or restriction of individual property rights 
by the state has to reflect an equitable balance between the interest of the affected 
individual and the public interest. 
The fact that the traditional view of property, as well as the conceptual approach to 
property, is relativised by the effect of the Grundgesetz and judicial review, creates the 
possibility for the social function of ownership to play a more prominent role in the 
creation and protection of individual property and property institutions. 
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9 
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
9.1 Introduction 
The Constitution of the United States of America includes the oldest written guarantee 
of individual property against unjustified interference by the state. It has been used as 
an example for the protection of private property in numerous other jurisdictions and 
has influenced the manner in which the property question has been dealt with in many 
other countries. The American property clause has been the subject of a vast number 
of cases, and in this chapter special attention is paid to the manner in which the 
Supreme Court has interpreted and applied the property clause in the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
The analysis of the property clause in the Constitution of the United States of America 
serves as an example of how the property question is dealt with in a common law 
system. It is trite that, whereas the civil law resolves legal questions in terms of general 
principles, common law solves each individual case in terms of a casuistic approach 
to law. In the United States the emergence of legal realism in the early twentieth 
century had a decisive influence on the way in which cases are adjudicated. 1 Legal 
realism aimed to achieve efficiency and social justice by interpreting and understanding 
legal rules in terms of their social consequences. Legal rules and abstract concepts 
were regarded as tentative classifications of decisions reached in other cases, and as 
such they are of limited use in predicting judicial decisions. The legal realists wanted 
to make judicial decisions more predictable by focusing on both the specific facts of 
cases and social reality in general, rather than on legal doctrine. Singer2 describes 
legal realism as follows: 
2 
See in general Singer 1988 California LR467; Singer 1982 Wisconsin LR 975; Grey 1989 
Stanford LR 787; Fisher, Horwitz and Reed American Legal Realism i. 
Singer 1988 California LR 467 at 4 7 4. 
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"[t]he legal realist wanted to replace formalism with a pragmatic attitude 
toward law generally. This attitude treats law as made, not found. Law 
therefore is, and must be, based on human experience,· policy and ethics, 
rather than formal logic. Legal principles are not inherent in some 
universal, timeless logical system; they are social constructs, designed 
by people in specific historical and social contexts for specific purposes 
to achieve specific ends". 
Contrary to the position in South Africa, Germany and the Netherlands, the realist focus 
on policy and politics meant that the US law moved away from formalism and an 
abstract legal science to a certain extent. More attention is paid to policy and the social 
and political function of property. 
Although general trends can be deduced from the different judgments of the Supreme 
Court concerning property, very few clear principles exist according to which the 
outcome of future cases can be predicted. Due to the influence of legal realism in US 
law, the different personal convictions and jurisprudential approaches to the protection 
and limitation of property of the Supreme Court judges had a more direct influence on 
the type of judgments delivered by the court than in jurisdictions where a formalist 
approach is followed. 3 
Property and the protection thereof form an integral part of the American society and 
the free market system. The treatment of property by the Supreme Court reflects the 
inherent tension which exists between the protection and the limitation of property 
rights. 4 On the one hand property has to be protected as the cornerstone of the free 
market system, but on the other hand the limitation of property is necessitated by 
3 
4 
See in this regard Radin Reinterpreting Property 120 et seq where different philosophical 
approaches to the protection and limitation of property are discussed. 
See the discussion in 9.3 below. Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Can J Law & Jur 161 
especially at 185 et seq suggests that the inconsistencies in US takings jurisprudence can 
be ascribed to the fact that the courts have trouble in dealing with the inherent tension 
between the protection of property on the one hand and the limitation thereof on the other. 
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policy, social programmes and other measures to ensure that property serves the 
common good. 
In general and on the surface the treatment of property in the property clause by the 
American courts is similar to that of most other (Western) jurisdictions. Private property 
is protected and provision is made for the deprivation or regulation and expropriation 
of property for a public purpose. In the case of expropriation, the payment of 
compensation is compulsory. The distinguishing characteristic in the treatment of the 
property question in the United States of America is the fact that compensation is paid 
for all takings, and not only for expropriations. Takings is a wide category and includes 
not only the narrow category of expropriation or actual acquisition of property by the 
state, but also regulatory takings or inverse condemnations, and the destruction of 
property without the state acquiring the property. 
In this chapter the nature an extent of the property guarantee in US law, the 
requirements for valid deprivations and takings, and the payment of compensation is 
looked at. 
9.2 The property guarantee 
The property guarantee in the Constitution of the United States of America ( 1787) is to 
be found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fifth Amendment (1791) states 
that: 
"[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, ... nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without just compensation". 
The protection of property on a federal level was extended to the different states in 
1868 in the Fourteenth Amendment: 
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"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws". 
The property clause may be divided into two separate parts: the due process clause 
and the takings clause. The due process clause regulates the regulation of property 
and ensures that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. 
The takings clause (in the Fifth Amendment) determines that the taking of property is 
only permissible for public use and against the payment of compensation. The takings 
clause in the Fifth Amendment is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment via the 
due process clause and so applied to the individual states. The guarantee of property 
is formulated negatively in the Fifth Amendment to ensure that the individual is 
protected against unwarranted interferences with his/her property by the state.5 
The fact that property is guaranteed does not imply that the state may never interfere 
with an individual's property. There are authors who hold the opinion that property is 
inviolate and that every (or any) state interference amounts to an expropriation of 
property, 6 but this view is not generally accepted. 7 It is held in general that the state has 
the power to interfere with private property in terms of its power of eminent domain and 
its police power:8 firstly the state has the authority to take property for public use 
(provided that the affected party is compensated) in terms of its power of eminent 
domain; and secondly, the state may deprive an ir:ldividual of property or specific uses 
or entitlements thereof in terms of its regulatory police power (the state does not have 
5 
6 
7 
8 
See Michelman 1981 Wash & Lee LR 1097at1099. 
See in this regard Epstein Takings: Private property and the power of eminent domain. 
Radin Reinterpreting property 120 et seq. 
For a general discussion on the historical development of the theory of eminent domain 
see Taggart in Forsyth and Hare The golden metwand and the crooked cord 91 et seq. 
Also see Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter 
on the United States of America; Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 at 396. 
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an obligation to compensate in the case of a deprivation9). 
Any interference by the state with private property (whether in terms of the power of 
eminent domain or the police power) has to comply with the requirements of the due 
process clause. The exact meaning of the due process clause has for many years been 
(and to some extent still is) a major point of contention in US law. It is generally 
accepted that the due process clause guarantees the adherence to procedural 
requirements. This position was, however, not always as clear and certain. The case 
of Lochner v New York10 applied the concept of substantive due process according to 
which the court reserved for itself the right to review the reasonableness and wisdom 
of the intended state action and the purpose or aim that the state wished to achieve 
through such action. In terms of the substantive due process test there has to be a 
reasonable link between the intended aim of legislation and the means employed to 
achieve the aim. In this case the court struck down legislation which limited the working 
hours of workers in bakeries, because it was felt that any limitation of the individual's 
right to sell his/her labour amounted to an unreasonable limitation of the individual's 
right to liberty. The court formulated the test for substantive due process as follows: 
"[i]s this a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power 
of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary 
interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty? ... The 
act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, and the end 
itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can be held to be 
valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in 
9 
10 
The general view that the state is not obliged to compensate for a deprivation or regulation 
in terms of the police power was qualified in Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon 260 US 393 
(1922). Also see 9.5 below. See in general Sax 1964 Yale LJ 36 et seq where a distinction 
is made between different kinds of interferences with property in terms of the state's police 
power to regulate the use of property. The distinction is made between interferences in 
terms of the state's 'enterprise' capacity (for which compensation has to be paid) and its 
'public' power (for which no compensation is payable). 
198 us 45 (1905). 
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his person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor". 11 
During the years after the Lochner decision (the era of Lochnerism) numerous laws 
aimed at the improvement of social and welfare conditions were struck down on the 
basis of substantive due process. This led to a political battle between Congress and 
the Supreme Court, mainly because the court frustrated Roosevelt's New Deal 
programme. The court eventually abandoned its stance on substantive due process in 
West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish. 12 It has been suggested that the decisions in Nol/an v 
California Coastal Commission13 and Dolan v City of Tigarc/1 4 reintroduced a muted form 
of substantive due process. However, the approach followed in these cases seems to 
be much more cautious and does not aim to judge the political wisdom of government 
action. It merely amounts to an inquiry into the proportionality between the regulations 
and the state interest it aims to promote.15 
The power of eminent domain and the police power may not be exercised without valid 
justification. An interference with private property will only be valid if the state exercises 
its power for the promotion of the common good or interests of the general public. The 
Fifth Amendment determines that an interference, whether it qualifies as a deprivation 
or a taking, has to be for a public use. The 'public use' requirement has always been 
interpreted widely by the Supreme Court to mean public purpose (which includes public 
use). It was stated in Berman v Parker16 that the concept of public welfare is broad and 
inclusive.17 In this case the owner's property (a department store in a slum area) was 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
198 US 45 (1905) at 56 et seq. 
333 US 379 (1937). Also see Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative 
analysis chapter on the United States of America. 
483 us 825 (1987). 
114 S Ct2309 (1994). 
Alexander 1996 J Leg Ed 586 at 592 et seq; Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 at 403; Van 
der Walt The constitutional property clause 11 O; Singer 1997 SAPL 53 at 64 et seq. 
348 us 26 (1954). 
348 US 26 (1954) at 32. 
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condemned as part of a project to clear up a slum and redevelop the area. The property 
was sold to a private developer and the owner argued that this did not constitute a 
public use. It was held that 'public use' should be read as 'public purpose' and that 
Congress should be allowed a wide discretion to determine which state actions would 
fall within the ambit of 'public purpose' .18 This approach was confirmed in Hawaii 
Housing Authority v Midkiff. 19 In this case property was taken and transferred to the 
lessees of the land in an effort to effect a more equitable distribution of land in Hawaii. 
The Supreme Court found the taking of property in this case to be in promotion of a 
public purpose. The concept of 'public use' is clearly interpreted wide enough to include 
the taking of property from one individual to transfer it to another individual.20 
9.3 The scope of constitutional property 
Due to the fact that no sharp division is made in Anglo-American legal systems 
between private and public law, the scope of property has always been wider in Anglo-
American jurisdictions than in Roman-Germanic jurisdictions. Property is not restricted 
to tangible objects, as is the case in (private law in) Roman-Germanic jurisdictions.21 
Property in the US has always included both tangible and intangible objects, but since 
the 1960's the scope of property has been extended even further to include a wide 
range of interests against the state. The impetus for this extension was the now famous 
article by Charles Reich22 on 'new property' in which he argued that the creation of the 
welfare state necessitated the recognition and protection of certain interests against the 
state as property. According to Reich the rise of the welfare state created a situation 
where citizens' estates were no longer mainly dependent on ownership of physical 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
348 US 26 (1954) at 32 et seq. 
467 US 229 (1984). For a discussion of this case see chapter 13. 
For a discussion see Taggart in Forsyth and Hare The golden metwand and the crooked 
cord 91 at 99 et seq. But see Rubenfeld 1993 Yale LJ 1077 et seq who argues that the 
'public use' requirements should be interpreted strictly, so that only takings that are for a 
public use will require compensation. 
For a discussion see Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 37 et seq. 
Reich 1964 Yale LJ 733. 
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objects, but comprised much more of interests in state largesse in the form of licenses, 
pensions, jobs, benefits, contracts, subsidies, housing and so on. These new forms of 
property needed to be included in the notion of property and protected as such. 
Welfare benefits were first recognised as property in Goldberg v Kelly. 23 Brennan J 
stated in his decision that: 24 
"[s]uch benefits are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified 
to receive them. Their termination involves state action that adjudicates 
important rights. The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an 
argument that public assistance benefits are 'a privilege' and not a 'right"'. 
Any interference with these benefits must comply with the due process requirement, 
and 
" ... consideration of what procedures due process may require must begin 
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function 
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by 
governmental action".25 
A wide range of participatory claims and welfare rights have since been recognised as 
property and have been afforded constitutional protection in US law. In order to 
determine whether a particular interest qualifies as property in terms of the due process 
clause, the court formulated the following test in Logan v Zimmermann Brush Co: 26 
23 
24 
25 
26 
397 us 254 (1970). 
397 US 254 (1970) at 262. He continues in a footnote, with reference to Reich, to stress 
that welfare entitlements are regarded much more like property than a gratuity. See 397 
US 254 (1970) at 262 n 8. Also see Alexander 1982 Co/ LR 1545 at 1547 et seq; 
Michelman 1987 Iowa LR 1319 at 1322 et seq. 
397 US 254 (1970) at 263. 
455 US 422 (1981) at430. 
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"[t]he hallmark of property, the Court has emphasized, is an individual 
entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except for 
'just cause' .... Once that characteristic is found, the· types of interests 
protected as 'property' are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating 
'to the whole domain of social and economic fact"'. 
The interests which have been recognised as property include, amongst others, a 
driver's licence,27 state employment,28 medical benefits,29 welfare benefits,30 high school 
education,31 continued service by a public utility, 32 the expectation to be granted 
tenure,33 a horse trainer's licence34 and a prisoner's good time credits. 35 It is, however, 
important to note that all these interests were granted constitutional protection in terms 
of the due process clause. This does not mean that these interests necessarily qualify 
as property, for all interests (whether it is a property interest or not) enjoy the protection 
of due process. The question which remains to be answered is whether compensation 
will be paid where these interests in welfare rights are expropriated. It is generally 
accepted that a much stricter interpretation is applied as far as the takings clause is 
concerned, but this stricter interpretation has not yet been applied in case law. 36 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
Bell v Burson 402 US 535 (1970). 
ConnellvHiggenbotham403 US 207 (1971); Bishop v Wood426 US 341 (1976); Arnett 
v Kennedy416 US 134 (1975). 
Mathews v Eldridge 424 US 319 (1976) . 
• 
Goldberg v Kelly 397 US 261 (1970). 
Goss v Lopez 419 US 565 (1975). 
Memphis Ught, Gas and Water v Graft 436 US 1 (1977). 
Perry v Sindermann 408 US 593 (1971); Board of Regents v Roth 408 US 564 (1971). 
Barry v Barchi 443 US 55 (1979). 
Wolffv McDonnell 418 US 539 (1974). 
Nedelsky Private property and the limits of American constitutionalism: the Madisonian 
framework and its /egacy242 et seq; Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 40; 
Simon 1986 stan LR 1431 et seq; Simon 1985 Maryland LR 1 et seq; Alexander 1982 Co/ 
LR 1545 et seq; Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 at 406. Also compare the German situation 
as far as the expropriation of welfare rights are concerned. See 8.3.3. Three requirements 
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It is pointed out by Alexander37 that the apparent extension of the property concept to 
include 'new property' for constitutional purposes has the effect that the initial inquiry 
as to the nature of the interest in question is often not carried out. Instead of first asking 
whether a specific interest actually qualifies as property or not, the process is focused 
exclusively on the issues of due process and compensation. In terms of this approach 
the protectibility of an interest is dependent on its relationship to the concepts of due 
process and compensation. According to Alexander:38 
" ... scholars in the new mode agree that an interest's protectibility is 
ultimately determined not by its status as property or nonproperty, but by 
its relation to the theory of substantive values attributed to the concepts 
of just compensation or due process". 
Underkuffler-Freund39 points out that the threshold question (whether a specific interest 
qualify as property or not) is most crucial. Without answering this question it is 
impossible to determine whether the interest has indeed been taken. The Supreme 
Court, however, usually glosses over this question and immediately continues to 
investigate the issues of due process and compensation. No clear articulation of the 
shape, contours or other identifying characteristics of the constitutional concept of 
property is to be found in the decisions of the Supreme Court. This leads to the 
interesting question whether 'new property' is actually regarded as property in terms of 
US law. Although 'new property' has been afforded protection in terms of the due 
process clause, it has never been dealt with or.recognised as property in terms of the 
takings clause, and as was pointed out above the question remains whether the courts 
37 
38 
39 
are set in German law for a public law right to qualify as constitutionally protected property: 
The right in question must be separated from state control and must be acquired by the 
individual; it must be based on substantial contributions of the holder of the right; and it 
must serve to ensure the holder's survival or existence. 
Alexander 1982 Col LR 1545 at 1550 et seq. Also see Van der Walt The constitutional 
property clause 40 et seq; Underkuffler-Freund 1996 The Can J Law & Jur 161at165. 
Alexander 1982 Col LR 1545 at 1552. 
Underkuffler-Freund 1996 The Can J Law & Jur 161 at 165. Also see Van der Walt The 
constitutional property clause 41 et seq. 
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will award compensation in the case where these rights are taken. The implication of 
this approach is that the courts do not focus on the concept or definition of property. 
Underkuffler-Freund40 suggests that the inconsistencies in takings jurisprudence are 
directly related to the fact that the courts work with two different perceptions of property, 
but they are not able to make a clear distinction between the nature and implications 
of each perception. In terms of the one perception property is that which demarcates 
the boundaries between the individual's sphere of autonomy and control and that of 
collective power, and the other is that which describes property as the way in which a 
particular dispute between the interests of the individual and the public has been 
solved at a specific moment, but which incorporates within the concept of property itself 
the tension between the individual and the collective as well as the possibility of 
change. In terms of the second perception the ever-existing tension between the 
individual and the collective is internal to the concept of property. The extension of the 
constitutional concept of property has the effect (as was pointed out above) that the 
actual content of the concept of property (the threshold question) is passed over and 
attention is mainly focused on substantive issues of the justification of particular 
· limitations. By approaching the property question in this manner the inevitable tension 
between the individual and the collective is brought from outside the concept of 
property to inside. The tension between the individual and the collective and the 
attempts to create a balance between these conflicting interests thus form part of the 
concept of property. According to Van der Walt41 this characteristically constitutional 
perception of the concept of property has the implication that the inclusion of a 
particular right in the protection of the property qlause will not necessarily imply that 
private property is privileged over the public interest. The court will also not disallow 
a specific right protection in terms of the property clause on the grounds of the 
conceptualist approach to the concept of property, but will rather proceed to look into 
the substantive issues which are raised in the second stage of the constitutional 
dispute. 
40 Underkuffler-Freund 1996 Can J Law & Jur 161 especially at 185 et seq. 
41 Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 41 et seq. 
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Another interesting characteristic of the post-Realist concept of property is the fact that 
property is described as a bundle of rights.42 The question arose in US case law 
whether the state's interference with one strand of the bundle of the property rights 
without destroying the property right as a whole constitutes a taking. Radin43 describes 
this practice as conceptual severance and explains it as follows: 44 
"[t]his strategy I shall call 'conceptual severance'. To apply conceptual 
severance one delineates a property interest consisting of just what the 
government action has removed from the owner, and then asserts that 
that particular whole thing has been permanently taken. Thus, this 
strategy hypothetically or conceptually 'severs' from the whole bundle of 
rights just those strands that are interfered with by the regulation, and 
then hypothetically or conceptually construes those strands in the 
aggregate as a separate whole thing". 
Conceptual severance was initially rejected in a few cases. In Penn Central 
Transportation Co v New York City45 the court found that: 
"'[t]akings' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete 
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment 
have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular 
42 
43 
44 
45 
In terms of the 'bundle of rights' perception of property, the different rights and entitlements 
connected with a specific object are seen as separate and independent property interests. 
This perception of property is a move away from the notion of thing-ownership. The 
different entitlements are disconnected from the 'thing' and treated as individual property 
interests. See in general Grey in Pennock and Chapman Property 69. Although the 
'bundle of rights' perception of property originated in common law, it acquired a different 
meaning due to the influence of the legal realists. For a discussion of the legal realism 
approach to property in general see Singer 1988 California LR 467; Singer 1982 
Wisconsin LR 975; Grey 1989 stanford LR 787; Fisher, Horwitz and Reed American Legal 
Realismi. 
Radin Reinterpreting property 120 and especially at 126 et seq. 
Radin Reinterpreting property 126. 
438 US 104 (1987) at 130. Also see Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v 
DeBenedictis 480 US 470 (1987). 
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governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both 
on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the 
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole". 
Conceptual severance has, however, been accepted in a number of cases. The right 
to exclude, especially, has been accepted as a very important strand in the bundle of 
rights that make up ownership and an interference with the owner's right to exclude can 
constitute a taking. Conceptual severance with reference to the owner's right to exclude 
was applied in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp, 46 Kaiser Aetna v United 
States,47 Nol/an v California Coastal Commission48 and Dolan v City of Tigard. 49 It was 
held in Nol/an v California Coastal Commission50 that: 
"[t]o say that the appropriation on a public easement across the 
landowner's premises does not constitute the taking of a property interest 
but rather 'a mere restriction on its use', ... is to use words in a manner 
that deprives them of all their ordinary meaning ... We have repeatedly 
held that, as to property reserved by its owner for private use, 'the right 
to exclude [other is] 'one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of 
rights that are commonly characterized as property". 51 
In Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp52 the court found that a taking of the 
right to exclude, by means of a permanent physical occupation of the property or a part 
thereof, is such a clear example of a taking that it will always be regarded as a taking, 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
458 us 419 (1982). 
444 us 164 (1979). 
483 us 825 (1987). 
114 S Ct 2309 (1994). 
483 US 825 (1987) at 831. 
This statement was made with reference to Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp 
458 US 419 (1982) and Kaiser Aetna v United States 444 US 164 (1979). 
458 us 419 (1982). 
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no matter how insignificant the invasion or how important the public purpose served by 
such a physical occupation. The taking of the right to exclude was also held to be a 
compensable taking in Kaiser Aetna v United States.53 In this case a pond on private 
property was dredged by the owners. They created a marina on the pond and opened 
it up to into a navigable bay. It was claimed by the Army Corps of Engineers that the 
owners could no longer exclude the public from the marina, because since it has been 
opened up into a navigable bay, it became part of navigable water and is subject to the 
navigational servitude of the United States government. The Supreme Court, however, 
held that the dredged pond has always been considered private property and as such 
it should not be treated any different from fast land adjacent to navigable water, and 
consequently that: 
"the 'right to exclude', so universally held to be a fundamental element of 
the property right, falls within this category of interests that the 
Government cannot take without compensation. This is not a case in 
which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that 
will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioner's private property; 
rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will 
result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina". 54 
In these cases it was found that an infringement of the right to exclude may effect a 
taking, but it was emphasised that this will only be the case where there is no sufficient 
relation between the restriction of the right to exclude and the purpose served by the 
restriction. Conceptual severance has also been applied with reference to the best use 
of the land in question55 and the right to pass property to one's heirs. 56 
53 444 us 164 (1979). 
54 444 US 164 (1979) at 179 et seq. 
55 See for instance Agins v City of Tiburon 447 US 255 (1980). 
56 Hodel v Irving 481 US 704 (1987). 
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9.4 Deprivation of property 
It is generally accepted that the property guarantee does not .imply that an owner has 
the unrestricted use of his/her property, but that the owner's rights may be limited by 
the state. This section deals specifically with deprivation of property by way of 
regulation. This category of interferences with private property do not normally amount 
to or constitute takings, and consequently no compensation is due to the affected 
individuals. Deprivations that restrict the owner's rights to such an extent that they 
amount to takings (for which compensation is required) are discussed in the section on 
takings. 
It is common cause that the state may regulate the use of property in terms of its police 
power to promote or protect the public interest.57 In Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty 
Co58 the court explained and justified the increased necessity of regulation as follows: 
"(u]ntil recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but, with great 
increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and 
constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require, 
additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private 
lands in urban communities ... And in this there is no inconsistency, for, 
while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of 
their application must expand or contract to meet new and different 
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. 
. . . But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to the 
meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes and 
ordinances, which after giving due weight to the new conditions, are 
found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of course, must fall...The 
ordinance now under review, and all similar laws and regulations, must 
57 
58 
See in general Sax 1964 Yale LJ 36 et seq. But see Epstein Takings: private property and 
the power of eminent domain. 
272 US 365 (1926) at 386 et seq. 
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find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the 
public welfare. The line which in this field separates the legitimate from 
the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise 
delimitation. It varies with circumstances and conditions". 
There are no clear rules to indicate or determine whether a specific deprivation of 
property will be constitutionally valid. In general the state has to comply with the due 
process requirement and has to prove that the deprivation is effected in the public 
interest, but it was stated in Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York59 that 
the determination of whether a taking of property was effected involves an essentially 
ad hoc inquiry into the circumstances and conditions of each individual case. As long 
as the regulation in question serves the public interest and does not impose 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious restrictions on an individual property owner, the 
regulation will be regarded as a valid exercise of the police power.60 In order to 
determine whether a specific regulation complies with the principles of reasonableness 
and fairness the court has to look at both the benefit the effect of the restriction confers 
on all property owners in that specific area, and the severity of the burden placed on 
the individual owner by such a restriction. 61 
Although the Fifth Amendment does not specifically mention the public interest 
requirement in connection to deprivations of property, this requirement has been 
emphasised and explained in a number of cases. In general this requirement 
determines that any state interference with private property has to be in the public 
interest for it to be constitutionally valid. In Penn Central Transportation Co v New York 
City62 the court recognised the fact that the state has to implement laws which may 
negatively affect certain economic values connected with an individual's property or 
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even destroy it, but as long as these laws act to protect the health, safety, morals or 
general welfare of the public, these laws will be constitutionally valid. The public 
interest requirement was also mentioned in Agins v City of Tiburon: 63 
"[t]he application of a general zoning law to a particular property effects 
a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state 
interests". 
Regulatory measures which aim to control a public nuisance are generally not regarded 
as takings. It is argued that any use of the property which causes a public nuisance 
never formed part of the owner's entitlements in the first place and therefore measures 
to prohibit such a use of the property do not take any property right from the owner and 
consequently no compensation will be payable in such a case. 64 
It was stated in Prune Yard Shopping Center v Robins65 that in order for a regulation to 
be constitutionally valid, it must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. In Nol/an 
v California Coastal Commission66 the court confirmed the principle that land use 
regulation (in particular zoning and town planning) falls within the ambit of the state's 
police power, as long as these regulatory measures do not deprive the owner of all 
viable economic use of his/her property. The court also set out the test for a reasonable 
deprivation. In the first place the court has to determine whether there is an 'essential 
nexus' between the conditions imposed by the regulating body and the legitimate state 
interest it sought to promote. After the 'essential nexus' is established, the court will 
63 
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look into the nature of the relationship between the imposed conditions and the effects 
of the permission for a certain land use. In Dolan v City of Tigara67 the court had to deal 
mainly with the second part of the test, namely the nature of the relationship between 
the restriction and the proposed development. The court stated that if it can be found 
that there is a 'reasonable relationship' between the regulatory measure or condition 
and the expected effects of the development, the regulatory condition will be 
constitutionally valid. The court, however, explicitly stated that it prefers to refer to this 
test as the 'rough proportionality test', because it best describes the requirement of the 
Fifth Amendment. The process of determining whether a relation of rough 
proportionality exists between the imposed condition and the purpose which the 
condition aims to achieve does not require a mathematical calculation. However, the 
city has to make some sort of individualised determination that the required dedication 
is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. 
The court has, however, also indicated that the police power of the state may not be 
abused in order to force an individual to make some sort of sacrifice in return for a 
specific land use permission, even if the sacrifice is clearly beneficial to the broader 
public. For a regulatory measure to be valid there has to be a clear relation between 
the restriction or the sacrifice of certain property rights and the purpose of the 
restriction. After a reasonable nexus has been found, the court will continue to 
determine whether there is a rough proportionality between the restriction or sacrifice 
and the expected effect of the permission of a specific land use. An example of this 
principle is to be found in Dolan v City of Tigard. 68 In this case the owner of a piece of 
property applied for permission to extend her stor:e and to pave the adjacent parking 
lot. The permission was granted subject to the condition that the owner dedicate a 
portion of her land for a public greenway along a creek in order to minimise flooding 
that would be exacerbated by the proposed development, and also for a pedestrian and 
bicycle pathway to relieve traffic congestion in the city. The court found that there was 
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indeed a clear nexus between the restriction and the purpose it aims to achieve, 
namely to reduce the risk of flooding and the increase in traffic. The second part of the 
test (the rough proportionality test), however, proved to be the determining factor in this 
case. The court had to determine whether there was a rough proportionality between 
the restriction and the expected effects of the proposed development. The court found 
that the condition to dedicate a part of the property for the creation of a public 
greenway and a pathway was clearly disproportionate to the possible effects of the 
development. Not only would the greenway have infringed on the owner's right to 
exclude the public from her property, but there was no logical reason why the flooding 
problem had to be addressed by the creation of such a greenway. Furthermore, there 
was also no clear indication that the pathway would indeed have reduced the expected 
increase in traffic volume. Thus, the city was not allowed to disguise some condition or 
sacrifice as a regulatory control over the use of property, even if the sacrifice proves 
to be loosely in the public interest. 69 
It is still uncertain whether the decisions in Nol/an v California Coastal Commission70 
and Dolan v City of Tigard71 introduced a new era of heightened review in US law. It has 
been suggested that these decisions may be seen as reintroducing a muted form of 
substantive due process. It is, however, a much more cautious approach than the one 
followed in the Lochner era. 72 Here the court does not evaluate the wisdom of 
government actions, but merely requires that there should be a reasonable nexus 
between the measures imposed by the regulating body and the legitimate state interest 
it sought to promote, and a rough proportionality between the regulatory measure or 
condition and the expected effects of the development. An inquiry into the 
proportionality of a limitation is not the same as substantive due process. Although both 
inquiries deal with the process by with limitations are imposed, the proportionality 
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inquiry is aimed at the constitutional justifiability of the limitation and not at the political 
wisdom of the policy decision which motivates the imposition of the limitation. 
The deprivation of property by the state in terms of its police power may have a severe 
effect on the individual property owner. The deprivation may even go so far as to 
destroy the property completely. In Miller v Schoene73 the court found that the 
destruction of one kind of property in order to save or preserve another kind of property 
will be constitutionally valid as long as it can be proved that the collective interest is 
served by such an action. In this case the owner of a number of cedar trees was 
ordered to cut them down to prevent the spreading of a plant disease to apple orchards 
in the vicinity. The court found that this set of facts did not involve a conflict between 
private owners, but that the public had a definite interest in this regard. 
9.5 Expropriation of property 
In terms of the Fifth Amendment the state may take private property, against 
compensation, for public use. This exercise of the state's power of eminent domain will 
only be legitimate if it is used to promote the public interest. A taking in order to 
advance some private interest will be illegitimate, even if it is accompanied by just 
compensation. 
In general each takings case is approached separately and is based on an 'essentially 
ad hoc, factual inquiry'.74 Alexander, 75 however, points out that the method of the court 
is not entirely without formality. In essence the court's analysis of a takings case is 
centred around three questions: (a) has property been taken by the state?; (b) if so, 
was this done to effect some public purpose?; and (c) if so, has the state provided just 
compensation for the property it has taken? The first of these three questions seems 
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to be the one that has been at the centre of the whole takings issue in US law. 
Initially the takings clause only affected actual expropriation~ (acquisition of property 
by the state), but this situation has been complicated since the judgement in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon. 76 In this case Holmes J stated that an exercise of the 
police power to regulate the use of property becomes a taking when 'it goes too far'. 77 
A regulatory measure (deprivation of property) that 'goes too far' is described as a 
regulatory taking (sometimes referred to as an inverse condemnation), and in terms of 
the judgment in Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon compensation is due for any such 
excessive exercise of the police power. It was not explained exactly when a regulatory 
measure will be regarded as going too far, and this has been the cause of much of the 
debate surrounding the takings clause. In principle, this type of cases are approached 
as ad hoc, factual inquiries, and in essence the court attempts to determine whether an 
individual is forced by the state to carry a burden which ought to be carried by society 
at large. 78 If so, the particular state action constitutes a regulatory taking and the 
individual will accordingly be entitled to just compensation. 
In Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York'9 the court identified three factors 
which have to be taken into account in an attempt to determine whether the state action 
in question effects a taking: (a) the character of the government action; (b) the 
diminution of the value of the affected property; and (c) the extent of interference in 
reasonable, investment backed expectations. The central principle of the three-factor 
test is whether the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of 
an exercise of state power in the public interest. This inquiry will necessarily require a 
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weighing of private and public interests.80 This principle also aims to bar the state from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.81 
Since the three-factor test has been introduced in Penn Central Transportation Co v 
City of New York, three distinct categories of regulations which will always qualify as 
takings have been identified by the courts. These so-called 'per se' takings will always 
require the payment of compensation and no case specific inquiry into the possible 
advancement of the public interest or the possible effect on the owner is required. The 
'per se' takings include regulations which (a) force the owner to suffer a permanent 
physical invasion of his/her property; (b) deny the owner of all economically viable use 
of the property; or (c) extinguish one of the core property rights. 82 It is interesting to 
note that while the court proclaims that takings cases are examined by engaging in 
essentially ad hoc factual inquiries83 and that no set formula exists according to which 
it can determine whether a specific public action requires the payment of 
compensation,84 the court nevertheless searches for and identifies fixed rules and 
principles according to which takings cases can be adjudicated.85 
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The first and certainly the most well-known category of regulatory measures that 
qualifies as a 'per se' taking is a permanent physical invasion.86 In Loretto v 
Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp87 the court held that a regulatory law which 
required certain landlords to permit the installation of television cables on their 
properties without compensation was a taking. The court recognised the fact that the 
intrusion on the property would be minimal and that the public interest would be served 
by such an installation (both educational and community interests), but the court viewed 
the physical invasion to be of such a serious nature that it regarded it as a taking. In 
fact, any permanent physical invasion of private property, no matter how insignificant, 
will be held to be a taking. 88 It is pointed out in Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan~9 
with reference to Kaiser Aetna v United States,90 that a physical invasion of private 
property actually constitutes a taking of the owner's right to exclude, a right which is 
regarded as one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of property rights. In fact, the 
court stated that a regulation which compels the owner to suffer a physical invasion 
actually chops right through the bundle of rights that make up property ownership, 
taking a slice from every strand. The court further stated that the actual size of the 
invasion is not determinative, because the owner cannot be expected to suffer, without 
compensation, an invasion and occupation of his/her property by a stranger, especially 
when he/she has no control over the timing, nature or extent of the invasion.91 
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The rule that a permanent physical invasion of property is always to be regarded a 
taking for which the payment of compensation is due, was criticised in a dissenting 
opinion92 because it seemed to be in conflict with the principle that there is no set 
formula to determine whether compensation is required for a deprivation of property, 
and that every case should be judged individually. Physical invasions of property have 
nevertheless been accepted as 'per se' takings and compensation will always have to 
be paid in such cases. 93 
The court has, however, recognised exceptions to the physical invasion principle. In 
Prune Yard Shopping Center v Robins94 the court held that a state law which compelled 
the owner of a shopping centre to allow the public to enter the shopping centre to 
exercise their right to free speech (hand out literature and collect signatures) did not 
effect a taking of the owner's property. Although this may resemble a physical invasion, 
the fact that the shopping centre was opened to the general public and the fact that the 
owner was free to introduce measures to control the time, place and manner of the 
expressive activities, the actions of the petitioners cannot be described as a physical 
invasion of the property. 95 The owner also failed to prove that the exclusion of certain 
people from the shopping centre was so essential to the economic value and use of the 
property that the state law amounted to a taking. In Yee v City of Escondido96 the owner 
of a mobile home park claimed that the state's anti-eviction legislation constituted a 
taking in that the owner of such a park was not allowed to terminate the mobile home 
owners' rental of space. The court, however, held that: 
" 
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compensation is required only if considerations such as the purpose of 
the regulation or the extent to which it deprives the owner of the 
economic use of the property suggest that the regulation has unfairly 
singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by 
the public as a whole". 97 
The court stated that an owner was not normally compelled to suffer a physical invasion 
of property, but that this principle was not threatened here because the property was 
rented out voluntarily. The right to exclude was thus not taken from the owner in this 
instance. The state law did no more than regulate the relationship between landlord 
and tenant. The court also reiterated the fact that the different states may enact 
measures to regulate the relationship between landlord and tenant without paying 
compensation for all economic injuries incurred as a result of such measures.98 
The second of the 'per se' takings or redline rules where a regulation will be regarded 
as a taking without a case specific inquiry, is those instances where the owner of 
property is denied all economically viable use of the property.99 In Lucas v South 
Carolina Coastal Counci/100 the court stated that: 
" ... the functional basis for permitting the government, by regulation, to 
affect property values without compensation . . . does not apply to the 
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relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a landowner 
of all economically beneficial uses". 
In this case Lucas bought two beachfront properties on which he planned to erect 
family homes. The adjacent properties all had similar buildings built on them already. 
After Lucas bought these properties, the state enacted legislation which prevented the 
erection of permanent structures on the property. It was argued that the legislation acts 
to serve the public interest by protecting the environment. The Supreme Court found 
that the effect of state action which denies the owner of all economically viable use of 
his/her property is not dissimilar to a physical invasion of property. 101 Requiring that the 
land be left in its natural state for the benefit of the public, and thereby denying to the 
owner all productive and beneficial use, carries the increased risk that the private 
owner has to sacrifice his/her property for some public service under the guise of the 
prevention of public harm. 102 Thus, the court found that: 
" ... when the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all 
economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to 
leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking". 103 
It will only be possible to deprive the owner of all economically beneficial use without 
compensation if it can be proved that the proscribed uses did not form part of the 
owner's title when he/she acquired the property104 or that the restriction of the specific 
uses in question was already prohibited by the law of nuisance.105 
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The third category of 'per se' takings involve regulations which extinguish one of the 
core property rights. In Hodel v lrving106 the court found that the abrogation of the right 
to leave a certain type of property to one's heirs amounted to a taking for which 
compensation is payable. The court stated that the right to leave property to one's heirs 
is just as essential in the bundle of rights as the right to exclude, and for this reason the 
right to pass on property cannot be extinguished without just compensation. 107 Singer108 
points out that this is probably the only 'core' property right which will be recognised by 
the court for the purposes of this category of 'per se' takings. 
Once it is established that none of the categories of 'per se' takings (the physical 
invasion of property, the denial of the economically viable use of the property and the 
destroyal of a core property right) is applicable to a specific case, the court will continue 
to apply the three-factor test as set out in Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New 
York.109 The court will evaluate the facts of the case according to: (a) the character of 
the government action; (b) the diminution of the value of the affected property; and (c) 
the extent of interference in reasonable, investment-backed expectations. According 
to Singer110 the character of government action 
" concerns the issue of whether the regulation is more closely 
analogous to a physical invasion or seizure of a core property right or to 
a general regulatory program affecting numerous parcels and designed 
to protect the public from harm by adjusting the benefits and burdens of 
economic life to promote the common good". 
The second factor is related to the second category of 'per se' takings: the greater the 
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diminution of value of the property, the more likely the regulation is to be regarded as 
a taking. 111 With regard to the third factor Singer112 points out that: 
"[a] regulation is more likely to be held a taking if a citizen has already 
invested substantially in reasonable reliance on an existing statutory or 
regulatory scheme; it is less likely to be rules a taking if the regulation 
prevents the owner from realizing an expected benefit in the future". 
It was pointed out in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v County 
of Los Angeles113 that a taking need not be permanent for it to qualify for the payment 
of compensation. The owner will be entitled to compensation where a regulation 
temporarily deprives him/her of all use of the property. According to the court there is 
no difference between permanent and temporary takings, because as long as the 
restriction is in place the owner experiences it as a permanent taking. In the case of 
temporary takings the property owner will be entitled to just compensation for the loss 
of the use of his/her property from the time that the regulation came into force until the 
time that it is rescinded.114 
In terms of the Fifth Amendment the state may only take someone's property against 
compensation if it is for a public use. The public use requirement is used as a formal 
requirement for the validity of takings, but, as is illustrated by the decision in Hawaii 
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Housing Authority v Midkiff, 115 this requirement does not really restrict the state in the 
exercise of its power of eminent domain. According to Alexander116 the test adopted in 
this case provides little basis for invalidating condemnations on public use grounds. 
The court formulated its approach as follows: 
"Where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to 
a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated 
taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause". 117 
In this case the court held that a Hawaiian statute which authorised the expropriation 
of land from private owners in order to transfer it in ownership to the lessees of that 
land, was constitutionally valid. Although the statute effected the expropriation of 
property from one individual and redistributed it to other individuals, the court found this 
to be justifiable in terms of the broader land reform programme, which in itself is in the 
public interest.118 
9.6 Compensation 
The Fifth Amendment requires the state to pay 'just compensation' in the event of a 
taking. It is common cause that the state is not required to compensate affected parties 
for each and every interference with their property. As was pointed out in Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Association v DeBenedictis119 the state will only be required to 
compensate in the case where the broader public, rather than the affected party alone, 
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should bear the burden of state's interference with private ownership in the collective 
interest. In Pennsylvania Coal Co v Mahon120 the court indicated that the state's 
obligation to compensate is based on the fact that: 
"[a] strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to 
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way 
of paying for the change". 
It has been accepted in US law that 'just compensation' does not mean full 
compensation. It was pointed out in United States v Causby121 that the value of 
compensation is calculated with reference to the owner's loss and not the taker's gain. 
In Coniston Corp v Village of Hoffman Estates122 the court stated that market value is 
regarded as just compensation, but that market value is not necessarily full 
compensation: 
'"U]ust compensation' has been held to be satisfied by payment of market 
value ... Compensation in the constitutional sense is therefore not full 
compensation, for market value is not the value every owner of property 
attaches to his property but merely the value that the marginal owner 
attaches to his property". 123 
Alexander124 points out that the reason for not compensating for the loss of the full 
personal value of property is the fact that there are too many practical difficulties in 
doing so. 
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9. 7 Conclusion 
The protection and limitation of property in the US are to some extent approached 
differently that in other western jurisdictions. The interpretation of the wide term 
'takings', to include not only actual acquisitions by the state, but also regulatory 
expropriations, places a heavy burden on the state to compensate individuals for state 
interferences with private property. The US courts approach takings cases as ad hoc 
factual inquiries, and in each individual case the courts have to determine whether an 
interference 'amount to' a taking. The strong protection afforded to individual property 
holders is emphasised by the recognition of the so-called 'per se' takings, and indicates 
that the US courts follow a conceptual approach to some extent. 
However, if the recent decisions in Prune Yard Shopping Centre v Robins, 125 No/Ian v 
California Coastal Commission126 and Dolan v City of Tigard27 are to set a trend for 
future decisions, one may assume that the court is moving towards a approach not 
dissimilar to a general limitation test followed in other jurisdictions such as Germany, 128 
South Africa129 and the Council of Europe. 130 In terms of this test the social function of 
property is recognised and limitations are evaluated with reference to all the 
surrounding circumstances. The interests of the affected party is weighed up against 
the public interest and if it is found that an individual is expected to bear an economic 
burden which should be borne by the public at large, such a limitation is regarded as 
a taking, for which compensation has to be paid. 131 The test set out in these cases 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
447 US 74 (1980) at 84. 
483 us 825 (1987). 
114 S Ct2309 (1994). 
See chapter 8. 
See chapter 11. 
See chapter 10. 
Penn Central Transportation Co v City of New York 438 US 104 (1978) at 124. Also see 
Nol/an v California Coastal Commission 483 US 825 (1987); Hawaii Housing Authority v 
Midkiff467 US 229 (1984); Kaiser Aetna v United States 444 US 164 (1979); Hodel v 
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furthermore requires that limitations should not be unreasonable, arbitrary or 
capricious, that there should be a reasonable nexus between the limitation imposed 
and the purpose served by such a measure, and that there should be a rough 
proportionality between the restrictive measure and the expected results of the 
proposed development.132 The approach followed in these decisions makes it possible 
for the courts to consider the social function of property. Van der Walt, 133 however, 
points out that the growing tendency to recognise more categories of the so-called 'per 
se' takings, seems to frustrate the move towards a contextual and proportionality-
oriented approach and to confirm the conceptual, definitional approach in terms of 
which certain rights and limitations are regarded as an inherent part of the definition of 
that right, without taking cognisance of the social role and function of property. 
132 
133 
Irving 481 US 704 (1987). 
Dolan v City of Tigard 114 S Ct 2309 (1994) at 62 LW 4580; Nol/an v California Coastal 
Commission 483 US 825 (1987) at 837 et seq; Prune Yard Shopping Centre V Robins 447 
US 74 (1980) at 84; Agins v City of Tiburon 447 US 255 (1980). 
Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on the 
Uni~d States of America. 
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10 
PROPERTY IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
10.1 Introduction 
The European Convention on Human Rights was drafted by the Council of Europe1 and 
adopted in 1950. It entered into force on 3 September 1953. The Convention is 
adjudicated by the European Court of Human Rights2 and the European Commission 
of Human Rights3 in Strassbourg. Member states must accept the principles of the rule 
of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, 4 and the acceptance of the Convention and the jurisdiction of 
the European Court of Human Rights makes this a political obligation of membership 
of the Council of Europe. The Convention was a direct reaction to human rights 
violations during World War II and the initial aim of the Convention was to act as an 
alarm to alert the member states of any large scale human rights violation. It has since 
taken the role of a European bill of rights and is primarily used to settle smaller human 
2 
3 
4 
The Council of Europe was formed after World War II as a first attempt to unify Europe. 
The following countries are current1y members of the Council of Europe: Albania, Andorra, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San 
Marino, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United 
Kingdom. Albania, Andorra, Estonia, Latvia and Moldova have yet to ratify the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
See in general Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 648 et seq; European Convention on Human Rights - Collected texts 150 
et seq, Manual of the Council of Europe 277 et seq with regard to the structure, jurisdiction 
and procedures of the European Court of Human Rights. 
See in general Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 571 et seq ; European Convention on Human Rights - Collected texts 117 
et seq; Manual of the Council of Europe 266 et seq concerning the structure and 
procedures of the European Commission of Human Rights. 
Article 3 Statute of the Council of Europe, European Treaties Series No 1 2. 
219 
rights violations within the boundaries of its member states. 5 
It is important to note that the Council of Europe and the European Union are two 
different institutions. The European Union is not directly liable under the Convention 
for the conduct of its institutions because it is not a party to the Convention.6 It did 
however incorporate the Convention into Union law via the Maastricht Treaty. 7 
However, this does not allow an individual to make an application against the Union at 
the European Court of Human Rights. Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick8 point out that it 
is unclear, insofar as the Convention is applied as part of Union law, that the 
Convention would prevail in case of a conflict between the provisions of the Convention 
and Union law. In such an instance the interpretation and application of the Convention 
will be subject to the views of the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg (an 
institution of the European Union), and not the views of the institutions of the Council 
of Europe (the European Court and the European Commission of Human Rights). 
This chapter will look at the protection and application of the guarantee of property in 
article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. The jurisprudence of both the European Commission and the 
European Court of Human Rights has an increasing influence on the domestic law of 
the member states, and for this reason it is important to study the nature and extent of 
the property guarantee provided by the Convention. 
10.2 The property guarantee 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
5 
6 
7 
8 
See in general Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 1 et seq; Peukert 1981 HRLJ 37 et seq; Schwelb 1964 Am J Comp Law 
vol 13 518 et seq; Beddard Human rights and Europe 19 et seq. 
CFDTv European Communities No 8030fl713 DR 231 (1978). 
Article F(2) determines that "the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed 
by the European Convention .... as general principles of law". 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The Jaw of the European Convention on Human Rights 27. 
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Fundamental Freedoms states: 
"[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful.enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived9 of his possessions except in the 
public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by 
the general principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right 
of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use 
of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties". 10 
The property guarantee in article 1 consists of three sentences. The first sentence 
guarantees the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The second sentence determines 
that no one may be deprived of his/her possessions and the third sentence (second 
paragraph) provides for the control of the use of property by a member state. The 
different sentences are generally referred to as the first, second and third rules 
respectively. 11 
10.2.1 The scope of property 
A comparison between the English and French texts of the First Protocol, which are 
equally authentic, reveals that no terminological symmetry and consistency exists within 
article 1. Rule 1 of the English text states that every person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his 'possessions', whereas the French text uses the term 'biens'. The term 
9 
10 
11 
It should be noted that in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights the 
term 'deprivation' is equated with 'expropriation'. In most other jurisdictions 'deprivation' is 
interpreted to mean 'regulation'. 
See European Convention on Human Rights - Collected texts 24. 
Initially reference were made to the first sentence of the first paragraph, the second 
sentence of the first paragraph and the second paragraph, but since Sporrong and 
L6nnroth v Sweden 5 EHRR 35 (1989) the different sentences are referred to as Rules 
1,2 and 3 respectively. 
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'possessions' is repeated in Rule 2 of the English text, while the French text speaks of 
'propriete'. In Rule 3 the terms 'property' and 'biens' are used respectively. The 
inconsistency in the use of terminology leads to the conclusion that the term 
'possessions' should not be interpreted in the narrow sense as actual factual 
possession as opposed to property (or as 'possession' - a term which is never used in 
the French text of article 1 - as opposed to 'propriete'). 12 
Peukert13 points out that article 1 of the First Protocol is an international text, and as 
such it may be assumed that it guarantees not only real rights, but rather the 
international concept of ownership as understood in its widest sense. The international 
law concerning the protection of property has taken the largest and widest definition of 
property from various jurisdictions. 
The court stated in Marckx v Belgium14 that article 1 in substance guarantees the right 
of property (more particularly ownership of property). The property guarantee 
encompasses the right to have, use, dispose of, pledge, lend or even destroy one's 
property.15 It seems as if the Court and the Commission do not attribute any weight to 
the phrase "peaceful enjoyment of possessions" and that they simply apply article 1 as 
a guarantee of property in the wide sense. A wide range of proprietary interests have 
been protected by the institutions of the Council of Europe. 16 This approach is followed 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
See in general Wiggins v United Kingdom No 7 456fl6 13 DR 40 (1978) at 46; Schwalb 
1964 Am J Comp Law 518 at 519 et seq; Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 517; Van Dijk and Van Hoof Theory and practice 
of the European Convention on Human Rights 340 et seq. 
Paukert 1981 HRLJ 37 at 42 et seq. 
ECHR SeriesAvol 31 (1979). Also see Handyside v United Kingdom ECHR Series A vol 
24 (1976). 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on Human Rights 519. 
Also see Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter 
on Council of Europe. 
This includes both movable and immovable property (Wiggins v United Kingdom No 
7456fl613 DR 40 (1978)); shares (Brame/id and Malmstrom v Sweden No 8588fl9 and 
no 8589fl9 29 DR 64 (1982)); patents (Smith Kline and French Laboratories v 
Netherlands No 12633187 66 DR 70 (1990)); contractual rights (A, Band Company AS v 
Federal Republic of Germany No 7742176 14 DR 146 (1978); Association of General 
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even if the wide interpretation of the property concept is in conflict with a narrower 
interpretation in a domestic legal system.17 
The property guarantee does not include the mere expectation to claim in terms of a 
right, but only protects rights which already exist and to which the claimant has an 
existing and valid (vested) claim. 18 
10.2.2 Rule 1: The general principle and the fair balance test 
There has always been uncertainty as to what the exact meaning of each rule is and 
to what extent the three different rules are interrelated. Rule 2 has always been 
identified with the expropriation of property, while Rule 3 has been identified with the 
regulation of property. The role and meaning of Rule 1, however, have always been 
contentious. It has never been clear what the meaning or purpose of Rule 1 is and 
whether it should have any bearing or influence on the interpretation and application 
of the other two rules. Despite the positive formulation of Rule 1 it has always been 
accepted that Rule 1 does not provide a claimant with a positive claim against the 
17 
18 
Practitioners v Denmark No 12947187 62 DR 226 (1989)); leases (Mellacher and others 
v Austria ECHR Series A vol 169 (1989)); and judgment debts (Stran Greek Refineries 
and Stratis Andreadis v Greece ECHR Series A vol 301 (1994)). Also see Sporrong and 
UJnnroth v Sweden 5 EHRR 35 (1982), James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123 (1986), Tre 
Traktorer AB v Sweden ECHR Series A Vol 159 (1989) and Lithgow v United Kingdom 
ECHR Series A vol 102 (1986); where property is interpreted in a wide sense. See in 
general Peukert 1981 HRLJ 37 at 44 et seq; Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 517 et seq. 
See 7.6 above in this regard. See in general Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: 
a comparative analysis chapter on Council of Europe; Peukert 1981 HRLJ 37 at 43; 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on Human Rights 517. 
Batelaan and Huiges v Netherlands No 10438183 41 DR 170 (1984); Marckx v Belgium 
ECHR Series A vol 31 (1979); Xv Sweden No 6676fl4 2 DR 123 (1974); A, Band 
Company AS v Federal Republic of Germany No 7742176 14 DR 146 (1978). See in 
general Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 517; Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter 
on Council of Europe; Van Dijk and Van Hoof Theory and practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 341. 
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state. 19 The suggestion that Rule 1 signifies an institutional guarantee of property has 
also been rejected. 20 
The question regarding the exact meaning and purpose of Rule 1 and its relation to the 
rest of article 1 was resolved in Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden. 21 The court 
explained the situation as follows: 
" ... this provision comprises three distinct rules. The first rule, set out in 
the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and 
enunciates the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property; the second 
rule, contained in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers 
deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions; the 
third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises the contracting 
states are entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest. The three rules are not 'distinct' in 
the sense of being unconnected: the second and third rules are 
concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in light 
of the general principle enunciated in the first rule ... ". 
In light of this statement Rule 1 amounts to much more than a mere statement of 
19 
20 
21 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on Human Rights 519; 
Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on Council 
of Europe; Peukert 1981 HRLJ 37 at 52 et seq. 
The fact that Rule 1 is phrased positively crates the impression that it constitutes an 
institutional guarantee of property. In Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz ECR 3727 (1979) the 
Court of Justice of the European Communities stated that the regulation of property is 
acceptable as long as the interference is not disproportionate to the rights of the owner 
and as long as the interference does not imping upon the very substance of the right to 
property. This resembles the German situation where an institutional guarantee is derived 
from the positively phrased guarantee (see chapter 8 above). The possibility of an 
institutional guarantee in Rule 1 was, however, ruled out in Sporrong and Lonnroth v 
Sweden 5 EHRR 35 (1982) and James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123 (1986). See in 
general the discussion in Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative 
analysis chapter on Council of Europe. 
5 EHRR 35 (1982) at par 61. 
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principle. It provides a separate ground for the regulation of interferences with property. 
State action which does not amount to either a deprivation or a control of the use of 
property may be regulated in terms of Rule 1 if it constitutes an interference with the 
claimant's peaceful enjoyment of his/her property. 22 The court relied on Rule 1 in the 
Sporrong and Lonnroth case to declare state action in breach ot' the property 
guarantee. In this case the city of Stockholm issued expropriation permits for the 
redevelopment of the city centre. The expropriations were not carried out, but the 
owners of the affected properties were prohibited from construction on their properties 
as long as the permits remained in place (some of these permits were in place for up 
to 25 years). The court found that, although this did not amount to either an actual 
expropriation or a control of the use of property, it constituted an unjust interference 
with the owner's right to peaceful enjoyment of his/her property.23 
The court introduced the 'fair balance' test in the Sporrong and Lonnroth case as a 
means to determine whether Rule 1 has been complied with. The court stated that: 
"[f]or the purposes of [Rule 1]. .. the Court must determine whether a fair 
balance was struck between the demands of the general interests of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's 
fundamental rights. The search for this balance is inherent in the whole 
of the Convention and is also reflected in the structure of Article 1".24 
In the application of the fair balance test the state has a wide discretion (or in the words 
of the court, a wide margin of appreciation) to determine exactly what the general or 
public interest in a particular case is. The court attempts not to dictate to the contracting 
22 
23 
24 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on Human Rights 521 
et seer. Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on 
Council of Europe; Van Dijk and Van Hoof Theory and practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 342. 
See also Stran Greek Re'fineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece ECHR Series A vol 301 
(1994); Poiss v Austria ECHR Series A vol 117 (1987); Erkner and Hofauer v Austria 
ECHR Series A vol 117 (1987). 
5 EHRR 35 (1982) at par 69. 
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states how to conduct their business, and the states' determination of what qualifies as 
the general interest, and that the general interest outweighs the individual interest, will 
not easily be overturned by the court. The court will, however, conduct an investigation 
to determine whether there is a proportional relation between the means employed by 
the contracting state and the purpose of the action. The measures taken by a 
contracting state in an attempt to strike a balance between the interests of the 
community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights 
may be a factor which the court will take into account to determine whether a balance, 
compatible with the requirements of the Convention, has indeed been struck. 
Whenever it is found that the affected party has to carry an individual and excessive 
burden, the state action will be in conflict with the provisions of article 1.25 
According to Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick26 the fair balance test finds its authority in 
two sources. The first is the general balance between the individual's rights and the 
public interest which is present throughout the Convention27 and the second has to do 
with the substantive content of law as understood by the institutions of the Council of 
Europe. The latter includes the protection of the individual against arbitrary and 
disproportionate effects of an otherwise formally valid national law.28 Any interference 
with the individual's rights has to be in accordance with a specific national law and this 
law has to provide an indication of the factors which motivate the interference. The 
court will apply the fair balance test with reference to these factors. It has been stated 
above that a contracting state has a wide margin of appreciation to determine exactly 
what the public interest is and whether a balance has been struck between the 
individual and public interest. Although the state's Gonclusion carries a lot of weight, the 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on Human Rights 522 
et seq. 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on Human Rights 525. 
Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden 5 EHRR 35 (1982) at par 69 and Case relating to 
certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in Belgium ECHR Series A vol 6 
(1968). 
See in general Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 285 et seq. 
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court has the final power of review. 29 
Despite the fact that the fair balance test has been devised to deal with cases which 
fall within the ambit of Rule 1, the test has been used to judge the proportionality and 
acceptability of all interferences with property. Due to the fact that Rule 1 constitutes 
the general principle with regard to the protection of property, and that Rule 2 and Rule 
3 are seen as specific instances where Rule 1 is given more specific content, the fair 
balance test will apply to the whole of article 1. The court will thus apply the fair 
balance test in cases of both deprivation of property as well as the control of the use 
of property to determine whether a fair balance has been struck between the interests 
of the community and the interests of the affected individual. 30 Due to the fact that Rule 
2 and 3 contain specific requirements for the validity of deprivations and regulations 
respectively, the application of the fair balance test will not be exactly the same in all 
instances. It does, however, provide a framework within which all interferences can be 
assessed. 
The separate ground for assessing and regulating an interference with an individual's 
property rights identified in Rule 1 has proved to be of great importance. There has 
been a tendency to judge any interference with property in terms of the guarantee of 
the peaceful enjoyment of property rather than in terms of Rule 2 or Rule 3, and to 
assess the interference with reference to the fair balance test. 31 
The court may furthermore only judge a case with reference to article 1 as a whole and 
29 
30 
31 
Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden 5 EHRR 35 (1982) at par 69. 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrtck The law of the European Convention on Human Rights 522; 
Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on Council 
of Europe; Beddard Human Rights and Europe 105. 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrtck The law of the European Convention on Human Rights 525 
et seq. It is pointed out that the reason for the assimilation of the assessment of all 
interferences with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions is twofold. In the first place the 
court is reluctant to expand the concept of deprivation to instances of de facto deprivations 
and in the second place it is argued that the conditions (both substantive and procedural) 
for interferences in terms of Rule 1 are set out in such a way that it can be applied 
successfully to both the second and third rules. 
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not with reference to any specific rule. In Papamichalopou/os v Greece32 the court held 
that the occupation of the claimant's land by a public body constituted a de facto 
expropriation because the claimant was refused access to th.e land and was not able 
to deal with the land in any way. Although the court held that the state action amounted 
to a de facto expropriation, it did not identify any specific rule in its decision. The court 
merely decided that there had been a breach of article 1. 
10.2.3 Rule 2: Deprivation of property 
Rule 2 determines that no one may be deprived of his/her possessions (property) 
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the 
general principles of international law. This rule is commonly regarded as the 
expropriation clause. (In the context of the European Convention on Human Rights the 
term 'deprivation' is equated with 'expropriation'.) A few questions need to be 
addressed with regard to the interpretation and application of Rule 2: what qualifies as 
a deprivation; does the Convention provide for regulatory expropriation (inverse 
condemnation); what constitutes the public interest; what is the position regarding the 
general principles of international law; and the question concerning compensation. 
According to Peukert33 the deprivation of property in international law embraces 
nationalisation, confiscation and expropriation in the wide sense. Expropriation in the 
broad sense includes the actual deprivation (taking) of property as well as measures 
of interference which affect the substance of the right of ownership. The institutions of 
the Council of Europe have, however, consisten.tly interpreted Rule 2 to encompass 
expropriation in the narrow sense. This implies that the affected party must have been 
the owner of the property in question and he/she must be divested of his/her 
ownership.34 All the legal rights of the applicant (the owner) must be extinguished by 
operation of law. This approach is interesting because of the fact that Rule 1 
32 ECHR Series A vol 260 (1993). 
33 Peukert 1981 HRLJ 37 at 54 et seq. 
34 Holy Monasteries v Greece ECHR Series A vol 301 (1994). 
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guarantees the peaceful enjoyment of possessions and not, as is suggested by the 
narrow approach to Rule 2, ownership.35 Cases where the owner's rights (to use his/her 
property) are dramatically limited, while he/she retains ownership of the property, are 
not regarded as expropriations or deprivations in terms of Rule 2, but rather as extreme 
measures of control of the use of property in terms of Rule 3. In Handyside v United 
Kingdom36 the court held that the temporary seizure of property by the state amounts 
to the control of the use of property and not the deprivation thereof. There has to be an 
actual taking of ownership before Rule 2 will come into play. 
It is important to distinguish between deprivations and regulations for purposes of 
article 1, because they are governed by different provisions, 37 and because of the fact 
that compensation may only be claimed for deprivations. This distinction is, however, 
complicated by the possible recognition of regulatory expropriations. Regulatory 
expropriations are interferences with property which are regulatory in nature, but which 
have an expropriatory effect. Article 1 does not provide for regulatory expropriations or 
inverse condemnations. Van der Walt38 points out that the door was left open for the 
recognition of regulatory expropriation in Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden. 39 The same 
approach was followed in Papamichalopoulos v Greece40 where the court decided that 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
Van der Walt ConS'titutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on Council 
of Europe. 
ECHR Series A vol 24 (1976). Also see Uthgow and Others v United Kingdom ECHR 
Series A vol 102 (1986); Marckx v Belgium ECHR Series A vol 31 (1979); Wiggins v 
United Kingdom No 7456n613 DR 40 (1978); Mellacher and Others v Austria ECHR 
Series A vol 169 (1989); Tre Traktorer AB v Sweden ECHR Series A vol 159 (1989); Xv 
Austria No 8003n717 DR 80 (1980); X and Y v The Netherlands No 6202173 1 DR 66 
(1975); Al/gemeine Gold- und Silberscheideanstalt [AGOSI] v United Kingdom ECHR 
Series A vol 108 (1986); James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123 (1986). 
According to Rule 2 deprivations have to be in the public interest and are subject to 
conditions of law and the general principles of international law, while regulations in terms 
of Rule 3 must be lawful, deemed necessary by the contracting state and must be in the 
general interest. 
Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on Council 
of Europe. 
5 EHRR 35 (1982). 
ECHR Series A vol 260 (1993). 
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the occupation of the claimant's land by a public body for a public purpose constituted 
a de facto interference which amounted to a de facto expropriation (a regulatory 
expropriation) because the claimant was refused access to the land and was not able 
to deal with the land in any way. It is, however, doubtful that the court will give outright 
recognition to the theory of regulatory expropriations. 41 Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick42 
are of the opinion that regulatory expropriations will be in breach of Rule 2 because 
they are not 'provided for by law'. In view of the case law it seems as if the court will 
only deal with an interference with property in terms of Rule 2 if it is clear that the 
claimant has been deprived of his/her ownership. All other interferences will be dealt 
with either in terms of Rule 1 which guarantees peaceful enjoyment of possessions, or 
Rule 3 in terms of which the contracting state's control use of property is regulated. It 
was pointed out in Baner v Sweden43 that if ownership is seen as a bundle of rights, the 
deprivation of one of these rights does not amount to the deprivation of ownership, but 
rather a measure to control the use of property. 
Rule 2 requires that any deprivation of property has to be in the public interest. It has 
always been the opinion of the court that the contracting states are in the best position 
to determine exactly what the public interest is and which objectives would promote the 
public interest. The states are thus left a wide margin of appreciation in this regard, but 
the court retains the final power of review. It was stated in Lithgow v United Kingdom44 
that the justification and motivation for the actual expropriation directly relates to the 
public interest and that the court will not easily challenge to state's conclusion that a 
particular deprivation will promote the public interest. In this case the court held that the 
justification and motivation for the nationalisation of the shipbuilding industry was in the 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Hentrich v France ECHR Series A vol 296 (1994); Tre Traktorer AB v Sweden ECHR 
Series A vol 159 (1989); Mellacher and Others v Austria ECHR Series A vol 169 (1989). 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on Human Rights 528. 
NO 1176318560 DR 128 (1989) at 140. 
ECHR Series A vol 102 (1986) at par 109. Also see Van Dijk and Van Hoof Theory and 
practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 343. 
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public interest. In James v United Kingdom, 45 where landowners were deprived of their 
property in order to enfranchise long lease holders, the court came to the conclusion 
that the deprivation of the property of one individual in order to transfer it to another 
individual may be in the public interest, depending on the circumstances. Even if the 
community at large does not benefit directly from the use or enjoyment of the property 
taken, it might still be argued that the state action promotes the public interest, as long 
as the deprivation is carried out in pursuance of a legitimate social, economic or other 
policy. The taking of property to enhance social justice within the community will 
therefore always be in the public interest.46 
It was further stated in James v United Kingdom47 that, in order to satisfy the 
requirements of the public interest provision, there has to be a proportional relationship 
between the means employed by the contracting state and the purpose it aims to 
achieve. In other words, there has to be a fair balance between the public interest and 
the interests of the affected individual. Whenever the individual has to bear a personal 
and excessive burden the means employed by the contracting state will be in conflict 
with the provisions of article 1. Due to the structure of article 1 and the relation between 
the general principle formulated in Rule 1 and specific applications thereof in Rules 2 
and 3 respectively, the fair balance test is applicable to the whole of article 1. 
Any deprivation in terms of Rule 2 is subject to the conditions provided for by law. This 
means that any expropriation has to be based on a specific law on a national level. The 
law has to be generally accessible and sufficiently certain. This requirement also 
provides a safeguard against arbitrariness.48 The· term 'law' is not limited to statutory 
45 
46 
47 
48 
8 EHRR 123 (1986). 
James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123 (1986) at par 45. Also see Holy Monasteries v 
Greece ECHR Series A vol 301 (1994) at par 67 et seq. In view of this decision a land 
reform programme will most probably constitute a legitimate purpose. 
James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123 (1986) at 145. Also see Sporrong and Lonnroth v 
Sweden 5 EHRR 35 (1982). 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on Human Rights 530. 
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law but also includes unwritten law. 49 
The reference to the general principles of international law is of special importance for 
nationals as far as a claim for compensation is concerned. The reference to the general 
principles of international law has two possible interpretations.50 The first is that the 
general principles of international law are only applicable as far as non-nationals are 
concerned. This interpretation is based on the argument that they have no influence 
as far as the formation of national law is concerned and have to rely on the general 
principles of international law to provide them with adequate protection against 
measures of confiscation, nationalisation or expropriation. 51 The second interpretation 
is that the standards of international law is to be incorporated into the Convention. Such 
an interpretation would provide nationals and non-nationals with equal protection. 52 The 
court, however, favours the first interpretation. It was stated in Gudmundur 
Gudmundsson v lcelancF that: 
" ... the general principles of international law, referred to in Article 1, are 
the principles which have been established in general international law 
concerning the confiscation of the property of foreigners; ... it follows that 
measures taken by a State with respect to the property of its own 
nationals are not subject to these general principles of international law 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Sunday Times v United Kingdom ECHR Series A vol 30 (1979) at par 49. Also see 
Peukert 1981 HRLJ 37 at 65; Van der Walt Cons'fitutional property clauses: a comparative 
analysis chapter on Council of Europe. 
See in general Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 530 et seq. 
Gasus Dosier- und Fordertechnik v Netherlands ECHR Series A vol 306 (1995) at par 63; 
Guc/mundur Gudmundsson v Iceland YB 3 394 (1960); James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 
123 (1986). Also see Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention 
on Human Rights 530; Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative 
analysis chapter on Council of Europe; Peukert 1981 HRLJ 37 at 65. 
Schwelb 1964 Am J Comp Law 518 et seq. Also see Salgado 1987 Vir J Int Law 865 et 
seq, Van Dijk and Van Hoof Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 344. 
YB 3 394 (1960) at 422 et seq. 
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in the absence of a particular treaty clause specifically so providing". 
This view was confirmed in James v United Kingdom54 where it was said that it was not 
the intention of the parties to the Convention to extend the protection of the general 
principles of international law to nationals. 
The question surrounding the applicability of the general principles of international law 
becomes all the more important if it is considered that no mention is made in article 1 
of compensation, and claimants thus have to rely on international law to claim 
compensation from the expropriating state. The position of non-nationals is secure in 
this regard, because, as was pointed out above, the reference to the general principles 
of international law provides them with a claim for compensation. Nationals, however, 
do not have a claim for compensation in terms of article 1. Rule 2 merely protects them 
against arbitrary confiscation.55 
This approach to the compensation claims of nationals was clearly unfair, and a more 
equitable approach has been followed since the 1980's. The introduction of the fair 
balance test in Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden56 brought about a more just approach 
to the position of nationals where their property rights have been interfered with. 
Although this decision did not clearly establish the nature and extent of the obligation 
to compensate, it did establish the principle that compensation may be used as a 
means to create a fair balance between the different parties. 
The uncertainty surrounding compensation was re~olved in James v United Kingdom. 57 
The court set out the principle as follows: 
54 
55 
56 
57 
8 EHRR 123 (1986) at 148. 
Paukert 1981 HRLJ 37 at 65 et seq; Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a 
comparative analysis chapter on Council of Europe; Van Dijk and Van Hoof Theory and 
practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 343. 
5 EHRR 35 (1982) at par 69 and 73. 
8 EHRR 123 (1986) at par 54. 
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"[l]ike the Commission, the Court observes that under the legal systems 
of the Contracting States, the taking of property in the public interest 
without payment of compensation is treated as justifiable only in 
exceptional circumstances . . . As far as Article 1 is concerned, the 
protection of the right to property it affords would be largely illusory and 
ineffective in the absence of any equivalent principle. Clearly, 
compensation terms are material to the assessment whether the 
contested legislation respects a fair balance between the various 
interests at stake and, notably, whether it does not impose a 
disproportionate burden on the applicants". 
The principle that at least some compensation is required to establish a fair balance 
between the various interests of the parties involved in the case of an interference with 
an individual's property was confirmed in Uthgow v United Kingdom. 58 This principle is 
applied even in the case where the public interest requires strong protection.59 
Although the principle that article 1 impliedly requires the payment of compensation for 
the taking of property was acknowledged in James v United Kingdom, the court stated 
that article 1 does not guarantee the right to full compensation in all circumstances. The 
amount of compensation must be reasonably related to the value of the property in 
question. However, 
"[l]egitimate objectives of 'public interest', such as pursued in measures 
of economic reform or measures designed to achieve greater social 
justice, may call for less reimbursement of the full market value".60 
58 
59 
60 
ECHR Series A vol 102 (1986) at par 120. For a discussion of this case see Salgado 1987 
Vir J Int Law 865. Also see Hentrich v France ECHR Series A vol 296 (1994) at par 47 et 
seq. 
Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v Greece ECHR Series A vol 301 (1994) at 
par 80 et seq; Holy Monasteries v Greece ECHR Series A vol 301 (1994) at par 7 4. 
8 EHRR 123 (1986) at par 54. 
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The court acknowledges the fact that the states have a wide margin of appreciation to 
determine the necessity and quantum of compensation. The states have a wide 
discretion to determine the amount and terms of compensation and, in the first place, 
to determine the value of the property in question. The court will not easily question the 
states' decision in this regard.61 The court's power of review is limited to determining 
whether the choice of compensation terms falls outside the state's wide margin of 
appreciation.62 The fair balance test remains the guiding principle to establish a right 
to compensation for nationals in the first place, and in the second place to determine 
an amount of compensation which can be regarded as just and equitable in a specific 
set of circumstances. 
10.2.4 Rule 3: Control of the use of property 
Rule 3, which is generally associated with the state's power to regulate the use of 
property, provides that the provisions of Rule 1 and Rule 2 shall not in any way impair 
the right of a state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of 
property in accordance with the general interest, or to secure the payment of taxes 
other contributions or penalties. It is clear from the wording of Rule 3 that the 
contracting states have wide powers to regulate the use of property by its subjects. This 
power is, however, limited by the requirement that is has to be exercised in accordance 
with the general interest. It is pointed out by Paukert 63 that the concepts "public 
interest" (as used in Rule 2) and 0 general interest" (as used in Rule 3) mean exactly the 
same thing. The concepts are, however, interpreted differently in the sense that the 
margin of appreciation of the state in the case of expropriations (Rule 2) is interpreted 
narrower than in the case of control of the use of property (Rule 3). 
61 
62 
63 
Lithgow v United Kingdom ECHR Series A vol 102 (1986) at par 137 et seq. 
James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123 (1986) at par 54. Also see Harris, O'Boyle and 
Warbrick The Jaw of the European Convention on Human Rights 533. 
Paukert 1981 HRLJ 37 at 61. Also see Handyside v United Kingdom ECHR Series B vol 
22 (1976) at par 167. 
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Although it might seem that Rule 3 is not subject to the rest of article 1 ("the preceding 
provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a state ... "), the ruling in 
Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden64 made it clear that the different rules are inter-
related, and as such the fair balance test is applicable to Rule 3 as well. In order for a 
regulatory measure to comply with the requirements of article 1 it must: (a) be lawful 
(comply with national law); (b) have a legitimate purpose (be in the general/public 
interest); and (c) reflect a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of 
the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental 
rights. 65 The apparent unlimited right of a state to control the use of property is 
therefore curtailed by two factors: the first is the fact that the control measure must be 
in the general interest, and the second is that the measure has to meet the 
requirements of the fair balance test. 
Peukert66 points out that it is absolutely essential that the general interest for which the 
particular measure is taken, is specified in legislation. It is, however, not necessary to 
specifically name the general interest in question, as it is sufficient if it follows from the 
purpose of the legislation. 
The court has confirmed that the state has a wide margin of appreciation the determine 
whether a particular measure to control the use of property falls within the ambit of 'the 
general interest'67 and as such it is highly unlikely that the court will contradict the 
64 
65 
66 
67 
5 EHRR 35 (1982). 
See in general Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights 534 et seq; Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative 
analysis chapter on Council of Europe. 
Peukert 1981 HRLJ 37 at 63. 
Gudmundur Gudmundsson v Iceland YB 3 394 (1960); A, B, C and D v United Kingdom 
YB 10 506 (1967); X and Y v Netherlands No 6202173 1 DR 66 (1975); X and Others v 
Belgium No 6837fl4 3 DR 135 (1976); Handyside v United Kingdom ECHR Series A vol 
24 (1976); Wiggins v United Kingdom No 7 456fl6 13 DR 40 (1978); Marckx v Belgium 
ECHR Series A vol 31 (1979); Xv Austria No 8003fl717 DR 80 (1980); Sporrong and 
L6nnroth v Sweden 5 EHRR 35 (1982); James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123 (1986); 
Lithgow v United Kingdom ECHR Series A vol 102 (1986); Tre Traktorer AB v Sweden 
ECHR Series A vol 159 (1989); Mel/acher and Others v Austria ECHR Series A vol 169 
(1989); Pine Valley Developments Limited and Others v Ireland 14 EHRR 319 (1991). 
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states' conclusion. 68 The court nevertheless has the final power of review and may 
determine whether the state has satisfied the requirements of lawfulness and legitimate 
\ 
purpose, and that the burden placed on the individual is not excessive.69 
The states' power to control the use of property includes the power to oblige an 
individual to take positive action, 70 as well as the power to restrict or limit specific 
activities. The latter includes, amongst others, land reform, 71 the seizure of property for 
legal proceedings, 72 import and export law~ the issuing of licenc~s. planning 
controls, 75 inheritance laws, 76 measures aimed at the protection of the environment, 77 
rent control78 and economic regulation of professions. 79 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
Peukert 1981 HRW 37 at 62; Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 535; Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a 
comparative analysis chapter on Council of Europe; Beddard Human Rights and Europe 
105; Van Dijk and Van Hoof Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 344. 
Xv Austria No 7287fl513 DR 27 (1979); ISKCON v United Kingdom No 20490192 76 DR 
90 (1994). Also see Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention 
on Human Rights 535; Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative 
analysis chapter on Council of Europe; Peukert 1981 HRLJ 37 at 62. 
Denevv Sweden No 12570186 59 DR 127 (1989). In this case the claimant was required 
to plant trees on his property in the interest of environmental protection. 
James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123 (1986); X and Others v Belgium No 6837 n 4 3 DR 
135 (1976). 
G, S and M v Austria No 9614181 34 DR 119 (1983). 
Allegemeine Gold- und Silberscheideanstalt [AGOSI] v United Kingdom ECHR Series A 
vol 108 (1986). 
Tre Trakt6rer AB v Sweden ECHR Series A vol 159 (1989). 
Sporrong and LCinnroth v SWeden 5 EHRR 35 (1982); Allan Jacobsson v Sweden ECHR 
Series A vol 163 (1989); Pine Valley Developments Umited and Others v Ireland 14 EHRR 
319 (1991). 
lnze v Austria ECHR Series A vol 126 (1987). 
Fredin v Sweden ECHR Series A vol 192 (1991). 
Xv Austria No 8003fl717 DR 80 (1980); Mellacher and Others v Austria ECHR Series 
A vol 169 (1989). 
Karniv Sweden No 11540185 55 DR 157 (1988). 
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The regulatory power of a contracting state to impose and enforce measures to secure 
the payment of taxes, other contributions or penalties has been interpreted widely. 
Although the state has to ensure that the measures taken in. this regard reflect a fair 
balance between the general interest and the interests of the affected parties 
respectively, it has more or less unlimited powers to determine the levels of taxation, 
the means of assessment and the manner in which these liabilities are enforced.80 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick81 point out that a taxation scheme may adversely affect 
the individual's guarantee of ownership if the scheme places an excessive burden on 
the taxpayer or fundamentally interferes with his/her financial position. The state's wide 
margin of appreciation is, however, respected by the court, and the court will not easily 
question the state's conclusion as to what is in the general interest, except in cases 
where the purpose or aim of the taxation seems to be devoid of any reasonable 
foundation.82 Notwithstanding the very lenient approach of the court in this regard, it 
was stated in X v Austria83 that the court always has the power to investigate the 
proportionality and necessity of a certain measure, even if it is clear that it is a tax, 
contribution or penalty in terms of Rule 3. 
10.3 Conclusion 
The institutions of the Council of Europe have interpreted article 1 of the First Protocol 
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to 
provide the widest possible protection to individuals while ensuring that the contracting 
states retain the power to regulate the property regimes in their respective jurisdictions. 
The phraseology of article 1 reflects the compromising attitude at the negotiation 
80 
81 
82 
83 
Van Dijk and Van Hoof Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights 345. 
Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick The law of the European Convention on Human Rights 537. 
Also see Wasa Liv Omsesidigt v Sweden No 13013187 58 DR 163 (1988); Scenska 
Managementgruppen v Sweden No 11036184 45 DR 211 (1985). 
Gasus Dosier- und FOrdertechnik v Netherlands ECHR Series A vol 306 (1995) at par 60. 
No 7287fl5 13 DR 27 (1979). Also see Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a 
comparative analysis chapter on Council of Europe. 
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process at which the property clause was drafted, but its interpretation and application 
to some extent disregard the exact wording of the article and follow the general trend 
of guaranteeing and protecting property as a fundamental h~man right. 
The term 'possessions', as used in article 1, is interpreted to mean 'property' in the wide 
sense, and as such it allows for the protection of most of the individual's patrimonial 
interests, while at the same time allowing the state to regulate a wide range of property 
interests in an attempt to promote the public interest. Article 1 is furthermore interpreted 
to protect the peaceful enjoyment of property (Rule 1, as a general principle). The 
deprivation or expropriation and regulation or control of the use of property (Rules 2 
and 3 respectively) are seen as specific instances of interference with the individual's 
peaceful enjoyment of property. An interference with the individual's property interests 
may be declared invalid or disproportional in terms of Rule 1, even if it does not 
constitute an expropriation in terms of Rule 2 or a regulation of property in terms of 
Rule3. 
The inference of the fair balance test from article 1 as a whole in Sporrong and 
L6nnroth v Sweden84 furthermore ensures that an interference with or limitation of an 
individual's property interests reflects a proportional balance between the public or 
general interest on the one hand and the interests of the affected parties on the other. 
Although the state has a wide margin of appreciation (discretion) to determine what 
constitutes the public interest and which interferences will promote the public interest, 
the interference will be in breach of article 1 if it places an excessive burden on the 
individual. The question of compensation (for bot~ nationals and non-nationals) in the 
case of deprivation is also dealt with in terms of the fair balance test. The court has the 
final power of review to determine whether an interference complies with the 
requirements of valid interferences: the interference has to be lawful, has to be in 
pursuance of a legitimate purpose and has to comply with the fair balance test. 
The interpretation and application of the property guarantee in article 1 of the First 
84 5 EHRR 35 (1982). 
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Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms reflects the importance of the social function of property in a post-World War 
II Europe. As is pointed out in this chapter the institutions of the Council of Europe 
afford the individual adequate protection of his/her property rights, but the exercise of 
these rights have to be reflect and provide for the social and political context within 
which they function. As a result of the relationship between the Council of Europe and 
the contracting states, the contracting states have a wide margin of appreciation to 
determine what constitutes a public interest in a particular jurisdiction and which 
interferences with an individual's property rights serve to promote the social and 
political well being of all members of that particular society. 
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11 
PROPERTY IN SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
11.1 Introduction 
The property clause in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1 is the result of 
a negotiated settlement between the African National Congress and the main 
opposition parties, the National Party and the Democratic Party. The African National 
Congress wanted to ensure that the property guarantee was phrased in such a manner 
that it would not frustrate land reform, while the opposition strived for the widest 
possible protection of existing property rights.2 It is clear from the text of the property 
clause that it is supposed to provide adequate protection of existing property rights 
while still allowing for comprehensive land reform. The attempt to find an equitable 
balance between these seemingly conflicting interests is a theme which influences 
almost every aspect of the nature, scope and application of the property guarantee. 
This chapter focuses on the nature and extent of constitutional property rights in South 
Africa. The requirements for valid deprivations and expropriations are looked at, and 
in the case of expropriations, the question of compensation is discussed. 
11.2 Interpreting the property clause 
In order to understand the true meaning of and properly interpret the property 
2 
Section 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, and section 
28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. The final Constitution is 
officially numbered Act 108 of 1996, but Van Wyk 1997 THRHR 377 at 378 et seq points 
out that it is a mistake to number the Constitution in this manner, because, unlike the 
interim Constitution of 1993, this is not a normal act of Parliament, but a document drafted 
by the Constitutional Assembly. 
For a discussion on the negotiations over the protection of property rights in the interim 
Constitution see Chaskalson 1995 SAJHR 222. 
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guarantee, it has to be seen against the background of the Constitution3 as a whole. 
Although the phraseology of the guarantee itself is important, the property clause has 
to be read in context in order to determine its meaning. The property guarantee forms 
part of the bill of rights in chapter 2 of the Constitution. All rights contained in the bill 
of rights have to be interpreted in terms of the interpretation clause in section 39. 4 
Section 39 determines that all fundamental rights have to be interpreted so as to 
promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom. It is furthermore pointed out in the preamble that the 
purpose of the Constitution is to: 
"heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on 
democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights". 
In the property clause it is stated that property may only be expropriated for a public 
purpose or in the public interest, 5 and that the public interest includes land reform~ 
Compensation, in the case of expropriation, has to be just and equitable and it has to 
reflect an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of the affected 
parties. 7 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Reference to the 'Constitution' should be regarded as reference to the final Constitution 
of South Africa (1996). References to the interim Constitution (1993) will be indicated as 
such. 
Section 39 determines that: 
"{1) When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum -
{a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
{c) may consider foreign law. 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary 
law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights. 
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights or freedoms that are 
recognised or conferred by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that 
they are consistent with the Bill". 
Section 25(2)(a). 
Section 25(4)(a). 
Section 25(3). 
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All these references to the promotion of the public interest indicate that the Constitution 
(and as such also the property clause) is directly geared towards the advancement and 
realisation of a specific socio-political programme. The Constitution should be seen as 
an instrument to achieve social upliftment, the obliteration of inequalities, the promotion 
of equality, human dignity and freedom, the realisation of land reform, and so on. Van 
der Walt8 points out that 
" ... the property clause must be read against the background of a social 
policy aimed at striking a compromise between providing a simple but 
powerful constitutional guarantee for (inevitably) existing property rights 
on the one hand and a purposeful effort at removing some of the 
historical imbalances with regard to the distribution of land rights on the 
other". 
The nature, scope and extent of property rights are directly influenced by societal 
needs. Thus, although an individual is entitled to the constitutional protection of his/her 
property rights, these rights are not inviolate, and may be limited validly if and when the 
public interest requires such a limitation~e most fundamental rights the right to 
property is limited in principl~owever, this does not mean that the state has carte 
blanche to limit or take an inaividual's property whenever and however it sees fit. Any 
interference with property has to comply with the requirements for such an interference 
as set out in sections 7, 25 and 36 of the Constitution, and it has to reflect an equitable 
balance between the rights and interests of the affected party and the public interest. 10 
8 
9 
10 
Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 at 186. 
See section 7 (3) of the Constitution determines that all rights in chapter 2 are subject to 
the limitations contained in the general limitation clause in section 36, or elsewhere in the 
bill of rights. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 164; Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 at 
186 et seq. Also see the judgement of McCreath J in Diepsloot Residents and landowners 
Association v Administrator, Transvaal 1993 (3) SA 49 (T). 
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Kleyn11 points out that although the social state principle is not explicitly mentioned in 
the Constitution, the Constitution contains references to the principles on which the 
social state is founded. The protection of a variety of socio-economic rights and the 
stated aim to create a society based on social justice and the improvement of the 
quality of life of all citizens indicate that the social state principle is applicable in South 
Africa. As such the state has an obligation to guarantee a dignified existence for all and 
to work towards the elimination of inequalities which exist within the society. 12 This has 
a direct bearing on the interpretation and application of the property clause, specifically 
as far as land reform is concerned. 
By following a purposive and functional approach towards the interpretation of the 
property clause, it is possible to account for and deal with the tension between the 
interests of the individual and the public interest and to create a just and equitable 
balance between the interests of the haves and the have-nots, the privileged and the 
underprivileged. This approach will also ensure that the private-law concept of 
ownership will not interfere with the adjudication of constitutional property disputes. The 
purposive approach to interpretation of the property clause will enable the courts to 
follow a more socially conscious approach to the property question. 13 
In order to understand and interpret the property clause both of the goals of the 
property clause have to be taken into account. In each individual case an attempt 
should be made to create an equitable balance between the protection of individual 
property and the social function and responsibility of property. This implies that neither 
the protection of private land rights nor land reform may take precedence over the 
other, but that the promotion of both these goals should be harmonised to ensure that 
each of them enjoys the greatest possible relative protection or advancement. The 
11 
12 
13 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 407. Also see De Waal 1995 SAJHR 2 at 8. 
See the preamble of the Constitution. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 13 et seq; Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 
at 334 et seq; Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 at 185 et seq; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 
415; Davis, Chaskalson and De Waal in Van Wyk et al Rights and Constitutiona/ism 1 at 
122 et seq; Murphy 1995 SAPL 115; Murphy 1994 SAJHR 386 et seq. 
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tension between the protection of individual rights and the social function of property 
forms an integral part of the meaning and application of the property clause, and the 
balancing of these apparent contradicting interests should be the main focus in the 
process of solving each individual case. In any attempt to create a just and equitable 
balance between individual property rights and the public interest the courts have to 
recognise the aim of the Constitution, namely to ensure for every citizen an existence 
characterised by equality, freedom and human dignity in an open and democratic 
society. Van der Walt14 points out that no magic formula exits according to which the 
courts can solve the tension or maintain the balance between the protection of 
individual rights and the promotion of the public interest. This tension will always form 
an integral part of any property dispute and the courts cannot adjudicate any property 
case without recognising or dealing with this tension. 
According to Van der Walt15 the identification of a fundamental guideline for the 
interpretation of the different fundamental rights contained in the bill of rights will assist 
in solving interpretation and limitation problems. He suggests that the phrase 'the 
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom' be used as such a constitutional guideline. This guideline would 
accommodate both individual interests 16 and public interests, 17 and would ensure that 
individual rights are not perceived as absolute rights, and that these rights cannot be 
infringed upon arbitrarily. 
11.3 The property clause 
The property clause, contained in section 25 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 16. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 99. 
The protection offundamental rights should promote human dignity, equality and freedom. 
The protection of fundamental rights should take place within an open and democratic 
society. 
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"(1) (n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms of a law 
general application, and no law may permit the arbitrary 
deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of a law of general 
application -
(a) For a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time 
and manner of payment of which have either been agreed 
to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of 
payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable 
balance between the public interest and the interests of those 
affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including -
(a) the current use of the property; 
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
(c) the market value of the property; 
( d) the effect of direct state investment and subsidy in the 
acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the 
property; and 
( e) the purpose of the expropriation. 
(4) For the purposes of this section -
(a) the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land 
reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all 
South Africa's resources; and 
(b) property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable 
citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis. 
(6) A person or community whose tenure is legally insecure as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, 
to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure 
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which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
(7) A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 
1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is 
entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to 
restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 
(8) No provision of this section may impede the state from taking 
legislative or other measures to achieve land, water and related 
reform, in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination, 
provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is 
in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1 ). 
(9) Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection 
(6)". 
Section 25 comprises mainly four different categories of provisions: (a) the deprivation 
provision in section 25 (1 ); (b) the expropriation provisions in section 25(2) and 25(3); 
(c) the interpretation provision in section 25(4); and (d) the land reform provisions in 
section 25(5) to section 25(9). A discussion of the first three categories of provisions 
is provided below, while the provisions on land reform are discussed in chapter 15 
below. 
~ property guarantee in section 25 is phrased negative_~is raises the question 
whether section 25 includes a guarantee of the positive entitlements usually associated 
with property (the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property), 18 as was guaranteed 
in section 28 of the 1993 Constituti~s, however, held in Jn re: Certification of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 199620 that neither the positive nor the 
negative guarantee of property can be regarded as a universally recognised 
18 
19 
20 
Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaska Ison et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 10. 
Section 28 of the interim Constitution provided that: "(1) Every person shall have the right 
to acquire and hold rights in property and, to the extent that the nature of the rights 
permits, to dispose of such rights". See Badenhorst in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 
at 10. 
1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC). 
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formulation, and that the negative formulation implicitly provides protection for the right 
to hold property ~he fact that the property guarantee is formulated negatively is not 
regarded as an indication that the guarantee does not include a guarantee of the 
positive entitlements of property.22 Van der Walt23 points out that the exact phraseology 
of the guarantee is not all that important: different formulations of the property 
guarantee in different jurisdictions with completely different socio-economic, legal and 
constitutional backgrounds are all interpreted within a broad constitutional framework 
to mean more or less the same and provide more or less the same guarantee. 24 Thus, 
notwithstanding the fact that most of the other provisions in the bill of rights are 
formulated positively, the negative formulation of section 25 does not imply that 
property should not be regarded as a guarantee of property as a fundamental right. 25 
The positive formulation of the property guarantee in section 28 of the interim 
Constitution may be regarded, as in German law,26 as a guarantee of property as an 
institution. 27 Since the positive formulation of the property guarantee has been 
abandoned the question of an institutional guarantee of property is no longer at issue 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at 1287. 
See Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 
10 where it.is argued that the negative formulation of the property guarantee does not 
provide for the (formal or substantial) right to acquire, hold and dispose of property. They 
contend that the equality clause (section 9) will have to be used in order to ensure that all 
South Africans are afforded the same rights - whereas whites have existing property rights 
(and may consequently hold and dispose of those rights), members of other race groups 
will have to rely on the equality clause to ensure that they are afforded the same rights. 
But see Badenhorst in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 9. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 23 et seq. 
See in this regard the discussion of the different property guarantees in chapters 8, 9 and 
10. Although the formulation of the property guarantee in these jurisdictions differ 
substantially, they all have more or less the same result. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 25. 
See 8.3.2 above. 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 413 et seq; Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 at 302 et seq; 
Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 131 at 133; Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al 
Constitutional law of South A'frica 31-1 at 6; Badenhorst in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-
1 at 8. 
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in South African law.28 The positive formulation of the rights to security of tenure in 
section 25(6) and land restitution in section 25(7) indicate that these are positive claim 
rights against the state. These are, however, not unlimited rights. Both section 25(6) 
and 25(7) clearly stipulate that these rights are to be limited by an Act of Parliament. 
The availability of resources will inevitably also have a limiting effect on these rights. 
Section 25 reflects a balance between the protection of private property rights and the 
advancement of the common interest. The provisions on the deprivation29 and 
expropriation of property,30 the determination of just and equitable compensation! 
access to land, 32 security of tenure; restitution of property and land reform in 
general35 accentuate the importance of private property rights. These provisions are of 
cardinal importance for the achievement and realisation of the clearly defined 
constitutional aims of personal freedom and human dignity. At the same time the 
promotion of the public interest is regarded as an aim of the Constitution in general and 
the property clause in particular. The restriction and limitation of private property rights 
are justified to the extent that is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society.36 Section 25 provides for the deprivation37 and expropriation of private property 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 24 et seq; Chaskalson and Lewis in 
Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 10. But see Kleyn 1996 SAPL 
402 at 418 who argues thatthe negative formulation of the property guarantee does not 
necessarily imply that the institution of property is no longer guaranteed in South African 
law. 
Section 25(1). 
Section 25(2). 
Section 25(3). 
Section 25(5). 
Section 25(6). 
Section 25(7). 
Section 25(8). 
Section 36(1). Also see section 7. 
Section 25(1 ). 
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for a public purpose or in the public interest,38 and the amount of compensation in the 
case of expropriation is determined with reference to the public interest.39 Land reform 
is recognised in section 25 as an important goal and it is stated specifically that the 
public interest includes land reform. 40 
11.4 Scope of constitutional property 
The term 'property' is not defined in the Constitution. The courts and the legislature will 
have to give meaning and content to the term 'property', and to determine the scope of 
constitutional property to be afforded protection in terms of section 25. It is impossible 
to provide a clear indication of what exactly will qualify as property (this includes both 
the objects of property and the rights which may qualify as property rights), and one 
may only speculate as to how wide the term 'property' will be interpreted by the courts 
and the legislature.41 It is, however, possible to derive general trends with regard to the 
scope and content of constitutional property from other jurisdictions .. 
In line with the situation in most other jurisdictions, the courts can be expected to follow 
an inclusive approach with regard to the objects and rights under the property clause. 
The inclusion of an object or right is determined by the question whether or not it 
promotes the purpose of the constitutional protection of property, and in most other 
38 
39 
40 
41 
Section 25(2). 
Section 25(3) determines that the amount of compensation must reflect an equitable 
balance between the public interest and the interest of the affected party, taking into 
account the current use of the property, the history of the acquisition and use of the 
property and the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and capital 
improvement ofthe property. 
Section 25(4) to (9). 
It should be noted that the interim Constitution protected the 'rights in property' (section 
28(1)). Section 25 changed this to 'property'. Most commentators treat these two terms 
similarly and regard them as having the same meaning. See Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 
298; Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 30; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 423; 
Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 2 et 
seq; Badenhorst in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 12. 
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jurisdictions the courts are lenient in answering this question.~erms of the so-called 
'two stages' approach the court will first determine wheth~~~ particular right can be 
afforded constitutional protection in terms of the property clause (in the first stage), and 
only then will the court continue to investigate substantive issues like due process and 
compensation in the second stage.43 The courts will rather include than exclude an 
object or right under the property clause, and they will then proceed to the second 
stage of the constitutional dispute where the validity and constitutionality of an 
infringement of that right are investigated.44 
The distinction between private law and public law is of special importance as far as 
the scope and content of constitutional property is concerned. In private law the object 
of property law is usually limited to corporeal things, and property rights are usually 
associated with real rights, of which ownership is regarded as the most important. In 
most jurisdictions where a clear distinction is made between private and public law, the 
scope and content of constitutional property is much wider than in private law.45 This 
may be ascribed to the fact that the purpose of the protection of property in private law 
differs from the purpose of the protection of property in constitutional law. Whereas the 
purpose for the protection of property in private law is to provide an absolute safeguard 
against any unpermitted interference with that right, the purpose of the property clause 
is to ensure that an equitable balance is struck between the rights of the affected 
individual and the public interest in the case of any state interference with private 
42 
43 
44 
45 
See chapters 8, 9 and 10 above in this regard. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 41 and 57 et seq. The so-called 'two 
stages' approach has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane and 
Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 100 et seq , Ferreira v Levin and Others; Vryenhoek and 
Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at 44 and Prince v President of the 
Law Society, Cape of Good Hope and Others 1998 (8) BCLR 976 (C) at 982. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 55. 
See in general 8.3.3 above with regard to the scope of constitutional property in German 
law and 7 .e above with regard to the scope of constitutional property in Dutch law. Also 
see 10.2 above with regard to the position in terms of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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property. 46 
Property law in South Africa has been dominated by the civil-.law traditio~~nership 
was regarded as the most comprehensive and valuable property right, and corporeals 
were the main property objects. The introduction of the constitutional property clause 
,•-- ... -~<-·-· ··- ., ' . 
was o~viously 9oing to change this perp~ptionof.properiy Jawf!~~.matical'i]Property' 
has a much wider meaning in the constitutional context than the private-law concept of 
'ownership'. 47 A wide range of objects and rights may be expected to be afforded 
constitutional protection in line with experiences in other jurisdictions. It can be 
expected that most real rights,48 personal rights with regard to property and so-called 
'new property' will be included in the constitutional concept of property. It should, 
however, be noted that 'new property' includes a vast variety of different rights and 
objects, and the courts will have to determine the grounds on which these rights or 
objects will be accepted as property in terms of the property clause. 49 The different 
objects which may qualify for protection in terms of section 25 include immovable 
tangible property, movable tangible property, immaterial property, rights with regard to 
debts, claims, goodwill and shares in a company, welfare rights against the state, 
licences, permits, quotas, and other rights against the state which are based on 
legislation. In Transkei Public Servants Association v Government of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others50 it was stated obiter that a housing subsidy could be a right 
in property for the purposes of section 28 of the interim Constitution. Similarly, the 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 67. 
Administrator, Natal, and Another v Sibiya and Another 1992 (4) SA 532 (A) at 539. 
See Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 
7 where it is argued that the term 'rights in property' is too narrow to allow for the protection 
of the occupation rights of labour tenants and the undisturbed possession of squatters. But 
see Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 181 at 193 et seq. 
In German law three requirements are formulated for the acknowledgement of public law 
rights as constitutional property: (a) it must accrue to a person exclusively like a private law 
right; (b) it must be substantially based on the personal contribution or effort of the 
individual; and (c) it must serve to secure the person's survival. See Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 
at 421; Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on 
Germany. 
1995 (9) BCLR 1235 (TkS). 
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protection of property as a right may be extended to include ownership and limited real 
rights, personal rights, immaterial property rights, customary residential and 
commonage-use rights, statutory rights in terms of land reform legislation, social 
security rights and other non-proprietary rights.51 According to Van der Walt52 the exact 
range of objects and rights which can be included under the property ctause will have 
to be determined, in each individual case, with reference to the principle underlying the 
Constitution, namely whether the inclusion of a specific object or right will promote the 
values that characterise an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. 
It should, however, be noted that the meaning and scope of constitutional property are 
not stable or unchangeable, and will always be subject to changes within a society. 
Different social, political or economic circumstances may cause the courts to remove 
an object or rights from the category of protected property interests. The question will 
always be whether a specific right serves to promote the constitutional purpose of the 
property clause, namely to establish an equitable balance between the interests of an 
individual property holder and the public interest in an open and democratic society 
based on equality, freedom and human dignity. It may also be possible that while a 
specific property interest is afforded constitutional protection, not all entitlements 
associated with that property interest will necessarily be guaranteed.53 
It has been pointed out above that ownership in the private law context is regarded as 
an absolute and exclusive right, and although ownership is always subject to limitation, 
51 
52 
53 
See in this regard the discussion by Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 46 
and 63 et seq. Also see Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 at 311 ; Van der Walt 1994 THRHR 
181 at 193 et seq; Badenhorst in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 10 and 12 et seq; 
Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law in South Africa 31-1 at 2 et 
seq, especially at 6; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 423; Du Plessis and Olivier 1997 HR & 
Const L J of SA 11 at 12. Also see 8.3.3 above with regard to the scope of constitutional 
property in Gennan law and 7 .4 above with regard to the scope of constitutional property 
in Dutch law. Also see 10.2 above with regard to the position in terms of Article 1 of the 
First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 55. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 68. 
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it is perceived as an inherently unrestricted right. Limitation and restriction of the 
owner's right are regarded as exceptions. 54 Constitutional property rights, on the other 
hand, are regarded as inherently restricted rights.55 Section.7(3) of the Constitution 
determines that all rights (including property rights) contained in the bill of rights are 
subject to the limitations contained or referred to in section 36 (the general limitations 
clause). Section 25 furthermore provides for the limitation (either by way of deprivation 
or expropriation) of property rights and sets out the requirements for valid limitations. 
Roux56 points out that the phrase 'rights in property', as it was used in the interim 
Constitution, coupled with the notion of property as a bundle of rights, might lead to the 
recognition of the idea of conceptual severance. A reactionary court would be in a 
position to regard every taking of a specific entitlement in property as an expropriation 
for which just and equitable compensation is required. The application of the idea of 
conceptual severance would, however, be limited by the term 'expropriation' in section 
25, which has a narrower meaning than the American term 'taking'. The question of 
conceptual severance would only be raised in those cases where the state actually 
acquires a specific entitlement in property, and not in cases where the state merely 
deprives or restricts a specific entitlement. If the courts adopt a reactionary approach 
to expropriation and compensation the notion of property as a bundle of rights would 
provide ample opportunity to apply the idea of conceptual severance without any 
assistance of the phrase 'rights in property'.57 
In an effort to create an equitable balance between the interests of the individual and 
the public interest, the introduction of limits, restrictions, controls, regulations and levies 
on individual property right are necessary to ensure that the public interest is protected. 
54 
55 
56 
57 
See chapter 6 above. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 4 7 et seq; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 419. 
Roux in Chachalia et al Fundamental rights in the Constitution 239 et seq. 
Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on South 
Africa; Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298; Badenhorst in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 
12. 
254 ) 
The extent to which property rights may be restricted is determined by balancing the 
rights or interests of the individual with the interests of society. The courts may follow 
the German approach in terms of which the right's proximity to either personal or social 
interests plays a decisive role when rights are restricted: the closer or more important 
the right is to the individual freedom and personality, the less severe the restrictions will 
be, and the further a right is removed from the individual and the closer it is to serving 
the public interest, the more severe the restrictions will be. 58 
11.5 Limitation of property 
Section 7(3) determines that all the rights in the bill of rights are subject to the 
limitations contained or referred to in section 36, or elsewhere in the bill. Section 36 
contains the general limitation provisions and every limitation of a fundamental right 
has to comply with the requirements set out in this section. Section 25 explicitly 
provides for the limitation of property rights. Section 25( 1 ) provides that no one may be 
deprived of property except in terms of a law of general application and that arbitrary 
deprivations are not permitted. Section 25(2) and (3) specifically deal with the question 
of expropriation. 
~limitation of a property right (either deprivation or expropriation of property) has to 
comply with the specific limitation provisions set out in section 25 as well as with the 
general limitation provisions contained in the general limitation clause in section 3D 
Specific limitation provisions are contained in the guarantee clause itself (in this case 
the property clause) and provide for limitations of that right specifically with regard to 
the purpose for which the right may be limited, the procedure to be followed for 
imposing a limitation, the organs which may limit the right, and so on. 59 
58 
59 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 423 et seq. 
Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope and Others 1998 (8) BCLR 
976 (C) at 992. See also Rautenbach General provisions in the South African bill of rights 
1 06 et seq; Woolman 1997 SAJHR 102 et seq; Woolman in Chaskalson et al 
Constitutional law of South Africa 12-1 et seq; Van der Walt 1997 SAPL 275 at 282; Van 
der Walt The constitutional property clause 80 et seq. 
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The general limitation clause reads as follows: 
"Limitation of rights 
36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of 
a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account 
all relevant factors, including -
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
( e) less restrictive means to achieve the same purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision 
of the Constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill 
of Rights". 
Section 36 differs from the limitation clause in the interim Constitution (section 33) in 
that the requirements that a limitation needs to be necessary in certain circumstances, 
and that the limitation must not negate the essential content of the right are not 
included in section 36. Other than this the two limitation clauses are similar. The 
limitation clause has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane 
and Another. 60 Although this case was decided on the grounds of section 33 of the 
interim Constitution, it is assumed that the court's interpretation will also apply to 
section 36.61 In essence the limitation clause involves the assessment of the competing 
public and private interests or rights based on the proportionality principle. The court 
stated that: 
60 
61 
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC). 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 83; Van der Walt 1997 SAPL 275 at 314 
et seq. 
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"[t)he limitation of constitutional rights for the purpose that is reasonable 
and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of 
competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on 
proportionality". 62 
The court stressed the fact that no absolute standard can be laid down for determining 
reasonableness, because different rights have different implications in a open and 
democratic society based on freedom and equality. Although general principles can be 
established, they have to be applied on a case to case basis, taking the particular 
circumstances of the case into consideration. The balancing of the different interests 
is inherent to the requirement of proportionality. The court went on to set out the 
considerations which may be taken into account in balancing the rights of the affected 
individual with the public interest.63 The considerations mentioned by the court were 
ultimately included in section 36. The general limitation clause, as interpreted by the 
Constitutional Court, embodies the proportionality test, according to which limitations 
will be judged. By applying the proportionality test the courts will determine whether a 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom and whether the limitation is rationally related to 
the purpose it aims to achieve. 64 
The court emphasised the fact that it is not for the courts to second-guess the wisdom 
of policy choices made by the legislature.65 The balancing of the different interests 
should not be done in such a manner that it amounts to a inquiry into the political 
62 
63 
64 
65 
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 436C. 
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 436E. 
The proportionality test, as set out in the Makwanyane decision has its roots in Canadian 
law. The proportionality principle in the general limitation clause is strongly based on the 
Canadian decision in R v Oakes (1986) 19 CRR 308. See in general Rautenbach General 
provisions in the South African bill of rights 81 et seq; Woolman 1997 SAJHR 102 at 107 
et seq; Woolman in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Jaw of South Africa 12-1 et seq; Van 
der Walt The constitutional property clause 83 et seq, Van der Walt 1997 SAPL 275 at 
314 et seq; Carpenter 1995 SAPL 260. 
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at 436F-G. 
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wisdom of legislative measures. This would amount to the application of a substantive 
due process standard and may severely frustrate any attempt by the state to effect 
social and economic change.66 The role of the courts .is rather to judge the 
constitutional suitability of a limitation of a fundamental right.67 This means that the 
courts have to determine whether a specific limitation can be justified In terms of the 
provisions set out in the Constitution itself, and whether it is justified to allow one 
constitutional principle to outweigh another constitutional principle. The court's view on 
the political wisdom or necessity of a specific law should have no bearing on its 
decision whether or not to allow a particular limitation of a fundamental right. 
With regard to the interaction between the specific limitation provisions and the general 
limitation provisions it is important to note that the general limitation clause is 
applicable to all rights contained in the bill of rights. 68 The reason for and purpose of 
a specific limitation provision determines its relationship with the general limitation 
clause.69 Firstly, a specific limitation provision can deviate from one of the general 
limitation provisions. In this case the specific limitation provision will override that 
specific element of the general limitation clause, while all the other elements of the 
general limitation clause are still fully applicable. Secondly, a specific limitation 
provision may clarify one of the elements of the general limitation provisions in order 
to avoid confusion and uncertainty. All other elements of the general limitation clause 
66 
67 
68 
69 
See in this regard 9.2 above with regard to the effects of the application of the substantive 
due process standard in the United Sates of America. Also see Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 
388 at 401 et seq; Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South 
Africa 31-1 at 11. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 83 et seq, Van der Walt 1997 SAPL 275 
at 315 et seq. 
Section 36(1). For different interpretations on the relationship between the specific 
limitations provisions in the property clause and the general limitations clause see Murphy 
1995 SAPL 107 at 120 et seq; Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional 
law of South Amca 31-1 at 11 where a distinction is made between limitations effected by 
the exercise of executive powers and limitations effected by the legislature. Also see 
Badenhorst in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 33. 
See in general Rautenbach General provisions in the South African bill of rights 106 et 
seq, Woolman 1997 SAJHR 102 et seq; Woolman in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law 
of South Africa 12-1 et seq; Van der Walt 1997 SAPL 275 at 287. 
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will still apply unchanged. Thirdly, specific limitations can be mere repetitions of the 
general limitations provision. This will not detract from the validity of any of the 
elements of the general limitation clause. 70 
The term 'deprivation' is used in the specific limitation provisions in section 25(1 ). This 
is not in conflict with the term 'limitation' as used in the general limitations clause. The 
provision that no one may be deprived of property except in terms of a law of general 
application simply repeats the similar provision in section 36(1 ). The specific limitation 
provisions in section 25(1) do not change or add anything to the general limitation 
provisions in section 36(1) and will consequently be treated in terms of the second 
category mentioned above. 71 Although section 25( 1) mentions the extra requirement 
that a limitation may not be arbitrary, it may be argued that the phraseology of section 
36 will not allow arbitrary limitations of rights either.72 Any limitation (deprivation and 
expropriation) of property thus has to be imposed in terms of a law of general 
application (as required by both section 25(1) and section 36(1 )), may not be arbitrary 
(as explicitly required by section 25(1) and implicitly by section 36(1 )), and must be 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors including: the nature of 
the right; the importance of the purpose of the limitation; the nature and extent of the 
limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and less restrictive means 
to achieve the same purpose (as required by section 36(1 )). The limitation also has to 
be imposed for a public purpose or in the public interest and must be proportionate in 
the sense that there has to be a rational connection between the limitation and the 
70 
71 
72 
For a discussion see Van der Walt 1997 SAPL 275 at 287; Van der Walt The constitutional 
property clause 92 et seq; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 428. 
For a discussion see Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 431 et seq; Van der Walt The constitutional 
property clause 93; Van der Walt 1997 SAPL 275 at 285 et seq. 
Section 36 requires that a limitation has to be effected in terms of a law of general 
application, and in terms of the proportionality principle the limitation has to bear a rational 
relationship to the legislative goal it intends to achieve. Section 36 will not allow for any 
'arbitrary' limitation of a right - no matter what interpretation is given to the word 'arbitrary'. 
See Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 107 et seq; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 
at 433; Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaska Ison et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 
at 13. 
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purpose it aims to achieve. 73 
Deprivations include all legitimate state interferences with. private property rights. 
Deprivations constitute a wide category of state interferences including both the 
regulation of the use of property and expropriation of property. Not all of these 
interferences require compensation. Compensation is only required for expropriation. 
The difference between deprivations and expropriations can be explained in terms of 
the difference between the state's police power and its power of eminent domain. 74 In 
terms of the police power the state has the authority to limit and regulate the use of 
private property. Property is not expropriated (acquired) from an individual in the case 
of deprivations. Deprivations merely limit the use and exploitation of property by the 
imposition of regulations, controls and restrictions. 75 Because of the fact that 
deprivations are non-acquisitive in nature, no compensation is payable to the affected 
party. Deprivations may include measures such as land-use and planning controls, 
building regulations, certain land reform measures and environmental conservation 
laws. Expropriations, on the other hand, are effected in terms of the state's power of 
eminent domain. In this case property is actually taken from the individual and acquired 
by the state for a public purpose or in the public interest, and consequently 
compensation will be payable in this case. 
73 
74 
75 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 95 and 109. 
The distinction between deprivation and expropriation corresponds with the situation in 
other jurisdictions. See 8.4 and 8.5 with regard to the situation in Germany, 9.4 with regard 
to the position in the United States of America and 10.2 regarding the position in terms of 
Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. See Van der Walt in Van Wyk et al Rights and constitutionalism 
455 at 464 et seq; Murphy 1992 SAJHR 362 et seq; Murphy 1993 THRHR 623 et seq; 
Badenhorst in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 15; Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388. Also 
see Davies and Others v Minister of Land, Agriculture and Water Development 1997 (1) 
SA 228 (ZS) where the distinction is accepted as part of Zimbabwean law. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 102 et seq; Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298 
at 307 et seq, Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 427; Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 131 at 134 et seq; 
Murphy 1995 SAPL 107 at 115 et seq; Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al 
Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 10 et seq. 
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11.5.1 Deprivation of property 
In terms of section 25(1) the deprivation has to be impos.ed by a law of general 
application and no law may permit arbitrary deprivations of property. The requirement 
that the deprivation of property has to take place in accordance with a· law of general 
application entails that the law must apply generally and not just to one person or a 
group of persons so as to single them out for discriminatory treatment. Such a law also 
has to be accessible, non-arbitrary, specific and clear.76 In terms of the interim 
Constitution the term 'law' in section 28(2) has been interpreted to connote a statute. 
The Afrikaans translation of section 28(2) uses the word wet which means statute. 77 In 
the final Constitution, however, the Afrikaans translation of 'law of general application' 
is 'algemeen ge/dende regsvoorskrif. In this context 'law' is interpreted in its widest 
sense to include common law and customary law.78 
It is not exactly clear what the meaning of the second part of section 25(1 ), which 
requires that no law may permit arbitrary deprivations, is. The obvious meaning would 
be that deprivations may not only be directed at one or a group of persons, but have 
to be of general validity. A deprivation would also be regarded as arbitrary if it depends 
simply on the will of the party effecting the deprivation. This meaning is, however, 
already established by the requirement that deprivations have to be effected in terms 
76 
77 
78 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 81 et seq. Chaskalson and Lewis in 
Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 11; Woolman in Chaskalson 
et al Constitutional law of South Africa 12-1 et seq; Badenhorst in Bill of Rights 
Compendium 3FB-1 at 33. With reference to the position in terms of Article 1 of the First 
Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms see Lithgow v United Kingdom ECHR Series A vol 102 (1986) where it was 
held that a law depriving some one of their property has to be adequately accessible and 
precise. 
Du Plessis v De K/erk 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) par 44 et seq. Also see Kleyn 1996 SAPL 
402 at432. 
Badenhorst in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 32; Van der Walt The constitutional 
property clause 108. 
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of a law of general application. 79 fu__n der wc1f€J points out that the meaning of 
'arbitrary' may be to ensure that no law can delegate the arbitrary power to effect a 
deprivation to some state body or offici~ Legislative measures will also be arbitrary 
when th~y bear no rational relations~o the legislative goal they are intended to 
achiev~ 
Section 25(1) contains no explicit requirement for a deprivation to be in the public 
interest or for a public purpose. Read against the background of the purpose of the 
property clause (to create an equitable balance between the interests of an individual 
and the public interest in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom) and the requirements for the valid limitation of all fundamental 
rights contained in the bill of rights as set out in section 36, it may be assumed that a 
public purpose or public interest requirement implicitly forms part of the requirements 
for valid deprivations of private property. The factors listed in section 36(1) which have 
to be taken into account in order to determine whether a limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society also indicate that a limitation will only be 
valid if it is effected for a public purpose or in the public interest.82 
11.5.2 Expropriation of property 
It is pointed out above that expropriations form part of the broader category of 
79 
80 
81 
82 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 433. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 107. Van der Walt also indicates that 
'arbitrary' may be interpreted to mean that an individual or a small group of individuals may 
not be expected to bear an unacceptably heavy burden for the sake of the general public. 
See S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC). Although this case was 
decided with reference to the right to economic activity (section 26 in the interim 
Constitution) its implications will have a direct bearing on section 25(1) in that it equates 
the non-arbitrary standard of review with the rationality review standard in US law. Also see 
Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 13; 
Badenhorst in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 33. 
See Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 108 et seq where it is pointed out that 
a comparative analysis of the situation, in among others, Germany, Switzerland, Austria 
and the European Convention reveals that the courts have generally been strict in 
requiring that deprivations have to be for a public purpose. 
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deprivations, and in order to determine whether the provisions of section 25(2) will be 
applicable to a specific case, it is important to differentiate between 'mere deprivations' 
and expropriations. According to the traditional view an expropriation entails the 
transfer of property from an individual to the state (for a public purpose) against the 
payment of compensation to the expropriatee. In terms of this narrow, traditional view, 
expropriations are those deprivations where the state actually acquires the individual's 
property.83 According to Chaskalson and Lewis84 
"[e]ven state action which extinguishes property rights is not recognised 
as expropriation unless there is some transfer of the rights in question to 
the state or to a third party. It would follow that the 'expropriations' to 
which ... s 25(2) refer are instances where the state, without the consent 
of the owner of the property concerned, acquires that property or transfer 
it to a third party. State interference with property rights which does not 
involve acquisition or transfer of property is not an expropriation, 
irrespective of the extent of the interference". 
With regard to the nature of an expropriation, Van der Walt85 indicates that the scope 
of expropriation should not be restricted unduly, but should be interpreted wide enough 
to include the acquisition of any right in the property (not only ownership), any form of 
property which is recognised for the purposes of the property guarantee, and 
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Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 434; Van der Walt The constitutional properly clause 136 et seq. 
See Badenhorst in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 28 where an exposition of the 
differences between expropriation (in the narrow sense) and regulatory measures of 
control (deprivations) of property is provided. 
Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 15. 
Van der Walt The constitutional properly clause 134. Van der Walt The constitutional 
properly clause 135, however, points out that the technique of conceptual severance, 
according to which the entitlements of a property holder are conceptually divided into 
separate properties, should be avoided. See in this regard Radin Reinterpreting properly 
126 et seq. 
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permanent as well as temporary acquisitions. 86 The scope of expropriation should 
furthermore not be restricted to the private law concept of an actual acquisition of 
property by the state, because property can be taken without the state acquiring 
anything.87 It is, however, up to the courts to decide exactly what the term 
'expropriation' will encompass in the South African context. 
The constitutional validity of an expropriation will be scrutinised during the second 
phase of the constitutional property dispute. Only after it has been established that the 
right in question qualifies for protection in terms of the property clause will the court 
evaluate the constitutionality of the limitation in question. In order for an expropriation 
to be constitutionally valid it has to conform with the specific limitation provisions set 
out in section 25 and the general limitation provisions set out in section 36.88 As is 
pointed out above, expropriations can be regarded as a specific form of deprivations, 
and as such all expropriations have to meet the requirements for valid deprivations as 
set out in section 25(1 ). An expropriation will only be valid if: (a) it is effected in terms 
of a law of general application;89 (b) it is not arbitrary~ (c) it is effected for a public 
purpose or in the public interest;91 (d) it is subject to the payment of just and equitable 
compensation;92 and (e) it is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors including the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, 
the nature and extent of the limitation, the relation between the limitation and its 
86 
87 
88 
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90 
91 
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Also see Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional Jaw of South Africa 31-1 
at 15; Chaskalson 1994 SAJHR 131 at 136 with regard to the extension of the concept of 
expropriation to include temporary expropriation. 
Van der Walt The constitutional properly clause 134; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 437. Also 
see 9.5 above. 
See the discussion in 11.5 above. 
Section 25(1), section 25(2) and section 36(1). 
Section 25(1). 
Section 25(2)(a) read with section 25(4)(a). 
Section 25(2)(b) and section 25(3). 
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purpose, and less restrictive means to achieve the same purpose. 93 
Section 25(2) determines that property may only be expropriated for 'a public purpose 
or in the public interest'. It is unclear why the public purpose/public interest requirement 
is duplicated, but it probably is to ensure that land reform measures are not frustrated 
by a narrow interpretation of the public purpose requirement to include only 'public 
use'. 94 The duplication of the public purpose/public interest requirement and the 
statement in section 25(4)(a) that the public interest includes the nation's commitment 
to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's 
resources, ensures that the validity of land reform measures are not attacked for not 
being in the public interest. Expropriations will thus only be valid if they are effected for 
a public purpose and if they are for purposes of land reform, which is in the public 
interest. 95 
Van der Walt96 points out that the two different references to the public purpose 
requirement in section 25(2) and section 25(3) may be interpreted differently. The 
public purpose requirement in section 25(2) is aimed at the protection of the individual 
against unnecessary or unjustified expropriation by the state and as such it may be 
read restrictively to mean 'public necessity'. The public purpose requirement in section 
25(3), on the other hand, is aimed at the protection of the common interest in the 
determination of the amount of compensation and should be read extensively to mean 
'public benefit'. The two different interpretations of the public purpose requirement can 
indicate that expropriations, even if they are effected to effect land reform, have to 
reflect an equitable balance between the interests of the individual and the public 
interest, and must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom. However, this does not mean that 
93 
94 
95 
96 
Section 36(1). 
Chaskalson 1994SAJHR131at137; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 434. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 135; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 437. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 137 et seq, with reference to the opinion 
of Bohmer J in the German case BVerfGE 56, 249. 
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private rights will be sacrificed or that the implementation of land reform measures will 
be unnecessarily restrained or frustrated by the public-purpose requirement. The 
phraseology of the property clause as well as the direct programmatic paradigm within 
which the property clause functions will ensure that comprehensive land reform will not 
be impeded by the property guarantee. The interpretation and application of the 
property clause have to reflect the values underlying an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and the property clause specifically 
emphasises the importance of the public interest in both the protection and the 
limitation of property rights. 
Up to the implementation of the first democratic Constitution in South Africa, 
expropriation of property implied the actual acquisition of property by the state or the 
transfer of property to the state.97 However, in a constitutional context there is a wider 
perception of expropriation, in terms of which compensation is required for the taking 
of property. Takings include both expropriation (where the state acquires property) and 
those cases where the property rights of the individual are affected so severely that it 
requires the payment of compensation. This second category of cases where the 
payment of compensation is.required notwithstanding the fact that the state does not 
acquire anything is commonly known in the US as inverse condemnation or regulatory 
expropriation.98 Thus, although no actual expropriation is effected, the effects of the 
deprivation is such that it is regarded as going too far and amount to a taking of 
property for which compensation is required. In these instances the loss of the 
individual property holder rather than the gain of the state is considered to be the 
functional element of a taking. 99 
It is not clear whether the South African courts will recognise the existence of a 
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Van der Merwe Sakereg 294; Kleyn and Borraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The law of 
property 316. 
See chapter 9 in this regard. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 118; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 437 et seq; 
Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 at 396; Chaskalson 1994SAJHR131 at 134; Chaskalson 
and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 18. 
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category of regulatory expropriations.100 In light of the purpose of the property clause 
(to create an equitable balance between the interests of the individual and the public 
interest) and the application of the proportionality principle embodied in section 36) it 
seems likely that the courts will not allow the severe restriction of an individual's 
property rights without compensation. 101 Although it might seem that the recognition of 
the middle category of regulatory expropriations may impede reform measures in that 
the payment of compensation is required for regulatory interferences with private 
property, it does not necessarily mean that existing property rights are afforded 
absolute protection. It is accepted in other jurisdictions that existing, legitimate uses of 
property may be prohibited without compensation if and when they become contrary to 
public health or safety.102 In protecting the public health and safety the legislature is not 
restricted to a choice between upholding existing rights or expropriating them against 
compensation. The legislature has the authority to subject existing rights to new legal 
regimes in order to accommodate new or changed circumstances. In the process 
existing rights or entitlements can be abolished, changed or subjected to new or stricter 
controls and restrictions without attracting compensation and without violating the 
property guarantee, as long as the rule of law is upheld, the changes are effected in the 
public interest and are in accordance with the proportionality principle. 103 The 
100 
101 
102 
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See 8.5 above where it is pointed out that inverse condemnation is not recognised by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in German law. This is mainly the result of article 14.3 (the 
Junktim-Klausel or linking clause) which requires that law which authorises an 
expropriation should provide for the nature and extent of compensation. Also see 9.5 
above where the position in US law is explained. Regulatory taking is recognised in US 
law. Whenever it is found that a deprivation 'goes too far' it will be classified as a taking for 
which compensation is payable. The US courts judge each case on its own merits in an 
'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiry'. · 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 120 et seq; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 437 
and 441. Although Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South 
Africa 31-1 at 18 strongly criticise the ad hoc approach of the US courts, they also 
recognise the possibility that the South African courts may accept the distinction between 
deprivations, expropriations and regulatory or constructive expropriations. Chaskalson 
1994 SAJHR 131 at 136 expresses the opinion that the South African courts would do well 
by not recognising regulatory expropriations, because this may result in a situation where 
the duty on the state to pay compensation becomes so burdensome that it may impede 
land reform. 
See 8.5 and 9.5 above. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 130; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 437. 
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recognition of a category of regulatory expropriations will not entrench existing property 
rights as long as the courts recognise the simultaneous need for regulatory measures 
that do not require compensation. 
The line between deprivations and regulatory expropriations is not very clear and the 
courts will have to determine in each individual case whether a specific limitation 
requires the payment of compensation. The principles of reasonableness and 
proportionality will have to be applied to each case, and compensation will only be due 
if it is unjust and inequitable to expect the affected property holder to bear the burden 
without compensation, 104 either because the burden is too harsh or the individual (or 
a small group of individuals) is expected to bear a burden which should be borne by 
society at large.105 
11.6 Compensation 
Section 25(2) determines that expropriation of property by the state is subject to 
compensation. Section 25(3), which deals with the determination of the quantum, 
manner and time of payment of compensation, determines that compensation must be 
just and equitable and that it must reflect an equitable balance between the public 
interest and the interests of the affected party. In order to determine whether 
compensation is just and equitable and whether an equitable balance is created 
between the conflicting interests, section 25(3) states that all relevant factors must be 
taken into account, including: (a) the current use of the property; (b) the history of the 
acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market value of the property; (d) the extent 
of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital 
improvement of the property; and ( e) the purpose of the expropriation. 106 
104 
105 
106 
With reference to section 25(2) and (3) and section 36(1). 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 132; Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 441; 
Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 18. 
For a discussion of these factors see Badenhorst Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 39 
et seq; Budlender in Budlender, Latsky and Roux Juta's New Land Law 1-56 et seq. 
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The amount, time and manner of payment of compensation have to be agreed on by 
the affected parties, and failing an agreement, the court will have to make a 
determination in this regard. 107 Van der Walt108 points out that compensation need not 
be paid in money, nor is it necessary to pay it immediately, as long as the time and 
manner of payment of compensation adhere to the balancing principle and are just and 
equitable in view of the relevant circumstances. 
The balancing principle embodied in section 25(3), as well as the list of factors which 
have to be taken into account in the determination of the quantum of compensation 
clearly indicates that the state need not pay full compensation or the full market value 
of the expropriated property. In a comparative analysis the Constitutional Court found 
in In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996109 that 
there is no evidence to suggest that market value is the only acceptable standard for 
compensation. Compensation may also be less than market value, as long as the 
amount of compensation reflects a proportional balance between the interests of the 
affected individual and the common interest. The factors listed in section 25(3)(a) to (e) 
will assist the court in creating such a balance. Property which was acquired or 
improved with direct state investment and subsidies, is underutilised or is held for 
purely speculative purposes may justify expropriation against compensation less than 
market value or even no compensation at all. In light of the statement in section 
25(4)(a) that the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform, 
coupled with the immense social, political and economical importance of efforts to bring 
about a just and equitable distribution of land in South Africa, it might be justified to set 
the quantum of compensation in the case of land reform at less than market value. 110 
107 
108 
109 
110 
Section 25(3). 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause 144. Also see Chaskalson and Lewis in 
Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 25; Badenhorst Bill of Rights 
Compendium 3FB-1 at 38. 
1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) at 1288. 
See in general Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 444; Van der Walt The constitutional property 
clause 145 et seer. Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South 
Africa 31-1 at 23 et seq; Badenhorst Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 38. 
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Budlender111 provides an interesting analysis of the factors which have to be taken into 
account when the quantum of compensation is determined. The guiding principle is that 
compensation should be just and equitable. To determine· exactly what is just and 
equitable all relevant factors have to taken into account, and the weight and meaning 
of the different factors should be determined with reference to the overall structure and 
purpose of the Constitution. The facts and circumstances of each case will have a 
bearing on the method and outcome of the way in which the factors are weighed 
against each other. The market value of the affected property is only one of the relevant 
factors, and it should not be regarded as the most important factor. In terms of the 
Expropriation Act112 market value has traditionally been regarded as the only guiding 
principle in the calculation of the quantum of compensation, 113 but in light of the fact 
that this Act has to be interpreted in accordance with the Constitution, this perception 
is likely to change. Every relevant factor has to be accounted for in light of the facts and 
circumstances of the specific case. 
It is theoretically possible that compensation may be higher than market value, 
depending on the circumstances in that particular case. Although the value of the 
property holder's own investment in the property is not mentioned in section 25(3) as 
a factor which must be considered in the process of determining the amount of 
compensation, 114 it is stated in section 25(3) that all relevant factors must be taken into 
account to determine just and equitable compensation, and own investment may play 
a decisive role in this regard. 115 Chaskalson and Lewis, however, point out that in the 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
Budlender in Budlender, Latsky and Roux Juta's New Land Law 1-56 et seq. Although this 
discussion is based on the factors enumerated in section 28(3) of the interim Constitution, 
the arguments are also valid for section 25(3). 
63of1975. 
The importance of the market value in the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 has perhaps been 
overstated. See Kerksaylnvestment(Ply) Ltdv Randburg Town Council 1997 (1) SA 511 
(T) at 522. 
Section 28(3) of the interim Constitution specifically included the value of investments by 
those affected as one of the factors which must be taken into account in the determination 
of the quantum of compensation. Also see Murphy 1995 SAPL 107 at 129. 
Kleyn 1996 SAPL 402 at 444. 
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determination of the quantum of compensation it is the benefit of the state and not the 
loss of the affected individual which has to be taken into account, and as such is seems 
highly unlikely that compensation at more than market value will be regarded as just 
and equitable. 116 
The duty to compensate in the case of expropriation is recognised in most 
jurisdictions.117 Compensation needs to be just and equitable and must reflect an 
equitable balance between the interests of the affected individual and the public 
interest. This requirement allows for the possibility of very low or even no 
compensation, depending on the circumstances of the specific case. In these 
exceptional cases the state will, however, have to indicate that all relevant factors 
justify the payment of very low or no compensation and that the quantum of the 
compensation reflects an equitable balance between the conflicting interests. 
Exceptional cases where property has been acquired and/or improved inequitably with 
direct state funding and subsidy may justify expropriation against very little or no 
compensation. 118 
Section 25(8) states that no provision of section 25 may impede land or other reform 
measures taken by the state to redress the results of past racial discrimination, 
provided that any departure from the provisions of section 25 is in accordance with the 
provisions of section 36(1 ). Van der Walt119 points out that section 25(8) seems 
superfluous and that the only possible interpretation of section 25(8) is that the state 
may be able to expropriate without compensation if the state can indicate that the non-
116 
117 
118 
119 
Chaskalson and Lewis in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 31-1 at 24 
point out that in the determination of the quantum of compensation it is the benefit of the 
state and not the loss of the affected individual which have to be taken into account, and 
as such is seems highly unlikely that compensation at more than market value will be 
regarded as just and equitable. Also see Badenhorst Bill of Rights Compendium 3FB-1 at 
38. 
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payment of compensation is in accordance with section 36(1 ). It should, however, be 
noted that the specific limitation provisions for valid deprivation and expropriation of 
property set out in section 25 correspond with the general limitation provisions of 
section 36, and consequently it seems improbable that an expropriation without 
compensation will meet the requirements of section 36 without also meeting the 
requirements of section 25. Or put differently, if an expropriation without compensation 
aimed at land reform is not just and equitable in terms of section 25, it is hard to 
imagine that it will be justifiable in terms of section 36. 
11. 7 Conclusion 
It is pointed out in section 1 that the concept of ownership and property rights did not 
develop in a uninterrupted, linear line, but that the development was subject to a few 
discontinuities. Each of these discontinuities constituted a break in the logical 
development of property rights in that the different concepts or the social function of 
ownership or property had to change dramatically in order to suite the needs of a 
particular society. Vulgar Roman law, the introduction of feudalism, the abolition of 
feudal law and the concept of divided ownership, and the creation of a scientific, 
hierarchical system of property rights each called for a totally new approach to either 
ownership or property rights in general. The change in the social function of ownership 
or the creation of a new concept of property rights was necessitated by the changing 
social and political context in which property rights had to function. 
It is pointed out in chapter 6 that the process of scientification of the private-law 
concept of ownership (and other property rights) in South Africa was influenced by 
German Pandectism. The social function of property rights was negated and pushed 
to the background by conceptual approach to property law. The hierarchical system of 
property rights reinforced the concept of absolute, exclusive and individual ownership 
as the most comprehensive real right. All other property rights were regarded as lesser 
rights. In terms of this concept of ownership, ownership was regarded as an in principle 
unlimited right and all limitations or restrictions of the owner's rights were seen as 
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exceptions. 
The implementation of the first democratic Constitution in South Africa signalled 
another discontinuity or break in the development of property rights in South Africa. The 
' 
constitutional guarantee of property placed the whole property debate within a new 
constitutional context. The traditional conceptual approach to property law is replaced 
by a new, broader debate which emphasise the social and political function of property. 
The range of rights and objects which are afforded protection in terms of section 25 is 
much broader than in private law, and ownership is no longer regarded as the most 
important property right. 
The implementation of the constitutional property guarantee does not mean that a new 
concept of property is created, but rather that the property debate has changed. 
Cognisance is taken of the important social and.political function of property and this 
has become part of the public debate on property. All property rights are now afforded 
the same protection and the limitation of all rights are regulated by section 25. Special 
provision is made in section 25( 4) to 25(7) for different measures to effect 
comprehensive land reform. These provision further emphasise that property has a 
social function and that the exercise and limitation of property rights should be dictated 
by the social context in which they function. 
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SECTION 2 
CONCLUSION 
Property in a constitutional context is approached differently from property in a private-
law context. It is pointed out in the previous section that property law in private law in 
the twentieth century is dominated by the abstract conceptualist approach to property 
rights. In terms of this approach property law is dealt with scientifically. The different 
property rights are fitted into a hierarchical system of rationally connected concepts and 
definitions. The conceptualist approach does not take cognisance of the social or 
political function of property, but treats the different property rights as scientific 
concepts largely unaffected by social circumstances. The conceptualist approach is 
regarded as flexible enough to adapt to different social and political circumstances. In 
view of the neutrality and abstractness of this approach, it is said that property is not 
affected by new social and political circumstances, it merely adapts to suit the new 
context in which it has to function. 
In a constitutional context property is approached differently. In this context the private-
law concept of property is not amended or changed to accommodate the socially 
important role that property has to fulfill, but property rights are rather interpreted and 
approached differently. Cognisance is taken of the importance of the social and political 
role and function of property, and the protection and limitation of property rights have 
to reflect its social and political dimension.· The extent of the protection and limitation 
of property has to be determined with reference to the public interest, and as such the 
courts have to establish an equitable or fair balance between the interests of the 
individual property holder and the common interest. Constitutional property is not dealt 
with in terms of different concepts which form part of and fit into a hierarchical system 
of rights. All property rights which are afforded constitutional protection are protected 
equally. 
It is pointed out in the different chapters in this section that individual property rights 
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are afforded strong protection, but that this protection is balanced with the interests of 
society. On the other hand, the range of property rights which are protected in terms 
of the constitutional guarantee of property is much wider than in private law. The scope 
of constitutional property includes much more than merely ownership and limited real 
rights with regard to corporeal things. In a constitutional context property is interpreted 
to include all patrimonial rights, including real rights, personal rights, immaterial 
property rights, and contractual rights of purchase and sale. In South Africa particularly, 
it is believed that the scope of constitutional property will be so wide as to also include 
customary residential and commonage-use rights, statutory rights in terms of land 
reform legislation, social security rights as well as other non-proprietary rights. The 
different objects which are or may be recognised as property in terms of the 
constitutional property clause incluse movable and immovable tangible property, 
immaterial property, rights with regard to debts, claims, goodwill and shares in a 
company, welfare rights, licences, permits, and other rights against the state which are 
based on legislation. It is up to the courts to decide whether a particular right, interest 
or object qualify for protection in terms of the property guarantee. In Germany the 
guiding principle in this regard is whether the protection of a particular right or object 
will serve to secure for the individual a sphere of personal liberty within which he/she 
can take responsibility for his/her own affairs in the patrimonial sphere. In South Africa 
" the values underlying the Constitution, namely the promotion of freedom, equality and 
human dignity in an open and democratic society, will be decisive in the court's 
determination of whether constitutional protection ought to be afforded to a particular 
right or object. 
On the other hand, unlike the position in civil law, constitutional property rights are not 
seen as in principle unlimited and absolute rights. It is commonly recognised that the 
state may limit or restrict an individual's rights in the public interest. The social function 
of property is accentuated in this regard. The state has the power to limit private 
property rights. In terms of its power of eminent domain the state may expropriate 
private property (against just compensation) and in terms of its police power the state 
has the authority to regulate the use of property. In most western jurisdictions (including 
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South Africa) the courts strive to establish an equitable or fair balance between the 
interests of the affected individual and the public interest whenever private property 
rights are limited. The proportionality principle forms an integral part of constitutional 
property in German law and is has a substantial influence on the treatment of 
constitutional property. The proportionality principle is applied in one form or another 
in most developed countries. Although the European Court of Human rights and the 
European Commission of Human Rights emphasise the social function of property by 
leaving a wide margin of appreciation to the contracting states to determine what 
constitutes a public purpose within their respective circumstances, they still require that 
a fair balance be struck between the individual and public interest when private 
property rights are limited. In the US there are Supreme Court decisions which seem 
to indicate that US law is also moving in the direction of applying a proportionality 
principle not dissimilar to the principle applied in Germany, the Council of Europe and 
South Africa. It was stated in Prune Yard Shopping Center v Robins1 that in order for a 
regulation to be constitutionally valid, it must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or 
capricious. In Nol/an v California Coastal Commission2 the court set out the test for a 
reasonable deprivation. In the first place the court has to determine whether there is 
an 'essential nexus' between the conditions imposed by the regulating body and the 
legitimate state interest it sought to promote. After the 'essential nexus' is established, 
the court will look into the nature of the relationship between the imposed conditions 
and the effects of the permission for a certain land-use. In Dolan v City of Tigarc/3 the 
court mainly had to deal with the second part of the test, namely the nature of the 
relationship between the restriction and the proposed development. The court stated 
that if it can be founq that there is a 'reasonable. relationship' between the regulatory 
measure or condition and the expected effects of the development, the regulatory 
condition will be constitutionally valid. The court, however, expressly stated that it 
prefers to refer to this test as the 'rough proportionality test', because it best describes 
2 
3 
447 US 74 (1980) at 84. 
483 US 825 (1987) at 837 et seq. 
114 S Ct 2309 (1994) at 62 LW 4580. 
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the requirement of the Fifth Amendment. Van der Walt, 4 however, points out that the 
growing tendency to recognise more categories of the so-called 'per se' takings, seems 
to frustrate the move towards a contextual and proportionality-oriented approach and 
rather confirm the definitional approach in terms of which certain rights and limitations 
are regarded as an inherent part of the definition of that right. The conceptual approach 
to property rights in US law differs from the a-conceptual approach in most other 
western jurisdictions. 
A further indication that the social function of property is recognised and emphasised 
in the constitutional context is the fact that compensation for expropriation (taking in the 
US) does not have to be set at market value, but that it may be set at less than market 
value, depending on all relevant circumstances. This principle is of particular 
importance in the South African context where land reform is being effected. Section 
25 (3) of the South African Constitution determines that the amount of the 
compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, 
reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those 
affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including (a) the current use of 
the property; (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; (c) the market 
value of the property; (d) the effect of direct state investment and subsidy in the 
acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and ( e) the purpose of 
the expropriation. 
The social importance of property is recognised in the constitutional context and 
individual property rights are thus not protected at all cost. The individual has to 
exercise his/her rights in such a manner that it does not harm the interests of society. 
Where private property rights are limited the individual is expected to make some 
proportional sacrifice for the common good. The public interest plays a decisive role in 
the determination of the extent of the sacrifice expected of the individual property 
holder. The weight of the public interest is determined by the particular circumstances 
4 Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on the 
United States of America. 
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in a specific society. Whereas private property rights are afforded strong protection in 
the US, it can be expected that the public interest will weigh much heavier in the South 
African context where the maldistribution of land and the land reform measures which 
aim to rectify this situation, place stronger emphasis on the social function of property. 
The approach to property rights in a constitutional context is visibly different form the 
conceptual approach followed in private law. The importance of scientific, socially and 
politically unaffected concepts is diminished by the fact that all property rights are 
interpreted and applied in view of their social role and function within society. The 
nature and extent of the rights, as well as the extent of the protection and limitation of 
property rights, are determined with reference to the social role and function of property 
in society. In the constitutional context recognition is given to the fact that property 
rights are creatures of their socio-political context and are therefore themselves political 
in nature. Each property decision (whether to create, reinforce or protect a right) is a 
political question that has to be taken and justified for each case with full recognition 
of the context within which the decision is made and the implications of the decision. 
Property rights are not seen as unchangeable concepts, but rather as violate rights 
which may be changed or limited to promote the common interest. The introduction of 
the constitutional order in most jurisdictions (including Germany, the Council of Europe 
and South Africa) has emphasised the need for a socialised or social-sensitive 
approach to property, and consequently it necessitated the re-evaluation of the 
traditional private law model in terms of which property rights are reduced to abstract, 
scientific and context-neutral concepts. 
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SECTION 3 
PROPERTY AND LAND REFORM 
This section deals with land reform and the relation between land reform and the 
constitutional protection of property. It is pointed out in the previous section that the 
traditional, conceptualist approach to property rights is not followed in constitutional 
law, where the social function of property is emphasised much more strongly than in 
private law. In is pointed out In section 1 below that there is no historical foundation for 
the assumption that property developed in an uninterrupted line from its inception in 
Roman law and that it is flexible enough to adapt to different social and political 
circumstances. Therefore, there does not seem to be any legitimate justification for the 
argument that the traditional private law perception of property need or may not be 
replaced by a new debate on the social role and function of property in society. Section 
2 indicates that the protection and limitation of constitutional property is strongly 
influenced by the social function of property. The public interest plays a decisive role 
in the determination of the extent of the protection and limitation of property rights, and 
the courts aim to establish an equitable balance between the interests of the existing 
property holder and the public interest. In a constitutional context property is seen as 
a violate right which may be limited for social and political reasons to promote the 
public interest. 
Land reform can be described as a direct, publicly controlled change in the existing 
character of land ownership and land tenure in an attempt to diffuse wealth, income and 
productive capacity. In this sense land reform (which aims to promote the public 
interest) can be interpreted conservatively as being in conflict with the constitutional 
protection of existing individual property rights. This may lead to a constitutional conflict 
between a judiciary, that interprets the constitutional, property guarantee as a strong 
guarantee of existing property rights, and a legislature, that attempts to promote the 
public interest. The Indian experience illustrates the possible dangers and effect of a 
constitutional battle between the judiciary and the legislature over the implementation 
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of land reform. However, it is pointed out in this section that the implementation of land 
reform measures need not lead to a constitutional conflict between the protection of 
existing property rights (by the judiciary) and the promotion of the public interest (by the 
legislature). In jurisdictions where the judiciary recognises the importance of the social 
function of property, land reform is not necessarily seen as an unwarranted interference 
with individual property rights. Land reform is rather seen as a legitimate public purpose 
for which the state may limit the rights of the individual. In these jurisdictions the courts 
attempt to establish an equitable balance between the existing property rights of an 
individual and land reform in the public interest. 
In this section the different forms of land reform and the reasons for the implementation 
of land reform are discussed in chapter 12. The court's treatment of the relation 
between existing property rights and land reform is looked at both in jurisdictions with 
an official land reform programme (mostly developing countries) in chapter 13, and in 
jurisdictions without an official land reform programme (mostly developed countries) in 
chapter 14. The different land reform measures introduced by the Mandela government 
in South Africa, as well as the provisions in the constitutional property clause relating 
specifically to land reform are investigated in chapter 15. 
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12 
LAND REFORM: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
12.1 Introduction 
The concept of land reform is well-known in a variety of jurisdictions, but due to the fact 
that its purpose and application vary in different jurisdictions it is difficult to provide a 
general definition of land reform. The term land reform is open to a wide range of 
interpretations. On the one hand it can be interpreted narrowly to mean the 
redistribution of land or rights in land in order to provide land to the landless. This 
would include any programme that leads to change (for the better) in the way in which 
land is held and used.1 The wide interpretation of the concept of land reform 
encompasses a comprehensive public programme designed to correct defective land 
tenure systems and to transform a society on a social, political and economical level. 
In this sense land reform is a direct, publicly controlled change in the existing character 
of land ownership and land tenure in an attempt to diffuse wealth, income or productive 
capacity. In the broad sense a land reform programme includes measures aimed at the 
redistribution of land, the improvement of existing systems of land tenure, resettlement 
schemes, the imposition of a land tax, land consolidation for the reorganisation of 
agricultural units, the provision of housing and the restitution of land to people who 
have been unjustly dispossessed of their land. 2 The broader definition of the concept 
of land reform ensures that a land reform policy is not restricted to the redistribution of 
land, but that a range of other measures to support land reform can also be included 
in a comprehensive land reform policy. Essentially, land reform can be described as a 
state initiative to modify, redirect or change the rights to, use of and relations on the 
2 
Warriner Land reform in principle and practice xiv. 
Jacoby in Weitz Rural development in a changing world 270 et seq; Chiviya Land reform 
in Zimbabwe: Policy and implementation 20 et seq. 
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land with regard to the way in which land is used and held in a particular jurisdiction. 3 
12.2 Reasons for the introduction of land reform 
According to Tai4 the need for land reform centres around two problems: 'maldistribution 
of land and tenancy problems. Maldistribution of land refers to the fact that a large 
percentage of land is concentrated in the hands of a few landowners, while the rest of 
the land is shared, usually in small fragmented farming units, by a large number of 
peasants. 5 Maldistribution of land is characteristic of most developing countries. 
Particularly countries which have a history of colonialism are plagued by inequalities 
in the patterns of land distribution. 6 More often than not the disparities which exist with 
3 
4 
5 
6 
King Land reform - a world survey 5; King Land reform: The Italian experience 2; Carroll 
The concept of land reform 35; Tai Land reform and politics: a comparative analysis 11; 
Domer Land reform and economic development 19 et seq; Marcus, Eales and Wildschut 
Down to earth 179; Hann in Abrahams A'fter socialism 23 at 24. 
Tai Land reform and politics: a comparative analysis 22 et seq. Also see Dorner Land 
reform and economic development 19 et seq. 
It is pointed out by Tai Land reform and politics: a comparative analysis 24 that although 
a high concentration of agricultural land is common in developed counties, the agricultural 
sector in the national economy is relatively small, and non-agricultural employment 
opportunities are abundant. The maldistribution of land does therefore not pose serious 
"economic problems. In developing countries, however, the capacity of industries to absorb 
the surplus rural population is limited and consequently the pressure on land is generally 
high. King Land reform - a world survey 115 points out that 4,5% of the rural population 
in BolMa owned 70% of all rural land in 1950, prior to the implementation of land reform 
measures. Prior to land reform in Brazil 81 % of the land was owned by 4,5% of the 
population. Also see King Land reform: The Italian experience 10 and The World Bank 
Staff working paper no. 275 Land reform in Latin America: Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela 1 et seq for more examples of th~ maldistribution of land. 
For the purposes of this study the situation in Southern Africa is of particular importance. 
For an exposition of the history of black land tenure and the apartheid legislation in respect 
to land in South Africa see Van der Merwe 1989 TSAR 663; Olivier, Du Plessis and 
Pienaar 1990 SA Public law 266, Van der Walt 1990 Stell LR 26; Van der Walt 1990 De 
Jure 1; Davenport 1985 Acta Juridica 53; Schoombee 1985 Acta Juridica 77; Van der Post 
1985 Acta Juridica 213; Kleyn and Boraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The Jaw of 
property 493 et seq. For a discussion of the position regarding the maldistribution of land 
in Zimbabwe see Van Horn 1994 JAL 144 at 14 7; Naldi 1993 The J Mod Afr Stud 585; 
Moyo The land question in Zimbabwe 104 et seq; Moyo and Skalness 1990 Africa Focus 
201 et seq, and for the position in Namibia see Development Strategy and Policy Unit of 
the Urban Foundation Urban Foundation Research Report 4 and 5 - Land ownership and 
conflicting claims: studies from Germany 1937-1991, and from Kenya, Zimbabwe, and 
Namibia 1950-1991 1 et seq; Office of the Prime Minister Report of the technical 
committee on commercial farmland 42; Biesele Democratization in Namibia - the view from 
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regard to the distribution of land are indicative of a disparity in wealth, income and 
political power, and land reform is used as a means to create social justice and to 
remove barriers to economic development. 7 Maldistribution of land is characterised by 
the high concentration of landownership in the hands of a few; the fact that a high 
concentration of landownership is often coupled with a high degree of absenteeism of 
the owners; and lastly, the fact that the remaining land is often largely fragmented into 
small, uneconomical units. High rents, insecurity of tenure and a lack of incentives for 
productive utilisation of land characterise the tenancy problem.8 
Land reform programmes are usually adopted due to the existence of one or more of 
the following conditions: revolution, rural unrest, an ideological commitment to land 
reform, an international climate conducive to land reform, and pressure from the 
population itself. 9 The forcible change of the existing political order is usually 
accompanied by an idealistic aspiration to promote social justice and the public welfare. 
It is therefore not uncommon for land reform to be associated with political revolutions, 
for both aim to improve the position of the poor by means of compulsory change. Rural 
unrest may be an indication that the need for land reform exists. Terrorism against 
landowners, banditry, and land invasions are regarded as (violent) manifestations of 
pressure for change from the rural community. The ideological commitment of a group 
or political party may also provide the impetus for the initiation of land reform. A further 
condition that may lead to the implementation of land reform measures is pressure from 
the international community. Lastly, rapid population growth may necessitate a change 
in the pattern of land use. 
The adoption and implementation of a land reform programme by the state is generally 
'the Bottom Rung' 1 et seq. 
7 Chiviya Land reform in Zimbabwe: Policy and implementation 24. 
8 Tai Land reform and politics: a comparative analysis 24. 
9 Tai Land reform and politics: a comparative analysis 51 et seq. 
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based on one - or a combination - of three motives: social, political and economic. 10 
The motive to bring about social equity is founded on the premise that inequality and 
exploitation are unacceptable in a society based on human dignity and freedom. In this 
case the aim of land reform is to bring about an equal distribution of land, wealth, 
' 
income and political power, and to create a free and equal society. 11 The social motive 
for land reform entails measures to deal effectively with the injustices of inequitable 
dispossession of land and the need for an equal distribution of land. The White Paper 
on South African Land Policy emphasises the need to undo the injustices of the past. 
The policy of racial segregation - particular with relation to the distribution of land - has 
led to the impoverishment of a large section of the South African population, and the 
land reform programme aims to alleviate the poverty and suffering of the victims of 
apartheid. By ensuring that land and rights to land are distributed equitably amongst 
all the people of South Africa, the land reform programme aims to make a contribution 
towards national reconciliation and the creation of a stable environment in which all 
South Africans can live and work. 12 
King13 points out that the social motive may also be interpreted in a different 
perspective. In many Latin American countries the social responsibility and function of 
ownership is recognised by law, and when an owner fails to bear his/her social 
responsibility to the community the state may expropriate the land for redistribution 
purposes. In terms of this perspective the state uses the social responsibility of 
landowners as a lever to ensure that owners provide for at least some of the needs of 
the local community. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
See in general Tai Land reform and politics: a comparative analysis 38 et seq; King Land 
reform - a world survey 11 ; ChMya Land reform in Zimbabwe: Policy and implementation 
24; Sullins An assessment of selected land redistribution programs in Latin America, Asia 
and Africa and implications for the analysis of land resettlement 16. 
Warriner Land reform in principle and practice 4; Chiviya Land reform in Zimbabwe: Policy 
and implementation 23 et seq. For an exposition of the social equity motive in the South 
African context see White Paper on South African Land Policy 7. 
White Paper on South African Land Policy 11. 
King Land reform - a world survey 11 . 
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The political motive behind land reform is closely related to the social motive. In a 
country characterised by landlessness and the concentration of land ownership in a few 
hands, land reform can be used as a political tool to demonstrate the government's 
sincerity in its attempts to bring about visible and effective change. An effective land 
reform programme can furthermore establish or confirm the political legitimacy of the 
government of the day.14 However, the implementation of a land reform programme is 
not dependent on a specific political order. Land reform programmes have been 
implemented under a variety of different political forms with varying degrees of success. 
Land reform has been instituted under democratic procedures (India), under military 
regimes (Egypt), under foreign military occupation (Japan), as the result of peasant 
revolution (Bolivia and Mexico), under revolutionary movements (China, Cuba and 
Algeria), as a result of rural unrest (Columbia and the Philippines), and under 
communist collectivisation (Russia). 15 
The economic motive for land reform centres around the need to create employment, 
increase agricultural production, distribute income equally, and to correct a defective 
land tenure system.16 In most developing countries employment opportunities are 
concentrated in urban areas and due to the fact that a large sector of the population of 
most developing countries live in rural areas, land reform can assist in creating 
alternative and additional employment opportunities in rural areas. Although it may be 
argued that land reform will inevitably cause a reduction in production on large farming 
14 
15 
16 
Tai Land refonn and politics: a comparative analysis 38 et seq; King Land reform - a world 
survey 11; Chiviya Land reform in Zimbabwe: Policy and implementation 25 et seq. 
Dorner Land reform and economic development 33; Chiviya Land reform in Zimbabwe: 
Policy and implementation 30; Tai Land reform and politics: a comparative analysis 63; 
Warriner Land reform and development in the Middle East 1 O et seq; King Land reform -
a world survey 279 (India), 379 (Egypt), 192 (Japan), 92 (Mexico), 115 (Bolivia), 154 
(Columbia), 252 (China), 127 (Cuba), 426 (Algeria); World Bank Staff working paper no. 
275 Land refonn in Latin America: Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela 17 and 21. 
Domer Land refonn and economic development 20. For a discussion of how land reform 
contributed to alleviate poverty in Egypt, Syria and Iraq see Warriner Land reform and 
development in the Middle East 1, 10 et seq, 71 et seq and 113 et seq. See King Land 
reform - a world survey for the position in a variety of countries, including Mexico (92), 
Bolivia (115), Cuba (127), Japan (192), India (279), China (252), Egypt (379), and Iraq 
(392). Also see Sullins An assessment of selected land redistribution programs in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa and implications for the analysis of land resettlement 19 et seq. 
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estates, 17 Chiviya 18 points out that this is only a temporary situation and it can be 
accounted for by administrative difficulties. The productive output on new, small farming 
units will increase as soon as the farmers settle and establish themselves on the new 
farms. Small agricultural units are often farmed more intensively and are more labour 
absorbing than large estates.19 
A defective land tenure system may be regarded as an obstacle to economic 
development. By implementing measures directed at correcting the defective land 
tenure system, land reform can contribute to economic development and growth. 20 The 
White Paper on South African Land Policy21 identifies the following economic benefits 
of land reform: (a) major cost savings resulting from a more rational use of urban land; 
(b) more households will be able to access sufficient food on a consistent basis; (c) the 
creation of more opportunities for small scale production; ( d) land reform can make a 
major contribution towards addressing unemployment, particularly in rural areas and 
small towns; (e) land reform will support business and entrepreneurial culture; and (f) 
land reform can have an important favourable environmental impact in both urban and 
rural areas. The White Paper22 emphasises that redistributive land reform cannot in 
itself ensure national economic development. It is, however, a precondition for a more 
secure and balanced civil society. Due to the fact that land reform contributes to 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
See King Land reform - a world survey 115 et seq and 392 et seq where it is pointed out 
that the market output in BolMa and Iraq respectively fell by more than 50% during the first 
3 years after land reform was introduced. 
Chiviya Land reform in Zimbabwe: Policy a[ld implementation 28. Also see Hunt The 
impending crisis in Kenya: The case of land reform 1 et seq; Sullins An assessment of 
selected land redistribution programs in Latin America, Asia and Africa and implications 
for the analysis of land resettlement 19 et seq. 
Dorner Land reform and economic development 119 et seq; Raup 1963 Economic 
development and cultural change 1 et seq; Dovring 1970 Agency for International 
Development Spring Review of land reform 1 at 13; King Land reform: The Italian 
experience 20. 
See Chiviya Land reform in Zimbabwe: Policy and implementation 29 and the sources 
mentioned there. 
White Paper on South African Land Policy 13. 
White Paper on South African Land Policy 14. 
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creating conditions of stability and certainty, it is an essential element of sustainable 
growth. 
Although the social, political and economic objectives may complement and enhance 
one another, they may also impede one another. Land reform to effect social justice is 
often not reconcilable with economic efficiency. India is a case in point. In India a 
ceiling of 20 acres was put on the size of land holdings in order to enable as many 
families as possible to own and live off the land. However, the creation of millions of 
small plots adversely affected food production and reduced the marketable surplus. 
This in tum had a disastrous effect on the economy of India. 23 The social and economic 
objectives or motives for land reform should, however, not be seen as mutually 
exclusive, because it is more often than not the case that a land reform programme 
does not strive to realise only one of these objectives. Usually, a programme has 
multiple objectives in varying arrangements of priority and it is simply a question of 
finding the optimal combination. Dorner24 points out that social equity and productivity 
goals conflict only if the present ownership structure of land and the capital connected 
with that land are assumed to be fixed. When calculations are based on national 
accounts, with all social costs and benefits appraised, the dilemma seems to break 
down. Economic considerations should thus not be allowed to dominate or dictate the 
terms of land reform. Effective land reform measures may succeed in relieving social 
and political tension, which in turn may create a climate conducive to economic 
development and new entrepreneurial attitudes.25 According to King6 the political 
motive should not be underestimated, for it is often the political balance in a country 
that determines the extent of land reform. The political motive can be decisive to ensure 
that land reform laws are indeed implemented and that the practical effects serve to 
23 
24 
25 
26 
King Land reform - a world survey 279 et seq; King Land reform: The Italian experience 
10. 
Dorner Land reform and economic development 141 et seq. 
Warriner Land reform and development in the Middle East 5 et seq. 
King Land reform - a world survey 12. Also see Tai Land reform and politics: a 
comparative analysis 13 et seq. 
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benefit society as a whole. 
12.3 Different forms of land reform 
Land reform can take many forms, including land redistribution, restitution of land, 
tenancy and tenure reform, land tax reform, consolidation of land holdings and 
colonisation schemes. 
12.3.1 Land redistribution 
A common characteristic of developing countries, especially post-colonial countries, is 
the inequality in the distribution of landownership. Any programme which aims to 
redress these inequalities has to focus strongly on the redistribution of land. It is 
therefore generally accepted that the redistribution of land forms the core of any 
effective land reform programme, and it is thus perceived as a universal feature of land 
reform programmes. Ladejinsky27 points out that without land redistribution, all other 
land reform measures, including security of tenure and rent reduction, may prove to be 
short-I iv ed. 
In most jurisdictions land redistribution involves the expropriation of some or all land 
from big land owners and the assignment thereof to the landless or semi-landless either 
in the form of individually owned land or as communal units.28 It often happens that 
foreign-owned land is confiscated or expropriated against little compensation for 
redistribution purposes.29 The imposition of a ceiling on the size of privately owned land 
27 
28 
29 
Ladejinsky in Hapgood Po/ides for promoting agricultural development 298. Also see King 
Land reform - a world survey 6; Tai Land reform and politics: a comparative analysis 12. 
King Land reform - a world survey 14 et seq; King Land reform: The Italian experience 3; 
Cheng Land reform in Taiwan 15; Warriner Land reform and development in the Middle 
East 7; Sullins An assessment of selected land redistribution programs in Latin America, 
Asia and Africa and implications for the analysis of land resettlement 13. 
King Land reform - a world survey 15 mentions Algeria, Tunisia and Libya in this regard. 
Also see the discussion in 14.4 of the position in Namibia with reference to the Agricultural 
(Commercial) Land Reform Act of 1995 in this regard. 
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is also used as a means to acquire land for redistributive purposes. All land held in 
excess of the permitted size may be expropriated by the state. 30 The redistribution of 
land is, however, not dependent on expropriation alone. There are other means of 
acquiring land for redistributive purposes. The White Paper on South African Land 
' 
Policy31 states that the process of redistribution in South Africa relies mainly on 
voluntary transactions between willing sellers and willing buyers. The state will ensure 
that all impediments to the efficient operation of the land market are removed, and will 
establish financial mechanisms to provide grants and loans for land acquisition. State 
land suitable for redistribution will also be identified. 32 Expropriation (against 
compensation) will only be used as a last resort where land is needed urgently for 
redistribution and the land needs cannot be met through voluntary market transactions. 
Although the level of compensation may vary in different jurisdictions, it is commonly 
accepted that at least some compensation should be paid to the land owner in the case 
of redistribution. King33 points out that compensation can take different forms. 
Compensation is paid in cash only in the richer countries (such as Venezuela)34 or in 
countries where the reform is very small (such as Guatemala).35 Compensation was 
also paid in cash in Kenya where the reforms were funded by Britain. In poorer 
countries (such as Bolivia and Peru)36 compensation is often paid in non-negotiable 
government bonds. In China all non-working landlords were expropriated without any 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
A ceiling on permitted private landholding was introduced in Paraguay, Taiwan, India, 
Egypt and Cuba. See King Land reform - a world survey 15. Also see Cheng Land reform 
in Taiwan 68. Also see 14.4 with regard to t~e position in Namibia. 
White Paper on South African Land Policy 38. 
Also see Cheng Land reform in Taiwan 15; Dorner Land reform and economic 
development 48. 
King Land reform - a world survey 16. 
King Land reform - a world survey 147 et seq; Also see World Bank Staff working paper 
no. 275 Land reform in Latin America: Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela 24. 
King Land reform - a world survey 16. 
Sullins An assessment of selected land redistribution programs in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa and implications for the analysis of land resettlement 29 and 31. 
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compensation. 37 
12.3.2 Tenancy reform and security of tenure 
The defects of tenancy and insecurity of tenure are well known. Tenants and people 
with insecure tenure have little incentive to invest in and improve the land since they 
can never be sure of enjoying the fruits of the land or of their labour. Insecurity of 
tenure is related to and aggravated by poverty, forced removals, unemployment and 
social unrest. In the case of tenancy reform the aim is to improve the position of the 
tenant. These reforms amount to an amendment of the law of contract in that it 
changes the relation between the landlord and the tenant. Tenancy reform may include 
measures concerning: (a) rent levels and form of payment (cash or in kind); (b) the 
period of tenancy; (c) the basis for renewal of tenancy; (d) grounds for the termination 
of the contract and the eviction of the tenant; ( e) restrictions on subletting; (f) the right 
to, and compensation for improvements; and (g) encouragement of eventual ownership 
by the tenant. 38 
Tenure reform is aimed at the clarification and strengthening of the rights of individuals 
or groups to the land they occupy. Tenure reform also amounts to an amendment of the 
law with regard to land holding, and as such it amounts to an amendment of property 
law. It is mainly rights-based and is generally designed to extend registerable tenure 
rights to all landholders, to eliminate land holding systems based on temporary and 
provisional permission to use and occupy the land, and to ensure that holders of 
individual and communal rights in land have comparable status in law to that of land 
owners.39 
In Taiwan, where most land was owned by landlords but worked by tenants, tenancy 
37 
38 
39 
King Land reform - a world survey 252 et seq. 
Abensour and Moral-Lopez Principles of land tenancy legislation 9 and 92 et seq. Also 
see King Land reform - a world survey 16 et seq; Cheng Land reform in Taiwan 18 et seq. 
Marcus, Eales and Wildschut Down to earth 190. 
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reform entailed a reduction of rent to a level not exceeding 37,5% of the total annual 
yield of the main crop. These reforms did not improve the position of the tenants 
sufficiently and shortly after this rent reduction was implemented, Taiwan abolished the 
tenancy system and replaced it with a system of direct ownership in order to provide 
the former tenants with security of tenure. 40 
The White Paper on South African Land Policy41 states that tenure reform is primarily 
aimed at providing security of tenure by: (a) the award of independent land rights and 
secure lease agreements; (b) through protection against eviction; (c) by membership 
of a group based system of land rights; or (d) through private ownership. Tenure reform 
in South Africa focuses on two principles. Firstly it is aimed at developing mechanisms 
for the upgrading of de facto vested interests in land into legally enforceable rights, and 
secondly it aims to provide occupants of privately owned land with protection against 
eviction, while at the same time respecting the rights of the current owners. 
12.3.3 Land restitution 
The purpose of the restitution of land is to restore property to persons or groups of 
persons who were unjustly dispossessed. Restitution differs from redistribution in the 
sense that restitution deals with claims relating to specific property. Whereas 
redistribution is aimed at the general distribution of land (or other property) amongst 
the landless, restitution deals only with that group of persons who were unjustly 
dispossessed and relates only to the specific property which has been taken from them. 
Claimants have to prove that they have a claim to the specific land or property and that 
they were dispossessed in terms of unjust legislation or an unjust act of government. 
In South Africa the Restitution of Land Rights Act42 determines that a person is entitled 
40 
41 
42 
Cheng Land reform in Taiwan 18 et seq and 71 et seq, and for the problems regarding 
tenancy in Taiwan see 29 et seq. With regard to the abolition of tenancy in Japan see King 
Land reform - a world survey 192 et seq. 
White Paper on South African Land Policy 64. 
22of1994. 
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to restitution if he/she was dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June 1913 under or 
for the object of furthering the object of a racially discriminatory law (that is in terms of 
apartheid legislation), or was not paid just and equitable compensation. In Australia and 
New Zealand, where the claims for restitution are based on the claimants' aboriginal 
title, 43 dispossession was effected by the British colonisation. 44 In Germany claims for 
the reinstatement of private property rights in the former East Germany are based on 
the premise that the expropriation of private property by the East German government 
and the Soviet occupying authorities who preceded it is illegal and that the property 
should therefore be returned.45 Remedies in the case of restitution of property include 
restoration of the specific property from which the claimants were dispossessed, the 
provision of alternative property or the payment of compensation. 46 
12.3.4 Land tax reform 
Due to different circumstances and objectives in different jurisdictions it is difficult to 
provide a clear definition of 'land tax'. Defined broadly it can be described as any tax 
43 
44 
45 
46 
Aboriginal title reflects the historic entitlement that indigenous inhabitants have to their 
traditional lands under their own laws and customs. Aboriginal title is recognised in 
Australia in terms of the decision in Mabo v Queensland (1992) 175 CLR 1, and in New 
Zealand in terms of the Treaty of Waitangi Act. On aboriginal title in general see Butt in 
Van Maanen and Van der Walt Property Jaw on the threshold of the 21st century 495 at 
499; Theron 1998 Vic Uni of Wei LR 311 at 323; McHugh 1984 Cant LR 235; Nettheim 
1987 Aus W 297; Davies 1987 L & Anthropology 30; Bennett 1993 SAJHR 443; Bennett 
in Van Maanen and Van der Walt Property Jaw on the threshold of the 21st century 517. 
Although the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 does not rule out a claim for 
restitution on the grounds of aboriginal title Bennett in Van Maanen and Van der Walt 
Property law on the threshold of the 21st century 517 points out that such a claim has little 
change of success because of historic and demographic circumstances peculiar to South 
Africa. 
See in general Jeffress 1991 Yale LJ 527 et seq. 
Theron 1998 Vic Uni of Wei LR 311 at 334; Jeffress 1991 Yale LJ 527 at 544; White 
Paper on South African Land Policy 56; Restitution of Land Rights Act section 35(2). In 
the South African context specifically restitution is not restricted to rights in land. Section 
25(7) of the 1996 Constitution provides for "equitable redress" as an alternative to the 
restitution of specific property. See Dulabh and Another v Department of Land Affairs 1997 
(4) SA 1108 (LCC) and Ex Parle North Central and South Central Metropolitan 
Substructure Councils of the Durban Metropolitan Area and Another 1998 (1) SA 78 
(LCC). 
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with immovable property as the primary taxable object within its base.47 Franzsen 48 
defines a land tax as: 
" ... an annual wealth tax levied on the ownership, or in some instances, 
on other rights of occupation relating to agricultural land. Although the 
taxable value may be established with regard to real or potential farming 
income and the tax be paid out of that income, the base remains the land 
itself'. 
For the purposes of a land tax 'land' can be interpreted to mean all agricultural land, 
only underutilised land, or only land within commercial farming areas (thus excluding 
communal land). It is suggested in the White Paper on South African Land Policy49 that 
all land (that includes privately owned land, state-owned land and tribal land) be 
included in the tax base and that the tax be levied on the improved market value of the 
land. It is further suggested that the tax be levied on the owner and/or occupier to a 
maximum of 2% per annum for all land in all jurisdictions. 
King50 indicates that land reform can be brought about automatically by indirect 
methods such as land tax reform. Franzsen, 51 on the other hand, points out that the 
introduction of a land tax alone is not an appropriate tool to bring about comprehensive 
land reform, but that it has to be accompanied by other more direct land reform 
measures. The purpose of a land tax is to increase landholding costs to larger 
landowners, forcing them to increase the productive use of the land and/or to reduce 
the size of their estates. A land tax can also ·be used to raise revenue for the 
47 Franzsen 1994 De Jure 351. 
48 Franzsen 1994 De Jure 351 at 357. 
49 White Paper on South African Land Policy 20 et seq. 
50 King Land reform - a world survey 18. 
51 Franzsen 1994 De Jure 351 at 354. 
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government. 52 The implementation of land tax reforms may save the state some of the 
costs of a land redistribution program, because, apart from the revenue-raising 
possibilities of a land tax, a progressive land tax would gradually force owners of large 
estates to dispose of part of their land holdings. As such a land tax can function as a 
policy instrument to complement a non-confiscatory land reform programme. 
Furthermore, it can act as a disincentive to speculative landholding and may exert 
downward pressure on land prices. 53 
12.3.5 Land consolidation 
Land consolidation is concerned with land that is poorly organised in location and 
shape and is primarily aimed at improving poor spatial organisation of mainly farmland 
in order to improve productivity and production efficiency. This will be the case where 
farmers are badly located with respect to their farms/fields, where farms are fragmented 
or where farms are awkwardly shaped for modern farming techniques. Consolidation 
is used to remedy both the situation where farm property is divided into undersized 
units too small for rational exploitation, and the excessive dispersion of the parcels 
forming part of a single farm. Land consolidation entails the elimination of 
fragmentation of land by bringing disaggregated farms together through land exchange 
or by reducing the total number of farms by combining smaller farms. 54 King55 points out 
that the greatest obstacle to consolidation is longstanding tradition and the 
unwillingness of farmers to participate, even in cases where the advantages of 
consolidation are clear. Furthermore, consolidation requires follow-up legislation to 
ensure that subsequent subdivision does not cause a recurrence of the unfavourable 
52 
53 
54 
55 
Sullins An assessment of selected land redistribution programs in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa and implications for the analysis of land resettlement 15. Also see Dorner Land 
reform and economic development 128 et seq. 
White Paper on South African Land Policy 20. 
Sullins An assessment of selected land redistribution programs in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa and implications for the analysis of land resettlement 15 et seq. Also see King Land 
reform: The Italian experience 4; De Cloe Landinrichtingswet XIV; Edwards Planning 
betwist61. 
King Land reform - a world survey 21 et seq. 
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position before consolidation. 
12.3.6 Colonisation schemes 
These schemes are closely related to measures aimed at the redistribution of land. 
Colonisation schemes involve the colonisation of previously uninhabited and unused 
tracts of land.56 In terms of a colonisation scheme selected families are resettled on 
previously uncultivated land or less densely populated areas and supported by a range 
of measures including technical support and financial assistance. Colonisation 
schemes are designed to reduce population pressure and resource depletion in one 
area and to generate a more equitable distribution of land and labour for the colonists. 57 
These schemes are only effective where the problems of developing uninhabited land 
are manageable. 58 
12.4 Requirements for an effective land reform programme 
Tai59 identifies a number of requirements for a land reform programme to be successful. 
These requirements are identified with specific reference to the land reform 
programmes in Latin America and consequently not all of the requirements apply to the 
situation in Southern Africa. According to Tai the requirements for an effective land 
reform programme are that government has to play a decisive role in the drafting and 
implementation of the programme, the program needs government compulsion, it needs 
to effect drastic change, and it has to be implemented rapidly. 
56 
57 
58 
59 
For a discussion of the implementation of a colonisation scheme in Italy see King Land 
re'form: The Italian experience 203 et seq, and for a discussion of the colonisation scheme 
in Venezuela see Carroll in Hirschmann Latin American issues: Essays and comments 
175 et seq, World Bank Staff working paper no. 275 Land reform in Latin America: Bolivia, 
Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela 24. 
Sullins An assessment of selected land redistribution programs in Latin America, Asia and 
Africa and implications for the analysis of land resettlement 14. 
King Land reform - a world survey 22 et seq. 
Tai Land reform and politics: a comparative analysis 13 et seq. 
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The role of government: Land reform programmes are generally programmes to solve 
power problems within a society. A disparity in the land tenure structure is more often 
than not indicative of a disparity in economic, social and political power. As such land 
reform programmes are in essence 'public' programmes and are dependant on 
government input and support. Any programme which aims to transform a society in 
such a drastic manner cannot be successful if it is run privately. 60 Effective land reform 
cannot be achieved by depending completely on market forces either. Due to the fact 
that the implementation of land reform is often necessitated by the imbalances with 
regard to social, political and economic power within a society, the unequal position 
between landlords and the landless makes it virtually impossible to effect 
comprehensive land reform by relying on market forces alone. Government has to play 
at least some role to ensure that the landless are put on an equal footing with landlords 
where negotiation regarding the sale of land is concerned. 
The need for compulsion: A land reform programme which aims to effect drastic change 
to the character of the economic, social and political power structures in a society is 
dependent on government compulsion. Landowners are generally in a strong position 
economically, socially and politically, and will not voluntarily renounce this position, but 
must be forced by the government to comply with the terms of the land reform 
programme. Another reason for government compulsion is the fact that landlords and 
peasants are not equal parties. For this reason a landreform programme which relies 
solely on the willingness of landowners to voluntarily part with their land is doomed to 
failure. To be effective, a land reform programme must rely on the willingness and 
readiness of the government to apply sanctions against those landowners who do not 
comply with the terms of the programme. 61 
A land reform programme has to effect drastic changes: In a society where land is a 
decisive factor for the determination of a citizen's financial, social and political position 
in that society, the land tenure system amounts to no more than an institution that 
60 Tai Land reform and politics: a comparative analysis 13 et seq. 
61 Tai Land reform and politics: a comparative analysis 15 et seq. 
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determines and allocates the values of the society. Thus, if a land reform programmes 
aims to change the tenure system in such a society, it has to effect drastic change in 
order to fundamentally alter the entire system. Minor changes to the tenure system or 
symbolic action will not produce lasting results.62 
Rapid process of change: In order to break old traditions and habitual acceptance of 
the existing system, a land reform programme needs to effect rapid change. A frontal 
attack on the system is needed to change people's rigid ideas of how things ought to 
be. Prompt execution is also needed to maintain the spirit of reform, which tends to 
fluctuate or fade away with time. 63 
It may be accepted that the first two requirements identified by Tai, namely that 
government has to play a decisive role in the drafting and implementation of the 
programme and that the programme needs government compulsion, are applicable to 
the land reform programme in South Africa. The last two requirements, namely the need 
for land reform to effect drastic change and to be implemented rapidly, are, however, 
not directly applicable to the South African situation. Although the restitution of land in 
South Africa has to be effected within a relatively short period in order to contribute to 
legal certainty, the rest of the land reform programme in South Africa does not aim to 
bring about sudden and rapid change. Although it aims to change land holding patterns 
completely, the change is brought about gradually by means of a variety of land reform 
measures to ensure a more equitable distribution of land amongst all the people of 
South Africa. The respective land reform programmes in Southern Africa64 are not 
based on a process of nationalisation or confiscation of all (agricultural) land by the 
state in order to redistribute the land equally amongst the entire population. In South 
Africa particularly the land reform programme is a well planned programme based on 
broad consultation with all interest groups. While land reform is essential to redress 
62 
63 
64 
Tai Land refonn and politics: a comparative analysis 16 et seq. But see Mattei 1990 Rev 
of Soc L 17 et seq. 
Tai Land refonn and politics: a comparative analysis 17 et seq. 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Botswana. See chapter 14 in this regard. 
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the injustices of the past, to improve the general household welfare and to alleviate 
poverty, the land reform programme also aims to foster national reconciliation and 
stability and to underpin economic growth. The programme takes cognisance of the 
rights, interests and aspirations of all South Africans. A wide variety of land reform 
measures, including land restitution, redistribution of land and measures to effect 
security of tenure, are introduced simultaneously to ensure that the process of 
distributing land equitably among all South African does not have a negative influence 
on the productive output of especially agricultural land.65 Due to the complexity of the 
situation regarding property rights and the process of consultation that accompanies 
the introduction of the different measures, the land reform programme follows a 
cautious approach and is not implemented rapidly. 66 
King67 points out that a land reform programme can only be successful if the necessity 
for land reform is recognised by the people concerned. It is common cause that no 
landlord-dominated government or society will act so as to harm its own position, or 
vote itself out of its landowning status and the privileges associated or connected with 
landownership. There has to be broad dissatisfaction with the existing landholding 
structure. The impetus for land reform should be the recognition of its necessity by the 
people concerned. This situation is likely to occur in societies where the public's idea 
of social justice changes faster than the rate at which opportunities to advance 
financially and socially are created by economic development. 
65 
66 
67 
See in general White Paper on South African Land Policy 7 et seq. 
The White Paper on South African Land Policy states that while interim measures are 
introduced to provide security of tenure to certain groups, a comprehensive tenure reform 
strategy will only be introduced after extensive consultation with the various interest 
groups. A period of two years is set aside for consultation around tenure policy, for 
implementation of test cases and for the preparation of legislation. See White Paper on 
South African Land Policy states 60. 
King Land reform - a world survey 9 et seq. Also see Banfield The moral basis of a 
backward society, World Bank Staff working paper no. 275 Land reform in Latin America: 
Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela 6 et seq. 
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12.5 Choice between individual and communal tenure 
Lastly, it has to be pointed out that land reform does not imply that a choice for or 
against a specific form of tenure (individual or communal) has to ,be made. It is 
generally accepted that land reform aims to improve the economic, social and political 
conditions for the benefit of society as a whole, and for this reason it is important to 
consider all possible forms of tenure when a land reform programme is being drafted. 68 
In this regard it is important to look at the advantages and disadvantages of the 
communal form of tenure as it applies in customary law. It is common cause that 
customary land rights are very effective in a situation where there is an abundance of 
land, but overpopulation and the pressing need for product demand cause communal 
tenure to become unstable and fall victim to mismanagement and the over-exploitation 
of the available resources. Under these circumstances communal tenure seems to 
move in the direction of privately owned property or ownership in the western sense of 
the word. Other factors also contribute to the personalisation of customary land rights, 69 
but this form of land tenure should not be underestimated or disregarded when land 
reform is planned and effected. Platteau70 points out that: 
"[u]pholders of the static view have ignored or downplayed the dynamic 
potential of indigenous African land systems partly because they have 
failed to see that individual tenures can exist under a general system of 
68 
69 
70 
Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 1 at 12 et seq; Cr.oss in Cross and Haines Towards freehold: 
Options for land and development in South Africa's black rural areas 3 and 369 et seq. 
Inheritance may cause the personalisation of customary property rights. Fathers often 
disregard the customary rules of inheritance and tend to leave their land to their own sons. 
Communal property is furthermore personalised by the sale of the land, first only to 
members of a specific tribe or group with the permission of the group (subject to the right 
of pre-emption and the right of the seller to buy the property back), later the sale of lan.d 
is permitted to non-members of the group subject to the permission of the group, and still 
later the sale of communal land to individuals is permitted freely. See Platteau 1996 
Development and change 29 at 31 et seq. 
Platteau 1996 Development and change 29 at 33. Also see Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 
1 et seq; Marcus, Eales and Wildschut Down to earth 175 et seq; Cross in Cross and 
Haines Towards freehold: Options for land and development in South Africa's black rural 
areas 3 , 342 and 369 et seq; Mattei 1990 Rev of Soc L 17 at 21 et seq. 
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corporate ownership; that communal arrangements are genuine multi-
tenure systems with different land uses calling for different tenures; and 
that land-use rights to a specific plot of land, are most often held by 
individuals or households. Such systems are flexible enough to allow the 
proportions of land held under relatively well-secured rights of individual 
possession to increase as the need arises for agricultural intensification 
and the accompanying long-term investments". 
It thus seems to be clear that communal tenure, just as private ownership, has a role 
to play in contributing to the creation of a just and equitable land tenure system. 
However, in order for communal tenure to play an effective role in the implementation 
of the land reform programme, the programme has to provide for secure customary land 
rights. 71 
12.6 Constitutional conflict: The Indian experience 
In terms of the traditional view of property rights, in terms of which ownership is seen 
as an absolute, exclusive and individual right and all limitations or restrictions of the 
owner's rights are seen as exceptions to be restricted to the minimum, land reform is 
perceived as an unjust, political interference with an individual's existing property 
rights. Those who support this traditional view expect the constitutional property 
guarantee to protect their existing rights absolutely. Due to fact that the traditional view 
of property rights enjoy widespread support among most property owners, it is 
sometimes argued that the constitutional property clause stands in the way of effective 
and comprehensive land reform. A conservative court can either argue that land reform 
71 See 14.3 below where it is pointed out that due to the lack of security of tenure of 
communal land rights is Zimbabwe, an informal system of land holding and transfer has 
develop whereby individuals have private rights to land. This led to the breakdown of the 
communal land rights system, a system which could have served the purposes of the 
Zimbabwean land reform programme very effectively. 
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does not constitute a valid public purpose for which property may be taken, 72 or that the 
proposed amount of compensation offered by the state does not qualify as 'just 
compensation'. 
The potential conflict between the protection of property as a fundamental right and 
land reform is illustrated by the constitutional conflict in India after its independence. 
The Indian experience indicates to what extent land reform can be frustrated by a 
conservative court and the results of a constitutional conflict. A brief exposition of the 
development and conclusion of this conflict in India illustrates how the court can use 
the guarantee of property as a fundamental right to frustrate effective and decisive land 
reform. 
The right to acquire, hold and dispose of property was initially guaranteed in the Indian 
Constitution,73 and in some cases the Indian Supreme Court applied this guarantee to 
frustrate reform measures introduced by the legislature. The post-independent 
government in India attempted to effect drastic land and economic reforms, but in some 
cases the conservative Supreme Court interpreted the property guarantee narrowly and 
in doing so they blocked these reforms and protected the privileges of existing property 
owners. 
72 
73 
See in this regard the Australian decision in C/unies-Ross v The Commonwealth of 
Australia and Others (1984) 155 CLR 193, the US decision in Berman v Parker 348 US 
26 (1954), and the German decision in BerfGE 74, 264 where the public purpose 
requirement was used to prohibit the state from expropriating private property. But see the 
US decision in Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984) for a good example 
of a case where it was stated that land reform constitutes a valid public purpose. 
Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India determined that: "All citizens shall have the right -
(f) to acquire, hold and dispose of property". Article 19(5) stated that: "Nothing in sub-
clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause [article 19(1)] shall affect the operation of any 
existing law in so far as it imposes, or prevent the state from making any law imposing, 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise of any of the rights conferred by the said sub-
clauses either in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of 
any Scheduled Tribe". Property is further guaranteed in Article 31. Article 31 (1) 
determined that: " No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law", 
and article 31 (2) determined that no property shall be dispossessed or acquired for public 
purposes without compensation. See in general Shukla The Constitution of India 56 for 
a discussion of article 19 and 137 for a discussion of article 31. 
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Between 1950 and 1954 the court declared certain land and economic reform laws 
invalid and unconstitutional.74 These laws were initially struck down in terms of the 
equality clause. 75 The legislature consequently amended the Constitution to ensure that 
its reform laws would not be declared unconstitutional in terms of articles 14, 19 and 
31 of the Constitution.76 The court's power of judicial review was also curtailed with 
regard to specified reform measures. 77 In State of Bihar v Ka mesh war Singh78 the court 
nevertheless held that the amendment only affected the court's jurisdiction with regard 
to the quantum of compensation, but that it might still inquire whether the legislation 
complied with the public purpose requirement. 79 
In a number of subsequent cases the courts interpreted the property guarantee 
narrowly and in doing so they frustrated the government's reform measures. An 
important stage in the development of the constitutional conflict was the decision in 
State of West Bengal v Subodh Gopal Bose and Others80 where it was held that article 
31(1) and 31(2) should be read conjunctively and that compensation should thus be 
paid for both deprivations and acquisitions of property. This judgment effectively 
destroyed the distinction between the government's exercise of its police power and its 
power of eminent domain. This decision had the effect that almost all deprivations were 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
Kameshwar Singh v Province of Bihar AIR (37) 1950 Pat 392; Kameshwar Singh v State 
of Bihar AIR (38) 1951 Pat 91 (FB); Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v The Union of India and 
Others AIR (38) 1951 SC 41. In most of these early cases the reform laws were found to 
be unconstitutional because they introduced discriminatory measures. 
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is interesting to note that the court initially made 
use of the equality clause, and not the property clause, to frustrate reform measures 
introduced by the post-independent government. 
Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951. 
See Shukla. The Constitution of India 142 et seq. 
AIR (39) 1952 SC 252. 
See in general Van der Walt The constitutional property clause: finding the balance 
between guarantee and limitation paper read at a conference entitled 'Property and the 
Constitution' presented by the New Zealand Institute of Public Law; Murhpy 1992 SAJHR 
362 at 381; Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 338 at 391. 
1954 (5) SCR 587. This decision was followed in Dwarkadas Shrinivas v The Sholapur 
Spinning and Weaving Co Ud and Others AIR ( 41) 1954 SC 119. Also see Saghir Ahmad 
v The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others 1955 (1) SCR 707. 
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subject to the payment of compensation. 81 A different development that reinforced and 
deepened the impact of State of West Bengal v Subodh Gopal Bose and Others came 
with the decision in State of West Bengal v Bella Banerjee and Others82 where the 
Supreme Court stated that it had the jurisdiction to determine whether all the relevant 
elements in the determination of compensation have been included. In terms of this 
approach the court regarded compensation as a true reflection of the full value (full 
indemnification or just equivalent) of the property acquired.83 In reaction to these 
decisions the legislature enacted the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act in 1955 to 
rephrase article 31 so as to reaffirm the distinction between the state's power of 
eminent domain (article 31 (2)) and the police power (article 31 (1 )). It also introduced 
an ouster clause to ensure that no law could be declared invalid on the basis of the 
compensation awarded. 84 In response to the Fourth Amendment the court ruled that 
article 31 (1) had to be read with article 19(5), which requires that any restriction of 
property has to be reasonable, thereby reclaiming jurisdiction via an alternative route. 85 
It was decided in IC Golak Nath and Others v State of Punjab and Another86 that the 
legislature does not have the power to amend the Constitution to such an extent that 
it takes away fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In order to overturn 
the decision in IC Golak Nath and Others v State of Punjab and Another the 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
By distinguishing the distinction between deprivations and acquisitions the Indian courts 
required compensation for a much wider category of regulations than is the case in US law 
with regard to the requirement of compensation for regulatory takings. See Van der Walt 
The constitutional property clause: finding the balance between guarantee and limitation 
paper read at a conference entitled 'Property and the Constitution' presented by the New 
Zealand Institute of Public Law 17; Murhpy 1992 SAJHR 362 at 367. 
AIR (41) 1954 SC 170. 
See Murphy 1992 SAJHR 362 at 37 4. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause: finding the balance between guarantee 
and /imitation paper read at a conference entitled 'Property and the Constitution' presented 
by the New Zealand Institute of Public Law 17. 
Kochuni v Sates of Madras and Kera/a AIR (47) 1960 SC 1080; Vajrave/u Muda/iar v The 
Special Deputy Collector for Land Acquisition, West Madras and Another AIR (52) 1965 
SC 1017; Union of India v The Metal Corporation of India Ltd and Another AIR (54) 1967 
SC 637; RC Cooper v Union of India AIR (57) 1970 SC 564. 
(1967] 2 SCR 762. 
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government enacted the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Amendments. The Twenty-
Fourth Amendment amended the Constitution to recognise the power of the legislature 
to amend the Constitution, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment completely removed the 
question of compensation from the court's power of judicial review by removing the duty 
to 'compensation' from article 31 (2) and replacing it with the payment of 'an amount'. 
In the case of Kesavananda v State of Kerala87 the Supreme Court finally conceded 
that its jurisdiction to decide the question of the reasonableness of compensation has 
been ousted by the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Amendments. With this decision 
the conflict between the courts and the government was finally resolved and the 
government was now free to implement reform measures and to restrict the right of 
property in the Constitution. A change in government took place in 1977, and the new 
government introduced the Forty-Fourth Amendment in 1978 to rule the possibility of 
a constitutional conflict between the courts and the government out completely by 
removing the guarantee of property as a fundamental right from the Constitution. This 
guarantee was replaced with a constitutional right (as opposed to a fundamental right) 
to the protection of property. 88 The constitutional right merely requires the deprivation 
of property to be effected in terms of a valid law which is within the power of the 
legislature. 89 
12. 7 Conclusion 
Land reform can take different forms including the (re)distribution of land, tenancy 
reform, measures to promote security of tenure, land restitution, land consolidation, 
87 
88 
89 
AIR (60) 1973 SC 1461. 
In terms of this change the protection of property was removed from the sphere of 
fundamental rights (Part II of the Constitution) and replaced by a constitutional right Qn Part 
XII of the Constitution) to the protection of property. Article 300A determines that: "no 
person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law". See Van der Walt The 
constitutional property clause: '/inding the balance between guarantee and limitation paper 
read at a conference entitled 'Property and the Constitution' presented by the New 
Zealand Institute of Public Law 23. 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause: finding the balance between guarantee 
and limitation paper read at a conference entitled 'Property and the Constitution' presented 
by the New Zealand Institute of Public Law 23; Murphy 1992 SAJHR 362 at 387. 
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land tax reform and colonisation schemes. The manner in which these measures are 
implemented and the extent of the reform measures will depend on the particular 
circumstances of a specific jurisdiction. 
The position in India illustrates the fact that a conservative interpretation of the 
constitutional property guarantee can frustrate government attempts to effect social and 
economic reforms. The potential conflict between the legislature and the courts with 
regard to land reform can be avoided if the courts take a different approach to the role 
of judicial review in general and the scope and extent of private property rights and its 
role within society as a whole. 90 In jurisdictions where private property is regarded as 
having both a personal and a social function, infringements of property rights to effect 
land reform are regarded as a valid exercise of the state's power to regulate the 
property regime within that jurisdiction. 
The relation between land reform and the constitutional protection of property is 
investigated in chapters 13 to 15. 
90 Murphy 1994 SAJHR 385 at 395; Nedelsky in Van Maanen and Van der Walt Property 
law on the threshold of the 21st century 417 at 432. 
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13 
LAND REFORM IN JURISDICTIONS WITHOUT AN OFFICIAL LAND 
REFORM PROGRAMME 
13.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the question of land reform as it is applied and justified in a 
variety of jurisdictions without an official land reform programme. At first glance land 
reform seems to be in direct conflict with the idea of the constitutional protection of 
property rights, especially if land reform is also a state duty or supported by the state. 
Although it is true that most constitutional property clauses provide for and regulate the 
deprivation and expropriation of property for the benefit of society as a whole, there is 
a perception that land reform goes beyond the scope of limitations of property rights as 
provided for in a constitutional property guarantee.1 As will be shown in this chapter, 
however, land reform is generally regarded as fulfilling a very important social function 
and as such land reform measures comply with the public purpose requirement for valid 
limitations with an individual's property rights. 
Due to the fact that land reform may be regarded as contradictory to or actually in 
conflict with the protection of property rights (especially in jurisdictions where property 
rights are perceived as an extension of the individual's freedom and a means of 
realising self-determination), the implementation of land reform measures run the risk 
of being blocked by the courts. A strict and narrow interpretation of the constitutional 
guarantee of property may be used by the courts to block land reform measures by 
declaring them unconstitutional. This apparent danger of constitutional conflict is often 
used as an argument for omitting the protection of property from a bill of fundamental 
See, however, 13.8 on land reform in the Netherlands where the property question is dealt 
with in private law. Also see chapter 7. 
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rights.2 It must, however, be pointed out that land reform is regarded as a valid exercise 
of the state's police power and its power of eminent domain in many jurisdictions, and 
that the constitutional protection of property is not always perceived as a stumbling 
block in the way of decisive and effective land reform. This is illustrated by the fact that 
some constitutions combine the protection of property with provisions for the 
implementation of land reform. 3 Land reform can advance the public interest, and as 
such the individual property holder may be expected to suffer an interference with 
his/her rights because such interference is effected for an important public purpose.4 
A constitutional conflict may also be avoided if the courts are able to create a suitable 
context for constitutional review. In terms of this context the court should take a 
different approach towards the relationship between the property clause and the public 
2 
3 
4 
Chaskalson 1993 SAJHR 388 et seq; Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 1 at 43; See especially 
Nedelsky in Van Maanen and Van der Walt Property law on the threshold of the 21st 
century 417 et seq; Nedelsky Private property and the future of constitutionalism: the 
Madisonian framework and its legacy 204 et seq. Nedelsky argues that the 
constitutionalisation of property will inevitably reinforce the conceptual divide between 
public and private law. This in tum will lead to a situation where private property rights are 
insulated against state interference in that every limitation or restriction of property rights 
will have to be justified. The constitutionalisation of property will entrench the situation 
where property exists and operates in an almost regulation-free zone of private enterprise. 
The second argument against the constitutionalisation offered by Nedelsky concerns the 
relationship between property and equality. Because of the fact that property is closely 
related to power, the constitutionalisation of property creates and supports unequal power 
structures. By providing property with constitutional protection the existing hierarchy of 
inequalities will be left intact. Nedelsky's third argument is closely related to the second 
argument. Property is not one of the first order values (life, liberty and security of the 
person) that are regarded as fundamental constitutional rights, but it is rather a means to 
these higher values. By constitutionalising property a situation is created where equality 
is held accountable to property rather than the ideal situation where property is held 
accountable to equality. Nedelsky also· offers pragmatic arguments against the 
constitutionalisation of property. High litigation costs and a waste of valuable resources 
can be avoided if property is not afforded constitutional protection. It will also avoid a 
situation where technical debates about the relationship between the state and private 
property become so intricate that it is in effect removed from the public debate and turned 
into the preserve of a small elite of lawyers. But see Van der Walt The constitutional 
property clause: finding the balance between guarantee and limitation paper read at a 
conference entitled 'Property and the Constitution' presented by the New Zealand Institute 
of Public Law 23 et seq for a critical analysis of Nedelsky's arguments. 
See in this regard the property clauses in the Constitutions of South Africa, Namibia and 
Guyana. 
The examples provided below illustrate the fact that the constitutional protection of 
property need not be an obstacle to the implementation of land reform measures. 
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interest. Proportionality is an essential ingredient for a model of judicial review. 5 
In this chapter an overview will be provided of land-reform related constitutional case 
law from jurisdictions where no official land reform programme is in place. Most of the 
jurisdictions which are discussed below have a constitutional property clause. The 
purpose of this overview is to look at the court's willingness to allow land reform 
measures which benefit the public at large. In most of these jurisdictions private 
ownership is recognised and protected and land reform measures could be seen as in 
conflict with the principle of private ownership. The attempts of the courts to create an 
equitable balance between the rights and interests of the affected parties and the public 
interest, as well as the extent to which the courts are willing to infringe on the rights of 
the owner indicate that the conservative and narrow interpretation of the property 
clause by the Indian Supreme Court is not the only possible response to the question 
on the relation between the constitutional property clause and land reform. 
13.2 Australia 
The decision in Clunies-Ross v The Commonwealth of Australia and Others6 illustrates 
the position where the court interprets the constitutional property guarantee narrowly. 
In terms of this interpretation the court did not regard social and political reasons as 
valid reasons for any interference with the individual property holder's existing property 
rights. This decision is distinguished from the rest of the cases discussed in this 
chapter in that the court did not allow for land-reform related measures on the grounds 
of social or political reasons. 
The case in Clunies-Ross v The Commonwealth of Australia and Others7 involved the 
question of how wide the public purpose requirement should be interpreted in the case 
5 
6 
7 
Murphy 1994 SAJHR 385 at 395; Nedelsky in Van Maanen and Van der Walt Property 
law on the threshold of the 21st century 417 at 432. 
(1984) 155 CLR 193. 
(1984) 155 CLR 193. 
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of an executive power. In terms of the Land Acquisition Act of 1955 the executive had 
been granted the power to 'acquire land for public purposes'. In this instance the 
executive wanted to exercise this power in order to remove the plaintiff from a specific 
area, because he interfered with the political process in that area. Clunies-Ross owned 
property on the Cocos (Keeling) Islands as a result of a species of colonial feudalism. 
Due to his social and economical position on the island, he negatively influenced the 
political process on the Islands. He was not prepared to abandon the anachronistic, 
feudal relationship between himself and the Cocos Malay community. As a result of this 
the government wanted to acquire his land and remove him and his family from the 
Islands. 
The High Court held that the words 'acquire land for a public purpose' does not include 
a remote purpose, but is limited to an acquisition of land which is needed or which it is 
proposed to use, apply or preserve for the advancement or achievement of that 
purpose. The court stated that: 
"[t]he provisions of the Act would fall short of enabling the Commonwealth 
compulsorily to acquire land in circumstancies where it is not suggested 
that the Commonwealth's purpose relates to any planned use, application 
or preservation of the land itself or of any buildings thereon but is for the 
purpose of depriving the owner of his possession of the land with the 
motive of thereby achieving some consequential advantage with can 
properly be described as a 'public purpose".8 
According to the court there was no ground for extending the power which the Act 
conferred to include the acquisition of land to advance or achieve some remote 
purpose. 
The court pointed out that there is a difference in nature between an executive power 
to acquire land for a public purpose and the power of the legislature to make laws with 
8 (1984) 155 CLR 193at199. 
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respect to the acquisition of land. The power granted to the executive 
"[t]o deprive a citizen of his property by compulsory acquisition should be 
construed as being confined within the scope of what is granted by the 
clear meaning or necessary intent of the words by which it is conferred". 9 
The court concluded to emphasise that its duty is to provide answers only on questions 
of law, and that the political or social desirability or otherwise of the deprivation of the 
plaintiff of his home is irrelevant to the proceedings of the court. It is the constitutional 
duty of the court to consider and answer the question objectively as a question of law 
and not as a matter to be determined by reference to the social or political merits of the 
case.10 
In a dissenting judgement Murphy J pointed out that he did not agree with the majority 
that social and political issues should not be allowed to play a role in the court's 
decision. According to his view, 
"[i]f the political and social considerations indicate a rational public 
purpose for the acquisition of the land, then under the Act, the 
Commonwealth is entitled to acquire it with just compensation". 11 
He pointed out, with reference to the US case of Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff, 12 
that, even if the 'public purpose' requirement was interpreted narrowly to mean 'public 
use', there was no reason why the acquisition of la,nd for a public purposes cannot also 
include social and political considerations. In his view the spirit and enjoyment of life 
of the Island population could only be improved by the removal of the formal feudal lord 
9 
10 
11 
12 
(1984) 155 CLR 193 at 201. 
(1984) 155 CLR 193 at 204. 
(1984) 155 CLR 193 at 206. 
467 us 229 (1984). 
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from the formal feudal manor. 13 
In this case the Australian High Court interpreted the publ.ic purpose requirement 
narrowly. The social and political function of property was not recognised as a valid 
motive or factor which might influence land distribution or the existing property rights 
of an individual property owner. 
13.3 Germany 
German case law provides a very good example of how the courts establish an 
equitable balance between the interests of the individual property owner and land-
reform related measures undertaken in the public interest in absence of a large land 
reform programme. In terms of the property clause property is protected, but the 
legislature has the power to determine the scope and content of the owner's rights, 
while at the same time the courts have to ensure that property rights are exercised i'n 
such a manner that they serve the public interest. A number of rent control cases 
illustrate the balancing of rights principle, and a valuable lesson is to be learnt from the 
manner in which the courts avoid the potential conflict, and create a balance between 
the two constitutional values of the protection of existing rights and the promotion of the 
social interest, which in this case requires the protection of residential tenants. 
In the WohnraumkOndigungsschutzgesetz case 14 the Bundesverfassungsgericht had 
to deal with the issue of rent increase in terms of a federal law which sets certain 
requirements which have to be met if a lessor wa~ts to effect a rent increase. This law 
was enacted to deal with the housing shortage and determined that a lessor may only 
raise the rent if the lessee agrees to the proposed increase. In order for the lessee to 
make an informed decision, the lessor has to provide the lessee with a written 
statement which contains information about comparable rent levels in similar situations. 
If the lessee does not agree, the lessor (owner) may apply to the court for permission 
13 
14 
(1984) 155 CLR 193 at 209. 
BVerfGE37, 132. 
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to raise the rent. In the case at hand two lessors applied to the court for such 
permission after they supplied their lessees with the relevant documentation but the 
lessees refused permission to raise the rent. The court a quo interpreted the 
requirements strictly in favour of the lessees. The courts found that the information 
supplied to the lessees was insufficient to allow the lessees to consider the raise. The 
lessors consequently claimed that their property rights have been infringed upon. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht pointed out that the provisions of the federal law effected 
a valid exercise of the legislature's duty to regulate the use of property by determining 
the content and limits of property. This regulatory power is, however, limited by the duty 
to uphold the guarantee of property in the property clause (article 14(1 )) and the duty 
to ensure that the regulation is in line with all the constitutional principles. The 
legislature has to establish a balance between the guarantee of property provided for 
in article 14(1) and the duty to ensure that property serves the social interest (article 
14(2)) when determining . the content and limits of property rights. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the rent control act was not in conflict with any of 
these principles, especially if the surrounding social circumstances (the housing 
shortage and the importance of the family home for the lessee) are taken into account, 
provided thaf an unfair burden is not placed on the lessor. This principle was later 
confirmed in the WohnungskOndigungsgesetz case.15 The court thus ruled that the rent 
control measures in question conformed to the principles of proportionality and 
succeeded in creating a fair balance between the interests of the lessee (to have a 
secure family home) and the interests of the lessor (the fair opportunity to raise the 
rent). The federal law was thus found to be constitutionally valid, but the court held that 
the heavy burden imposed on the lessor by the CC?urt a quo, which required the lessor 
to provide the lessee with precise and detailed information which was not always 
available or even necessary, was in conflict with the property guarantee in that it 
conflicted with the requirement that the lessor's interests also have to be taken into 
account. 
15 BVerfGE 68, 361. Also see BVerfGE 38, 248; BVerfGE 91, 294. 
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In the Eigenbedarfskiindigung case16 the Bundesverfassungsgericht had to decide 
exactly when it would be constitutionally valid to prohibit the owner to cancel a lease. 
In terms of the German civil code a lease of residential premises can only be cancelled 
if the lessor requires the premises for own use. In general all three the complainants 
were owners of apartment blocks in which they themselves lived, while they rented the 
rest of the apartments to other families. They all wanted to cancel the lease contract 
with one of the lessees, because they needed the apartments for their own purposes. 
All three the applications were denied in the court a quo. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht held that it is a recognised principle that the state has 
the authority to impose rent control measures and to impose strict control measures 
regarding the cancellation of leases. Measures such as these are regarded as 
regulations which determine the content and limits of property in terms of article 14(1 ). 
For these measures to be constitutionally valid, however, they have to reflect a 
proportional balance between the interests of the owner and the collective interest, 
taking into account the social importance of the property in question. Measures such 
as these are not seen to impose a too heavy burden on the owner, for he/she may on 
the one hand not cancel a lease without goOd reasons, while on the other hand he/she 
may cancel the lease if the property is required for his/her own needs. These 
considerations should always be evaluated with reference to the immense social 
importance of housing for both the owner and the lessee. 
In deciding cases such as these, the Bundesverfassungsgericht pointed out that the 
court must always have due regard for the basic principle underlying the property 
guarantee, namely that .the property is protected to such an extent and in such a 
manner that the owner will have the possibility to control and develop his/her own life, 
according to his/her own views and on his/her own responsibility. The owner does not 
lose this right when property is leased. Any decision by a court which ignores this 
principle will be constitutionally invalid. The courts thus do not have the authority to 
question an owner's decision regarding the necessity to use rented property 
16 BVerfGE 79, 292. 
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himself/herself, but have to accept the owner's decision in this regard. This does, 
however, not mean that the courts have no review powers in this regard, or that the 
lessee is without any protection. The court will always have to verify that the owner's 
need for the property does indeed exist, that it is reasonable and that it is feasible. 
In view of this the court decided that the first two applicants in this case were permitted 
to cancel their respective leases, but that the third applicant could not. The reason for 
this decision is the fact that the third applicant's reasons for the cancellation of the 
lease already existed when the property was leased in the first place, and that the 
cancellation of the lease at this point would be unreasonable. 
This case again illustrates the balancing principle: although the housing shortage 
necessitates strict rent control measures, the rights of the owner also have to be 
respected and the state cannot ride roughshod over these rights. In either protecting 
the rights of the owner or the imposition of regulatory measures to serve the public 
interest the legislature and the courts have to take cognisance of the interests of all 
affected parties in view of all the surrounding circumstances and attempt to create an 
equitable and reasonable balance between the conflicting interests.17 
It was decided in the Besitzrecht des Mieters case18 that the rights of the lessee are 
also protected in terms of article 14 of the Grundgesetz. The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
pointed out that the fundamental characteristic of the property guarantee is that it 
provides the property holder with a secured area within the patrimonial sphere in which 
he/she may take responsibility for the development.and control of his/her own life. The 
family home is essential for human existence and the lessee's lease rights to enjoy 
security with relation to the family home fulfill the same function in this regard as the 
owner's right of ownership. The security and protection which the lessee derives from 
rent control measures can be enforced against the whole world, including the lessor. 
Because of the fact that the lessee enjoys the same protection of his/her property rights 
17 Also see BVerfGE37, 132; BVerfGE68,361; BVerfGE 89, 237; BVerfGE 89, 1. 
18 BVerfGE89, 1. 
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as the lessor, the legislature has the duty to create a reasonable balance between the 
two legal positions. The lessee is, however, not protected in a horizontal relationship 
with regard to the lessor, and the relationship remains vertical because the protection 
of the property guarantee concerns statutory measures which disproportionally restrict 
the lessee's position against the lessor. Thus, even though the lessee enjoys 
constitutional protection, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the lessor's 
determination of what constitutes a need for own use of the leased property will be 
respected by the court if it is reasonable and feasible. 
In the Kleingarten case19 of1979 the Bundesverfassungsgericht had to decide another 
rent control case, although this case did not involve residential property. This case 
dealt with the rent control measures enacted to protect the lessees of allotment 
gardens. The allotment gardens are small pieces of land which were originally used 
(especially by the poor) to fulfill the basic need for food. Due to the immense social 
importance of these allotment gardens strict measures were enacted to control rent 
increases and the termination of leases. A 1969 law provided that a lease of an 
allotment garden may only be terminated with the approval of the responsible local 
authority. The complainant in this case was refused permission to terminate such a 
lease and he consequently contended that his property rights were infringed upon. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht extensively investigated the role and purpose of 
allotment gardens in German society and concluded that the social function of these 
gardens have changed. Whereas they initially ensured the livelihood and survival of 
their holders, they now are used mainly for relax~tion. The court a quo held that the 
strict rent control measures applicable to allotment gardens actually destroys the 
substance of the right. The measures as such cannot be regarded as a determination 
of the content and limits of property, because they constitute such an extensive 
restriction of the owner's right that almost nothing is left. The court consequently 
decided that the measures have an expropriatory character, but since no provision is 
made in the Grundgesetz for compensation in cases like these, the court declared the 
19 BVerfGE 52, 1. 
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provisions invalid. 
The Bundesverfassungsgericht did not agree with this line of r~asoning. It was pointed 
out that the law was invalid, not because it amounted to an expropriation without 
compensation but because the legislature exceeded its power to determine the content 
and limits of property. In terms of the proportionality principle the legislature has to 
create an equitable balance between the rights and interests of both the individual and 
the collective, and in this case it failed to do so. The law was therefore declared invalid. 
This case also illustrates the importance of the social function of property in the 
determination of the legislature's power to determine the content and limits of property: 
the closer the relation between the property and the personal freedom of the owner, the 
narrower the legislature's power, and the more important the social function of the 
property, the wider the powers of the legislature will be. Land has always been 
regarded as an invaluable natural resource with immense social importance and for this 
reason the legislature has always had extremely wide powers to determine the content 
and limits of the landowner's rights. It was, however, pointed out by the court that the 
social importance of allotment gardens have diminished considerably, and as such the 
very strict control measures applicable to these gardens are no longer justified. The 
court thus found that it would be constitutionally valid if the lessor was permitted to 
charge a reasonable rent. This principle was later confirmed in the Kleingarten case of 
1992. In this case the court held that rent control measures are not in conflict with the 
property guarantee in the Grundgesetz, especially with relation to land, but in this case 
it was not justified in view of all the circumstances afld constituted a disproportional and 
unconstitutional restriction of the owner's rights. 
13.4 United States of America 
The discussion of land-reform related constitutional cases in the US is centred around 
two issues: the redistribution of land and rent control. 
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The case of Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkitf0 concerned the redistribution of land. 
The main question before the court was whether the taking of property from one private 
individual, against just compensation, in order to transfer it to another private individual, 
falls within the scope of the public use requirement. The State of Hawaii enacted the 
Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967 in order to redress the imbalances which existed in 
Hawaii. As a result of a long history of a feudal land tenure system almost half of the 
land in Hawaii was concentrated in the hands of 72 landowners. The aim of the Act was 
to transfer some of this land to the lessees. The Act determined that lessees living on 
single family residential lots of at least five acres in size could ask the Hawaii Housing 
Authority to condemn the land on which they lived. If the Hawaii Housing Authority 
found that the acquisition of the land by the state would effectuate the public purposes 
of the Act, it would then acquire the former fee owner's (landowner's or lessor's) right, 
title and interest in the land at a price set either by a condemnation trial or by 
negotiations between the lessor and the lessee. Once the former landowner had been 
compensated, the state would sell the land to the lessee.21 
The applicants in this case were landowners whose land was involved in the 
redistribution scheme of the -state. They contended that the Act was unconstitutional 
in that it violated the public use requirement set in the Fifth Amendment for the taking 
of property. The Federal District Court found the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967 to be 
constitutional, but on appeal the Court of Appeals ruled that the Act violated the public 
use requirement of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court, however, found that the 
Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967 did not violate the public use requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment. The court ruled that the expropriation. of property from one private owner 
and the transfer thereof to another private individual in order to redress the imbalance 
in landownership, constitutes a valid public purpose. The court emphasised the fact 
that the legislature alone can determine what falls within the ambit of the public interest, 
and that 
20 
21 
467 us 229 (1984). 
The Act provided that the Hawaii Housing Authority could lend the tenants up to 90% of 
the purchase price to enable them to buy the land. 
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"the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs 
to be served by social legislation".22 
The court thus stated that the public use requirement is coterminous with the scope of 
the sovereign's police power. The court does have a role in reviewing the legislature's 
decision of what constitutes a public purpose, but this power is extremely limited. The 
court will only substitute the legislature's judgment with its own if the use is palpably 
without reasonable foundation.23 This decision confirmed the courts rejection of 
substantive due process. 
The court reiterated its stance on the taking of property from one individual in order to 
give it to another: 
"[t]o be sure, the Court's cases have repeatedly stated that 'one person's 
property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person 
without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid"'. 24 
In the case where the exercise of the power of eminent domain is rati-onally related to 
a conceivable publi~ purpose, the court has never prohibited a compensated taking on 
the ground tAat it was in conflict with the public use requirement. 25 For this reason the 
court found the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967 to be constitutionally valid and 
explained its reasoning as follows: 
"[r]egulating oligopoly and the evils associat~d with it is a classic exercise 
of the State's police powers. . . . We cannot disapprove of Hawaii's 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984) at 239 with reference to Berman 
v Parker 348 US 26 (1954). 
467 US 229 (1984) at 241, with reference to United States v Gettysburg Electric R Co 160 
US 668 (1896) at 680. 
467 US 229 (1984) at 241, quoting from Thompson v Consolidated Gas Corp 300 US 55 
(193-7) at 80. 
467 US 229 (1984) at 241. 
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exercise of this power. Nor can we condemn as irrational the Act's 
approach to correcting the land oligopoly problem" .26 
The fact that the property in question passed directly from the lessor to the lessee was 
also investigated by the court. It was decided that the mere fact that the property never 
at any stage resided with the state, does not mean that the public use requirement was 
not adhered to. Accordingly, the court ruled that: 
"[t]he Act advances its purposes without the State's taking actual 
possession of the land. In such cases, government does not itself have 
to use property to legitimate the taking; it is only the taking's purpose, 
and not its mechanisms, that must pass the scrutiny under the Public Use 
Clause". 27 
It seems clear from the above that land reform is regarded as a valid and justifiable 
ground in terms of the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment, even when it 
means that the state is taking private property from one individual and transferring it to 
another individual. Although the court does not have wide powers of review in the case 
where the legislature has declared a specific action as a legitimate public purpose, the 
court found the redistribution of land in order when the aim was to redress the 
inequalities in the land market, since this purpose was considered to have a 
'reasonable foundation'. 28 
The question of rent control has been raised in two cases, Pennell v City of San Jose29 
26 
27 
28 
29 
467 US 229 (1984) at 242. 
467 US 229 (1984) at 244. 
Also see the German decision in BVerfGE 66, 248. But see the Australian decision in 
Clunies-Ross v The Commonwealth of Australia and Others (1984) 155 CLR 193 and the 
German decision in BVerfGE 74, 264. 
485 us 1 (1988). 
322 
and Yee v City of Escondido, 30 and in both these cases the Supreme Court held that 
rent control constitutes a legitimate exercise of the state's police power.31 
In Pennell v City of San Jose32 the appellants challenged the constitutional validity of 
a provision of a rent control ordinance of the city of San Jose. The ordinance provides 
that a hearing officer must consider a number of factors in order to determine whether 
a rent increase proposed by a landlord can be approved. Among others, one of the 
factors to be considered is the possible hardship that a tenant may suffer as a result 
of the rent increase. The appellants claimed that the application of this provision of the 
rent control ordinance violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in that it 
constituted a taking of property for public use without just compensation. According to 
the appellants a reduction in rent as a direct result of the hardship provision constituted 
a taking, because the ordinance forced private individuals to bear a public burden in 
that they have to subsidise the poor tenants' housing. In the court's view, it was 
premature to consider such a contention on the facts before the court, because the 
facts did not provide any evidence that the hardship provision has ever been the direct 
cause of a reduction in rent, and 
"[t]he constitutionality of statutes ought not be decided except in an actual 
factual setting that makes such a decision necessary".33 
The appellants also contended that the mere fact that a hearing officer may consider 
the hardship provision in fixing a reasonable rent renders the ordinance 'facially invalid' 
30 
31 
32 
33 
503 us 519 (1992). 
See in this regard Radin Reinterpreting property 72 et seq. Radin contends that a 
distinction should be made between fungible property and personal property, of which the 
family home is the prime example. The protection of personal property should serve to 
improve the wellbeing of the person, and by treating personal property differently from 
other property, the wellbeing of the person will be ensured. 
485 US 1 (1988). See Singer Property law - Rules, policies and practices 676 et seq and 
1221 et seq; Radin Reinterpreting property 168 and 175. 
485US1 (1988) at 10, quoting from Hodel v Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn 
lnc452 US 264 (1981) at 294. 
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under the due process clause. The court disagreed with this contention, stating that: 
"the standard for determining whether a price control regulation is 
constitutional under the Due Process Clause is well established: 'Price 
control is 'unconstitutional ... if arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably 
irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt"".34 
The court pointed out that price or rate regulation acted to protect the consumer's 
welfare and that this was a legitimate and rational goal. The court accordingly held that 
the hardship provision in the rent control ordinance of the city of San Jose 
"[r]epresents a rational attempt to accommodate the conflicting interests 
of protecting tenants from burdensome rent increases while at the same 
time ensuring that landlords are guaranteed a fair return on their 
investment". 35 
This decision of the court seems to be in line with the general view that the property 
clause must attempt to establish an equitable balance between the interests -of the 
private property holder and the collective interest. The hardship provision does not 
prejudice the landlord, but it rather aims to balance the interest of the society at large 
with that of the landlord. The hardship provision ensures that the landlord is not 
prohibited from introducing a rent increase, provided that any increase is such that, 
although the landlord gets a fair return on his/her investment, it accounts for the public 
interest as well.36 
34 
35 
36 
485 US 1 (1988) at 11, quoting from Nebbia v New York 291 US 502 (1934) at 539. 
485 US 1 (1988) at 13. 
It should, however, be noted that the minority decision in this case took the opposite view. 
According to the minority the hardship clause did not substantially advance legitimate state 
interesfs and did indeed constitute an uncompensated taking (485 US 1 (1988) at 15). By 
allowing the hardship clause the landlord was forced to bear a social burden which should 
rather be borne by the public as a whole (485 US 1 (1988) at 19). 
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In Yee v City of Escondido37 the court was also confronted with a rent control problem. 
The petitioners claimed that the California Mobilehome Residency Law, read with a rent 
control ordinance of the city of Escondido, effected a phys.ical occupation of their 
property, and as such they were entitled to just compensation. Under the California 
Mobilehome Residency Law the basis for the termination of a mobile home owner's 
tenancy was limited to the non-payment of rent and the mobile home park owner's 
desire to change the use of his/her land. The Law furthermore prohibited the park 
owner from requiring the removal of a mobile home once it is sold, charge transfer fees 
for the sale of a mobile home, and from disapproving of a purchaser who is able to pay 
rent. The Law did not impose any limitation on the rent that the park owner may charge, 
but the city of Escondido enacted an ordinance which set the rent back to the levels of 
two years previously. The ordinance also prohibited any increase in the rent without the 
city's approval. The petitioners in this case, the owners of a mobile home park that 
rented pads to mobile home owners, contended that the ordinance effected a physical 
taking of their property by depriving them of all use and occupancy of their property, 
and that the ordinance in effect granted their tenants and their successors the right to 
permanently use and occupy the property. 
The Supreme Court rejected this contention. It was pointed out by the court that most 
of the cases which deal with the takings clause fall within one of two categories: those 
where the government authorises a physical occupation of the property, for which 
compensation is required, and those cases where the government merely regulates the 
use of the property. In the latter category the payment of compensation is dependent 
on considerations such as the purpose of the ~egulation or the extent to which it 
deprives the owner of the economic use of the property. If it is found that the regulation 
unfairly requires a single individual to bear a burden which should be borne by the 
public as a whole, compensation will be required. 38 
37 
38 
503 US 519 (1992). See Singer Property law - Rules, policies and practices 1179 et seq; 
Radin Reinterpreting property 168 and 175. 
503 US 519 (1992) at 522. 
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According to the court, the government only effects a physical taking where it requires 
the landowner to submit to a physical occupation of his/her land. In this case, however, 
the court found that the Escondido rent control ordinance read with the California 
Mobilehome Residency Law did not require the park owners to submit to a physical 
occupation of their land, but, rather, that they voluntarily rented their land to mobile 
home owners and they were not required to continue doing so. The court reiterated the 
fact that the right to exclude is one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of property 
rights, but in this case the court found that the right to exclude was not taken from the 
petitioners.39 The ordinance and the Law merely regulate the use of the property in 
question by regulating the relationship between the landlord and tenant. The state 
acted within its police power in this case, for it is a confirmed principle that the state 
may regulate housing conditions and the landlord-tenant relationship without paying 
compensation.40 Due to the fact that the state action in question amounted to no more 
than a regulation of the use of the property, no 'per se' taking was effected by the state 
in this case. 41 
This case illustrates the US Supreme Court's willingness to accommodate the interests 
of the collective. Although the decision in these cases confirmed the principle that rent 
control merely controls the owner's use of his/her property by regulating the 
relationship between landlord and tenant,42 it may also be read as a confirmation of the 
principle that the private property owner may be expected to make some sacrifice for 
the common good. It is, however, important to note that the sacrifice should never be 
such that the individual owner is expected to bear a burden which should be borne by 
39 
40 
41 
42 
503 US 519 (1992) at 522. 
503 US 519 (1992) at 522, with reference to Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Cotp485 US410 (1982) at 440. Also see Prune Yard Shopping Centerv Robins 447 US 
7 4 (1980); Pennell v City of San Jose 485 US 1 (1988). See Radin Reinterpreting property 
72 et seq for a justification of rent control. Also see Singer Property law - Rules, policies 
and practices 684 et seq for the different arguments for and against rent control. 
503 US 519 (1992) at 524. 
See Singer Property law - Rules, policies and practices 676 et seq, 1179 et seq and 1221 
et seq; Radin Reinterpreting property 72 et seq, 168 et seq and 175 et seq; Alexander 
1996 J Leg Ed 586 at 593. 
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society as a whole. This approach seems to bring the US law in line with other western 
jurisdictions where private property is protected, but only to such an extent that an 
equitable balance is struck between the rights of the individual and the collective 
interest. 43 
13.5 The Council of Europe 
The European Court of Human Rights has consistently interpreted the guarantee of 
property in article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms so as to leave a wide margin of appreciation to the 
member states to decide exactly what falls within the ambit of the public interest. This 
principle is also confirmed in land-reform related cases. 
In James v United Kingdom44 the applicants claimed that a legislative programme, 
designed to transfer property from one individual to another for the purpose of 
enfranchising long-leaseholders, was not in the public interest. The case involved the 
application of the Leasehold Reform Act of 1967, which gave tenants in houses held 
on long leases (for more than 21 years) at low rents the right to purchase compulsorily 
the freehold of the property (the landlord's interest). The court recognised the fact that 
the previous system regulating leasehold in the United Kingdom was inequitable to the 
leaseholder, and that the new law aimed to give effect to the occupying tenant's 'moral 
entitlement' to ownership of a house. 45 
The court held that 'in the public interest' does not. imply that the transferred property 
should be put to use for the general public or that the community, or even a substantial 
portion of the community, should benefit directly from the transfer. Legislative measures 
which intend to bring about a fair system to govern the property rights of private parties 
are capable of being 'in the public interest', even if they involve the compulsory transfer 
43 See chapters 8, 10 and 11 in this regard. 
44 8 EHRR 123 (1986). 
45 8 EHRR 123 (1986) at par 47. 
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of one individual to another. The court phrased its policy with regard to the 
interpretation of the public interest requirement as follows: 
"[t]he taking of property in pursuance of a policy calculated to enhance 
social justice within the community can properly be described as being 
'in the public interest"'. 46 
Due to the fact that modern societies consider housing of the population as a prime 
social need, the margin of appreciation provided to the member states to decide for 
themselves what qualifies as being in the public interest, 
"is wide enough to cover legislation aimed at securing greater social 
justice in the sphere of people's homes, even where such legislation 
interferes with existing contractual rights between private parties and 
confers no direct benefit on the State or the community at large". 47 
However, the court continued to state that there should be a reasonable relationship 
between the means employed by the legislature and the aim it sought to achieve. There 
should also be a proportional balance between the interests of the affected individuals 
and the interest of the broader society. Such a balance will be lacking where an 
individual is expected to bear an individual and excessive burden. 48 
In a number of other cases the European Commission of Human Rights confirmed its 
stance that measures which effect land reform ar~ regarded as a legitimate exercise 
of the state's power to regulate and control the use of property. In X and Y v The 
46 
47 
48 
8 EHRR 123 (1986) at par 41. Also see Holy Monasteries v Greece ECHR Series A vol 
301 (1994) at par 67 et seq. 
8 EHRR 123 (1986) at par 47. 
8 EHRR 123 (1986) at par 50, with reference to Sporrong and Lonnroth v Sweden 5 
EHRR 35 (1982). 
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Netherlands49 the European Commission of Human Rights held that, for the purposes 
of fair distribution of housing, the state may prohibit an individual to use his/her own 
house. The fair distribution of accommodation was regarded .as a legitimate purpose 
for exercising control over the use of property in terms of Rule 3 of article 1. This may 
even go so far as to prohibit an owner from inhibiting his/her own house. This particular 
action was not regarded as an expropriation (or deprivation in the context of the 
European Convention on Human Rights) because the European Commission of Human 
Rights only regarded a deprivation of ownership as a deprivation in terms of Rule 2 of 
article 1. In this case ownership was not taken from the owner, and as such Rule 2 did 
not apply. In X and Others v Belgium50 the applicants claimed that a land redistribution 
programme caused them to suffer great losses and that the programme constituted a 
breach of article 1. The European Commission of Human Rights again held that land 
reform measures formed part of the state's regulatory powers and that the state may 
deprive someone of his/her property 'in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law' without violating the property guarantee in article 1. The view that 
land reform measures are 'necessary' measures to control the use of property in terms 
of Rule 3 of article 1 was confirmed in Wiggins v United Kingdom. 51 In Xv Austria52 the 
European Commission of Human Rights held that rent control measures are also 
regarded as a legitimate purpose for the control of the use of property. Due to the fact 
that deprivations53 are only present where an actual expropriation of ownership is 
effected, any measure which do not deprive the owner of his/her ownership will be 
evaluated in terms of Rule 3 of article 1. In a situation where a housing shortage is at 
hand, rent control measures will qualify as a legitimate exercise of the state's regulatory 
power. 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
No 62021731 DR 66 (1975). 
No 6837fl4 3 DR 135 (1976). 
No 7456fl613 DR 40 (1978). 
No 8003fl7 17 DR 80 (1980). 
It should be noted that the term 'deprivation' as used in article 1 of the First Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is interpreted 
to mean expropriation or taking of property. In most other jurisdictions 'deprivation' is 
interpreted to mean the regulation of the use of property. 
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In Erkner and Hofhauer v Austria54 and Poiss v Austria55 the European Court of Human 
Rights held that a scheme for the consolidation of agricultural land holdings in the 
interest of their economic exploitation was not in principle invalid in terms of article 1, 
but that the administration of the scheme constituted a breach of Rule 1 of article 1. In 
both these cases a provisional transfer of land took place in terms of a provisional 
consolidation plan in 1970 and 1963 respectively. The applicants received new land 
holdings but claimed that their original land was more valuable than their new land 
holdings. They never received compensation in land of special value to which they 
were entitled. The court held that the Austrian authorities did not effect a formal 
expropriation, because the transfer of land was effected in terms of a provisional 
consolidation plan, and it would only become irrevocable when a final consolidation 
plan was enacted. The applicants may therefor recover there land if the final plan does 
not confirm the distribution made at the earlier stage of the proceedings. Nor was the 
provisional transfer essentially designed to restrict or control the use of the land.56 The 
court consequently had to inquire whether a proper balance was struck between the 
demands of the community's general interest and the requirements of protecting the 
fundamental rights of the individual. The court found that, seeing that a final land 
consolidation plan was not enacted in 1987, the necessary balance was lacking. The 
applicants, who remained uncertain as to the final fate of their property, have been 
made to bear a disproportionate burden. 57 
13.6 The Republic of Ireland 
The two cases which are discussed in this section deal specifically with rent control in 
the Republic of Ireland. During World War I temporary statutory restrictions were 
54 
55 
56 
57 
ECHR Series A vol 117 (1987). 
ECHR Series A vol 117 (1987). 
Erkner and Hofauer v Austria ECHR Series A vol 117 (1987) at par 7 4; Poiss v Austria 
ECHR Series A vol 117 (1987) at par 64. 
Erkner and Hofauer v Austria ECHR Series A vol 117 (1987) at par 79; Poiss v Austria 
ECHR Series A vol 117 (1987) at par 69. 
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placed on rent payable by tenants in certain dwelling-houses, and restrictions were 
placed on the power of owners of the dwelling-houses to recover possession of these 
dwellings. The temporary restrictions were renewed from time to time until 1960 when 
I 
a consolidation act was promulgated to replace the previous acts. This Act, the Rent 
Restriction Act, fixed the rent payable by tenants to pre-existing depressed levels of the 
rents prevailing as a result of the effect of the code since its inception. In Blake and 
Others v Attorney Genera/58 the plaintiffs, who were owners of such dwelling-houses, 
claimed that the restriction of rent and the restriction relating to their recovery of 
possession were invalid in view of the Constitution. At the hearing it was established 
that in one instance the rent obtainable by the owner in an open market would be nine 
times greater, and in another instance nineteen times greater than the rent as fixed by 
the Rent Restriction Act. 
After close scrutiny of the relevant section of the Constitution, the court held that the 
plaintiffs' claim should be heard in terms of article 40 of the Constitution, which protects 
an individual against unjust attack on the personal rights of the citizen. This article also 
determines that the state shall, in case of any injustice done to the citizen, vindicate the 
life, person, good name, and property rights of the affected·citizen.59 
58 
59 
(1982] IR 117. 
Article 40 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland determines that: 
"1. All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law. This shall not 
be held to mean that the State shall not in its enactments have due regard to 
difference of capacity, physical and moral, and of social function. 
3. 1 . The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its 
laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen. 
2. The State shall, in particular, by· its laws protect as best it may from unjust 
attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the ·life, person, good name, 
and property rights of every citizen." 
Article 43 states that: 
"1. 1.The state acknowledges that man, in virtue of his rational being, has the natural 
right, antecedent to positive law, to the private ownership of external goods. 
2. The State accordingly guarantees to pass no law attempting to abolish the right 
of private ownership or the general right to transfer, bequeath, and inherit 
property. 
2. 1. The State recognises, however, that the exercise of rights mentioned in the 
foregoing provisions of this Article ought, in civil society, to be regulated by the 
principles of social justice. 
2. The State, accordingly, may as occasion requires delimit by law the exercise 
of the said rights with a view to reconciling their exercise with the exigencies of the 
common good." 
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The court pointed out that the legislation in effect interfered with and rendered 
ineffective the exercise of the property rights of the owners of the dwellings. This 
constituted an attack on the rights of the owners. The question that needed to be 
answered was whether this attack was unjust and therefore in contravention of article 
40.3.2. The court found that, while the Act provided for the restriction of rent 'in certain 
cases', no clear basis existed in terms of which the houses affected by the legislation 
in question were selected. The court also found that neither the means of the tenant, 
nor the lack of means or possible hardship of the landlord was considered in the 
determination of the rent. The rent charged to the tenants was found to be fixed at a 
level which was oppressively uneconomic (the payable rent related to the rent 
chargeable in respectively 1914 and 1941 ) and it was further eroded by the statutory 
obligation of the owner to repair and maintain the affected property. Furthermore, the 
fact that there existed no power of review of such rents, irrespective of changes in 
conditions, led the court to the conclusion that the provisions of the Act 
"[r]estrict the property rights of one group of citizens for the benefit of 
another group. This is done, without compensation and without regard to 
the financial capacity or the financial needs of either group, in legislation 
which provides no limitation on the period of restriction, gives no 
opportunity for review and allows no modification of the operation of the 
restriction. It is, therefore, both unfair and arbitrary. These provisions 
constitute an unjust attack on the property rights of landlords of controlled 
dwellings and are, therefore, contrary to the provisions of article 40, s 3, 
sub-s 2, of the Constitution".60 
60 
The court pointed out that article 43 mainly deals with the institutional guarantee of 
property, and since this specific case does not qualify as a regulation or delimitation of the 
property rights of the affected parties, "it requires to be examined for its validity in relation 
to the provisions of Article 40, s 3, sub-s 2. Therefore the question to be decided is 
whether the impugned provisions of the Act of 1960 (as amended) constitute an unjust 
attack on the property rights of the plaintiffs". See Blake and Others v Attorney General 
[1982) IR 117at136. 
[1982) IR 117at139. 
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The court furthermore held, with regard to the restriction on the owners to obtain 
possession of their rented dwellings, that such a restriction in itself is not 
constitutionally invalid, provided that it is fair and not oppressive. In this case, however, 
where the tenant's family's right to retain possession after the death of the tenant is 
extensive, this restriction was found to be 
"an integral part of the arbitrary and unfair statutory scheme whereby 
tenants of controlled dwellings are singled out for special favourable 
treatment, both as to rent and as to the right to retain possession, 
regardless of whether they have any social or financial need for such 
preferential treatment and regardless of whether the landlords have the 
ability to bear the burden of providing such preferential treatment". 61 
This part of the legislation was thus also found to be an unconstitutionally unjust attack 
on the property rights of the affected landlords. 
In reaction to the decision in Blake and Others v Attorney Genera/62 the Irish 
government drafted the Housing (Private Rented Dwellings) Bill of 1981. The Bill was 
sent to the Supreme Court to ascertain whether its provisions were in conflict with the 
provisions of the Constitution. The Bill was evaluated in Re Reference Under Article 26 
Of the Constitution of the Housing (Private Rented Dwellings) Bi/11981.63 The court 
emphasised the fact that its function in this case was not to impress any part of the Bill 
with a stamp of constitutionality, but merely to declare repugnancy to the Constitution, 
should it be found. 64 The purpose of this Bill wast~ regulate rent control issues during 
the period of transition while the system of rent control (which was declared 
unconstitutional in the Blake decision) was phased out. The Bill determined that the 
61 [1982) IR 117 at 140. 
62 [1982) IR 117. 
63 [1983) ILRM 246. 
64 [1983) ILRM 246 at 24 7. 
333 
lessees of the affected dwellings would have security of tenure in that he/she would 
have a statutory entitlement to retain possession of the specific dwelling during his/her 
lifetime, or the lifetime of his/her spouse, and thereafter a qualified member of his/her 
family might retain possession for a period of 20 years from the commencement of the 
Act. The court pointed out that this situation seemed to have particular benefits for the 
tenant. The owner might not recover possession unless he or she needed the dwelling 
for his/her own residential purposes, the residential purposes of a fulltime employee, 
or for the interests of good estate management. In these instances the owner, however, 
had to pay for the tenant's expenses of quitting the dwelling, and for up to two years' 
rent for alternative accommodation. 65 
The court found the 'gross rent' to be a just and proper rent, but during the first five 
years of the scheme the landlords would receive an amount which was substantially 
less than the just and proper rent payable in respect of their property. Due to the fact 
that no constitutionally permitted justification was supplied for depriving the landlords 
of part of their just rent for the period specified in the Bill, the court regarded it to 
constitute an unjust attack on the owners' property rights, and as such the provisions 
were in contravention of the Article 40.3.2 of the Constitution.66 
The court acknowledged the fact that the effects of its decision might cause hardship 
to many tenants, and it was accordingly pointed out that such hardship suffered by 
tenants might amount to an unjust attack upon the property rights of tenants. The court 
concluded by pointing out that: 
65 
66 
[1983] ILRM 246 at 250 et seq. As far as the payment of rent was concerned, sections 6 
to 9 of the Housing (Private Rented Dwellings) Bi/11981 proposed an interesting scheme. 
The Bill proposed that a 'gross rent' was determined, either by agreement between the 
owner and the lessee or, if such an agreement was not reached, by the District Court. The 
'gross rent' should be determined on the basis of what a willing lessee not in occupation 
would give and a willing lessor take. This amount would then be reduced by the amount 
allowed for improvemenls. For the first five years after the commencement of this scheme 
the lessee would pay the rent payable at the commencement of the Act plus, in the first 
year, 40% of the difference between that rent and the 'gross rent', 55% of the difference 
in the second year, 70% of the difference in the third year, 85% of the difference in the 
fourth year, and thereafter the lessee would pay the full rent as fixed by the court. 
[1983] ILRM 246 at 252. 
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"[h]aving regard to the obligation imposed on the State by the 
Constitution to act in accordance with the principles of social justice, the 
court recognises the presumption that any such hardship will be provided 
for adequately by the State". 67 
This decision seems to be in line with the approach in most other jurisdictions. A clearly 
unjust situation with regard to the landowner will not be allowed, if a land-reform related 
law expects the individual to bear a burden which should be borne by the public at 
large. In this case the court placed the onus of carrying the financial burden during the 
transition period on the state. Private individuals would thus not have to suffer 
economic losses as a direct result of a clearly unfair and unjust system. The court 
accepted that land-reform related laws, such as rent control laws, are not invalid in 
principle. This will only be the case where the effects of the law are unfair or 
unreasonable. 
13. 7 The Netherlands 
The situation in the Netherlands serves as an example of a jurisdiction where land 
reform constitutes a legitimate reason for the restriction or infringement of property 
rights in civil law in absence of a constitutionally entrenched property clause. The civil 
law perception of specifically ownership in the Netherlands bears close resemblance 
to the position in South African common law before the implementation of the 1993 
Constitution, and it is therefore interesting for the purposes of this study to see that 
land reform is regarded as a valid reason for ~airly extensive infringement of the 
owner's common law rights. Although ownership is protected by the Dutch Constitution, 
parliament has the power to determine the extent of these rights and may limit the rights 
as they see fit. The Bill of Rights is not entrenched in the Dutch Constitution, and the 
Constitution does not afford the courts the judicial power of review. The owner thus has 
to rely on civil law for the recognition and protection of the rights associated with 
67 [1983) ILRM 246 at 253. 
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ownership.68 Although civil law affords the owner with very strong protection of his/her 
property rights, these rights are not regarded as inviolate in civil law and may be 
restricted or limited to serve the public interest. For the purposes of this section the 
effect of two Acts will be looked at, both of which have an effect on the content and 
scope of the owner's rights: the Leegstandwet69 and the Landinrichtingswet. 70 
The Leegstandwef1 determines that the state may use uninhabited buildings suitable 
for housing in order to deal with the housing shortage. Kleyn72 points out that the 
Leegstandwet rests on two legs: firstly it aims to prevent the non-use of houses and 
other buildings suitable for accommodation, and secondly, it aims to increase 
government involvement in the prevention of non-use of houses. In terms of the Act a 
register for uninhabited houses or dwellings has to be established for every district in 
the Netherlands.73 Within one month after the house became uninhabited, it has to be 
entered into the register. Non-compliance with this by the owner is a punishable 
offence.74 Once a house has been registered in terms of the Act, the local authority may 
acquire and use the house for purposes of housing homeless residents in order to curb 
the housing shortage. After the house has been unoccupied for five months the local 
authority has to make a decision within two weeks whether it will acquire the house to 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
See chapter 7 in this regard. 
Leegstandwet of 21 May 1981, Stb 337. 
Landinrichtingswet of 9 May 1985, Stb 299. · 
Leegstandwetof21May1981, Stb 337. See in general Balk 1980 R&K 390; Van der Walt 
1991 R&K 329; Kleyn LeegstandbestrQding. De Leegstandwet, tijdelijke verhuur, vorderen 
en kraken 9; Kleijn, Van Velten and Kleijn Overheidsingrijpen in de eigendoms- en 
gebruiksrechten van onroerend goed 39 et seq, Van Maanen Eigendomschijnbewegingen 
148 et seq. 
Kleyn Leegstandbestrijding. De Leegstandwet, tijdelijke verhuur, vord~ren en kraken 9. 
Section 2. 
Section 6 determines that an owner who does not register his/her un-used house may be 
fined f 25 000 or four weeks imprisonment. Also see Kleyn Leegstandbestrijding. De 
Leegstandwet, tijde/ijke verhuur, vorderen en kraken 12. 
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use it for housing the homeless. 75 The listing of a specific house in the register will only 
be scrapped if the owner starts to use the house him/herself again, 76 or if the house has 
been empty for more than a year. Once a house has been acquired by the local 
authority in terms of the Act, the local authority may allocate the house to a properly 
identified person. No contract of lease will be created ex lege, but both parties (the 
owner and the new resident) will have certain obligations towards one another in terms 
of the Act. The owner will have to provide the new resident with the use and enjoyment 
of the house, while the resident is obliged to pay the owner a reasonable amount for 
the use of the house. The owner is, however, free to enter into a lease contract with the 
new resident. 77 
The Act furthermore determines that krakers (squatters) occupying an unused house 
have to vacate the property immediately on the owner's request, and if they refuse to 
do so, the mayor has the authority to have them forcibly removed. An interesting aspect 
of this part of the Act is that the occupation of an unoccupied house which is not 
entered into the register, is not a punishable offence in terms of this Act. 78 
Another legislative measure which may have an impact on the landowner's rights is the 
75 
76 
77 
78 
Section 7. In the case, however, where an owner is relocating to another district and has 
to sell the house, or where the owner built a house for purposes of selling it, this period is 
twelve months. 
Section 5 of the Act determines that in the case where an owner starts to re-use his/her 
house, this has to be for a just cause. The owner may not re-use the house simply to 
frustrate the provisions of the Act. The onus of proof in this case will be on the local 
authorityto prove that the re-use of the house, which has previously been empty, is clearly 
for purposes of escaping the effects of this Act. 
This has both advantages and disadvantages. If the resident (lessee) does not pay rent 
regularly, the owner may terminate the contract. On the other hand, the contract of lease 
in the Netherlands has a more or less permanent character. In principle there is no 
stipulated period and the lessee is free to continue renting the property until his/her death, 
upon which the lessee's spouse or partner my continue to lease the property. See 1623 
BW. 
Section 14. Also see Kleyn Leegstandbestrijding. De Leegstandwet, tijdelijke verhuur, 
vorderen en kraken 12; Kleijn, Van Velten and Kleijn Overheidsingrijpen in de eigendoms-
en gebruiksrechten van onroerend goed 49; Balk 1980 R&K 390 et seq; Van der Walt 
1991 R&K 329 at 336. 
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Landinrichtingswet. 79 This Act deals mainly with planning law, but it provides for land 
consolidation as one of the measures to effect the constructive use of land. The Act 
determines that property holders in a specific area may apply for the redevelopment 
and planning of that area. The process involves the creation of a comprehensive plan 
to ensure that the land in question is put to the best possible use. This process may 
include measures to consolidate agricultural land where farms have become too small 
or dispersed for effective farming. 
Ruilverkaveling or land consolidation in the Netherlands traditionally entailed the 
exchange of farmland between individual owners where, as a result of subdivision of 
the land, farms were too small, peculiarly shaped or were not situated next to one 
another. Through a process of ruilverkaveling owners could exchange land in an 
attempt to consolidate their land. Since 1924 this process has changed to a certain 
extent. The Ruilverkavelingswet of 1924,80 193811 and 19Blf created a process 
whereby the state is in charge of land consolidation schemes. In terms of this process 
owners in a specific area may apply for the consolidation of their land. If more than half 
of the owners in that specific area vote in favour of a land consolidation scheme, the 
state will assist with the planning and the execution of the scheme for the designated 
area as a whole. Not only will farmland be redivided, but the state will also assist with 
the creation or improvement of the general infrastructure in that area (this may include 
the building of roads and canals, the reclamation of land, the supply of water for 
household purposes, electricity an so on).83 
The promulgation of the Landinrichtingswet in 1985 .introduced a new era in this regard. 
This Act is primarily aimed at the comprehensive and detailed planning of designated 
79 Landinrichtingswet of 9 May 1985, Stb 299. 
80 Ruilverkave/ingswet of 1924, Stb 481. 
81 Ruilverkave/ingswet of 1938, Stb 618. 
82 Ruilverkave/ingswet of 1954, Stb 510. 
83 See in general De Cloe Landinrichtingswet XIV; Edwards Planning betwist 61. 
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areas. The purpose of this Act is to ensure a responsible, rational and economically 
sound agricultural industry, to create a socially acceptable living and working 
environment in the countryside, to ensure the maximum use of land by the whole of the 
non-agricultural community, and to conserve as wide a variety of natural areas as 
possible. 84 
Land consolidation is just one of the measures provided for by the Act to effect effective 
planning. In terms of the Landinrichtingswet the organization of land may include 
measures aimed at the reorganisation of the land, accommodational organisation of the 
land, land consolidation, and land consolidation by agreement. 85 
The Act determines that where more than 50% of the parties concerned vote in favour 
of a land consolidation scheme, the whole area will be subject to such a scheme. 86 It 
may be argued that this constitutes a drastic interference with the rights of the owners 
who do not support the land consolidation scheme, but on the other hand it is argued 
that the scheme serves to promote the public welfare and that individuals are required 
to bear this burden to serve the collective interest. On approval of the scheme the land 
will be redivided to ensure the most effective and best possible use of the land, and 
general services will be provided. The Act further provides that no more than 5% of the 
value of the land may be appropriated by the state in order to finance the building of 
84 
85 
86 
De Cloe Landinrichtingswet XV. 
Article 13 of the Landinrichtingswet. To qualify for such a scheme in terms of the Act the 
land in question has to fulfill a mainly agricultural function, but it also has to serve, or ought 
to serve, some non-agricultural purpose. See article 15 of the Landinrichtingswet. Thus, 
in terms of the Landinrichtingswet land consolidation entails not only the mere 
reorganisation of agricultural land, but also measures and provisions pertaining to all 
facets of the use of land in a specific area, including agriculture, forestry, horticulture, 
nature conservation, the landscape, infrastructure, open air recreation and socio-historical 
aspects. See article 5 of the Landinrichtingswet. 
Article 51 of the Landinrichtingswet determines that the decision to introduce a land 
consolidation scheme must be taken by voting. The parties who vote against such a 
scheme will be forced to submit to the effects of the land consolidation scheme. The 
Landinrichtingswet has broadened the base of people eligible to vote when a decision has 
to be taken whether to accept a land consolidation scheme or not. In terms of the old 
Rui/verkave/ingswet only owners and users of the land in question were eligible to vote, 
but in terms of the Landinrichtingswetarticle 54 to 61 all parties concerned may participate 
in the process. 
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public roads, canals, and other provisions relating to the conservation of the natural 
environment. 87 If an owner loses some of his/her rights as a direct result of the land 
consolidation scheme, he/she may apply for compensation. 88 · 
The Act also provides for land consolidation by agreement. In terms of this process 
three or more owners may consolidate their land and redivide the total landmass by 
way of notarial deed. 89 
De Cloe90 points out that the need to include measures in the Act to prevent a 
degeneration to the position before the land consolidation scheme was executed, did 
not exist in this case. Land consolidation in the Netherlands seem to be permanent, 
and no preventative measures were thus included in the Act. 
Although both the Leegstandwet and the Landinrichtingswet entail measures which 
have a direct effect on the owner's rights to use his/her property as he/she sees fit, 
these measures are justified in terms of the public purpose they serve. These 
legislative measures illustrate the fact that the owner's rights may be subjected to the 
public interest. In the Netherlands, where there is a housing shortage as well as a 
shortage of agricultural land, it is justified that measures which aim to address these 
issues radically interfere with and restrict the owner's rights. 
13.8 Conclusion 
The land-reform related measures discussed in this chapter were all implemented in 
jurisdictions without an official, large-scale land reform programme. Although land 
reform is not regarded as a major issue in these jurisdictions, the case law dealing with 
87 Article 150 of the Landinrichtingswet. 
88 Article 140 of the Landinrichtingswet. 
89 Article 17, 119 and 120 of the Landinrichtingswet. 
90 De Cloe Landinrichtingswet XXI. 
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different land reform related measures discussed in this chapter clearly illustrate that 
land reform measures that involve either the regulation of the use of property in terms 
of the state's police power91 or the expropriation of property in terms of the state's 
power of eminent domain92 can be constitutionally acceptable. These cases also 
illustrate that the possibility of a constitutional conflict, as illustrated by the Indian 
experience, can be avoided. 
The implementation of land reform measures are generally aimed at improving the 
position of the non-owner by securing his/her rights with regard to the owner and to 
create a just and equitable situation with regard to the distribution of land. The tenure 
reform measures discussed in this chapter are mostly aimed at the improvement of the 
relationship between landlords and tenants. These reform measures are effected in 
terms of the state's police power and do not require the payment of compensation.93 
The possibility does, however, always exist that the regulation of the use of property 
may be regarded as a compensable taking of property in that it 'goes too far' and 
places a burden on the individual property owner that should be borne by society as 
a whole. The discussion above seems to illustrate that most courts are lenient in their 
approach to land reform measures, and that land reform measures are regarded as a 
valid exercise of the state's power to limit private property rights. In most developed 
countries the social function of property (especially land) is emphasised and the courts 
generally expect the owner to suffer the limitation or restriction of his/her rights in the 
public interest, provided that an equitable balance is established between the interests 
91 
92 
93 
X and Y v The Netherlands No 6202173 1 DR 66 (1975); Pennell v City of San Jose 485 
US 1 (1988); Yee v City of Escondido 503 US 519 (1992); Xv Austria No 8003n717 DR 
80 (1980); BVerfGE 37, 132; BVerfGE 68, 361; BVerfGE 38, 248; BVerfGE 91, 294; 
BVerfGE 79, 292; BVerfGE 89, 1; BVerfGE 52, 1. Also see the Dutch Leegstandwet of 21 
May 1981, Stb 337. See in general Balk 1980 R&K 390; Van der Walt 1991 R&K 329; 
Kleyn Leegstandbestrijding. De Leegstandwet, tijdelijke verhuur, vorderen en kraken 9; 
Kleijn, Van Velten and Kleijn Overheidsingrijpen in de eigendoms- en gebruiksrechten van 
onroerend goed 39 et seq. 
James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123 (1986); Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 
229 (1984). 
Pennell v City of San Jose 485 US 1 (1988); Yee v City of Escondido 503 US 519 (1992); 
Xv Austria No 800317717 DR 80 (1980); BVerfGE37, 132; BVerfGE68, 361; BVerfGE 
38, 248; BVerfGE91, 294; BVerfGE79, 292; BVerfGE89, 1; BVerfGE52,1. 
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of the individual and the public interest. 
Land reform measures which effect the expropriation of property (land) are mostly 
aimed at the equal (re)distribution of land among all the members of a particular 
society. Due to the fact that land reform is regarded as a legitimate public purpose in 
most developed countries, 94 the courts seem to allow for land reform where property is 
expropriated, even in cases where the expropriated property is eventually transferred 
to other individuals. 95 It is, however, important that an equitable balance should be 
struck between the rights of the individual and the public interest, and if it is found that 
the land reform measures impose on an individual property holder a burden which 
should rather be borne by society at large, the property holder should be compensated. 
The principles which govern land consolidation could also be applied to measures 
aimed at the redistribution of land. Land consolidation is generally aimed at the creation 
of a situation where available land is put to its optimum use. The implementation of 
such a scheme is usually dependent on the decision of the majority of landowners in 
a particular area. The dissenting minority is forced to accept the decision of the majority 
and has to submit to the effects of the scheme. 96 The redistribution of land also aims 
to ensure that all land is distributed just and equitably between all members of society, 
and the landed minority has to accept the needs and wishes of the landless majority. 
This chapter illustrates that the introduction of land reform measures need not cause 
friction between the legislature and the judiciary. It is widely accepted, even in 
jurisdictions where land reform is not regarded as a major issue, that property has a 
social function and that the state may legitimately restrict the individual's rights in order 
to serve the public interest. Land reform qualifies as a legitimate public purpose, and 
94 
95 
96 
BVerfGE 7 4,264; James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123 (1986); Hawaii Housing Authority 
v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984). Also see the dissenting judgement of Murphy J in Clunies-
Ross v The Commonwealth of Australia and Others (1984) 155 CLR 193 at 206 et seq. 
James v United Kingdom 8 EHRR 123 (1986); Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff 467 US 
229 (1984). 
See in general De Cloe Landinrichtingswet XIV; Edwards Planning betwist 61. 
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as long as the judiciary takes cognisance of the social role and function of property, the 
question of land reform need not pose a problem. The role of the judiciary would then 
be to make sure that the land reform measures comply with the principles for and 
boundaries of constitutionally legitimate land reform, and to ensure that the legislature 
does not impose a too heavy burden on individual property holders in its 
implementation of land reform. However, the possibility of friction between the 
legislature and the judiciary might become a reality in jurisdiction where the courts hold 
the view that the constitutional property guarantee provides an absolute guarantee of 
existing individual property rights and that existing property rights may not be limited 
or infringed upon for social and/or political reasons (as is illustrated by the Indian 
experience and the Australian decision in Clunies-Ross v The Commonwealth of 
Australia and Others).97 
97 (1984) 155 CLR 193. 
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14 
LAND REFORM IN JURISDICTIONS WITH AN OFFICIAL LAND 
REFORM PROGRAMME 
14.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the aims and implementation of formal or official land reform 
programmes in different jurisdictions are looked at. In most of these jurisdictions the 
implementation of land reform was necessitated by a history of discrimination and the 
consequent inequitable distribution of land. The land reform programmes devised to 
deal with these inequalities encompassed a variety of measures to ensure the equal 
distribution of land and to provide all citizens with security of tenure. 
It is pointed out in the previous chapter that land reform measures in jurisdictions 
without an official land reform programme may cause friction between the judiciary and 
the legislature, depending on the judiciaries view on existing property rights and the 
role and function of the national Constitution. The constitutional conflict between the 
courts and the legislature is usually the result of the courts' narrow and conservative 
interpretation of the property clause. This is illustrated by the situation in India and 
Australia. In these jurisdictions the courts interpreted the property clause in such a 
manner that the existing property rights are afforded strong protection, and the social 
function of property is not regarded as an inherent part of the property clause. 
However, it is pointed out that in other jurisdictions, where the courts emphasise the 
social and political role and function of property (Germany, the United States of 
America, the Council of Europe and Ireland) land reform measures need not be 
regarded as in conflict with the constitutional property guarantee. In most of these 
jurisdictions the social and political context within which property rights are interpreted 
and applied plays a decisive role, and the courts attempt to establish a just and 
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of the affected 
individuals. 
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In this chapter the position in jurisdictions with an official land reform programme is 
investigated. Firstly, mention is made of a variety of jurisdictions where provision is 
made in the Constituti"on for land reform in general or a specific form of land reform. 
The implementation of land reform in these jurisdictions usually does not cause any 
problems. The land reform programmes in Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana and Mexico 
are investigated with special reference to the type of reforms introduced, and the 
particular circumstances under which these reforms were implemented to cater for the 
needs of that specific society. 
The implementation of the respective land reform programmes in Namibia, Botswana 
and Mexico did not cause friction between the judiciary and the legislature in the sense 
that the land reform programme was in conflict with the constitutional property clause. 
In Zimbabwe the possibility of a constitutional conflict still exists, notwithstanding the 
fact that the court's jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation had been 
removed from the constitutional property clause. 
14.2 Developing countries that make provision for land reform in their 
constitutions 
The property clause in the South African Constitution contains a number of provisions 
which specifically provide for the implementation of land reform measures. These 
provisions are discussed in chapter 11 and chapter 15. In a number of other 
jurisdictions provision is also made in the national Constitutions for land reform 
measures. Due to the fact that no case law exists on the land reform measures 
provided for in the Constitution, these provisions will not be discussed in any great 
detail in this section. 
Nationalisation of all or specific land as a means to effect land reform is recognised in 
various jurisdictions.1 The Constitutions of Chile and Nigeria provide for the 
See in this regard King Land reform - a world survey 34 et seq. 
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nationalisation of all mines and minerals.2 In Lesotho all land vests in the Basotho 
Nation. The King of Lesotho, who holds the land in trust for the Nation, has the right to 
allocate land, make grants of interests or rights in or over the land, and to terminate or 
restrict any interest or right that has been granted. The Parliament makes provisions 
regulating the principles according to which and the manner in which the King may 
execute his powers.3 Similarly, the Ethiopian Constitution, the Mexican Constitution and 
the Constitution of Mozambique determine that the ownership of all land vests in the 
state, and that citizens have a right to use the land. 4 
2 
3 
4 
Article 42(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria determines that: 
"Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the entire 
property in and control of all minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, 
under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial 
waters and the Exclusive Economic Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the 
Government of the Federation and shall be managed in such a manner 
as may be prescribed by the National Assembly". 
Section 107 to 109 of the Constitution of Lesotho determines that: 
"107. Without prejudice to any allocation of land that was made before 
the commencement of this Constitution .... all land in Lesotho is vested 
in the Basotho Nation. 
108. (1) The power to allocate land that is vested in the Basotho Nation, 
to make grants of interests or rights in or over such land, to revoke or 
derogate from any allocation or grant that has been made or otherwise 
to terminate or restrict any interest or right that has been granted is 
vested in the King in trust for the Basotho Nation. (2) The power that is 
vested in the King by subsection (1) of this section shall be exercised in 
accordance with this Constitution and any other law .. 
109. Parliament may make provision prescribing the allocations that may 
be made and the interests or rights that may be granted in exercise of the 
power conferred by section 108 of this Constitution, the grounds upon 
which and the circumstances in which such allocations or grants may or 
shall be so made or may or shall be revoked or derogated from the 
interests or rights which may or shall otherwise be so terminated or 
restricted, appeals in respect of the allocation or refusal to allocate land 
or the revocation of interests to or in land and, generally, regulating the 
principles according to which and the manner in which the said power 
shall be exercised". 
Article 40(3) and (4) of the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
states that: 
"3. The right to ownership of all rural and urban land, as well as of all 
natural resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the peoples of 
Ethiopia. Land is a common property of the nations, nationalities and 
peoples of Ethiopia and shall not be subject to sale or to other means of 
transfer. 
4. Any Ethiopian who wants to earn a living by farming has a right, which 
shall not be alienated, to obtain without payment, the use of the land". 
Article 27 of the Constitution of Mexico determines that: 
"Ownership of the lands and waters within the boundaries of the national 
territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has had, and has, the 
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It is pointed out above that the fixing of a maximum limit on land ownership (as applied 
in Namibia5 and Mexic8) is an acceptable means of effecting land reform. The 
Constitution of Egypt contains a special provision (among the· articles dealing with the 
right to property) which allows for the fixing of a maximum limit on land ownership. This 
provision states that the law shall fix the maximum limit of land ownership with the view 
to protect the farmer and the agricultural labourer from exploitation and to assert the 
authority of the alliance of the people's working powers at the level of the village. 7 
The Constitution of Kenya contains an interesting provision. This provision determines 
that the non-discrimination guarantee will not apply to the giving or withholding of 
consent to a transaction in agricultural land.8 The possible effect of this provision is that 
the state may be in a position to control the alienation and transfer of agricultural land 
without fear of violating the landowner's right not to be treated in a discriminatory 
manner. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting 
private property". 
Article 46 and 47 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique states that: 
"46. 1. Ownership of land is vested in the State. 2. Land may not be sold, 
mortga,ged, or otherwise encumbered or alienated. 3. As a universal 
means for the creation of wealth and social well-being, the use and 
enjoyment of land shall be the right of all the people of Mozambique. 
4 7. 1. The State shall determine the conditions for the use and 
enjoyment of land. 2. The right to use and enjoyment of land shall be 
granted to individual or collective persons, taking into account its social 
purpose. 3. The terms for the establishment of rights in respect of land 
shall be governed by law and shall prioritise direct users and producers. 
The law shall not permit such rightS to be used to favour situations of 
economic domination or privilege to the detriment of the majority of 
citizens". 
Section 14 of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act 6 of 1995. See 14.4. 
See 14.6. 
Article 37 of the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt. 
Article 82 (2) of the Constitution of Kenya determines that: 
"(2) ... no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by a person 
acting by virtue of any written law or in the performance of the functions 
of a public office or a public authority". 
Article 82(6)(b) states that subsection (2) shall not apply to the giving or withholding of 
consent to a transaction in agricultural land by any body or authority established by or 
under any law for the purpose of controlling transactions in agricultural land. 
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In Guyana9 the process of reform is authorised, not by specific provisions in the 
property clause itself, but by a set of provisions which establish a political, economical 
and social system within which the property clause assumes a co-operative, social 
meaning. These provisions embody the constitutional goals of socio-economic reform 
and reconstruction and have an obvious effect on property rights. In the Guyanan 
situation the goals of socialism and co-operativism are attained through the regulation 
of the use of property and not through nationalisation of all property. Although these 
provisions emphasise socialism and co-operativism, they still leave room for the 
recognition of private property. 
9 The relevant sections of the Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana 
determines that: 
"14 The supreme goal of the economic system which is being 
established in the State is the fullest possible satisfaction of the people's 
growing material, cultural and intellectual requirements, as well as the 
development of their personality and their socialist relations in society. 
15(1) In order to achieve economic independence as the imperative 
concomitant of its political independence, the State will revolutionise the 
national economy. (2) The national economy of the State will be based 
upon the social ownership of the means of production and the eventual 
abolition of internal arrangements and relationships which permit the 
exploitation of man by man. (3) The economy will develop in accordance 
with the economic laws of socialism on the foundation of socialist 
relations of production and development of the production forces. (4) 
National economic planning shall be the basic principle of the 
development and management of the economy. It shall provide for the 
widest possible participation of the people and their socio-economic 
organs at enterprise, community, regional and national levels, and shall 
also provide continuous opportunity for the working people to exercise 
initiative and to develop a spirit of creativity and innovation. 
16 Co-operativism in practice shall be the dynamic principle of socialist 
transformation and shall pervade and inform all interrelationship in the 
society. Co-operativism is rooted in the historical experience of the 
people, is based on self-reliance, is capable of releasing the productive 
energies of the people, and is a unifying principle in the total 
development of the nation. · 
17 The existence of privately owned economic enterprises is recognised. 
Such enterprises must satisfy social needs and operate within the 
regulatory framework of national policy and the law. 
18 Land is for social use and must go to the tiller. 
19 Every citizen has the right to own personal property which includes 
such assets as equipment, motor vehicles and bank accounts. 
20 The right of inheritance is guaranteed. 
21 The source of the growth of social wealth and of the well-being of the 
people, and of each indMdual, is the labour of the people. 
26 Every citizen has the right to proper housing accommodation. 
36 In the interests of the present and future generations, the State will 
protect and make rational use of its land, mineral and water resources, 
as well as its fauna and flora, and will take all appropriate measures to 
conserve and improve the environment". 
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In Tanzania an Act which extinguished customary law land rights in a land-reform 
related process was invalidated by the High Court because it violated the affected 
parties' right not to be discriminated against. The Regulation of Land Tenure 
(Established Villages) Act of 1992 was declared null and void in the High Court of 
Tanzania decision in Aakonaay and Another v Attorney General of Taniania. 10 The Act 
extinguished all customary law rights which were held with relation to land that fell 
within villages established in terms of the Act. 11 The Act excluded payment of 
compensation for the land taken, 12 and provided that no proceedings could be instituted 
in any court or tribunal in relation to the extinction of any right by the 1992 Act or in 
relation to any village land under customary law.13 The court held that the Act violated 
article 13 of the Constitution 14 in that it amounted to discrimination. 15 Article 24 of the 
Constitution 16 was also violated in that the Act disregarded the lawfully acquired and 
exercised land rights of the affected parties. 17 Lastly the court held that the provisions 
of the Act promoted the exercise of the rights and freedoms of certain individuals in 
such a manner that it terminated or infringed upon the rights and freedoms of others. 18 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
[1993) 4 LRC 327 (HC). 
Section 3. 
Section 4. 
Sections 5 and 6. 
Article 13 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania determines that: 
"13(1) All people are equal before the law, and have the right, without 
discrimination of any kind, to be protected and to be accorded equal 
justice before the law. (2) It is forbidden for any law ... to impose any 
condition which is of a discriminatory nature of which is obviously to one's 
disadvantage". 
[1993) 4 LRC 327 (HC) at 332 et seq. 
Article 24 of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania determines that every one 
has the right to own property and the right to keep his property in accordance with the law. 
[1993) 4 LRC 327 (HC) at 334 et seq. 
This was found to be in violation of article 30 of the Tanzanian Constitution which 
determines that human rights and freedoms may not be used by one person in a way that 
will result in interference and curtailment of the rights and freedom of others or of the 
interests of the public. See [1993) 4 LRC 327 (HC) at 332 et seq. 
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14.3 Zimbabwe 
Land distribution patterns in Zimbabwe are distorted as a result of the country's colonial 
past. Before the political transformation in 1980 Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) was ruled 
' 
by a white minority government and land was distributed along racial lines. Most of the 
best arable land was allocated to whites, while blacks were localised in so-called tribal 
reserves comprising mostly of infertile land. In fact, ~t prior to the political 
transformation in 1980, more or less 6000 white farmers occupied 39% of the total land 
area in Zimbabwe. This portion of the land comprised the most fertile land in the 
country. At the same time 750 000 blacks were allocated 42% of the total land area of 
the country, which were for the most part the least fertile land availa~his situation 
led to dissatisfaction amongst the black majority and is recorded as one of the reasons 
for the war for political transformatio~ 
The political transformation of Zimbabwe came as a result of the Lancaster House 
agreement reached in December 1979 between the United Kingdom (as the erstwhile 
colonial power), the Rhodesia regime and the rebel Patriotic Front. The Lancaster 
House agreement determined that certain provisions of the new Constitution would be 
entrenched for a period of ten years. Among these provisions was section 16 of the 
Constitution which guaranteed the right to property. In terms of this guarantee white 
landowners were entitled to keep their property, and if their property was expropriated, 
compensation had to be paid in foreign currency.20 Section 16 made comprehensive 
land reform almost impossible. 
Towards the end of the ten year period the Zimbabwean government amended the 
Constitution. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 11) Act of 1990 amended 
the Constitution to allow for compulsory acquisition of land for the purpose of 
19 
20 
Van Hom 1994JAL144at147; Naldi 1993 J ModAfrStud585; Moyo The land question 
in Zimbabwe 104 et seq; Moyo and Skalness 1990 Africa Focus 201 et seq; Naldi 1998 
C/LSA 78 et seq; Stefanski 1995 Afryka Azja Ameryka lacinska 63 et seq. 
Van Hom 1994 JAL 144 at 148; Naldi 1993 J Mod Afr stud 585 at 568; Moyo The land 
question in Zimbabwe 104 et seq. 
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resettlement. The 'prompt' payment of 'adequate' compensation was changed to 'fair 
compensation' paid in a 'reasonable time'. 21 The Amendment Act also provided that 
Parliament has the power to specify the principles in terms of Which compensation was 
to be determined and paid, and to fix the amount of compensation in accordance with 
' 
those principles. Section 6 of the Act furthermore amended the Constitution to include 
a provision which states that no law could be called into question by any court on the 
ground that the compensation provided by that law was not fair. Two subsequent Acts 
amended the Constitution to ensure that the courts would have no jurisdiction at all with 
regard to the determination of compensation. The Constitution of Zimbabwe 
Amendment (No 12) Act deleted a clause enabling a claimant for compensation to 
apply to the High Court 'for the determination of any question relating to compensation', 
and the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 13) Act amended section 16 of the 
Constitution to allow only claimants for compensation with property other than land to 
apply to the court for the determination of a question relating to compensation. 22 
21 
22 
Ng'ong'ola 1992 Int & Comp LQ 117 at 134 et seq. 
Naldi 1998 CILSA 78 at 79 et seer. Ng'ong'ola 1992 Int & Comp LQ 117 at 134 et seq. For 
purposes of reference, the relevant part of section 16 of the Constitution, after the 
amendments, is provided here: 
"(1) No property of any description or interest or right therein shall be compulsorily 
acquired except under the authority of a law that -
(a) requires -
(Q in the case of land or any interest or right therein, that the acquisition 
is reasonably necessary for the utilization of that or any other land -
A. for settlement for agriculture or other purposes; or 
B. for purposes of land reorganisation, forestry, 
environmental conservation or the utilisation of wild life 
or other natural resources; or 
C. for the relocation of persons dispossessed in 
consequence of the utilisation of land for a purpose 
referred to in subparagraph A or B; or 
(ii) in the case of any property, including land, or any interest or right 
therein, that the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the interest of 
defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town 
and country planning or the utilisation of that or any other property for a 
purpose beneficial to the public generally or to any section of the public; 
and 
(b) requires the acquiring authority to give reasonable notice of the intention to 
acquire the property, interest or right to any person owning the property or having 
any other interest or right therein that would be effected by such acquisition; and 
(c) subject to the provisions of subsection (2), requires the acquiring authority to 
pay fair compensation for the acquisition before or within a reasonable time after 
acquiring the property, interest or right; and 
(d) requires the acquiring authority, if the acquisition is contested, to apply to the 
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In line with the constitutional changes the government announced its land policy in 
1990. The Zimbabwean land policy focuses on five issues: (a) to acquire five million 
more hectares in land blocks to resettle 11 O 000 more households; (b) to review the 
land tenure situation in communal and resettlement areas; (c) the selection of settlers 
' 
and land use models in resettlement areas were to be reviewed towards emphasising 
economic rather than social or subsistence criteria; ( d) it intended to promote blacks 
in capitalist farming through training and agricultural support services; and (e) it 
intended to introduce a land tax. These issues identified by the land policy statement 
were not linked together in a coherent, rational implementation sequence, but 
attempted to provide a comprehensive position on various land policy concerns and 
problems implemented since independence ten years earlier.23 
With a kind of land policy in place, and after the Constitution had been amended to 
ensure that land reform measures would not constitute a breach of or be blocked by the 
provisions contained in the Constitution, the government proceed to enact legislation 
for the purposes of the redistribution of land and the resettlement of the rural 
population. The Land Acquisition Act was adopted by Parliament in 1992 with an 
overwhelming majority. j!he main aim of the Act was to enable the government to 
acquire land on which it could resettle approximately 162 000 communal farming 
23 
High Court or some other court before, or not later than thirty days after, the 
acquisition for an order confirming the acquisition; and 
(e) enables any person whose property has been acquired to apply to the High 
Court or some other court for the prompt return of the property if the court does 
not confirm the acquisition, and to appeal to the Supreme Court; and 
(f) except where the property concerned is land or any interest or right therein, 
enables any claimant for compensation to apply to the High Court or some other 
court for the determination of any question relating to compensation and to 
appeal to the Supreme Court. 
(2) A law referred to in subsection (1) which provides for the compulsory acquisition of land 
or any interest or right therein may -
(a) specify the principles on which, and the manner in which, compensation for 
the acquisition of the land or interest or right therein is to be determined and paid; 
(b) fix, in accordance with the principles referred to in paragraph (a), the amount 
of compensation payable for the acquisition of the land or interest or right therein; 
(c)fix the period within which compensation shall be paid for the acquisition of the 
land or interest or right therein; 
and no such law shall be called into question by any court on the ground that the 
compensation provided by that law is not fair". 
Moyo The land question in Zimbabwe 245. 
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families~ith the Act in place, the government was able to plan for and target the 
type, location and scale of land required for its land reform programme in order to 
increase access to prime lands for new settlers, to broaden the scope of agricultural 
enterprises in the resettlement areas, and to improve the efficiency of prime land 
utilisation. 25 
In terms of section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act the President of Zimbabwe may 
compulsorily acquire any land where the acquisition is reasonably necessary in the 
interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, town and 
country planning, or its utilisation for a purpose beneficial to the public. Section 3 also 
permits the acquisition of rural lancP6 where it is reasonable necessary for its utilisation: 
(a) for settlement for agricultural or other purposes (including among others forestry, 
fruit growing and animal husbandry); or (b) for purposes of land reorganisation, 
forestry, environmental conservation, or the utilisation of wildlife or other natural 
resources; or (c) for the relocation of persons dispossessed as a result of the foregoing. 
The acquisition of derelict land is also authorised by section 3.27 
The procedure for the compulsorily acquisition of land is set out in section 5 which 
determines that prior notice must be given of any proposed acquisition. Upon such a 
notice the affected owner may submit written objection to the proposed acquisition or 
claim compensation. After notice has been given the owner of the land loses certain 
rights in that he/she cannot dispose of the land or make any permanent improvements. 
The prior notice remains in force for a period of one year. Section 8 determines that the 
24 
25 
26 
27 
Naldi 1993 J Mod Afr Stud 585; Naldi 1998 C/LSA 78 at 79 et seq. 
Moyo The land question in Zimbabwe 24 7. 
Section 2 of the Land Acquisition Act determines that rural land does not include 
communal land, state land, land in municipal, town and local government areas or in rural 
district council or rural council areas. 
Section 42 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act sets out the principles according to which the 
derelict status of land is to be determined: whether the land is or has been occupied; 
whether the land is being worked or cultivated; whether the owner can be found; the 
control which the owner has exercised over the land; and the extent of compliance with 
laws regarding the payment of rates, levies, or taxes in respect of the land. 
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state may acquire the land in not less than 30 days after the publication of the prior 
notice and that ownership of the land immediately vests in the acquiring authority upon 
publication of the notice to acquire the land, even in the case where the question of 
compensation may be unresolved. 28 
The Act furthermore provides for a procedure according to which the Minister of Lands, 
Agriculture and Rural Settlement may designate any rural land as land that can be 
acquired under the terms of section 3.29 In terms of this procedure the Minister has to 
specify the purpose for which the rural land is required, the acquiring authority, and the 
period within which it intends to acquire the land. The period for a designation may not 
exceed ten years.30 Public notice of such a designation has to be given and reasonable 
steps has to be taken to notify the owner of the land. 31 Once land has been designated 
in terms of the Act, the owner may not sell, lease or dispose of the land in any manner 
without the permission of the relevant Minister.32 Designation does not, however, affect 
the owner's right to use the property. The designation of rural land in terms of the Act 
has been the subject of constitutional litigation. In Davies and Others v Minister of 
Lands, Agriculture and Water Developmenf3 the Supreme Court confirmed the 
distinction between expropriation, for which compensation is required, and the 
deprivation of property, for which no compensation is required. The court ruled that a 
designation of rural land as land that can be acquired under the Act does not amount 
to an expropriation of the land because nothing is taken from the owner and the state 
does not acquire anything, and as such compensation is not payable for a designation. 
The court held that the owner is indeed deprived of his/her right to freely sell, lease or 
dispose of his/her rural land by a designation of the land, but that this right is not 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
Sectioil-"9 of the Land Acquisition Act provides for the eviction of the previous owner. 
See section 12. 
Section 12(2). 
Section 12(4). 
Section 14. Any sale, lease or disposal of the land without the required permission is 
regarded as void. 
1997 (1) SA228 (ZS). 
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passed on to the acquiring authority, and as such a designation does not constitute a 
compulsory acquisition or expropriation of the land. 34 The Supreme Court did not refer 
to the social and political impact or implications of land reform or the 'public purpose' 
question in its decision. Roux35 criticises the Supreme Court's neutral approach to the 
sensitive issue of land reform in post-colonial Zimbabwe, and the political and social 
context within which the judgment was delivered. He argues that the court has to reflect 
on, emphasise and justify the social and political importance of land reform in a 
developing country. However, the court a quo36 discussed the question of whether the 
acquisition of land by the state in order to redistribute the land satisfies the public 
purpose requirement. The court held that: 
" ... the facts that make land acquisition for resettlement a matter of public 
interest in Zimbabwe are so obvious that even the blind can see them. 
These facts make the resettlement of people a legitimate public 
interest".37 
This decision expressly states that land reform constitutes a legitimate public interest. 
With regard to the amount and payment of compensation the Land Acquisition Act 
determines that the acquiring authority has to pay fair compensation to the owner of the 
34 
35 
36 
37 
The court relied on the decision in Hewlett v Minister of Finance 1982 (1) SA 490 (ZS) at 
503 where it was decided that although the state benefited from the cancellation of a state 
debt incurred in terms of pre-independence legislation, the state did not 'get' anything and 
as such property was not 'acquired'. The appellant was not entitled to any compensation. 
Also see Chairman, Public Service Commission, and Others v Zimbabwe Teachers' 
Association and Others 1997 (1) SA 209 (ZS). For a discussion see Roux 1996 Afr J Int 
& Comp L 755 at 762 et seq; Naldi 1998 CILSA 78; Van der Walt The constitutional 
property clause 38. 
Roux 1996 Afr J Int & Comp L 755 at 779. 
Davies and Others v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development 1995 (1) 
BCLR 83 (Z). 
1995 (1) BCLR 83 (Z) at 93 et seq, with reference to the US decision in Hawaii Housing 
Authority v Midkiff 467 US 229 (1984). 
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land within a reasonable time.38 A Compensation Committee is established by the Act. 
This Committee has to determine the amount of compensation payable in case of a 
compulsory acquisition of designated rural land in terms of the Act. A valuation officer 
has to draft a preliminary estimate of the Committee's assessment. Both the 
Compensation Committee and the valuation officer have to consider a number of 
factors and principles in their determination of the amount of compensation. These 
factors include the size of the land, the type of soil to be found on the land, the nature 
and condition of the buildings and improvements on it, the agricultural and other 
activities that are or can be carried out on it, the variety and yield of crops, the use of 
non-arable land including grazing, water supplies, fencing, and the availability of 
electricity supply.39 
With regard to land which has not been designated as rural land, the Act requires fair 
and reasonable compensation to be paid for the loss of the land, balancing the right of 
the claimant with the general public interest, regard being had to the nature, location, 
and quality of the land.40 
Section 23 of the Act provides that compensation disputes may be referred to the 
Administrative Court. This court has jurisdiction to adjudicate cases where the 
claimant's right to, or the amount of compensation is disputed. The Administrative Court 
has the same jurisdiction as the High Court in instances of judicial review, and may set 
aside an assessment of the Compensation Committee if it finds that the Committee did 
not consider all of the relevant factors. The court has to ensure that fair compensation 
is paid within a reasonable time. Appeals from decisions of the Administrative Court 
may be directed to the Supreme Court.41 Thus, although the validity of the Act as such 
may not be called into question by the courts on the ground that the compensation 
38 Section 16. 
39 Section 19. 
40 Section 20. See Ng'ong'ola 1992 Int & Comp LQ 117 at 133. 
41 Section 46(3). 
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provided by the Act is not fair, the courts nevertheless have jurisdiction to review the 
compatibility of the decisions of the Compensation Committee with the principles 
prescribed under section 19. 
In May, Thomas, Cairns and Frogmore v Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe42 the Supreme 
Court interpreted 'fair compensation' (as required by section 16 of the Constitution) to 
include the following principles: 
"(i) the compensation is to be determined by reference to the value of the 
expropriated property to the person from whom it is taken and not by 
reference to the value of that property to the expropriating authority - the 
question is what the owner has lost and not what the State has gained; 
(ii) the compensation should not be less than the money value into which 
the expropriated property could have been converted if there had been 
\ 
no expropriation; and (iii) any increase or decrease in the value of the 
expropriated property due to the scheme of expropriation should be 
ignored". 
This case involved the expropriation of all foreign securities. The holders of these 
securities had to pay a 30% premium when they bought the securities. The court held 
that 'adequate compensation' included only the value of the securities on the 
appropriate stock exchange (in this case the Johannesburg Stock Exchange) and thus 
not the 30% premium. The court interpreted 'adequate compensation' to mean 
'sufficient compensation' and that the interests of the affected individuals had to be 
weighed against the interest of the public from whom the money paid in compensation 
came.43 Roux44 points out that, in absence of a clear indication in the Constitution as 
to how the quantum of compensation should be determined, the court applied a version 
of the balancing principle in terms of which the interests of the affected individual is 
42 1986 (3) SA 107 (ZS) at 135. 
43 1986 (3) SA 107 (ZS) at 135at119. 
44 Roux 1996 Afr J Int & Comp L 755 at 777. 
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weighed against the public interest. In the application of this principle the court watered 
down the value of the affected shareholder's rights by referring to those rights as 
'speculative', 'risky' and 'precarious', and in doing so the court ensured that the public 
interest would weigh heavier than the expropriated parties' interests. 
According to Naldi45 the terms for the calculation and determination of compensation 
as provided for in the Ad. seem to comply with the principles identified by the Supreme 
Court as well as with international human rights standards. 
~~ implementation of the land reform programme in Zimbabwe began at a snail's pace 
in 1992 when 13 farms were designated and acquired to resettle 900 famili~The 
other land reform measures announced in 1990 on tenure reform, land tax, the 
subdivision of land and settler selection and finance are still being formulated and 
planned. 46 By the end of 1993 only 90 farms have been designated. Despite fierce 
criticism from the commercial farmers' union that the designations undermined the 
productive capacity of the agricultural sector, analysis indicates that the majority of 
farms designated were situated outside or merely on the fringe of the region suited for 
extensive farming. 47 The general perception was, however, that the government had 
used political rather than technical criteria in selecting land to be designated for 
acquisition. 48 
45 
46 
47 
48 
Naldi 1993 J Mod Afr stud 585 at 598. But see Van Horn 1994 JAL 144 at 150 et seq 
where it is contended that the limitation the court's powers of judicial review has placed the 
issue of compensation (and land redistribution) in control of a political elite. According to 
Van Horn this issue cannot be subjected to the court (as an un-elected body) or the 
legislature (which represents only the political elite), but should be the subject of political 
debate until the nature and extent of property has been redefined in a post-independent 
Zimbabwe. 
Moyo The land question in Zimbabwe 256. 
Moyo The land question in Zimbabwe 248. 
Criticism included the absence of skilled land use assessors, the lack of adequate 
involvement of representatives from the farming community (including both black and 
white farmers), the direct involvement of politicians, and the growing pressure to exercise 
political patronage through the delivery of land. See in general Moyo The land question 
in Zimbabwe 257 et seq. 
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It is interesting to note that the slow pace of land redistribution and the absence of 
tenure reform have led to increased demand for individual title rather than communal 
property rights amongst rural families. As a result of the insecurity of land rights in 
communal areas an informal system of individual tenure has developed on communal 
lands whereby families establish full control over land and its transfer. Land control and 
land transfer have become individualised through various measures such as 
inheritance and informal private sales of land. According to Moyo49 the government has 
generally turned a blind eye to these developments. 
The land reform programme in Zimbabwe seems to lack public approval and legitimacy 
in that it is not perceived as a transparent and honest attempt to bring about 
fundamental change in land holding patters in Zimbabwe. tnce the promulgation of the 
Land Acquisition Act in 1992 the pace of land reform has been very slow and this has 
led to a situation where many people lost faith in the government's commitment to 
serious and effective land refor~his may be ascribed to the fact that the measures 
introduced are not implemented rapidly or efficiently. The slow pace of reform, the lack 
of transparency and efficiency in implementing the reforms, and the ascendance of 
political over technical criteria in land acquisition have created a perception that the 
programme is unable to bring about fundamental change and that it only benefits 
government officials. 50 
0ounting pressure from the more or less 100 000 families waiting to be resettled and 
50 000 former guerrilla fighters compelled the government to speed up the land reform 
program. Thus, in 1997 1734 farms were designated for acquisition. The government 
has pointed out that compensation for these farms will not include compensation for the 
land itself, but only compensation for the buildings on the lani)The compensation paid 
to landowners in terms of the 1997 designations would thus be substantially less than 
the amount previously paid in compensation. Although this may seem unfair, it is legal 
49 Moyo The land question in Zimbabwe 269 et seq. 
50 Moyo The land quesfion in Zimbabwe 253 et seq. 
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in terms of the Constitution and the Land Acquisition Act. 51 
The land reform measures introduced thus far are mainly aimed at the equitable 
(re)distribution of land among all the people of Zimbabwe. Judged in its entirety the 
' 
land reform programme in Zimbabwe seems to be founded on sound principles. 
Although the court's power to review the amount of compensation has been removed, 
the court nevertheless declared that land reform constitutes a legitimate public 
purpose, and that land reform is not in conflict with the provisions of section 16 of the 
Constitution. The acquisition, against just compensation, and designation of rural land 
for the purposes set out in the Act (including the fair redistribution of arable land) are 
in line with the principles of land reform in most other comparable jurisdictions. 
However, due to the fact that most of the land designated in terms of the Land 
Acquisition Act is in the hands of an economically strong minority, the government's 
designation and acquisition of land remains an explosive political issue. In view of the 
government's statement in 1997 that compensation will not be paid for the land itself, 
but only for buildings on the land, it remains to be seen if the compensation awarded 
to the owners of the land which has been designated in 1997 will comply with the 
principles of 'fair compensation' as set out by the Supreme Court in May, Thomas, 
Cairns and Frogmore v ReseNe Bank of Zimbabwe52 as well as with international 
human rights standards.53 The possibility also exists that the question of the court's 
jurisdiction with regard to the determination of the quantum of compensation may cause 
friction between the judiciary and the government when the land designated in 1997 is 
finally expropriated. 
14.4 Namibia 
Similar to the situation in Zimbabwe, the first post-independence government of 
Namibia was confronted by the problem of redressing the inequalities in the distribution 
51 SA Sunday /ndependent23November1997 8; SA Sunday Times 23 November 1997 28. 
52 1986 (3) SA 107 (ZS) at 135. 
53 See Naldi 1993 J Mod Afr Stud 585 at 598. 
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of land. Due to the fact that the land issue was central to the struggle for national 
liberation, the land issue had to be addressed with some urgency. Land plays a central 
role in the economy of Namibia. More than 90% of the population is dependant on land 
for its livelihood, either as owners of commercial land, as workers on the commercial 
farms or as farmers in communal areas. The uneven distribution of land is directly 
attributable to the country's history of colonialism and the effects of the policy of 
apartheid. During the period of German colonialism most of the arable land was 
reserved for the exclusive use by whites, while blacks were forced into the so-called 
reserves (later known as communal land). During the apartheid years the size of these 
reserves was further diminished in order to enable the apartheid government to use it 
for the settlement of white farmers. At the time of independence in 1990 almost 50% 
of all usable land was concentrated in the hands of less than 2% of the population. 54 
In terms of the Constitution of Namibia all citizens are entitled to acquire, own and 
dispose of all forms of property (including land). The state may, however, expropriate 
property in the public interest subject to the payment of just compensation. 55 No specific 
provision is made for the regulation of the use of property.56 
The Namibian land reform programme is contained in and effected by means of the 
54 
55 
56 
See in general Development Strategy and Policy Unit of the Urban Foundation Urban 
Foundation Research Report 4 and 5 - Land ownership and conflicting claims: studies 
'from Germany 1937-1991, and from Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Namibia 1950-19911 et seq; 
Office of the Prtme Minister Report of the technical committee on commercial farmland 42; 
Biesele Democratization in Namibia - the view from 'the Bottom Rung' 1 et seq. 
See in general Naldi Constitutional rights in Namibia 82 et seq. 
Section 16 of the Namibian Constitution determines that: 
"(1) All persons shall have the right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and dispose 
of all forms of immovable and movable property individually or in association with 
others and to bequeath their property to their heirs or legatees: provided that 
Parliament may by legislation prohibit or regulate as it deems expedient the right 
to acquire property by persons who are not Namibian citizens. 
(2) The State or a competent body or organ authortsed by law may expropriate 
property in the public interest subject to the payment of just compensation, in 
accordance with requirements and procedures to be determined by Act of 
Parliament". 
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Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act of 1995. 57 According to the long title of this 
Act, the purpose of the Act is to provide for the acquisition of agricultural land by the 
state for the purposes of land reform and for the allocation of such land to those 
citizens who do not own or otherwise have the use of any or of adequ~te agricultural 
land. The Act specifically aims to benefit those citizens who have been disadvantaged 
socially, economically or educationally by past discriminatory laws of practices. In order 
to achieve the purposes set out in the Act, it provides (a) the state with a preferent right 
to purchase agricultural land, (b) for the compulsory acquisition of certain agricultural 
land by the state, and (c) for the regulation of the acquisition of agricultural land by 
foreign nationals. 
In order to redress the inequalities in the distribution of land the Act mainly targets 
commercial agricultural land. It was decided that the ownership and control of 
communal land should remain with the government, and that only commercial land 
should be targeted by the land reform measures introduced. In terms of section 14 of 
the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Ad the Minister of Lands, Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation may acquire agricultural land in order to make such land available to 
citizens who do not own agricultural land or who do not have use of agricultural land. 58 
The land which may be acquired by the relevant Minister includes: (a) agricultural land 
offered for sale to the Minister in terms of section 17; (b) any land classified as under-
utilised land or (c) excessive land; and (d) any agricultural land acquired by a foreign 
national in contravention of section 58 or 59.59 
In terms of Part Ill of the Act the state has a preferent right to purchase agricultural land 
57 
58 
59 
Act 6 of 1995. 
In its report the technical committee investigating the possible land reform measures 
recommends the following prioritisation in terms of the categories of beneficiaries: 
beneficiaries should either be effectively landless; or be a San left behind by the South 
African occupation forces; or be an ex-combatant; or be a returned Namibian refugee; or 
be a war victim and disabled and able to practice agriculture; or be the head of a 
household, and female; and be unemployed and without any income; and be poor. See 
Office of the Prime Minister Report of the technical committee on commercial farmland 177 
et seq. 
See section 14(2). 
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whenever the owner of such land intends to sell it. The owner is obliged to offer the 
land to the state before he/she offers it to anyone else. Only in the case where the state 
provides the owner with a certificate of waiver may the owner sell the land to another 
interested buyer.60 
Section 14 determines that the state may compulsorily acquire land for the purposes 
of the Act if the land is declared as under-utilised land or excessive land. Land may be 
declared as under-utilised land with reference to the level of economic activity on the 
land, if it is apparent that no investment is being made in the land, and if the 
infrastructure on the land is deteriorating. 61 With reference to excessive land the Act 
provides for the division of certain parts of Namibia into agro-ecological zones and 
within each of these zones the size of an economic unit will be determined. Whenever 
someone owns agricultural land in excess of more than two economic units, whether 
in the same agro-ecological zone or in different zones, the state may classify such land 
as excessive land and may consequently acquire such land for the purpose of 
redistribution. 
Part VI of the Act restricts the acquisition of agricultural land by foreign nationals and 
provides for the expropriation of land owned by foreign nationals. The Act also prohibits 
Namibian citizens from acquiring and holding agricultural land on behalf of or in the 
interest of any foreign national. 62 
Where the relevant Minister wants to acquire land for the purposes of redistribution as 
contemplated by the Act, but is unable to negotiate with the owner the sale of such 
property by mutual agreement, the Minister may expropriate the property subject to the 
60 
61 
62 
Section 17. 
Office of the Prime Minister Report of the technical committee on commercial farmland 15 
et seq. 
Section 58 and 59. Section 16 of the Namibian Constitution provides Parliament with the 
power to regulate the right to acquire property by non-citizens. 
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payment of compensation. 63 The purpose of the Act clearly constitutes a 'public 
purpose' as required by the Namibian Constitution. Ownership of the land will vest in 
the state on the date of expropriation. The owner is, however, required to take care of 
and maintain the land from the date of expropriation to the date upon which the state 
takes possession of the land. The owner will be entitled to use the property during this 
period and he/she is entitled to any income derived from the property during this 
period.64 
In terms of the Act the state may only expropriate property subject to the payment of 
just compensation. In the absence of an agreement between the state and the affected 
owner, the amount of compensation will be determined by the Lands Tribunal. 65 In order 
to ensure that the amount of compensation is just, the Act prescribes that the following 
considerations have to be taken into account when the amount of compensation is 
determined: (a) if the value of the property was enhanced in consequence of the use 
thereof in a manner which is unlawful, such enhancement shall not be taken into 
account; (b) improvements made after the date of notice of expropriation will not be 
taken into account, except where they are necessary for the proper maintenance of 
existing improvements; (c) no allowance will be made for any unregistered right in 
respect of any other property or any indirect damage done with the object of obtaining 
compensation therefor; (d) any enhancement or depreciation in the value of the 
property which may be due to the purpose for which the property is being expropriated 
will not be taken into account; ( e) account will be taken of any benefit which will enure 
to the person to be compensated form any works which the state has built or 
constructed on behalf of such person to compensate in whole or in part any financial 
loss which such person will suffer in consequence of the expropriation, or in 
consequence of the expropriation of the property for the purpose for which it was 
63 Section 20. 
64 Section 21. 
65 Section 27. 
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expropriated. 66 In the case of agricultural land, the amount of compensation may not 
exceed the aggregate of the amount which the land would have realised if sold on the 
open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer, and an amount to compensate any 
financial loss caused by the expropriation. 67 
Land acquired by the state in terms of the Act may be distributed to any person or 
group of persons for agricultural purposes by way of alienation, lease or in any other 
manner which may be prescribed.68 In the case where a farming unit is leased the 
lessee is obliged to use the farming unit beneficially in that he/she has to take up 
effective residence on the farming unit, practise sound methods of good husbandry and 
take proper care and maintain improvements on the farming unit.69 The lessee of a 
farming unit in terms of this Act will be entitled to purchase the unit not earlier than five 
years after the commencement of the lease. 70 
It is clear that the main aim of the Agricultural (Commercial) Land Reform Act is to 
increase the accessibility of land. A distinct need existed in a post-independent 
Namibia to introduce land reform measures. As was stated above more than 90% of the 
Namibian population is dependent on the land for their livelihood, and it is therefore of 
the utmost importance that the people must have access to land. The Act introduced 
a number of measures, mainly aimed at redistributing usable land, to be implemented 
rapidly by the state. The Act succeeded in distributing land equally amongst all the 
people without jeopardising the agricultural sector of the economy. By only targeting 
commercial farmland, the Act ensured that communal land is kept intact and in doing 
so the large number of people living on communal land is ensured security of tenure 
and of their livelihood. The acquisition of under-utilised land, excessive land (that is 
66 Section 25(5). 
67 Section 25(1). 
68 Section 37. 
69 Section 44. 
70 Section 47. 
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land held in excess of the permitted maximum size), and land held by foreign nationals 
enables the state to ensure the equal distribution of arable land. Lastly, the detailed 
provisions in the Act concerning compensation contribute to enhance security of tenure. 
The land reform programme in Namibia seems to meet most of the requirements for an 
effective land reform programme set out in chapter 12. The programme stems from 
recognition by the people for whose benefit the reforms are implemented, the 
government plays a decisive role in the drafting and implementation of the programme, 
and the programme is capable of effecting rapid change in land holding patterns in 
Namibia. 
The land reform measures introduced in Namibia are all aimed at the redistribution of 
land. Although the property clause does not specifically provide for land reform the land 
reform measures seem to be valid in terms of section 16 of the Constitution. The 
property clause provides for the right to acquire, own and dispose of all forms of 
property and for the expropriation of property in the public interest subject to the 
payment of just compensation. 71 It also provides for the regulation of the right of foreign 
nationals to acquired land in Namibia. Although existing property rights are affected by 
these reforms, the effects are limited to under-utilised and excessive land. The reforms 
do not target large productive farms, as is the case in Zimbabwe, and consequently the 
land reform programme is not regarded as politically or economically controversial. 
14.5 Botswana 
Land in Botswana is governed by one of three land tenure systems depending on 
whether it is tribal land; state land or freehold land. These three land tenure systems 
existed before independence in 1966, but have since undergone changes to 
accommodate the needs of society. Tribal land currently comprises 71 % of the total 
71 See in general Naldi Constitutional rights in Namibia 82 et seq. 
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land area, state land 23% and freehold land 6%.72 The land reform measures 
introduced by the government of the post-independent Botswana were primarily aimed 
at reforming the land tenure system on tribal land. Measures to regulate and control the 
use of state and freehold land were also introduced. Land reform in Botswana differs 
from the land reform measures introduced in the other jurisdictions discussed in this 
chapter in that no large scale redistribution programme was implemented. Reforms 
centred around the provision of security of tenure to all citizens of Botswana. Thus, 
although the right to property is protected in the Constitution of Botswana, 73 there does 
not seem to be any conflict between the protection of existing property rights and the 
implementation of the land reform programme. 
Tribal land comprises mostly of land which originally formed part of the native reserves 
or tribal territories during the colonial era. Land in these areas is held in terms of 
customary law. Ownership of the land initially rested with the tribe under the leadership 
of a chief. The chief was not the absolute owner of the land but only held the land for 
the tribe. He allocated land to the individual members of the tribe. The tribesmen did 
not own the land, but only had exclusive use rights to their plots either for residential 
or farming purposes. Communal grazing land and land which had not been allocated 
to anybody was used collectively. Although these use rights were perpetual and 
inheritable the tribesmen were not allowed to sell the land or use it in a manner 
detrimental to the interests of the tribe. 74 
The Tribal Land Act75 was introduced in 1968 to reform the tribal land tenure system. 
72 
73 
74 
75 
Mathuba Land policy in Botswana Paper prepared for the workshop on Land Policy in 
Eastern and Southern Africa Maputo February 1992 4; Mathuba Overview of land 
administration systems in Botswana Paper prepared for the Conference on Land 
Administration Reform Pretoria July 1995 1 ; Mathuba Land institutions and land 
distribution in Botswana Paper presented at the Conference on Land redistribution options 
Johannesburg October 1993 2; Ng'ong'ola 1996 SAPL 1. 
Sections 3 and 8. 
Schapera A handbook of Tswana law and custom 196 et seq; Mathuba Land policy in 
Botswana Paper prepared for the workshop on Land Policy in Eastern and Southern Africa 
Maputo February 1992 4; Ng'ong'ola 1996 SAPL 1 at 16 et seq. 
54of1968. 
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These reforms included the introduction of modern institutions to deal with the 
administration of tribal land, the introduction of common law rights (in addition to 
customary land rights) with relation to tribal land, and the introduction of measures 
relating to expropriation of tribal land. Probably the most important change effected by 
the Tribal Land Act was the introduction of Land Boards for each of the fraditional tribal 
reserves. 76 The Act in effect transferred the customary land administration functions 
from the chiefs to the Land Boards. All rights and title to tribal land vested in the Land 
Boards in trust for the benefit and advantage of the tribesmen of that specific area and 
for the purpose of promoting the economic and social development of all the people of 
Botswana.n In terms of the Act all powers vested in the chief of a particular tribe under 
customary law in relation to land were transferred to the Land Board. These powers 
included powers pertaining to the granting of land use rights, the cancellation of such 
rights, dispute resolution and the imposition of restrictions on the use of tribal land. 78 
Tribal affiliation remained the primary qualification for a land grant. The Act determined 
that a land grant could only be made to a tribesman. 79 The primary aim of the Tribal 
Land Act was to improve the land administration of tribal land and to make the 
administration of land more democratic.80 The establishment of modern independent 
Land Boards did not uproot the customary land tenure system, but left it intact. 
The composition of the Land Boards attempted to balance tribal interests, political 
control and the object of democratising the tribal land tenure system. The members of 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
Nine Land Boards were established to roughly correspond with the nine tribal reserves, 
but the number of Land Boards was later increased to twelve. 
Section 10(1). 
Section 13(1). See Mathuba Land policy in Botswana Paper prepared for the workshop 
on Land Policy in Eastern and Southern Africa Maputo February 1992 21 et seq; Mathuba 
Overview of land administra'/ion systems in Botswana Paper prepared for the Conference 
on Land Administration Reform Pretoria July 1995 2; Mathuba Land institutions and land 
distribution in Botswana Paper presented at the Conference on Land redistribution options 
Johannesburg October 1993 5. 
Section 20(1). Section 2 defined a tribesman as "a citizen of Botswana who is a member 
of a tribe occupying tribal land". 
Mathuba Overview of land administration systems in Botswana Paper prepared for the 
Conference on Land Administration Reform Pretoria July 1995 2. 
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the Boards included the chief or tribal authority for the area, a nominee, two ministerial 
appointees, and two members elected by the district council. 81 The low level of 
education of Board members and their lack of understanding the Tribal Land Act 
necessitated the recomposition of the Land Boards in 1986. Although chiefs were no 
longer members of the Board, they retained the right to have a nominee. The other 
members of the Board included three members to represent the tribe, two 
representatives of the district council, three appointees of the minister responsible for 
lands, one representative of the Minister of Agriculture and one representative of the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry. The recomposition of the Boards reflected the 
objective of confirming the independence of the Land Boards while strengthening the 
hand of government in matters of land administration at the same time. 82 
The Tribal Land Act proposed the modernisation of the customary land tenure system 
by providing for the allocation of land under both customary and common law. Section 
24 determined that ownership or long leases could be granted to both citizens and non-
citizens for such purposes and under such conditions as determined by the Land 
Boards. The relevant minister had to provide written consent of any such grant. 83 These 
rights were registrable, thus confirming the transformation from customary law to 
common law.84 The Tribal Land (Amendment) Act85 of 1993 amended these provisions 
so that a grant of the common law right of ownership may only be made to the state, 
and that ministerial consent for the granting of common law leases was only required 
for non-citizens.86 To some extent the allocation of land rights in terms of both 
customary and common law contributes to the fragmentation of land rights in order to 
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provide for a wide range of differentiated land rights. 87 
The section 24 leases were utilised in the implementation of the government's Tribal 
Grazing Land Policy. In terms of this policy grazing land is individualised in order to 
ensure the conservation of Botswana's range resources, and the increase in 
productivity and commercialisation of the livestock industry. Lessees have to take 
responsibility for the pastures used by their cattle. According to the lease the individual 
farmer has to practise modern methods of cattle management such as controlled 
breeding and rotational grazing. The lease gives the lessee several rights which he did 
not possess under customary law such as the right to exclusive possession, the right 
to fence and the right to mortgage the land. The lease is inheritable and valid for 50 
years. It can be renewed for another 50 years. 88 
Before the implementation of the Tribal Land Act tribal land was not subject to 
expropriation in terms of Botswana's expropriation laws. The Tribal Land Act, however, 
provided for the expropriation of tribal land where such land was required for a public 
purpose. 89 The specific Land Board affected by the expropriation was not entitled to 
compensation for the loss of its right and title. The holder of a customary right to use 
the land was, however, entitled to a customary grant of land of equivalent value and to 
compensation for the value of standing crops. 90 The Act did not provide for the prompt 
payment of adequate compensation as is required by the Constitution, nor did it provide 
for a situation where no suitable land of equivalent value can be found elsewhere. The 
87 
88 
89 
90 
Van der Walt The constitutional property clause: finding the balance between guarantee 
and limitation paper read at a conference entitled 'Property and the Constitution' presented 
by the New Zealand Institute of Public Law 15. 
Ng'ong'ola 1996 SAPL 1 at 20; Mathuba Overview of land administration systems in 
Botswana Paper prepared for the Conference on Land Administration Reform Pretoria 
July 1995 3. For a detailed discussion of the Tribal Grazing Land Policy see Mathuba Land 
policy in Botswana Paper prepared for the workshop on Land Policy in Eastern and 
Southern Africa Maputo February 1992 9 et seq; Mathuba Land institutions and land 
distribution in Botswana Paper presented at the Conference on Land redistribution options 
Johannesburg October 1993 7 et seq. 
Section 32 sets out the procedure to be followed in the case of expropriation of tribal land. 
Section 33. 
371 
Tribal Land (Amendment) Acf1 of 1993 amended section 33 so that it now determines 
that the affected Land Board may grant the occupier of the expropriated land rights to 
use other land if available, and that he shall be entitled to adequate compensation from 
the state of the value of standing crops, for the value of improvements, for the costs of 
resettlement, and for the loss of the right to use the land. 92 
It is interesting to note that the Tribal Land (Amendment) Act replaced the word 
'tribesman' as used in the Tribal Land Act with the phrase 'citizen of Botswana'. The 
implication of this amendment is that tribal affiliation is no longer a required 
qualification for a customary grant and that the title to tribal land vests in the Land 
Boards for the benefit of all citizens of Botswana. 93 
Freehold land can be described as land owned by individuals - the state permanently 
alienated its title to areas of land to private persons. Section 3 of the Land Control Act94 
of 1975 determines that the citizens of Botswana have a statutory right of pre-emption 
in the acquisition of agricultural land in the freehold sector. Prior ministerial consent is 
required for every transaction involving agricultural land (including sale, transfer, lease 
for more than five years, exchange, partition or other disposal or dealing) where the 
acquiring party is not a citizen. 95 
State land is land owned and controlled by the state. In urban areas state land is 
allocated to individuals for residential, commercial and industrial purposes. In rural 
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areas state land is either leased to individuals for grazing purposes or used as game 
reserves.96 In terms of the State Land Act97 the President has the power of disposal of 
all state land. He is, however, permitted to authorise any person to exercise this power 
on his behalf. Any disposal of state land has to be in writing and has to bear the 
signature of the president or an authorised person. 98 The interests granted upon the 
allocation of state land to private persons or groups include a Fixed Period State Grant 
and a Certificate of rights. The Fixed Period State Grant (which can be described as 
something between ownership and a lease) entails the vesting of title in a private 
person for a fixed period (50 years for business premises and 99 years for residential 
premises). These grants are not· renewable and after the expiry of the term the title 
reverts back to the state. No compensation is payable for any improvements on the 
land. Rent is paid in a lump sum on allocation of the land and not periodically. 
Ng'ong'ola99 points out that the non-payment of compensation may be judged to be 
unconstitutional, but since none of these Fixed Period State Grants have expired yet, 
it remains to be seen what the government will do to resolve this situation. The 
probable scenario will be that the state will renew the grants on expiry of the fixed 
period to avoid unnecessary disruption. The Certificate of Rights was developed 
between 1972 and 1976 to deal with the squatter problem in some urban areas. The 
rights conferred by such a certificate resemble a usufruct, but with the difference that 
the holder's rights are perpetual and inheritable. The holder of a Certificate of Right 
may possess, occupy and use the property. It may also be ceded, assigned, pledged 
or transferred with the consent of the local council. Ownership of the property remains 
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with the state. 100 
14.6 Mexico 
Land reform in Mexico may be described as an ongoing and organic process. Since the 
first land reform measures were introduced in 1915 the process continued for a number 
of decades. Although land reform was not a major goal of the revolution to overthrow 
the Diaz regime in 1910, it was one of the direct results of the revolution. Prior to the 
revolution 1 % of the population owned 97% of all land in Mexico and 92% of the rural 
population were landless. This situation was the direct result of a 1856 law (Leyes de 
Desamortizaci6n or Law of Expropriation) that stripped the church and the traditional 
peasant communities of their right to landownership in an attempt to promote 
commercial homestead farming. 101 
The first land reform measures were introduced in terms of a land reform decree issued 
in 1915. The decree contained two main points: firstly it provided that all alienation of 
village land in terms of the 1856 lawwould be null and void and secondly, that villages 
needing land, but lacking proof of former title, would qualify to receive land which was 
expropriated from adjacent properties.102 This decree was incorporated in the 1917 
Constitution as Article 27. Article 27 determines that: 
"[o]wnership of the lands and waters within the boundaries of the national 
territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has had, and has, the 
right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting 
private property. 
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Private property shall not be expropriated except for reasons of public 
use and subject to payment of indemnity".103 
The main purpose of the initial reform measures was to effect the restitution of land to 
the peasant communities who were unjustly dispossessed of their land. Later on the 
policy of restitution of land to dispossessed communities was extended to include the 
redistribution of land by means of an endowment or grant to communities. This applied 
when a community or village petitioned for land to meet its needs rather than to have 
its former possession restored. 104 
Due to the fact that the ownership of all land vested in the state, landowners were 
generally not compensated for expropriated land, but they were permitted to retain 
relatively large portions of their land.105 It is interesting to note that the estate land 
which was expropriated for the purposes of land reform was not distributed to the estate 
workers, but rather to the neighbouring peasant communities. It was argued that most 
estate workers were residents of the estates and that they would continue to work on 
I 
the estates. The government did not initiate the restitution and redistribution process, 
but it was left to the peasant communities to petition for restitution or a grant in order 
to obtain land for their community. The communities were not required to pay for the 
land they received. They received the land as a community and not as individual 
members.106 
The rights to the land were given to an ejido, a specially formed communal unit which 
103 
104 
105 
106 
Peaslee Xydis in Peaslee Constitutions of Nations 891. Also see Chua 1995 Co/ LR 223 
at230. 
King Land reform 98. 
The estate owners were allowed to keep a reserve of 100 hectares of irrigated land, or in 
the case where the land was not irrigated cropland the owner was allowed more or less 
two hectares of rain fed cropland and up to 500 hectares of arid pasture land per hectare 
of irrigated cropland. See World Band Staff working paper no. 275 Land reform in Latin 
America: Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela 18. 
King Land reform 102 et seq; World Band Staff working paper no. 275 Land reform in 
Latin America: Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela 18; Otero in Thiesenhusen 
Searching for agrarian reform in Latin America 282 et seq. 
375 
held title to the land, administered it and allocated parts of the land to individual 
members of the ejido for farming purposes. The ejido was not a completely new 
concept, but in effect it was little more than the recreation ·of the traditional village 
communities which disappeared as a result of the nineteenth century expansion of the 
large estates or haciendas. The size of an ejido could vary from less than a hundred 
members to over a thousand. Two different forms of the ejido existed with regard to 
crop land: the collective ejido and the individual ejido. Members of the collective ejido 
had no individual ownership or use rights outside the house plot. Members of the 
individual ejido received a usufruct from the ejido to use a particular portion of the land. 
Although this right was hereditary, it could not be sold, leased, rented, mortgaged or 
alienated in any way. The land was lost by non-use for two years. The members of an 
ejido chose by majority vote which form of ejido they would adopt. Generally all 
pastures, woodlands, plantations, haciendas which were expropriated as large single 
units, and other non-cultivated land were held in common. 107 
The process of land restitution to peasant communities affected only those haciendas 
within a seven kilometer radius of the villages. Consequently haciendas which were not 
situated within close proximity of peasant villages were not subjected to the land reform 
measures because it was never the intention of the government to do away entirely with 
large commercial farms. The pace of the distribution of land to ejidos declined towards 
1931, but the process was revitalised in 1934 with the adoption of the Agrarian Code. 
The Code solidified and clarified the ejido policy and provided for speedier processes 
to accelerate the distribution of land. In 1936 the policy of only expropriating land within 
a seven kilometer radius of villages was changed and a ceiling was placed on 
landownership. All cropland in excess of 150 hectares (especially land in the larger 
cotton plantations) were expropriated for redistribution purposes. Between 1934 and 
1940 the process of redistribution was accelerated and extended more widely 
107 Whetten Rural Mexico 141 et seq; King Land reform 103; Otero in Thiesenhusen 
Searching for agrarian reform in Latin America 282 et seq; Meyer Land reform in Latin 
America 11. 
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throughout the country.108 Special collective ejido communities were set up and they 
received the land expropriated in terms of the new policy. The ejido became the pillar 
or the agricultural community and the government committed ·itself to the development 
of the rural infrastructure. By 1940 22% of all agricultural land had been distributed to 
more than 50% of Mexico's agricultural population.109 
Although the process of redistribution continued, the pace of land redistribution 
dropped sharply in 1940. Between 1940 and 1960 the redistribution of land was 
extended to areas of low population density and effected mostly pastures and arid land 
of low productive capacity. During this period the Mexican government centred its 
agricultural policy on productivity rather than equity. A firmer commitment to individual 
ownership became apparent during this period. Private owners of productive farms 
selectively received guarantees from the government that their land (within the legal 
land ceiling) would not be expropriated. Credit, technical support and other public 
services were concentrated on the more productive ejidos and the productive private 
sector. The poorer ejidos and the private landowners of small farms were largely 
excluded from state support. Whereas newly irrigated land was previously distributed 
only to ejidos, it was now distributed to ejidos and private landowners alike. The new 
production oriented policy of the government yielded good results and produced faster 
agricultural growth than in any other Latin American country. 110 Renewed pressure from 
the peasant community led to an increase in the pace of redistribution from 1960 
onwards, and by 1970 43% of all agricultural land was held by ejido communities, which 
constituted 66% of the rural population. 111 
Since the mid 1960's Mexico has been experiencing a major economic crisis. Due to 
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the enormous increase in Mexico's population the agricultural sector is unable to 
sustain production levels needed to provide adequately for the domestic needs. 
Agriculture is also unable to provide foreign exchange. This has led to calls for effective 
agrarian reforms. The distribution of land has, however, been ruled out as a means to 
solve Mexico's agrarian problems. The focus has shifted to the importance of the 
private sector and pressure is put on the ejidos to increase production on their land. 
The state has to a large extent utilised its resources to sponsor capitalistic agriculture 
and this in turn has led to the decimation of the ejido sector. However, the ejido as an 
institution has become an integral part of the Mexican landscape and it has shown that 
it is capable of greater production per hectare than private agricultural enterprises 
when aided by the state. Even if the ejidos are to be organised on an individual basis 
the ejido as an institution cannot be eliminated without causing a major social upset. 112 
The land reform measures in Mexico were originally aimed at the restitution of land, but 
this was later extended to include measures aimed at the redistribution of land. 
Although Mexico has a constitutional property clause, the property clause was never 
seen as a stumbling block in the way of comprehensive land reform. The 1917 
Constitutional declared that all land vested in the nation and that the nation has had 
and has the rights to transfer the land to private individuals in private ownership. Once 
land is held in private ownership, the state may not expropriate the owner's land without 
the payment of compensation. 
14.7 Evaluation 
A variety of different forms of land reform is discussed in this chapter. In Zimbabwe the 
land reform measures introduced up to the present were mainly concerned with the 
redistribution of land. The implementation of land reform in Zimbabwe is of special 
importance because the court's jurisdiction relating to the amount of compensation for 
expropriation has been removed from the Zimbabwean Constitution. Land reform in 
Namibia is also aimed at the redistribution of land. However, in this case the state does 
112 Otero in Thiesenhusen Searching for agrarian reform in Latin America 300 et seq. 
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not target large productive farms for redistributive purposes, but rather acquire under-
utilised and excessive land against just compensation. The classification of excessive 
land is made possible by the introduction of a maximum ceiling on the size of an 
individual's land holding. land held by foreign nationals in Namibia may also be 
acquired by the state for redistributive purposes. In Botswana land reform is 
concentrated on the provision of security of tenure and is mainly aimed at creating 
secure rights (in terms of both customary law and common law) on tribal land. Mexico 
has a long history of land reform which includes measures aimed at the restitution of 
land and the redistribution of land. The Mexican Constitution determines that all land 
vests in the state, and that the state has had, and has the power to transfer ownership 
of the land to private individuals. Consequently no compensation was paid to existing 
landowners in the initial stage of the land reform programme. A maximum ceiling on the 
size of landownership was also introduced in Mexico and all land held in excess of the 
permitted size was used for redistribution. 
The implementation of the land reform programmes in the respective jurisdictions 
discussed in this chapter illustrate that land reform is not necessarily regarded as being 
in conflict with the constitutional property guarantee. The property clauses in both 
Mexico and Botswana determine that all land is vested in the state, and that the state 
may transfer ownership to private individuals. Expropriation of private property is 
subject to compensation. In Mexico private individuals expropriated during the first 
stage of the land reform programme received no compensation, because at that stage 
(after the revolution) all land vested with the state. The non-payment of compensation 
was not challenged. In Botswana there also does not seem to be any conflict between 
the protection of existing property rights and land reform. Only 7% of all land is held in 
private ownership in terms of the freehold system and the land reform measures 
introduced in Botswana are not aimed at that part of the land. land reform in Botswana 
is for the main part concerned with the provision of security of tenure, and the land 
affected by these measures is held by the state. 
Although the property clause in both Zimbabwe and Namibia protect existing property 
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rights in the sense that compensation is required when an individual's property is 
expropriated, the introduction of land reform measures have been such that the courts 
found it not to be in conflict with the constitutional guarantee of property. In Namibia the 
categories of land which may be expropriated for the purposes of redistribution (under-
utilised land, land held in excess of the maximum ceiling on the size of land held by an 
individual, and land held by foreign nationals) are such that the public interest will 
almost always be regarded as more important than the interests of the individual with 
regard to that property (land). The Namibian Constitution requires the payment of just 
compensation for expropriation, and up to this point in time no cases have been 
decided on the question of the quantum of compensation. In Zimbabwe, where existing 
property rights are also protected, the question of compensation was raised in Davies 
and Others v Minister of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development. 113 The courts are 
not constitutionally permitted to rule on the quantum of compensation. In this case, the 
High Court114 ruled that land reform is in the public interest and that the state may 
acquire land for redistribution purposes. The Supreme Court held that compensation 
will only be due where the state actually acquires the property. In view of the 
government's statement in 1997 that it intends to acquire land against less 
compensation than in the past (compensation will only be paid for buildings on the 
acquired land and not for the land itself), it may be expected that the courts will 
challenge the provision in section 16 of the Zimbabwean Constitution which removed 
their jurisdiction to determine the amount of compensation. 
In most post-colonial countries the courts run the risk of becoming involved in a 
constitutional conflict between themselves and the legislature where social reform 
legislation is concerned. A too conservative interpretation and application of the 
property guarantee would inevitably frustrate attempts by the legislature to effect 
comprehensive reform. Murphy115 suggests that the constitutional conflict in India was 
the result of the court's inability to fashion an appropriate model of review with 
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proportionality as an essential ingredient of review. The social function of property 
should be recognised and property should be interpreted and applied in view of the 
social and political context within which property functions. Roux116 suggests that the 
model of review applied in most developed countries is not suitable for the specific 
situation in post colonial countries and that a different model of review should apply in 
post colonial countries. According to Roux117 a bipartite property clause is needed, 
" - one based on the a distinction between ordinary and social reform 
legislation. In respect of ordinary legislation, the Court's review power 
should approximate that exercised by courts in the developed world. In 
respect to social reform legislation, on the other hand, its power should 
be adapted in line with the perceived illegitimacy of certain property rights 
(most notably those in land) in the post-colonial context". 
Civil society should be allowed to participate in the policy formulation process with 
regard to the property rights order and social reform legislation. In terms of the 
adjudicative model suggested by Roux, the courts should simply be given the power to 
ensure that the political process operated fairly ih cases concerning social reform 
legislation. 
A completely new model of review is not needed in the South African context. The 
South African Constitution clearly sets out the social and political framework within 
which the courts have to interpret and apply the fundamental rights which are 
guaranteed in chapter 2 of the Constitution. The property guarantee in section 25 
specifically provides for land reform and this obliges the courts to take cognisance of 
the social and political function of property. In the event of land reform, the courts have 
to interpret property within the social context within which it functions and it is clear 
from the phraseology of section 25 that existing property rights cannot be protected 
absolutely. The courts have to establish an equitable balance between existing 
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property rights and land reform in the public interest. 
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15 
LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1991 
15.1 Introduction 
The policy of apt3rtheid had an enormous influence on the social, political, cultural and 
economic order in South Africa. In order to understand and evaluate the land reform 
process which started in 1991, it is necessary to briefly consider the main events that 
led to and the causes of the unequal land distribution that characterised the apartheid 
system, as well as is the influence of the system of racial segregation on property law 
and the distribution of land in South Africa. 
Certainly the most notorious of the statutes that entrenched apartheid in land law were 
the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936.1 In 1913 the Black Land Act 27 of 1913 was 
promulgated. The aim of this Act was to identify and reserve land for the exclusive use 
and occupation of black groups. All other land was available for use and occupation by 
white people. This situation was further entrenched by the Development and Trust Land 
Act 18 of 1936. This Act aimed at extending the existing black land by adding land 
which was released in terms of this Act. Private land in the vicinity of these designated 
areas was expropriated in order to consolidate the land held by the different ethnic 
groups. The idea was that these areas had to develop into independent political areas 
(the infamous homelands). Similarly, land held in full ownership by blacks within white 
areas (so-called 'black spots') was expropriated and the occupants were moved to 
reserved areas (so-called 'forced removals'). These removals were often effected by 
force and as such aggravated the harsh and unjust effects of the policy of racial 
segregation. The practical effect of this policy was that large groups of people were 
confined to areas much too small to fulfill their needs. The land was simply not enough 
See in general Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 1 at 2; Kleyn and Borraine Silberberg and 
Schoemen's The Law of Property 493; Cross and Haines Towards freehold 73 et seq; Van 
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to sustain the people living on it. The lack of facilities and the growing number of 
people living on the land aggravated the situation and made it impossible for these 
people to lead a normal life.2 
' 
Rights to the land within the reserved areas hardly ever amounted to full ownership, 
and land was usually held in terms of customary law or special rights created by the 
Land Acts. These rights, if not held in terms of customary law, usually took the form of 
statutory permits which were subject to the legislative and administrative whim of the 
· government. With regard to rural areas a distinction was made between land in towns 
and rural land. As far as towns in rural areas are concerned, Proclamation R2933 
provided for the following forms of land tenure: ownership units, certificates of use, 
lodger's permits, building permits, trading permits and leasehold. Proclamation R188,4 
which regulated land tenure of rural land, provided for quitrent and permission to 
occupy.5 
The apartheid policy determined that the presence of blacks in urban areas was seen 
as temporary and land rights in these areas reflected this situation. A number of 
temporary land rights were created and controlled by regulations issued in terms of the 
Black (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 25 of 1945, the Black Communities 
Development Act 4 of 1984 and the Black Local Authorities Act 102 of 1982. A number 
of permits were introduced by GN R1036,6 none of which amounted to either ownership 
or limited real rights. These permits included site permits, lodger's permits, hostel 
permits, certificates of occupation and residential permits. The Conversion of Certain 
Rights into Leasehold Act 81 of 1988 replaced this system by converting some of the 
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rights held in terms of the permits into leasehold7 and others into contracts of lease. 8 
The acquisition, occupation and alienation of land in the remainder of South Africa are 
regulated by the Groups Areas Act 36 of 1966, which was promulgated in 1966. Group 
areas were proclaimed in terms of this Act for the exclusive benefit of either whites , 
coloureds or Asians9 (the Act did not create group areas for blacks, but simply excluded 
them from white, coloured or Asian land). In essence, residential areas were 
proclaimed within the white areas for coloureds and Asians respectively. Full ownership 
of land in these areas could be obtained by a member of the particular group for which 
the group area had been proclaimed. Occupation of land in contravention of this law 
was a criminal offence. 10 
Customary land law fulfilled an important role in black areas. This system has a 
communal character and ensures that groups and families stay together. In many 
instances the rules and principles of customary law ensure the survival of groups and 
individuals. Customary law was, however, infiltrated and discredited by apartheid land 
law. This led to a situation where customary law was seen as an inferior system. 
Customary land rights were never recognised as 'proper rights' and were thus never 
regarded as a secure form of tenure. The western civil law land rights were perceived 
as the ideal system, because of the fact that rights held in terms of this system afforded 
the holder of these rights with a secure form of tenure. 11 Security of tenure was at least 
one area which deserved urgent attention in any future land reform programme. 
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1990 De Jure 1 at 16 et seq. These include residential permits, lodger's permits and hostel 
permits. See section 6 of the Conversion of Certain Rights into Leasehold Act 81 of 1988. 
As identified in terms of the Population Registration Act 30 of 1950. 
Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 1 at 16 and 26 et seq; Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 1 at 7. 
Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 1 at 6 et seq; Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 1 at 4 et seq. 
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Apartheid land law extended to the housing policy and the physical planning. The 
provision of and control over housing was seen as 'own affairs' of each of the different 
population groups and as such different measures applied to each of these groups. 12 
Land use planning and control was also executed on a racial basis and provision was 
made for the establishment and development of separate residential areas for the 
various population groups. 13 
The Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 was one of the most draconian laws 
enacted by the apartheid regime and concerned with the prevention, control and 
elimination of illegal squatting. This Act provided for the demolition and removal of 
buildings and structures erected or occupied without the consent of the owner of private 
land, local authorities and other government bodies. No prior notice to any person was 
required by the Act, and the courts were not allowed to consider or grant any order or 
relief founded upon the exercise of powers under the provisions of this Act, unless the 
applicant could show that the action was undertaken in bad faith. This Act provided the 
government with the power to enforce its policy of racial segregation by moving or 
removing groups of people without interference by the courts.14 
15.2 Land reform measures introduced in 1991 by the De Klerk government 
In 1991 the De Klerk government published the White Paper on Land Reform 15 in an 
attempt to rectify the imbalances brought about by the discriminatory land policies of 
the past. The White Paper emphasises the importance of land for the well-being of 
man. It is stated that: 
12 
13 
14 
15 
The Development and Housing Act 103 of 1985 controlled the provision of housing for 
whites, the Housing Development (House of Delegates) Act 4 of 1987 applied to Indians, 
the Housing Act (House of Representatives) 2 of 1987 and the Development Act (House 
of Representatives) 3 of 1987 applied to coloureds, and housing for blacks was controlled 
by the Community Development Act 3 of 1966 and the Housing Act 4 of 1966. 
The Physical Planning Act 88 of 1967 regulated matters pertaining to physical planning. 
See in general Van der Walt 1990 De Jure 1 at 26 et seq; Van der Walt 1990 Stell LR 26 
et seq; Lewis 1989 SAJHR 233 et seq. 
WP B-91 March 1991. 
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"[l]and is the most precious resource for the existence and survival of 
man. It provides him with living space and sustenance. Land is the base 
from which he operates and gains a livelihood and is,· indeed, the basis 
on which his entire economic, social and constitutional order is founded". 
The White Paper proposed the abolition of all laws and regulations that regulate the 
occupation, use and access to land on a racial basis. Private ownership should be 
extended to land in respect of which it was previously not available. The main idea 
behind these proposals was to make it possible for all South Africans to have free 
access to all land. The White Paper did not propose the actual redistribution of land, 
but suggested that the redistribution of land should be subjected to the forces of the 
market-orientated economy. 16 The White Paper emphasised the importance of the 
continued productive use of land, and the reform measures proposed in the White 
paper embodies 
"the best opportunities to bring about, in a responsible and orderly 
fashion, a land dispensation which is both economically sound and 
compatible with the basic values and ideals expressed in the Manifesto 
for the New South Africa". 
In order to effect these reforms the White Paper proposed five Bills, 17 but due to 
criticism, only three of these Bills were eventually promulgated: the Abolition of Racially 
Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991, the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 
of 1991 and the Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991. Certainly the 
most important of these was the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 
1991. This Ad abolished the majority of legislation on which the apartheid land tenure 
16 
17 
Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 1 at 1 O et seq; Kleyn and Borraine Silberberg and Schoeman's 
The law of property 501 et seq. 
The Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Bill; the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights 
Bill; the Residential Environment Bill; the Less Formal Township Establishment Bill; and 
the Rural Development Bill. 
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system was built.18 Although the mere abolition of apartheid land law did not eradicate 
the whole apartheid land tenure system or the effects thereof, this Act was the first step 
to prepare the way for substantial and meaningful land reform. Chapter VI of the Act 
introduced the concept of restitution of land rights in South African law. In terms of this 
' 
chapter individuals or groups who were dispossessed of their land could claim their 
land back in instances where the land was in state control. 19 Chapter VII of the Act 
provided for certain measures to ensure the maintenance of norms and standards in 
residential environments. 20 
The Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991 provided for the upgrading of 
certain land rights to full ownership.21 The rights in question were mostly rights created 
by apartheid legislation.22 The Act also provided for the transfer of land, which was held 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Amongst others the Black Land Act 27 of 1913, the Development Trust and Land Act 18 
of 1936, the Groups Areas Act 36 of 1966, the Black Communities Development Act 4 of 
1984 and the Free Settlement Areas Act 102 of 1988 were repealed. 
See Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 1 at 12 where it is pointed out that the Act provided for an 
Advisory Committee on Land Allocation. This was changed into the Commission on Land 
Allocation by the Abolition of Racially 13ased Land Measures Amendment Act 110 of 1993. 
The Commission was entitled to hold hearings and investigations in order to determine 
whether certain individuals or groups were prejudiced by the acquisition of land by the 
state in terms of apartheid legislation and whether such individuals or groups were entitled 
to restitution. 
Section 97 to 103 of Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991. 
According to the Act the majority of owners of residential premises in a neighbourhood 
may draft by-laws regarding overcrowding, inhabitable premises, maintenance of premises 
in a clean and hygienic condition, the repair , removal or clean-up of nuisances, the repair 
and maintenance of buildings, the orderly use of amenities and the prohibition of ant 
offensive, indecent, unhygienic or dangerous conduct in the use of these amenities. Any 
by-law that discriminate on grounds of race, colour or religion shall be of no force. 
It is interesting to note that this Act confirmed the fact that the western civil-law land rights 
were perceived as the ideal. No provision is made for security of any other statutory or 
customary-law rights. Thus, if it was impossible to upgrade the rights in question to full 
ownership, the position of the holders of these rights remained unchanged. 
These rights are specified in Schedule 1 and 2 of the Act. Schedule 1 rights (deeds of 
grant, rights to leasehold and quitrent) are upgraded to ownership and Schedule 2 rights 
(permission to occupy any irrigation or residential allotment, permission to occupy any 
allotment, rights of occupation and occupation of tribal land granted under the indigenous 
law or customs of the tribe in question) are converted into ownership upon submission of 
a certificate of ownership at the deeds registry by the owner of an erf or piece of land. See 
Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 1 at 11; Kleyn and Borraine Silberberg and Schoeman's The Jaw 
of property 504. 
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in trust for a tribe, to the tribe in full ownership. This will, however, not affect the 
customary land rights that are in place within the tribe. 23 The upgrading of land tenure 
rights were, however, subject to some form of survey, and due to the fact that facilities 
to provide quick and cheap surveys of land in black areas were insufficient, the Act did 
not yield adequate results. 
The Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991 provided for shortened and 
less formal procedures for the development of land. Minimum standards with regard to 
facilities and services are determined by the Act. Van der Walt and Pienaar24 point out 
that this Act recognised the permanence of black people within the so-called white 
areas. 
15.3 Policy indications of the Mandela government's approach 
15.3.1 The Reconstruction and Development Programme25 
The African National Congress published a policy document on the Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) shortly before the 1994 elections. This document 
specifically makes reference to the need for fundamental land reform. After the 
elections the RDP became official state policy and it provides the background against 
which most later reform measures were taken. 
The RDP is defined as an integrated, coherent socio-economic policy framework which 
23 
24 
25 
Section 18 and 19. Tribal land may, however, not be disposed of to a non-tribe member 
for a period of ten years after the commencement of the Act. The possibility of the 
alienation of tribal land to non-tribe members may lead to a situation that would be 
detrimental to the tribe. See in this regard Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 1 at 11 ; Van der Walt 
1990 De Jure 1 at 11; Cross and Haines Towards freehold 36 et seq; Dlamini in Van der 
Walt Land reform and the future of landownership in South Africa 37 et seq. 
Van der Walt and Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 439. See also Van der Walt 
1995 SAPL 1 at 12. 
Published as an official ANC policy document 1994. This was later reworked into the 
White Paper on Reconstruction and Development. See WP J-1994 Government Gazette 
16085, 23November1995. 
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seeks to mobilise all South Africans and the country's resources towards the final 
eradication of apartheid and the building of a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist 
. future.26 The aim of the RDP is to address the disparities in income distribution, access 
to urban and agricultural infrastructure, access to land and housing. It is stated that 
'meeting basic needs' is one of the key programmes of the RDP. 27 Land reform forms 
an integral part of this key programme. The programme recognises the devastating 
effects of the apartheid system and points out that a fundamental land reform 
programme is needed to address the results of apartheid. The land reform programme 
"must be demand driven and must aim to supply residential and 
productive land to the poorest section of the rural population and aspirant 
farmers. As part of a comprehensive rural development programme, it 
must raise incomes and productivity, and must encourage the use of land 
for agricultural, other productive, or residential purposes".28 
Three areas of land reform are distinguished. Firstly the land policy must ensure 
security of tenure regardless of the system of land holding, secondly the policy has to 
provide for the redistribution of residential and agricultural land to those who need it but 
cannot afford it, and thirdly the restitution of land to those who lost land because of 
apartheid laws. The three areas of land reform identified here established the 
framework for land reform in South Africa. 
15.3.2 The Green Paper on South African Land Po/icy29 
Due to the fact that the Green Paper on South African Land Policy was consequently 
replaced by the White Paper on South African Land Policy ( 1997), the Green paper will 
26 RDP 1; White Paper 7. 
27 RDP7. 
28 RDP20. 
29 Published by the Department of Land Affairs, 1 February 1996. 
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not be discussed in great detail. The Green Paper on South African Land Policy set out 
the government's goals and strategies to deal effectively with the land issue and to 
bring about necessary change in the land holding patterns in South Africa. In order to 
enable the land policy to effect these changes a number of factors have to be 
addressed in both rural and urban areas: the injustices of racially-based land 
dispossession; the inequitable distribution of land ownership; the need for security of 
tenure; the need for sustainable use of land; the need for rapid release of land for 
development; the need to record and register all rights in property; and the need to 
administer public land in an effective manner.30 
The land reform programme is said to be built on the three main pillars of land reform 
as identified in the RDP, namely restitution of land or rights in land, land redistribution 
and land tenure reform. 
As far as the redistribution of land is concerned, 31 the Green Paper proposed that the 
process of redistribution should provide the poor with land for residential and 
productive purposes in order to improve their livelihoods, without jeopardising the 
public confidence in the land market. The Green Paper proposed a single, flexible 
redistribution mechanism which would be capable to adapt to different circumstances. 
In essence the redistribution process would depend on willing buyers and willing 
sellers. The state would ensure that the poor are not prejudiced by supplying financial 
assistance and credit where it is needed. The redistribution programme was supposed 
to benefit the very poor, labour tenants,32 farm workers,33 women,34 individuals and new 
entrants to agriculture. 
30 Green Paper 1 et seq. 
31 Green Paper 14 and especially 25 et seq. 
32 Green Paper 32. 
33 Green Paper 30. 
34 Green Paper 32. 
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With reference to restitution35 the Green Paper confirmed the objectives of the then 
already promulgated Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 and the 1993 
Constitution.36 The Green Paper set the following time limits for the timeous completion 
of the restitution process: a three-year period for the lodgement of claims, a five-year 
period for the finalisation of all claims and a ten-year period for the implementation of 
all court orders. Special mention was made of pre-1913 claims and the claims of labour 
tenants. The Green Paper proposed that preferential status should be granted to pre-
1913 claims in land redistribution and development programmes, providing that these 
claimants are disadvantaged and will benefit in a sustainable manner from a land 
based support programme. The position of labour tenants was later addressed by the 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996. 37 
The Green Paper reiterated that restitution could take the following forms: restoration 
of the land from which the claimants were dispossessed; the provision of alternative 
land; the payment of compensation; alternative relief including a package containing 
a combination of the above, sharing of the land or special; budgetary assistance such 
as services and infrastructure development where claimants presently live; or priority 
access to state resources in the allocation and the development of housing and land 
in the appropriate development programme.38 Factors which had to be taken into 
account in the determination of the amount of compensation to claimants and land 
owners respectively were also discussed. 39 
The land tenure reform programme,40 as set out in the Green Paper, aimed to transfer 
the permit-based and informal systems of landholding and to replace it with registrable, 
35 Green Paper34 et seq. 
36 See 15.5.1.1 below. 
37 See the discussion below. 
38 Green Paper 38. 
39 Green Paper 38 et seq. 
40 Green Paper 43 et seq. 
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long-term rights that are legally enforceable, whether these be in the individual or 
communal contexts. 
15.3.3 The White Paper on South African Land Policy41 
The White Paper on South African Land Policy embodies the government's current 
policy and strategy concerning land use and land reform measures. The White Paper 
incorporates various issues raised in written submissions on the Green Paper as well 
as points of criticism and suggestions following a series of workshops on the Green 
Paper held with interested and affected parties. 
The White Paper stresses the importance of land for all South Africans. It states that: 
"[l]and is an important and sensitive issue for all South Africans. It is a 
finite resource which binds all together in a common destiny. As a 
cornerstone for reconstruction and development, a land policy for the 
country needs to deal effectively with: 
the injustices of racially based land dispossession of the past 
the need for a more equitable distribution of land ownership 
the need for land reform to reduce poverty and contribute to 
economic growth 
security of tenure for all 
a system of land management which will support sustainable land 
use patterns and rapid land release·for development".42 
The mere redistribution of land and the provision of security of tenure alone will, 
however, not bring about the necessary change. The provision of support services and 
infrastructure is essential for the improvement of the quality of life and the employment 
opportunities resulting from land reform. In order to achieve this, a constructive 
41 Published by the Department of Land Affairs, April 1997. 
42 White Paper 7. 
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partnership between government on a national, provincial and local level, and the 
private and non-governmental sectors is needed. 
like the Green Paper, the White Paper focuses on the three different forms of land 
' 
reform identified in the RDP: redistribution of land, land restitution and security of 
tenure. 
The government's approach towards the redistribution of land, as set out in the White 
Paper, involves a single redistribution mechanism. This mechanism should be flexible 
enough to adapt to different situations and circumstances. In effect it is dependent on 
willing buyers and sellers. Expropriation will be used as a last resort in cases where 
willing sellers are not available. The redistribution of land in this manner will result in 
dispersed land acquisition and settlement, as opposed to large block settlement in 
designated areas. The programme aims to treat all segments of the land market even-
handedly. 
State support for the beneficiaries of the land redistribution programme is essential for 
its ultimate success.43 The White Paper recognises the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Land Affairs to create an enabling environment with regard to financial 
services for land reform beneficiaries. The creation of an enabling environment consists 
of two aspects. 44 The first aspect entails a risk-sharing agreement between both 
parastatal and private sector financial institutions and the state. In terms of such an 
agreement the state undertakes to underwrite a percentage of the loan in the event of 
non-payment. This agreement will act as an incentive as well as a safety net to financial 
institutions which lend to this particular market. The second aspect entails the so-called 
'sunrise' subsidies. These include a graded entry to repayment of the interest on the 
43 
44 
See in general White Paper 39 et seq. 
As proposed by the Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Rural Financial Services (the 
Strauss Commission). 
394 
loan,45 a flexible repayment system46 and a discount subsidy.47 
The White Paper also mentions the issues of urban land redistribution, access to land 
and security of tenure for farm workers, the situation of labour tenants and the question 
of gender equality in the land redistribution programme. With reference to the 
redistribution of urban land, the programme consists of two elements: the first entails 
a pilot programme in conjunction with the Gauteng Provincial Government known as 
the Mayibuye programme. The programme involves making funds available for the 
acquisition of urban land to alleviate the plight of landless people in urban areas. 48 The 
second element of the programme deals with the provision of security of tenure to 
people in places where they currently reside. 49 
As far as farmworkers are concerned the White Paper mentions two possibilities: off-
farm settlement and on-farm settlement. In the case of off-farm settlement farmworkers 
may apply for assistance to establish an 'agri-village' close to farm employment and 
other employment opportunities. Several schemes are being piloted by landowners and 
farmworkers in relation to on-farm settlement of farmworkers. These include that the 
farmworker uses his/her state grant or subsidt° to enhance the housing or non-bulk 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
It is proposed that the beneficiary repays 60% of the interest in the first year, 75% in the 
second year, 90% in the third year and full interest from the fourth year onwards. 
The flexible repayment system involves the acceptance of a certain minimum payment of 
the loan. The repayment is, however, coupled to income flow - the bigger the income in 
a specific season the larger portion of the loan has to be paid off. 
The subsidy is designed to reward performance - timely payment will result in a reduction 
of the interest rate. 
Funds for the acquisition of urban land are acquired from the Settlement/Land Acquisition 
Grant. See the discussion on grants and subsidies below. A number of conditions for the 
grantto be allocated are listed in the White Paper. These include, among others, that the 
grant be used by landless people to gain land for settlement, that the grant be used to 
facilitate the rapid release of land in terms of the Development Facilitation Act and that the 
grant must be used for private land acquisition and the surveying and registration of sites 
in the name of beneficiaries. See White Paper 46. 
This element is dealt with in the section on security of tenure in the White Paper. See 
White Paper 64 et seq. 
See the discussion of state grants and subsidies below. 
395 
service provision on the farm subject to the right of occupancy. Another scheme 
involves an equity share-holding arrangement between the farmworker and the 
landowner. 51 
The position of labour tenants was subsequently addressed by the Land Reform 
(Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996.52 In relation to gender equality in the land reform 
programme, the White Paper lists a number of factors which have to taken into account 
in the implementation of the land reform programme. These include, amongst others, 
that all legal restrictions on women to participate in land reform should be removed. 
This includes the reform of marriage law, inheritance law and customary law which 
favour men, and contain obstacles to women receiving rights to land. The land reform 
programme should also be gender sensitive in its project identification, beneficiary 
selection and planning. 53 
The issue of the restitution of land is dealt with by the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 
of 199454 which was promulgated prior to the drafting of the White Paper. The White 
Paper does not add anything to what was already stated in the Green Paper. 55 
With reference to tenure reform the White Paper mentions a few specific areas at which 
the tenure reform should be directed:56 
The development of mechanisms for the upgrading of de facto vested interests 
in land into legally enforceable rights. These mechanisms are still in the 
development phase and entail a negotiating process where all stakeholders put 
51 White Paper 4 7 et seq. 
52 See the discussion below. 
53 White Paper 50. 
54 See the discussion below. 
55 See White Paper 52 et seq. 
56 White Paper 64 et seq. 
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forward concrete proposed solutions. The proposals will be assessed against 
criteria such as the extent to which they adequately encompass the rights of all 
occupants, the cost effectiveness and the public interest. If the criteria is met, 
the government will make funding, in the form of settlement subsidies and 
compensation, available to implement the proposed solutions. This process will 
entail a review of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991. 
The protection of occupants of privately owned land. Measures have to be 
introduced to secure the informal rights of occupants as wel I as the rights of the 
current owners of the land in question. The holders of the informal rights have 
to be protected against evictions. The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 
199757 (which was promulgated before the White Paper was published) deals 
with the relationship between owners and occupiers. It also addresses the 
circumstances under which eviction can take place. 
Forms of ownership. The Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 199658 
(which was also promulgated before the White Paper was published) provides 
for the registration of group or communal- ownership where the democratic 
majority of a particular group chooses this form of ownership rather than 
individual ownership. 
Family based ownership. The tenure reform needed in this area specifically 
relates to land which is allocated to individual families. The government should 
ensure that it secures the rights of all de facto rights holders when it transfers 
an asset to these rights holders. Where security vests in only one person 
(usually the head of the household), the rest of the de facto rights holders can 
57 See the discussion below. 
58 See the discussion below. 
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be adversely affected.59 A new form of family ownership is currently being 
investigated to address these problems. 
Group based rights. This entails the amendment of the Communal Property 
Associations Act 28 of 1996 to provide for the subdivision and registration of 
individual rights to areas within communal property. The implementation of the 
Act also proved to be too complex in situations where the group or community 
consisted of too many people. 
Rights under communal ownership systems. Legislation will be drafted to ensure 
that rural communities may hold and use land according to customary land law. 
The land in question will be transferred in ownership to the group as a whole 
and ownership will thus not vest in the chief, tribal authority, trustees or a 
committee. All the members of the group will be co-owners. They may decide by 
way of a majority decision whether to own the land as a group or to convert their 
rights into individual ownership. They may also choose to individualise only 
certain areas. The position of women within such a system will be protected by 
the said legislation. 
Gender equity in tenure reform. The White Paper accentuates the importance 
of gender equality in all the land reform measures. Special attention is paid to 
the protection of the position and rights of women. 
The Department of Land Affairs offers a number of grants to support the land reform 
programme.60 These grants apply to land restitution, land redistribution and tenure 
59 
60 
This situation occurred in the process of the upgrading of rights in terms of the Upgrading 
of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991. See Mnisi v Chauke and Others; Chauke v 
Provincial Secretary, Transvaal, and Others 1994 (4) SA 715 (T). 
White Paper 69 et seq. 
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reform. Eligible applicants61 may apply for one of the following grants: 
(a) SettlemenUland acquisition grant. This grant is set at a maximum of R15 000 per 
household and may be used for land acquisition, enhancement of tenure rights, 
investment in infrastructure, investment in home improvements and farm capital 
investments. 
(b) Grant for the acquisition of land for municipal commonage. Primary municipalities 
may use this grant to acquire land to extend or create a commonage. 
(c) Settlement planning grant. This grant may be used to employ planners or other 
professionals to assist applicants with the preparation of their applications. 
(d) Grant for determining Land Development Objectives. Under-resourced, poor or rural 
local authorities may use this grant to undertake strategic planning in terms of section 
28 of the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 to set land development objectives 
in order to provide a framework for decision making on the allocation of resources for 
land reform and settlement. 
15.3.4 The White Paper on Housing62 
The White Paper on Housing was one of the early key policy documents of the RDP 
and set out the problems facing the government and society in the provision of housing 
as well as the government's official policy in terms of which the housing question was 
61 
62 
According to White Paper70 eligible applicants include (a) landless people or people who 
have limited access to land (especially women) who want to gain access to land and 
settlement opportunities; (b) farm workers and their families who want to acquire land. of 
improve their tenure conditions; (c) labour tenants and their families who want to acqurr~ 
or improve the land which they hold; (d) residents who wish to improve and secure ~heir 
conditions of tenure; ( e) successful claimants in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act22of1994; (f) persons who were dispossessed but who fall outside the ambit of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 and (g) Municipal Councils who wish to create 
or extend commonage. 
Government Gazette 16178, 23December1994. 
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to be dealt with. Due to the fact that the availability of land plays an important role in 
the provision of housing, brief mention will be made here of the necessity of land reform 
in order to effect the housing policy. 
The White Paper on Housing made mention of only two areas of land reform, namely 
land redistribution and security of tenure. The restitution of land has no direct bearing 
on the housing question. 63 
According to the White Paper, the national housing vision entails the 
"establishment of viable, socially and economically integrated 
communities, situated in areas allowing convenient access to economic 
opportunities as well as health, education and social amenities, within 
which all South Africa's people will have access on a progressive basis, 
to: 
a permanent residential structure with secure tenure, ensuring 
privacy and providing adequate protection against the elements; 
and 
potable water, adequate sanitary facilities including waste disposal 
and domestic electricity supply".64 
The availability of developed land is essential for the successful implementation of the 
housing programme and as such the identification, allocation and transformation of 
undeveloped land into serviced land for residential settlement is critical for the supply 
of housing to all South Africans. The White Paper pointed out that effective land 
delivery has a direct influence on the rate and scale of housing supply, the potential for 
housing supply to contribute to the socio-economic development and environment of 
poor communities and the potential for housing supply to contribute to the racial, 
63 White Paper on Housing 54. 
64 White Paper on Housing 21. 
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economic and spatial integration of South Africa. 65 The Department of Land Affairs, in 
conjunction with the Department of Housing, subsequently tabled the Development 
Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 as a bridging measure in the short term to facilitate the 
speedy delivery of developed land. The Housing Act 107 of 1997 was promulgated later 
on. 
Publicly owned land was identified as a significant national asset and the White Paper 
emphasised the fact that it is essential that the potential use of appropriately located 
and suitable land for affordable housing should be_ considered for such use on an equal 
basis with other competing uses. 66 
15.4 Constitutional framework 
15.4.1 The 1993 Constitution67 
The first democratic Constitution provided further impetus for new and effective land 
reform measures in South Africa. The Constitution mentions property in two different 
sections. On the one hand rights in property are guaranteed, 68 and on the other hand 
the Constitution provides for active steps to effect land restitution. 69 Although these two 
references to property seem to contradict one another, this is not really the case. If 
these sections are interpreted in light of the Constitution as a whole, bearing in mind 
the underlying principles and values of the Constitution, it is possible to give effect to 
both, without sacrificing either. The mere fact that individual rights in property are 
guaranteed does not imply that land reform is impossible, just as the constitutional 
protection of land reform does not mean that the protection of individual rights is 
65 White Paper on Housing 53. 
66 White Paper on Housing 32 and 56 et seq. 
67 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
68 Section 28. 
69 Section 121 to 123. 
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impossible. It is nevertheless interesting that the land reform measures in section 121 
to 123 (which deal with the restitution of land) are not included in the Bill of Rights. 
It is also important to note that section 28 guarantees 'rights in property'. This 
formulation provides for the protection of a wide range of property rights (including land 
rights). This particular formulation also makes it possible to protect customary law rights 
in property. The customary law system provides for interests in property rather rights 
to property and as such section 28 creates the possibility for the protection of these 
interests. 
15.4.2 The 1996 Constitution70 
Section 25 of the 1996 Constitution71 replaced section 28 of the 1993 Constitution. As 
70 
71 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996. The final Constitution is officially 
numbered Act 108 of 1996, but Van Wyk 1997 THRHR 377 at 378 et seq points out that 
it is a mistake to number the Constitution in this manner, because, unlike the interim 
Constitution of 1993, this is not a normal Act of Parliament, but a document drafted by the 
Constitutional Assembly. 
The full text of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 
1996 is reproduced here for the convenience of the reader: 
(1) No one may be deprived of property except in terms of a law general application, 
and no law may permit the arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2) Property may be expropriated only in terms of a law of general application -
(a) For a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b) subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner 
of payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or 
decided or approved by a court. 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be 
just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and 
the interests of those affected, liaving regard to all relevant circumstances, 
including -
(a) the current use of the property; 
(b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
(c) the market value of the property; 
(d) the effect of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and 
beneficial capital improvement of the property; and 
(e) the purpose of the expropriation. 
(4) For the purposes of this section -
(a) the public interest include the nation's commitment to land reform, and 
to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's resources; 
and 
(b) property is not limited to land. 
(5) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to 
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is the case with section 28 of the 1993 Constitution, section 25 determines that any 
deprivation or regulation of property has to be in line with certain principles. However, 
section 25 also explicitly provides for land reform. The property clause is drafted in 
such a manner that a balance is struck between the protection of existing property 
rights and the promotion of land reform measures. Thus, although existing property 
rights are guaranteed and protected, the property clause ensures that the protection 
of the rights does not impede land reform. 
The property clause provides for land reform is several ways. The provisions in section 
25(5) to 25(7) deal with the three areas of land reform as identified by the RDP: 
redistribution of land, the provision of security of tenure, and the restitution of land. 
Section 25(5) obliges the state to take reasonable measures, within its available 
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
equitable basis. This section is clearly meant to provide for the redistribution of land 
and provide the state with strong protection to implement measures aimed at the 
redistribution of land. This provision does not place a positive duty on the state to 
provide every citizen with land, but merely obliges the state to provide access to land. 
The phrases 'within its available resources' and 'foster conditions' indicate that, 
although the state has a duty to provide appropriate assistance to people who do not 
have access to land, the state need not actually provide individuals with land. In terms 
of section 25(5) the state is under an obligation to take immediate steps towards the 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
land on an equitable basis. 
A person or community whose tenure is legally insecure as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act 
of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a r~sult 
of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent pro~1ded 
by an Act of Parliament, either _to restitution of that property or to equitable 
redress. 
No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative or other 
measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the 
results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the 
provisions of this section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1 ). 
Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6). 
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realization of the right to access to land. 72 
Section 25(6) deals specifically with security of tenure. The state is under an obligation 
to provide persons or communities, who have legally insecure tenure as a result of past 
injustices, with secure tenure or comparable redress. Legislation must be enacted to 
achieve this goal. 73 The obligation of the state to provide citizens with security of tenure 
may be limited by the provisions of the different Acts which deal with the provision of 
security of tenure. 74 Much of this legislation was already promulgated prior to the 
enactment of the 1996 Constitution. 75 
Section 121 to 123 of the 1993 Constitution, that dealt with the restitution of land, have 
been replaced by section 25(7). This section determines that persons or communities 
who have been dispossessed of property as a result of past racially discriminatory laws 
or practices are entitled to the restitution of that property to the extent provided by an 
Act of Parliament (the Restitution of Land Right Act 22 of 1994). Section 25(7) differs 
from the provisions in sections 121 to 123 in the interim Constitution in that section 
25(7) no longer provides for the restitution of a 'right in land'. This has been changed 
to 'property'. It may be argued that the term 'property' still makes it possible for persons 
to claim restitution of personal rights (especially in the case of sharecroppers and 
labour tenants) which were dispossessed in terms of apartheid laws.76 The term 'racially 
discriminatory law', as it was used in section 121 of the interim Constitution, has been 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
Eisenberg in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 40-1 at 7. Also see 
Budlenderin Budlender, Latsky and Roux Juta's New Land Law 1-1 at 69; Van der Walt 
Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on South Africa. 
Section 25(9). 
Budlender in Budlender, Latsky and Roux Juta's New Land Law 1-1at70; Eisenberg in 
Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 40-1 at 9. 
See the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991; the Land Reform (Labour 
Tenants) Act 3of1996; and the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996. 
Eisenberg in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 40-1 at 10. See also 
Budlender in Budlender, Latsky and Roux Juta's New Land Law 1-1 at 71; Roux in 
Budlender, Latsky and Roux Juta's New Land Law 3A-1 at 14 where it is pointed out that 
the scope of 'rights in land' was already limited by section 1 of the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act 22 of 1994. 
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replaced by 'racially discriminatory laws and practices'. Eisenberg77 points out that the 
term 'practices' is much wider than 'laws', and that section 25(7) does not require the 
law in terms of which people were dispossessed to be racially discriminatory, but 
merely that the actions of the state be discriminatory. 
In view of the positive formulation of sections 25(6) and 25(7) Van der Walf6 points out 
that the rights created by these sections may be regarded as positive claim rights 
against the state rather than institutional guarantees. The extent of these rights are, 
however, limited by the relevant legislation and by the availability of state resources. 
Section 25(8) is a general provision which states that no provision of the property 
clause may impede the state from taking measures to achieve land, water and related 
reform in order to redress the results of past racial discrimination. Any departure from 
section 25 must, however, be in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1).79 
Section 25(2) determines that property may be expropriated for a public purpose or in 
the public interest. If this is read with section 25(4)(a), which states that the public 
interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform and to reforms to bring about 
equitable access to all natural resources, it is clear that provision is made for 
expropriation to effect land reform. According to section 25(3) the amount of 
compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just an equitable. Read 
with section 25(4)(a), the public interest in land reform should assist in the 
determination of what constitutes just and equitable compensation. In the calculation 
of the amount of compensation cognisance shoulq be taken of past practices such as 
77 
76 
79 
Eisenberg in Chaskalson et al Constitutional law of South Africa 40-1 at 11. 
Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: a comparative analysis chapter on South 
Africa. 
See Bud lender in Budlender, Latsky and Roux Juta's New Land Law 1-1 at 72. Budlender 
argues that section 25(8) is most probably included in the property guarantee to "act as 
a directive to the courts that land, water and related reform in order to redress the results 
of past racial discrimination are a specially valued and protected purpose". This 
interpretation of section 25(8) is consistent with section 36(1 ). See also Van der Walt The 
constitutional property clause 143 et seq; Van der Walt Constitutional property clauses: 
a comparative analysis chapter on South Africa. 
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state investment in the property and the history of the acquisition of the property.80 
Section 25 provides clear constitutional authority for land reform. The provision in 
section 25(4), which determines that the public interest includes the nation's 
commitment to land reform, and to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South 
Africa's resources, indicates that the courts have to take cognisance of the social 
function of property and the public interest when land-reform related cases are 
adjudicated. This provision, coupled with the provisions in sections 25(5) to 25(7), 
which provide for specific forms of land reform, as well as the underlying principles of 
the Constitution create a framework within which the courts have to judge the limitation 
of property rights with regard to land reform. In view of these provisions section 25 
cannot be interpreted as an absolute guarantee of existing individual rights. Where the 
state imposes a limitation on individual property rights, the courts have to establish an 
equitable balance between the interests of the affected individual and the public 
interest. The authorizing and controlling provisions with regard to land reform in section 
25 ensure that the public interest is afforded the necessary weight in the balancing 
process. 
Although many of the reform measures contemplated in the 1996 Constitution have 
been implemented prior to the implementation of the Constitution itself, the Constitution 
provides a the measures with legitimacy. The drafters of the property clause in the 
1996 Constitution ensured that a wide range of land reform measures could be taken 
without infringing of the individual's property rights. The guarantee of individual rights 
has been drafted in such a manner as to ensure that, while these rights are adequately 
protected, it does not jeopardize or restrict the land reform programme. On the other 
hand, the provision for comprehensive land reform does not jeopardise the protection 
of individual rights either. The fact that the courts are obliged to balance the protection 
of existing property rights with measures to effect land reform ensures that the 
possibility of a constitutional conflict between the judiciary and the legislature is 
minimized. 
80 Section 25(3)(a) to (e). 
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15.5 Land reform laws and programmes 
15.5.1 Restitution 
15.5.1.1 The Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 
The Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 was promulgated in 1994 in terms of 
section 121 to 123 of the 1993 Constitution.81 Any person or community that was 
dispossessed of land rights not earlier than 19 June 1913 in terms of an Act which 
would have been inconsistent with the discrimination clause of the 1993 Constitution82 
may claim restitution from the state of those land rights in terms of this Act. Restitution 
of rights in land which have been expropriated in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 
1975 do not fall within the ambit of this Act.83 However, if the claimant is of the opinion 
that the compensation he/she received in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 is 
not just and equitable, he/she may claim restitution, but has to prove that the 
compensation was not adequate. Claims in terms of this Act are instituted against the 
state rather than against individuals or groups. 
'Rights in land' are defined widely in the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994: 
"'right in land' means any right in land whether registered or unregistered, 
and may include the interest of a labour tenant and sharecropper, a 
customary law interest, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust 
arrangement and beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less 
than 10 years prior to the dispossession in question". 84 
81 
82 
83 
84 
See in general Roux in Budlender, Latsky and Roux Juta's New Land Law 3A-1 et seq; 
Jaichand in Bill of Rights Compendium 3FA-3 et seq. 
See section 8(2). 
Section 121(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act200of1993. 
Section 1. 
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This definition of rights in land makes it possrble for a wide range of holders of rights 
to claim restitution in terms of the Act. It provides for all those dispossessed in terms 
of apartheid law who never had registered rights to land. The rights held in terms of the 
apartheid land tenure system will thus all qualify for possible restitution in terms of this 
Act. 
The Act provides for the establishment of a Commission on the Restitution of Land 
Rights85 and a Land Claims Court.86 The purpose of the commission is to screen all 
applications to determine the suitability of the claims in terms of the Act. The 
commission has to settle the claims if possible (through a process of mediation if 
necessary87), but has to refer cases which they cannot solve to the Land Claims 
Court.88 
The Act provides for a variety of different remedies. The Act states that the court: 
"may order-
(a) the restoration of land, a portion of land or any right in land in respect 
of which the claim or any other claim is made to the claimant or award 
any land, a portion of or a right in land to the claimant in full or in partial 
settlement of the claim and, where necessary, the prior acquisition or 
expropriation of the land, portion of land or right in land: Provided that the 
claimant shall not be awarded land, a portion of land or a right in land 
dispossessed from another claimant, unless such other claimant is or has 
been granted restitution of a right in land or has waived his or her right 
to restitution of the right in land concerned; 
85 
86 
87 
88 
Chapter II of the Act. Also see section 122 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act200of1993. 
Chapter Ill. 
Section 13. 
Section 14{c) and (d). Also see Blaauwberg Municipality v Bekker and others (LCC). 
Decision available on the Internet at http://law.wits.ac.za/lcc. 
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(b) the State to grant the claimant an appropriate right in alternative state-
owned land and, where necessary, order the Sate to designate it; 
(c) the State to pay the claimant compensation; 
( d) the State to include the claimant as a beneficiary of a State support 
programme for housing or the allocation and development of rural land; 
(e) the grant to the claimant of any alternative relief'.89 
The following factors have to be brought into the equation when the court considers 
its decision in a particular case:90 (a) the desirability of providing for restitution of rights 
in land to any person or community dispossessed as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices; (b) the desirability of remedying past violations of 
human rights; ( c) the requirements of equity and justice; ( d) if restoration of a right in 
land is claimed, the feasibility of such restoration; ( e) the desirability of avoiding major 
social disruption; (f) any provision which exists in respect of the land for that land to be 
dealt with in a manner which aims to protect and advance persons, or categories of 
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination in order to promote the achievement 
of equality and redress the results of past racial discrimination; (g) the amount of 
compensation or any other consideration received in respect of the dispossession, and 
the circumstances prevailing at the time of the dispossession; (h) the history of the 
dispossession, the hardship caused, the current use of the land and the history of the 
acquisition and use of the land; (i) in the case of an order for equitable redress in the 
form of financial compensation, changes over time in the value of money; and U) any 
other factor which the court finds relevant and consistent with the spirit and objectives 
of the Constitution. 
89 
90 
Section 35(1) as amended by the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act63 
of 1997. Also see section 123 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 
of 1993. Restitution is not restricted to rights in land. Section 25(7) of the 1996 Constitution 
provides for "equitable redress" as an alternative to the restitution of specific property. See 
Dulabh and Another v Department of Land Affairs 1997 (4) SA 1108 (LCC) and Ex Parle 
North Central and South Central Metropolitan Substructure Councils of the Durban 
Metropolitan Area and Another 1998 (1) SA 78 (LCC). 
Section 33 as amended by the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 63 of 
1997. Also see In re Macleantown Residents Association: Re Certain Erven and 
Commonage in Macleantown 1996 (4) SA 1272 (LCC). 
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In the case where the land in question is in possession of the state and the state 
certifies that restitution of the right is feasible, the state may be ordered to restore the 
right to the claimant. If, however, the land in question is in .possession of a private 
owner the state may purchase or expropriate the land and restore it to the claimant. 
The court will, however, not order the state to purchase or expropriate private land for 
restitution purposes unless it is just and equitable taking into account factors such as 
the history of the dispossession, the hardship caused, the current use of the property, 
the interests of the owner and others affected by any expropriation and the interests of 
the dispossessed. 91 Compensation paid in the event of expropriation has to be in line 
with the requirements set in section 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution.92 In the instance 
were compensation is paid to the claimant (where restitution of rights in land is not 
possible or not feasible) the compensation has to be just and equitable in light of all the 
relevant factors, including the circumstances which prevailed at the time of the 
dispossession and the payment of any compensation upon such dispossession. 93 
It is important to note that the restitution of rights in land does not necessarily mean 
that the claimant will be granted full ownership of the land in question. The claimant's 
position prior to the dispossession may be restored, but the Act determines that the 
court's power to restore a right in land or to grant a right in alternative state-owned land 
includes the power to adjust the nature of the right previously held by the claimant, and 
to determine the form of the title under which the right may be held in future. 94 
Where the claimant is a community, the court may determine the manner in which the 
rights are held or the compensation is paid. A r~stitution order of rights in land to a 
91 
92 
93 
94 
Section 123(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act200of1993. 
Section 35(5) originally referred to section 28(3) of the interim Constitution, but this section 
was amended by the Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 63 of 1997 to 
apply to the 1996 Constitution. 
Section 123(4)(a) of the Cons'/itution of the Republic of South Africa Act200of1993. The 
payment of compensation to a claimant is not excluded in the case where restitution has 
been effected by the claimants themselves. See Dulabh and Another v Department of 
Land Affairs 1997 (4) SA 1108 (LCC). 
Section 35(4). 
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community may be subjected to conditions the court deems necessary to ensure that 
all of the dispossessed members of the community will have access to the land or the 
compensation in question on a fair and non-discriminatory basis. 95 
15.5.1.2 The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 
The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 deals with the restitution of land 
rights, the provision of security of tenure to labour tenants, and the redistribution of land, 
occupied or used by labour tenants. The general principles of the Act and the 
provisions relating to the restitution of land are discussed here, while the provisions 
relating to redistribution and security of tenure are discussed below in the sections on 
redistribution and tenure reform respectively. 
The Act has a limited application and applies only to labour tenants. Farm workers are 
explicitly excluded from the protection provided by the Act. The Act provides for the 
protection of the labour tenant's rights with respect to the land in the sense that the 
labour tenant may occupy and use the designated portion of the farm for housing, 
cropping and grazing. In return for this right the labour tenant, or his/her associate, 
provides labour to the land owner or lessee. 
The protection provided by the Act applies to any person who was a labour tenant on 
2 June 1995. Any such person and his/her family members shall have the right to use 
and occupy the particular part of the farm which he/she (or his/her associate) was using 
and occupying on the said date.96 A person who _qualifies as a labour tenant in terms 
of the Act, but who vacated a farm or was evicted for any reason between 2 June 1995 
and the commencement of the Act on 22 March 1996, may institute an action for the 
reinstatement of his/her rights.97 This amounts to the restitution of the labour tenant's 
95 
96 
97 
Section 352(c) and 35(3). Also see Ex Parle Elandskloof Vereniging (LCC). Decision 
available on the Internet at http://law.wits.ac.za/lcc. 
Section 3(1)(a) and section 12(1)(a). 
Section 3(1)(b) and section 12(1)(b). 
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land rights. 
The Act defines a labour tenant as: 
"a person: 
(a) who is residing or has the right to reside on a farm; 
(b) who has or has had the right to use cropping or grazing land 
on the farm, referred to in paragraph (a), or another farm of the 
owner, and in consideration of such right provides or has provided 
labour to the owner or lessee; and 
(c) whose parent or grandparent resided or resides on a farm and 
had the use of cropping or grazing land on such farm or another 
farm of the owner, and in consideration of such right provided or 
provides labour to the owner or lessee of such or such other farm, 
including a person who has been appointed a successor to a labour 
tenant in accordance with the provisions of section 3(4) and (5), but 
excluding a farmworker".98 
It was decided in Mahlangu v De Jager9 that the onus is on the applicant to prove that 
he/she is a labour tenant. The applicant has to fulfill all three the requirements to 
qualify as a labour tenant. The fact that the three requirements have to be read 
conjunctively was confirmed in Zulu and Others v Van Rensburg and Others. 100 It did, 
however, prove difficult to discharge the burden of proof, and in Klapper and Others v 
Mkhize and Others101 it was decided that the definition of 'labour tenant' is obscurely 
worded. The third requirement provides an additional means by which a person can 
prove that he/she qualifies as a labour tenant in terms of the Act, and should not be 
98 
99 
100 
101 
Section 1 (xi). 
1996 (3) SA 235 (LCC). 
1996 (3) SA 1236 (LCC). 
1998 (1) SA 406 (N). 
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read conjunctively with the first two requirements. The court stated that: 
"[i]t may well have been intended that paras (a) anq (b) should be read 
conjunctively, but it seems that the further intention was that para (c) 
should either be read in its own or conjunctively with para (a) only. There 
is, in any event, no warrant for reading all three paragraphs 
conjunctively. "102 
This approach was followed in Tselentis Mining (Pfy) Ltd and Another v Mdlalose and 
Others.103 The court, however, modified the approach followed in Klopper and Others 
v Mkhize and Others to some extent to relieve the burden of proof. It was decided that 
paragraphs (a) to (c) should not be read conjunctively, but that paragraphs (a) and (b) 
should be read conjunctively and paragraphs (a) and (c) should be read conjunctively, 
but disjunctively from paragraphs (a) and (b). 104 The court found that most applicants 
would comply with the requirements set in paragraphs (a) and (b), but that paragraph 
(c) creates additional means by which a person who resided or had the right to reside 
on the farm on 2 June 1995, but who did not have in his own right the rights to u_se 
cropping or grazing on such farm can nevertheless qualify as a labour tenant if his/her 
parents or grandparents had such rights. 
It was also decided in Mahlangu v De Jager105 that the applicant must prove that he/she 
is not a farmworker. A farmworker is defined by the Act as: 
"a person who is employed on a farm in . terms of a contract of 
employment which provides that 
(a) in return for the labour which he or she provides to the owner or the· 
102 
103 
104 
105 
1998 (1) SA 406 (N) at 408. 
1998 (1) SA411 (N). 
1998 (1) SA411 (N) at419. 
1996 (3) SA 235 (LCC). 
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lessee of the farm, he or she shall be paid predominantly in cash or in 
some other form of remuneration, and not predominantly in the right to 
occupy and use land; and 
(b) he or she is obliged to perform his or her services personally". 106 
The Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 63 of 1997107 amended the 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 in 1997 to the effect that if it is proved in 
any proceedings that a person falls within paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the definition 
of a labour tenant, that person shall be presumed not to be a farmworker, unless the 
contrary is proved.108 Whenever the court has to establish whether a person is a labour 
tenant the court must have regard to the combined effect and substance of all 
agreements entered into between the person who avers that he/she is a labour tenant 
and his/her parent or grandparent, and the owner or lessee of the land concerned. 109 
This amendment further relieves the heavy burden of proof on applicants. 
The main distinction between a labour tenant and a farmworker is the fact that a 
farmworker is paid predominantly in cash or some other form of remuneration and not 
predominantly in the right to occupy and use land. In the case where the applicant 
provides labour to the owner or lessee in return for the right to occupy and use land as 
well as some other form of remuneration (be it cash or some other form of 
remuneration), the applicant has to prove that the right to occupy and use the land has 
a larger monetary value than any other form of remuneration. 110 
The provision of labour is paramount in the definition of a labour tenant. The labour 
tenant, however, does not have to provide the labour in person (as is the case with a 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
Section 1 (ix). 
Sections 2(5) and 2(6) were added to section 2. 
Sections 2(5). 
Section 2(6). 
For a discussion see Pienaar 1997 TSAR 131 at 133 et seq. 
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farm worker). The labour tenant merely has to provide labour to the owner. He/she may 
nominate another person to provide labour in his/her place, provided that such a 
person is acceptable to the owner or the lessee of the farm. 11 ~ However, the owner or 
lessee may not unreasonably refuse the nomination of a person to provide labour in 
stead of the labour tenant. 112 The conditions of service of the person who provides 
labour may not be less favourable than the conditions applicable to farm workers in 
terms of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983.113 
15.5.2 Redistribution 
15.5.2.1 The Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 
The Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 aims to promote reconstruction and 
development in relation to land by providing for a national framework for land 
development. The Act does not deal with historical land claims, but aims to increase 
the availability of land for redistribution purposes. Procedures for the subdivision and 
development of land in urban and rural areas are introduced to promote the speedy 
provision and development of land for residential, small-scale farming or other needs 
and uses. In some cases these measures are of a temporary nature and will be in effect 
only until more permanent procedures are developed. The Act provides for easier and 
speedier procedures to facilitate the development of land without getting bogged down 
by existing, time-consuming procedures. The Act furthermore promotes security of 
tenure and aims to ensure that end-user finance in the form of subsidies and loans 
becomes available as early as possible during the. land development process. The Act 
attempts to achieve its goals within a national framework of physical planning. It 
111 
112 
113 
Section 4(1). 
Section 4(2). 
This does not mean that the nominated labourer has to receive additional payment, but 
merely that the labour tenant's right to occupy and use the land must be in accordance 
with the provisions of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983. The working 
hours and conditions of leave of the nominated labourer, however, have to meet the 
requirements of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 3 of 1983. 
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provides for procedures for the development of land, land tenure issues and general 
planning and conservation standards. 
Chapter I of the Act sets out the general principles for the development of land. 114 The 
principles are applicable throughout South Africa and apply to actions of both the 
national government and local government bodies. This chapter provides for an 
integrated system of physical planning and is applicable to policy, administrative 
practice and legislation alike. This integrated system should provide for urban and rural 
land development and should facilitate the development of formal and informal, existing 
and new settlements. 115 The efficient and integrated development of land acts as a 
guiding principle and should be promoted by integrating the social, economic, 
institutional and physical aspects of land development; the integration of development 
of land in rural and urban areas to support of each other rather than being mutually 
exclusive; making residential and employment opportunities available in close proximity 
to each other; optimising agricultural, land, mineral, bulk infrastructure, roads, 
transportation and social facilities; the promotion of a diverse combination of land uses; 
the discouragement of urban sprawl in urban areas; the correction of historically 
distorted spatial patterns; the optimum use of existing infrastructure; and the 
encouragement of environmentally sustainable land development practices and 
processes.116 Sustainable land development should be achieved through the promotion 
of development which is within the fiscal, institutional and administrative means of the 
country, the establishment of viable communities, the sustained protection of the 
environment, meeting the basic needs of all citizens and the safe use of land.117 Land 
development should also promote security of tenure and provide for the widest possible 
range of tenure alternatives, including individual and communal tenure. 118 These 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
See in general Latsky in Budlender, Latsky and Roux Juta's New Land Law 2A-1 at 12. 
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Section 3(1)(c). 
Section 3(1)(h). 
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measures are specifically aimed at tenure reform. 
Chapters V and VI provide for alternative procedures to produce developed land in 
urban and rural areas respectively. These alternative routes and procedures do not 
replace or change the existing ones, but offer a cheaper and speedier' alternative to 
increase the rate of redistribution and reconstruction as envisaged by the RDP. 119 
Chapter VII relates to land tenure matters. Provision is made for a special registration 
arrangement120 which entails that, although a particular piece of land is not yet properly 
developed and registrable, such land may be registered provisionally, provided that the 
professional land surveyor that deals with the specific development certifies that there 
is no substantial risk that a general plan will not be approved121 and the conveyancer 
in the particular case certifies that there is no substantial risk that transfer of ownership 
of erven on that development will not be so registered. 122 This special registration 
arrangement aims to make it possible to introduce mortgages at an earlier stage in the 
development without increasing the risk of either users of financial institutions. 
A new form of title, known as 'initial ownership', may be registered in a deeds registry 
in terms of this special registration arrangement. 123 The registration of initial ownership 
vests in the holder thereof the right to occupy and use the erf as if he/she is the owner 
thereof. He/she has the right to encumber the initial ownership by means of a mortgage 
or a personal servitude, but may not encumber the initial ownership in any other way. 
The initial owner may also sell the initial ownership. 124 The land itself, however, may not 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
Latsky in Budlender, Latsky and Roux Juta's New Land Law2A-1at45 et seq. 
Section 61 (1). 
Section 61 (4)(a). 
Section 61 (4)(b). 
Section 62(1). See also Latsky in Budlender, Latsky and Roux Juta's New Land Law 2A-1 
at 84; Van der Walt The Constitutional property clause 154. 
Section 62(4). 
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be alienated or further encumbered in any way.125 Full ownership will vest in the holder 
of initial ownership as soon as the land becomes registrable in ownership. 126 
The Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 thus provides alternative procedures to 
speed up the development of land in line with the RDP, without replacing or sacrificing 
the general requirements of development standards, security of the registration 
procedure or environmental conservation. 
15.5.2.2 The Land Reform Pilot Programme 
The Land Reform Pilot Programme was launched in early 1995. The programme is 
merely the first step in the process of the redistribution of agricultural land and aims at 
the acquisition and planning of suitable land, providing it with infrastructure and 
redistributing it to rural communities. The programme was initially implemented on an 
experimental basis over a two year period. Between five and ten communities in each 
province were supposed to benefit from the programme in the initial phase. Once 
suitable land and beneficiaries were identified, the necessary planning was done with 
the participation of all parties involved. Participation at the lowest level forms the 
cornerstone of the programme. After the planning phase the land is acquired through 
state purchase (or expropriation where necessary) and the community is settled there. 
The aim of the Land Reform Pilot Programme is to develop efficient, equitable and 
sustainable mechanisms of land redistribution on a national level. These mechanisms 
will be put to use after the completion of the initial phase.127 
125 
126 
127 
Section 62(5). 
Section 62(7). 
See in general White Paper on South African Land Policy 38; Van der Walt and Pienaar 
Introduction to the Law of Property 445. 
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15.5.2.3 The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 
Chapter Ill of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 contain special 
provisions aimed at the redistribution of land. In terms of Chapter Ill of the Land Reform 
(Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 the labour tenant or his/her successor may acquire 
ownership or other rights in either the land which he/she is entitled to occupy and use 
or any other land elsewhere on the farm or in the vicinity (as proposed by the owner of 
the farm) as well as such servitudes 128 as are reasonably necessary or consistent with 
the rights he/she enjoys or previously enjoyed.129 If an award is made in terms of 
Chapter Ill the land in question will not be subject to the provisions of the Subdivision 
of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970.130 An application for the award of ownership or 
other rights in the land has to be instituted within four years after the commencement 
of this Act on 22 March 1996. 
A claim in terms of Chapter Ill of the Act has to be resolved by agreement between the 
owner of the farm in question and the labour tenant (the applicant). The owner may 
submit proposals to the Director-General for the equitable resolution of the claim. 
These proposals may include the acquisition by the labour tenant of rights in land 
elsewhere on the farm or other land in the vicinity or the payment of compensation to 
the labour tenant in lieu of the acquisition of such land.131 If the interested parties fail 
to reach an agreement the Director-General may appoint a mediator to assist the owner 
and the applicant to discuss the proposals. 132 If an agreement is not reached within 30 
days, the court can refer the case to an arbitrator. 133 The court will make the 
determination of the arbitrator an order of the court. 
128 For instance right of access to water or right of way. 
129 Section 16. 
130 See section 40 of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996. 
131 Section 18(1). 
132 Section 18(3) and section 36. 
133 Section 19 and 20. 
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The court and the arbitrator may make a determination on the following: 134 (a) whether 
the applicant is a labour tenant; (b) the nature, location and extent of any land or rights 
in land which may be awarded to the applicant; (c) such. servitudes as may be 
reasonably necessary or consistent with the rights which the applicant or the owner of 
the affected land enjoys or has previously enjoyed; ( d) compensation to 'be paid to the 
owner of the affected land or to any other person whose rights are affected; ( e) the 
manner and period of payment of compensation; and (f) compensation which may be 
paid to the applicant in lieu of the transfer of land or rights in land. On acquisition by 
the labour tenant of ownership or other rights to land or compensation in lieu of the 
land, his/her rights as a labour tenant will be terminated. 135 The nature of the order 
made by the court must have regard to the desirability of assisting labour tenants to 
establish themselves on farms on a viable and sustainable basis, the achievement of 
the goals of this Act, the requirements of equity and justice, the willingness of the 
parties involved to make a contribution to settle the application and the findings of the 
arbitrator. 136 
The acquisition by the labour tenant of ownership of land or other rights in land is 
regarded as an expropriation and entitles the owner to just and equitable 
compensation. The amount of the compensation is to be determined with reference to 
the Constitution. Should the parties be unable to reach agreement, the court or the 
arbitrator will determine the amount, the manner in which and the period within which 
compensation must be paid.137 Should the applicant fail to make any payment, the 
owner may apply to the court to have its previous order declared null and void. 138 
Parliament will appropriate funds for the acquisition of land or rights in land by labour 
134 Section 22(4). 
135 Section 3(2)(d). 
136 Section 22(5). 
137 Section 23. 
138 Section 24. 
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tenants and in terms of the Act the Minister may grant advances or subsidies to labour 
tenants for the acquisition of land or rights in land by labour tenants as well as the 
development of land occupied or to be occupied by labour tenants. 139 
15.5.2.4 The Housing Act 107of1997 
The Housing Act 107 of 1997 does not introduce any explicit land reform measures. It 
does, however, prescribe that one of the general principles which is applicable to 
housing development entails that the 
"national, provincial and local spheres of government must ensure 
housing development provides as wide a choice as possible of housing 
and tenure options as is reasonably possible".140 
It continues by stating that individuals and communities must be encouraged and 
supported in their efforts to fulfill their own housing needs by assisting them in 
accessing land, services and technical assistance.141 Although this Act contributes to 
the process of redistribution of land on an equitable basis to all South Africans, it also 
has a bearing on the provision of security of tenure. 
15.5.3 Tenure reform 
15.5.3.1 The Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 
The Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 was promulgated to enable 
groups of people or communities to hold and manage property142 collectively. A group 
139 
140 
141 
142 
Section 26 and 27. 
Section 2(1)(c)(i). 
Section 2(1)(d). 
The Act applies to both movable and immovable property and to any right in and to 
movable or immovable property. See section 1 (xii). 
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or community that wants to hold property collectively has to register itself as a 
communal property association in terms of this Act. It also has to register a written 
constitution to regulate the management of the property and .to protect the individual 
members of the association against abuse. The Act forms part of the Department of 
Land Affairs' restitution and land reform programme in that it enables the court to 
identify a communal property association as the beneficiary in a restitution or 
redistribution order. Many people choose to hold and manage property as a group 
rather than individually because of the economic and social functions it fulfills. The Act 
provides the necessary structures 143 to enable communities to acquire, hold and 
manage property collectively. 
The Act provides for the registration of a provisional communal property association. 144 
The provisional communal property association may acquire the right to occupy and 
use land for a period of twelve months, but may not in any way alienate such a right. 
A written constitution for the communal property association has to be drafted145 during 
this twelve month period. 
An association will qualify for registration 146 if the community qualifies for protection in 
terms of this Act, 147 the association has as its main object the holding of property in 
common and the constitution of the association complies with the principles prescribed 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
Available institutions such as voluntary associations, share block schemes, companies, 
sectional title and trusts proved to be inappropriate, particularly for the less experienced 
and under-resourced communities. See in general the Memorandum on the Proposed 
Communal Property Associations Act 2 accompanying the Communal Property 
Associations Bill B 1038-95. 
Section 5. 
The Act prescribes certain guidelines for the drafting of the constitution. These guidelines 
will ensure that the drafting process is transparent, democratic and fair. See section 6, 7 
and 9 as well as the Schedule. 
Section 8(2). 
Section 2 lays down the requirements for a community to qualify as an association in 
terms of this Act. 
422 
by the Act.148 The constitution has to be consistent with the following general principles: 
(a) a fair and inclusive decision-making process;149 (b) equality of membership;150 (c) 
democratic processes; ( d) fair access to the property of. the association; 151 ( e) 
accountability and transparency. 
If the Director-General: Land Affairs is satisfied that the association qualifies for 
registration he/she will send the application, the constitution and his/her written consent 
to the Registration Officer, 152 who will then register the association. Upon registration 
the association will be established as a juristic person, with the capacity to sue and be 
sued. It may acquire rights and incur obligations, and acquire and dispose of 
immovable property and real rights therein and encumber such immovable property by 
mortgage, servitude, lease or any other manner. The association may, however, only 
dispose of or encumber its immovable property with the consent of the majority of 
members present at a general meeting of members. Any disposal, mortgage, or 
encumbrance which does not conform to this requirement will be voidable. Registration 
of the association will furthermore provide it with perpetual succession regardless of 
changes in its membership. The constitution will be deemed to be a matter of public 
knowledge and will be a legally binding agreement between the association and its 
members.153 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
Section 9. 
Section 9(1)(a) determines that all members must be afforded the opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making processes and membership of the association may only 
be terminated on reasonable grounds after a fair hearing at which the member was given 
the opportunity to present his/her case. 
Section 9(1)(b). No direct or indirect discrimination will be tolerated against any member 
on one of the following grounds: race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture or language. If different 
classes of members are created the differentiation must be compatible with the principle 
of equality and all members within a specific class must have equal right. 
Section 9(1)(d). The association must manage its property to the benefit of all its members 
in a participatory and non-discriminatory manner. The association may not sell or 
encumber its property without the consent of a majority of its members. 
An officer of the Department of Land Affairs appointed by the Director-General. See 
section 1 (xv). 
Section 8(6). 
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The Minister may determine that the laws governing the establishment of a township, 
and in the case of agricultural land, the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970 
will not apply to land registered in the name of a communal property association. 154 
This Act left the nature of the rights to the land open and clearly makes it possible for 
a community to own land collectively in the civil law sense, while customary law 
regulates the internal use and management of the land. 
15.5.3.2 The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 
The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 contain provisions which deal 
specifically with the termination of the labour tenant's rights and the procedure for 
eviction. These provisions have a bearing of the security of tenure enjoyed by the 
labour tenant. The rights of a labour tenant can be terminated by the waiver of his/her 
rights. Such a waiver has to be contained in a written agreement signed by both the 
labour tenant and the owner. 155 The labour tenant's rights will also be terminated if 
he/she leaves the farm voluntarily or if he/she appoints a person as his/her successor 
with the intention to terminate the labour tenant agreement. 156 In the case where the 
labour tenant dies, becomes unable to manage his/her affairs due to mental illness or 
another disability or leaves the farm without appointing a successor, the family of the 
labour tenant may appoint a successor.157 The rights of a labour tenant will not be 
terminated in the case where he/she attained the age of 65, or is unable to provide 
labour personally due to disability and fails to appoint someone to provide labour in 
his/her place. 158 Upon the death of such a labour tenant, his/her associates may be 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
Section 8(8). 
Section 3(6). Also see section 3(7) which states that the Director-General has to certify 
that the labour tenant had full knowledge of his/her rights and the implications of the 
waiver of such rights. 
Section 3(3). 
Section 3(4). The family has to inform the owner of the person so appointed within 90 days 
after the owner requested them in writing to do so. 
Section 9(1). 
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given twelve month's notice to leave the farm. 159 The labour tenancy may also be 
terminated if the labour tenant refuses or fails to provide labour to the owner or the 
lessee, 160 commits a material breach of the relationship between the owner or lessee 
and the labour tenant161 or acquires ownership or other rights in the land.162 
The owner of a farm may apply to court for the relocation of the labour tenant and 
his/her associates if the owner needs the land occupied or used by the labour tenant 
for agricultural or other development purposes which is of public benefit. 163 The court 
will only agree to such a relocation if the hardship suffered by the labour tenant and 
his/her associates due to the relocation is less than the hardship suffered by the owner 
if the labour tenant and his/her associates are not relocated.164 The court may also 
order the payment of compensation to the labour tenant and his/her associates to 
ensure that they are not prejudiced by the relocation. 165 The owner has to use the land 
for the purposes he/she submitted to the court within one year after the relocation, for 
if not, the labour tenant may institute proceedings for the reinstatement of his/her right 
to occupy and use that land. 166 
The owner or lessee of the farm is protected in that the Act provides for the eviction of 
the labour tenant and his/her associates under certain circumstances. 167 An owner who 
applies for an eviction order has to prove that the eviction of the labour tenant or 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
Section 9(2). 
Section 7(1)(a). 
Section 7(1)(b). 
Chapter Ill. 
Section 8(1). 
Section 8(2). 
Section 8(3). Relocation will take place only after such compensation has been paid. See 
section 8(4). 
Section 8(5). 
Section 5 and 6. 
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his/her associates is (a) just and equitable; and (b) that the labour tenant refused or 
failed to provide labour to the owner or lessee; or (c) that the labour tenant or his/her 
associate committed such a material breach of the relationship -between the owner and 
the labour tenant and his/her associate that it is practically impossible to remedy it.168 
The owner may furthermore make an urgent application for the removal 'of any person 
from the farm pending the outcome of the final order. Such an order will only be granted 
if the court is of the opinion that (a) there is a real and imminent danger of damage to 
the owner or lessee or his/her property if the person is not removed from the farm; (b) 
the owner or lessee has no other available remedy and (c) the likely harm to the person 
against whom the order is sought by granting such an order is less than the likely harm 
to the owner or the lessee if the order is not granted.169 
The Act provides for the payment of compensation to the labour tenant in the case of 
an eviction in terms of section 6 and 7 .170 The labour tenant will be given an opportunity 
to demolish any structure erected by him/herself and to remove the materials so 
salvaged. He/she may also tend to the crop until it is ripe and thereafter to reap it. The 
court may order the owner to pay just and equitable compensation to the labour tenant. 
In the determination of the amount of compensation the court has to take the following 
factors into account: 171 (a) the replacement value of such structures and improvements; 
(b) the value of materials which the labour tenant may remove; (c) the value of 
materials provided by the owner for the erection of such structures and improvements; 
( d) if the labour tenant was not given the opportunity to remove the crop, the value 
thereof; and (e) the circumstances that led to the eviction, including the conduct of the 
parties. 
168 Section 7. 
169 Section 15. 
170 Section 10(1). 
171 Section 10(2). 
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15.5.3.3 The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 
The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of. 1996 aims to provide 
protection of certain rights to and interests in land which are not otherwise adequately 
protected by law. The protection afforded by this Act is of a temporary nature and 
lapsed on 31 December 1997 .1n The operation of this Act was subsequently extended 
to 31 December 1998. 173 
Informal rights to land which are protected in terms of this Act include the access to or 
use and occupation of land held in terms of tribal, indigenous or customary law, the 
right or interest in land of a beneficiary under a trust of which the trustee is a body 
appointed in terms of an Act of Parliament or the holder of a public office and beneficial 
occupation 174 of land for not less than five years prior to the expiry of this Act. The Act 
specifically excludes the rights and interests of a tenant, labour tenant, sharecropper 
or employee if such rights or interests are purely of a contractual nature as well as any 
right or interest based purely on the temporary permission of the owner or lawful 
occupier of the land.175 The Act also emphasises that it does not confer on the holder 
of real rights to land any rights in addition to those which he/she holds in that land.176 
The Act provides that no person my be deprived of any informal right to land without 
his/her consent. This general rule is, however, not applicable to the expropriation of 
land in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 or in terms of any other law which 
provides for the expropriation of land or rights in land, or to a deprivation in accordance 
with the community's custom, provided that the. deprivation is based on a majority 
173 
174 
175 
176 
Section 5(2). 
GN 1008of1997, Government Gazette 18152, 25July1997. 
Section 1 (1)(Q defines beneficial occupation as the occupation of land by a person, as if 
he/she is the owner, without force, openly and without the permission of the registered 
owner. 
Section 1(1)0iQ. 
Section 1 (2){a). 
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decision within the community and that appropriate compensation is paid to the person 
who is deprived of an informal right to land.177 
This Act provides interim protection for formally insecure rights while new legislation 
is drafted to provide the holders of these rights with permanent security of tenure. 
15.5.3.4 The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 
The Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 aims to facilitate long-term security 
of tenure for occupants who reside on land which belongs to another person. The Act 
is applicable to occupiers who currently have consent or on 4 February 1997 or 
thereafter had consent or another right to reside on the land. 178 
The Minister of Land Affairs may grant subsidies to facilitate the long-term security of 
tenure to occupiers. These subsidies may be used to facilitate the planning and 
implementation of developments (both on-site and off-site developments), to enable 
occupiers, former occupiers or other persons who need long-term security of tenure to 
acquire land or rights in land and for the development of land which is occupied in 
terms of on-site or off-site development.179 The Act lists a number of criteria which have 
to be complied with before an application for a subsidy will be granted. The most 
important of these are that the development must accommodate the interests of both 
the occupiers and the owners and that the development must be cost-effective. 180 
An occupier has the right to reside on and use the .land and to access to such services 
as had been agreed upon with the owner. Balanced with the rights of the owner, the 
occupiers will also have the right (a) to security of tenure; (b) to receive visitors at 
177 
178 
179 
180 
Section 2. 
Section 1 (1 )(x) and section (3). 
Section 4(1). 
Section 4(2). 
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reasonable times and for reasonable periods; (c) to receive postal and other 
communication; (d) to family life; (e) not to be denied or deprived of access to water, 
education or health services; and to visit and maintain his/her family graves. The 
occupier may not intentionally or unlawfully harm any other person occupying the land 
or cause material damage to the property of the owner. He/she may not intimidate 
others occupying the land or assist unauthorised persons to establish new dwellings 
on the land in question.181 
The right of residence of the occupier may be terminated on any lawful ground, . 
provided that the termination is just and equitable. To determine whether such a 
termination is just and equitable, a number of different factors have to taken into 
account: the fairness of the agreement on which the owner relies; the conduct of the 
parties that gave rise to the termination; the possibility and extent of the hardship 
caused to the owner or the occupier when the right to residence is or is not terminated; 
the possible reasonable expectation of the occupier that the agreement from which the 
right to residence stems will be renewed; and the fairness of the procedure followed by 
the owner to terminate the right of residence of the occupier. 182 In the case where the 
occupier's right of residence arises solely from an employment contract, the right of 
residence may only be terminated if the occupier is dismissed in accordance with the 
provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 or if he/she resigns from the 
employment.183 The right of residence of an occupier may not be terminated if he/she 
has resided on the owner's land for ten years and (a) he/she is older than 60 years or 
(b) he/she is an employee and as a result of ill health, injury or disability is unable to 
supply labour, 184 unless he/she committed a material breach of the agreement between 
the owner and the occupier.185 These provisions are aimed at providing the occupier 
181 Section 6. 
182 Section 8(1). 
183 Section 8(2). 
184 Section 8(4). 
185 Section 10(1)(a) to (c). 
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with security of tenure. 
The owner may apply to the court for the termination of the right to occupy and then for 
an eviction order against the occupier. The Act differentiates between persons who 
- were occupiers on 4 February 1997 and persons who became occupiers 'after this date. 
Different requirements are set for valid eviction orders for the two categories of 
occupiers. With regard to persons who were occupiers on 4 February 1997 an eviction 
order may be granted if the occupier committed a material breach of the agreement 
between the owner and the occupier or he/she resigned voluntarily from the 
employment of the owner. 186 If none of these circumstances applies, an eviction order 
may be granted if the court is satisfied that suitable alternative accommodation 187 is 
available to the occupier. Should suitable accommodation not be available to the 
occupier within nine months after the termination of his/her right of residence, the court 
will grant an order for eviction of the occupier if it is just and equitable to do so, having 
regard to the efforts of both the owner and the occupier to secure alternative 
accommodation for the occupier, and the interests of the respective parties which will 
include the comparative hardship the owner and the occupier will be exposed to if an 
order for eviction is or is not granted. 188 
As far as an order for the termination of the right to occupy and an order for eviction of 
a person who became an occupier after 4 February 1997 are concerned, the court will 
grant such orders if it was a material term of the consent granted to an occupier that the 
consent would terminate on a fixed or determinable date, and the consent did indeed 
terminate on such a date. The court will only grant an eviction order if it is the opinion 
of the court that it is just and equitable to do so. In determining whether the granting of 
186 
187 
188 
Section 10(1). 
In terms of section 1 (1 )(xvii) suitable accommodation means alternative accommodation 
which is safe and not less favourable to the occupiers previous situation. The 
accommodation must be suitable with regard to the reasonable needs and requirements 
of all the occupiers in the household in question for residential accommodation, land for 
agricultural use and services, their joint earning abilities and the need to reside close to 
employment opportunities. 
Section 10(3). 
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such an order will be just and equitable the court must take the following factors into 
account: (a) the period for which the occupier resided on the land; (b) the fairness of 
the terms of the agreement between the parties; (c) whether suitable alternative 
accommodation is available; ( d) the reason for the eviction; and ( e) the balance of the 
interests of all affected parties. 189 
In the case of an eviction order being granted, the occupier is entitled to compensation 
for the structures he/she erected, any improvements he/she made and the standing 
crops he/she planted. The occupier is also entitled to his/her outstanding wages. The 
court may also order the owner to grant the occupier a fair opportunity to demolish the 
structures erected and improvements made by him/her, to remove the salvaged 
materials and to tend the standing crops, harvest and remove them. 190 
15.5.3.5 The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act 19of1998 
(!he Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
repeals the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Ac~he Act determines that no person 
may evict an unlawful occupier of land except on the authority of an order of a 
competent court. 192 The unlawful occupier must receive notice of the hearing of the 
proceedings by an owner or person in charge of land for the eviction of the unlawful 
occupier at least 14 days before the hearing. 193 A court may grant an order for eviction 
if it is of the opinion that it is just and equitable to do so, after considering all the 
relevant circumstances, including the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled 
189 
190 
(;) 
192 
193 
Section 11. 
Section 13. 
52 of 1951 together with all the Amendment Acts (24 of 1952, 62 of 1955, 92 of 1976, 72 
of 1977, 33 of 1980, 104 of 1988, 80 of 1990) 
Section 8(1). Any contravention of this section constitutes an offence (section 8(3)). 
Section 4(2). 
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persons and households headed by women.194 If an unlawful occupier has occupied the 
land in question for more than six months at the time when the proceedings are 
initiated, the court has to consider in addition to the relevant circumstances mentioned 
above whether land has been made available or can reasonably be made available by 
a municipality or other organ of state or another landowner for the relocation of the 
unlawful occupier.195 The court is obliged to grant an eviction order if it is satisfied that 
all the requirements of the Act have been complied with and that no valid defence has 
been raised by the unlawful occupier. 196 The Act also provides for urgent proceedings 
for eviction when, (a) there is a real and imminent danger of substantial injury of 
damage to any person or property if the unlawful occupier is not forthwith evicted from 
the land, (b) the likely hardship to the owner or any other affected person if an order for 
eviction is not granted, exceeds the likely hardship to the unlawful occupier if an order 
for eviction is granted, and (c) there is no other effective remedy available. 197 The Act 
furthermore provides for the instance where an organ of state wants to institute 
proceedings for the eviction of an unlawful occupier. 198 The court may grant such an 
order if it is just and equitable to do so. In deciding whether it is just and equitable to 
grant an order for eviction to an organ of state the court must have regard to: (a) the 
circumstances under which the unlawful occupier occupied the land; (b) the period the 
unlawful occupier has resided on the land in question; and (c)the availability of suitable 
alternative accommodation or land to the unlawful occupier. 199 
15.6 Evaluation 
A wide range of reform measures have been introduced to effect land reform in all three 
194 Section 4(6). 
195 Section 4(7). 
196 Section 4(8). 
197 Section 5. 
198 Section 6. 
199 Section 6(3). 
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areas identified in the RDP, namely the restitution of land, redistribution and the 
provision of security of tenure. 
The process of restitution of land is aimed at restoring the property rights of individuals 
who have been dispossessed in terms of apartheid legislation. Possible remedies 
provided for in the restitution process include the restitution of specific land to the 
claimant, the provision of alternative land, compensation instead of restitution of land 
or rights in land or any other form of equitable redress. The restitution process is 
directed at the state and claims between private individuals or groups are not foreseen 
in terms of the Act. Where private land is needed for restitution purposes, the land will 
be purchased or expropriated, against just and equitable compensation. 
Redistribution of land is aimed at the equitable redistribution of land among all South 
Africans. Redistribution is effected by the provision of access to land. In order to 
facilitate this, the state provides for grants and subsidies to the landless as well as 
speedy and cheap procedures to deliver developed land. The state will also facilitate 
the negotiation process between sellers and buyers to ensure that suitable land is 
distributed to the landless at a reasonable price. 
As far as security of tenure is concerned, the land reform programme is aimed either 
at the upgrading of insecure tenure rights to full ownership, the provision of statutory 
security for other land rights, or the creation of new rights. Most of the insecure land 
rights held in terms of old apartheid laws can be upgraded to full ownership in terms of 
the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991. The rights of labour tenants and 
lawful occupiers of land (mostly farm workers who do not qualify for the protection 
afforded to labour tenants) are afforded security in terms of the Extension of Security 
of Tenure Act62of1997. 
The different reform measures aim to operate in such a way that the rights and interests 
of all affected parties are protected. Current land owners are protected in that provision 
is made for just and equitable compensation to be paid to parties who are expropriated. 
433 
The land owner's rights are also protected by the provision of fair eviction procedures 
against labour tenants or other lawful occupiers of privately owned land, and for 
procedures for eviction in urgent cases. On the other hand the rights and interests of 
labour tenants and lawful occupiers of land are protected by these same procedures. 
The beneficiaries of the land reform programme are also protected in tha't measures are 
taken to ensure that the purchase price of privately owned land (in the case of the 
redistribution process) is just, equitable and reasonable. Provision is made for 
mediation and arbitration when the conflicting parties fail to reach an agreement on the 
settlement of a claim. The state furthermore provides for grants and subsidies to the 
landless to enable them to acquire suitable land or upgrade property of their property 
rights. 
Another interesting feature of the land reform programme is the position which full 
ownership fulfils. The initial measures taken simply upgraded 'lesser land rights' to full 
ownership.200 This reinforced the perception created during the apartheid years. that all 
rights which do not amount to full ownership are inferior rights. Some of the later reform 
measures, however, indicate a possible shift in the ownership paradigm and seem to 
afford land rights other than ownership with more or less the same protection afforded 
to ownership.201 By providing the holders of these rights with security of tenure, the gap 
between ownership and other land rights is narrowed to some extent. If the perception 
of a hierarchy of land rights (where ownership is regarded as the ultimate right and all 
other rights are perceived as inferior or inadequate rights) can be overcome it will be 
possible to increase the possibilities of land reform to a large extent. This will create 
200 
201 
In terms of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991. 
See in this regard the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, the Communal 
Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act. The 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 
1997 provides labour tenants and other lawful occupiers with statutory security of tenure. 
The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 does, however, provide for the situation 
where the rights of the labour tenant can be transformed or upgraded to full ownership. 
This reinforces the hierarchy of land rights perception to some extent. In terms of the 
Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 a group of people can acquire full 
ownership of land, but the Act provides for total freedom concerning the land hold and 
land use patterns within the property association. This creates the possibility of a situation 
where customary land 'rights' may be exercised without compromising the security of these 
rights. 
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a situation where rights in/to land can be (re)distributed, rather than the land itself. In 
light of the fact that land is a limited resource the distribution of secure tenure rights will 
alleviate the existing situation and appease the land hunger: 202 
It may, however, also be argued that by extending full ownership to as wide a range as 
possible of property holders, the distribution of land (especially agricultural land) will 
be more equitable. By merely providing security of tenure to different rights holders on 
agricultural land and not extending the base of landowners, the existing situation where 
agricultural land remains in the hands of predominantly white owners, will not be 
rectified to a meaningful extent. 
A factor which hampers the successful implementation of the land reform programme 
is the non-availability of information, especially in rural areas. It is of cardinal 
importance that the people who stand to benefit from land reform measures are 
informed accordingly. These measures can only be effective if the people for whom it 
is intended has knowledge thereof. 203 The complexity of these measures furthermore 
impede the successful and speedy implementation of the different reform measures. 
It was found that the possible beneficiaries often do not understand how to go about 
to apply for the benefits in terms of the reform measures. 204 In order to solve these 
problems the White Paper205 suggests that a information bank containing land tenure 
data be created. The Department of Land Affairs is currently in the process of 
establishing a National Land Information System (NUS) to provide easy access to 
information on land tenure data, information on people's entitlements under the various 
land reform programmes, the availability of land· and the progress of land reform in 
different areas. 
202 
203 
204 
205 
See in this regard Van der Walt 1995 SAPL 298. 
It is suggested in the White Paper 39 that the Post Office be used as a centre in rural 
areas to provide information on land reform issues. 
White Paper 39. 
White Paper 106. 
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Section 25 of the South African Constitution has been phrased in such a manner that 
provision is made for both the protection of existing property rights and the 
implementation of land reform measures. In adjudicating land-reform related cases the 
courts have to establish an equitable balance between the rights of the individual 
property holder and the public interest, or put differently, between existing property 
rights and the public interest. The importance of land reform in the South African 
context is emphasised by the provision in section 25(4) which determines that the 
public interest includes measures to effect land reform, and the provisions in section 
25(5) to 25(7) which authorise and control the implementation of the different forms of 
land reform. The emphasis on land reform in the property clause ensures that existing 
property rights are not afforded absolute protection, and that these rights may be 
limited or restricted for the purpose of land reform. These provisions create a 
framework within which the courts have to adjudicate land-reform related cases. The 
courts have to take cognisance of the social function of property and they have to 
interpret and apply property rights within the social context within which it functions. 
This will ensure that the possibility of a constitutional conflict between the judiciary and 
the legislature is minimized. 
The position in South Africa differs from the position in Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Botswana in that the South African constitutional property clause specifically authorises 
and controls the implementation of different forms of land reform. The possibility of a 
constitutional conflict, as is the case in Zimbabwe (and as it was illustrated by the 
Indian experience) is almost completely ruled out by the structure of the South African 
property clause. The courts are obliged to establish a balance between the protection 
of existing private property rights and the implementation of land reform measures. 
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SECTION 3 
CONCLUSION 
Land reform encompasses a comprehensive public programme designed to correct 
defective land tenure systems and to transform a society on the social, political and 
economic levels. Measures implemented to effect land reform may include the 
redistribution of land, land restitution, consolidation of agricultural units, colonisation 
schemes, the imposition of a land tax and tenure reform. Not all of these measures are 
always included in a land reform programme and in some jurisdictions, depending on 
the particular situation and circumstances, the introduction of only one form of land 
reform may solve existing problems with regard to the manner in which land is held and 
used. In general land reform aims to bring about an equitable distribution of land, 
wealth, income and political power, and to create a freer and more equal society where 
all citizens enjoy security of tenure. 
In terms of the traditional view of property rights existing private property rights are 
afforded strong protection and these rights are seen as socially and politically neutral. 
According to this view the exercise of property rights should not be limited for 'purely' 
social and political reasons. Ownership fulfills a central role in the traditional view of 
property rights, and it is seen as an absolute, in principle unrestricted, exclusive right. 
The social function of property is disregarded and it is not seen as a juridically relevant 
aspect of the role and function of property. Property is rather seen as essential for the 
personal autonomy, freedom and well-being of the individual. In terms of the traditional 
view the constitutional property guarantee is interpreted as a guarantee of existing 
rights and the holder of these rights is consequently afforded strong constitutional 
protection against state interference. 
The traditional private law perception of property may cause friction between the 
judiciary and the legislature in jurisdictions where land reform is implemented. 
According to the traditional private law view land reform is seen as an invalid social and 
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political reason for interference with the existing property rights of the individual. The 
constitutional guarantee of property can thus be interpreted in such a manner that it 
frustrates attempts by the legislature to effect land reform. A conservative interpretation 
of the property clause may lead the court to decide that land reform does not constitute 
a legitimate public purpose. The court may also set the amount of co;,,pensation for 
expropriation at such a high level that it makes comprehensive land reform virtually 
impossible. In India and Zimbabwe the court's conservative stance on land reform 
necessitated the amendment of the Constitution. In the case of India the property 
clause was completely removed from the bill of fundamental rights and in Zimbabwe the 
Constitution was amended to remove the court's jurisdiction with regard to the 
determination of the amount of compensation. 
Although it might seem that the constitutional protection of property (which aims to 
protect the rights and interests of the individual) is in direct conflict with the 
implementation of land reform measures (which aim to promote the public interest), the 
protection of property as a fundamental right need not prevent or impede land reform. 
As long as the traditional private-law perception is not allowed to dominate the 
constitutional process, the legislature would be in a position to effect comprehensive 
land reform. The conflict between the judiciary and the legislature can be avoided if the 
courts adopt a more socially conscious approach to property rights and land reform. In 
most developed countries the social function of property is emphasised and the courts 
consequently interpret and apply property rights in view of the social context within 
which these rights are created and function. In most jurisdictions where property rights 
are protected in the national constitution, the constitution basically determines that the 
use of property may be regulated (usually for a public purpose or in the public interest) 
and that property may be expropriated or taken in the public interest subject to the 
payment of compensation. Although some of these countries do not have an official, 
large-scale land reform programme, the courts recognise the importance of the social 
function of property and they have a lenient approach to the implementation of ad hoc 
land reform measures. The regulation of the use of property to effect land reform does 
not generally pose problems. As far as the expropriation of property is concerned the 
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courts interpret the 'public purpose' requirement widely to include land reform. In 
jurisdictions where the social function of property is recognised and where the courts 
strive to create a balance between the protection of the rights and interests of the 
individual and the promotion of the public interest, the implementation of land reform 
usually does not pose a problem. 1 
The situation in Namibia, Botswana and Mexico, where an official land reform 
programme is in place, illustrates that the implementation of land reform in developing 
countries need not cause a constitutional conflict between the judiciary and the 
legislature. As long as the courts recognise the importance of the social function of 
property, and do not allow the traditional private-law perception of property to dominate 
the constitutional process, it is possible to afford the existing property holder with 
adequate constitutional protection, while still allowing for land reform in the public 
interest. The land reform programme can also be planned in such a manner so as to 
ensure that the implementation of land reform measures do not impose unnecessary 
restrictions on the existing land owners. The redistribution programme in Namibia is a 
case in point. Rather than targeting large productive farms, under-utilised land, land 
held in excess of the maximum ceiling on landownership, and land held by foreign 
nationals is used for redistribution. In Botswana the land reform programme entails to 
provision of security of tenure to people living on tribal land and state-owned land. 
Privately owned land is not affected by the programme. In Mexico the importance of the 
social function of property is recognised, as land reform is regarded as being in the 
public interest. 
In South Africa the property clause in the Constitution recognises the dual purpose of 
protecting individual rights and implementing comprehensive land reform. The White 
Paper on South African land policy2 clearly states that: 
2 
See in this regard chapters 8 (Germany), 9 (United States of America) and 10 (Council of 
Europe) above, and the discussion of the treatment of issues relating to land reform by the 
courts in a variety of jurisdictions in chapter 13. 
White Paper on South African land policy 16. 
439 
"[t]he new Constitution seeks to achieve a balance between the 
protection of existing property rights on the one hand, and constitutional 
guarantees of land reform on the other hand. The property clause itself 
now provides clear constitutional authority for land reform". 
Although section 25 provides for the protection of individual property rights against 
unwarranted state interference, the social function of property and the importance of 
land reform as a means to effect social change determine that existing property rights 
may be limited for the purpose of land reform. Section 25( 4) determines that land 
reform is in the public interest. This provision, read with the authorizing and control 
provisions of land reform (section 25(5) to 25(9)), obliges the court to take cognisance 
of the social function of property. Existing property rights can consequently only be 
protected to the extent that they do not stand in the way of comprehensive, effective 
land reform. The constitutional goal of creating an open and democratic society based 
on freedom, equality and human dignity also indicates that the courts have to interpret 
and apply property rights within a specific framework. This framework dictates that the 
courts have to be lenient when dealing with measures aimed at effecting social change. 
However, this does not mean that the courts have to allow all land reform measures 
which infringe upon the rights of an individual. The courts have to determine whether 
there is a proportional balance between the existing property rights of the affected 
individual and the public interest, and whether there is a proportional balance between 
the measures implemented and the goal they aim to achieve. The amount of 
compensation in the case of expropriation may be a deciding factor in the determination 
of whether such a balance is established. Section 25(3) of the South African 
Constitution determines that compensation must be just and equitable, reflecting an 
equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected. A 
number of factors have to be taken into account when the amount of compensation in 
the case of expropriation is determined. These factors provide for both the interests of 
the individual and the public interest and include the current use of the property, the 
history of the acquisition and us~ of the property, the market value of the property, the 
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effect of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital 
improvement of the property, and the purpose of the expropriation. 
The phraseology of the South African property clause and the context within which it 
' 
applies ensure that a constitutional conflict between the legislature and the judiciary 
relating to issues of land reform can be avoided. 
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CONCLUSION 
The implementation of a comprehensive land reform programme in South Africa 
necessitates a new look at property rights and the role of the public interest in the 
protection and limitation of property rights. According to the traditional private law 
perception property rights are reduced to abstract, scientific concepts which form part 
of a hierarchical system of rationally related concepts and definitions. These concepts 
are treated in an abstract, objective and scientific manner and they are seen as largely 
unaffected by social and political realities. In this view the constitutional guarantee of 
property is regarded as a guarantee of existing property rights that may not be infringed 
upon by the state for social or political reasons. In terms of the traditional, private law 
view of property rights land reform constitutes an invalid reason for the limitation of 
property rights. 
Land reform measures serve to promote the public interest, and in most cases the 
implementation of land reform necessitates the limitation of property rights (either by 
regulation the use of property or by expropriating private property). A conservative 
judiciary's adherence to the traditional private law view of property may lead to a 
constitutional conflict between the judiciary (that wants to afford existing property rights 
with strong constitutional protection) and the legislature (that wants to promote the 
public interest by implementing comprehensive land reform). A conservative court might 
interpret the property clause in such a manner that it either does not regard land reform 
to be a legitimate public purpose for which existing property rights may be limited, or 
that it sets the amount of compensation in the case where property is expropriated at 
such a high level that the implementation of comprehensive land reform is virtually 
impossible. In India the court's conservative stance on the protection of individual rights 
and the implementation of land and other social and economic reform led to a 
constitutional conflict between the judiciary and the legislature. The legislature's efforts 
to implement comprehensive land and economic reforms were frustrated by the court's 
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strict interpretation of the constitutional property guarantee. In an effort to solve this 
impasse the legislature removed the property clause from the bill of fundamental rights. 
In Zimbabwe a possible constitutional conflict was averted when the court's jurisdiction 
with regard to the determination of the amount of compensation was removed from the 
property clause to allow the legislature to determine the amount of compensation. In 
the Australian decision in Clunies-Ross v The Commonwealth of Australia and Others1 
the court also regarded the constitutional property clause as a guarantee of existing 
individual property rights. This case illustrates the situation where the court adheres to 
the traditional private law perception of property and consequently refuses to allow the 
limitation of an individual's property rights for social and political reasons. However, a 
constitutional conflict is not a necessary consequence of the implementation of land 
reform measures. It can be avoided if the courts adopt a different, overtly constitutional 
approach to property rights according to which the social function of property is 
emphasised, and the constitutional protection and limitation of property rights reflect 
an equitable balance between the interests of the affected individual property holder 
and the public interest. In such a constitutional context property is not dealt with in an 
abstract or conceptual manner. The social function of property fulfills a central role to 
determine whether a particular right should be afforded constitutional protection, and 
if it is, the extent of the protection would be determined with reference to the common 
interest. The recognition of the social and political function of property implies that 
property rights are created and maintained by the social and political order, and 
therefore property rights may be altered or limited for social and political reasons. 
The traditional private law perception of property is described and explained with 
reference to the abstract, scientific, conceptual approach to property rights, the concept 
of absolute property, the continuous development of property rights and the apparent 
flexibility of property rights. Although these topics are related and form part of the larger 
problem, they can be distinguished from one another. In terms of the abstract scientific 
approach property rights are reduced to abstract, context-neutral concepts. The 
different concepts form part of and fit into a hierarchical system of stronger and weaker 
(1984) 155 CLR 193. 
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rights. These concepts are rationally and logically related. All limitations or restrictions 
of property rights are explained and justified, and all legal problems solved, in terms of 
the relationships between the different concepts. In view of the abstractness of this 
approach the content and protection of a right are determined with reference to the 
definition of a particular concept and its place within the system. Sodal and political 
realities are regarded as peripheral to the science of law and the different concepts are 
therefore seen as largely unaffected by the social and political context within which they 
function. 
The abstract, scientific approach to property law is manifested in the concept of 
absolute, in principle unrestricted property rights. Property rights are regarded as 
essential to ensure for the property holder a sphere of personal freedom and autonomy, 
and consequently the property holder is protected against unwarranted state 
interferences for social and political reasons. In this view property rights can endure 
limitations or restrictions, but all limitations are seen as unnatural, exceptional and 
temporary. The continued acceptance of the concept of absolute property rights is 
justified by the assumption that it is based on Roman law dominium and that it enjoyed 
continuous and uninterrupted development from Roman law to the present. In line with 
this way of thinking the concept of abstract, context-neutral, absolute property (as the 
manifestation of the abstract, scientific, conceptual approach to property rights) is 
regarded as flexible enough to adapt to changing social and political circumstances, 
and therefore it is able to adapt to suit the needs of post-apartheid South African 
society. It is pointed out in this thesis, among others, that an adherence to the 
traditional view of and approach to property has.no historical foundation. Neither the 
abstract, scientific approach to property, nor the concept of absolute, in principle 
unrestricted property rights is the direct result of the uninterrupted development of 
Roman property law. The development of property rights is rather characterised by a 
series of discontinuities or fundamental breaks and the nature of property rights or their 
social function changed completely with every discontinuity to cater for societal needs 
in a particular period of its development. Although it may be argued that property rights 
have always been able to change and adapt to different social and political 
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circumstances, the changes that did occur were so dramatic that they cannot be 
regarded as mere adaptations of Roman law dominium, but should rather be seen as 
discontinuities in the development of property rights. These discontinuities illustrate 
that the traditional private law approach to, and perception of, property are not based 
' 
on Roman law dominium, but are of relevant recent origin. Therefore, there does not 
seem to be any justification for the argument that the modern civilist perception of 
property may not be replaced by a new approach in terms of which the social function 
and political nature of property are recognised. In the constitutional order the social and 
political nature of property rights is decisive to ensure that the interests of all South 
Africans are promoted by the use, distribution and exploitation of property. 
The perception that ownership in modem South African law (prior to the implementation 
of the 1993 Constitution) resembles dominium in Roman law2 cannot be supported. 
Although the same terminology is sometimes used to describe some of the 
characteristics of 'ownership' in both Roman and South African law, the social 
circumstances and the social function of ownership in these two systems are 
completely different. In classical Roman law a distinction was made between dominium, 
possession and other proprietary rights, five different types of dominium existed and 
the possibility of dual dominium was recognised. No clear classification of rights was 
made and in terms of the casuistic approach followed in Roman law the emphasis was 
on actions rather than on rights. To some extent vulgar Roman law constituted the first 
discontinuity in the development of ownership. In vulgar Roman law the distinction 
between dominium, possession and other proprietary rights became blurred and only 
one proprietary right was recognised. Although· Justinian reaffirmed the distinction 
between dominium, possession and other proprietary rights, the notion of dual 
dominium was abolished. 
Feudal law constituted another discontinuity in the development of Roman law 
dominium. Different forms of dominium, namely dominium directum and dominium 
2 See Van der Merwe Sakereg (1989) 171; Cowen New Patterns of Landownership 68 and 
70; Kunst Historische ontwikkeling van het recht 192; lmmink 1959 TR 36 at 41. 
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indirectum or dominium utile were developed as part of the medieval social order. This 
development was not the result of the logical and uninterrupted development of Roman 
law dominium. Roman law texts3 were interpreted widely to explain the distinction 
between the dominus directus and the dominus indirectus. In terms of this distinction 
the feudal lord had dominium directum and the vassal had dominium utile. The only 
difference between the two types of dominium was that each had a different content. 
Whereas dominium directum provided the dominus with the power of disposal, 
dominium utile merely provided the dominus with the power to use the property. The 
medieval distinction between different forms of dominium was a social, a-conceptual, 
practical institution, and property rights were developed as part of the social order in 
which they functioned. These rights were not approached conceptually or abstractly, 
but were strongly influenced by the social role and function of property in medieval 
society. Bartolus' definition of dominium as "[d]ominium est ius de re corporali perfecte 
disponendi nisi lege prohibeatur"4 is often interpreted to mean that Bartolus regarded 
dominium as an absolute, unrestricted right, and that his definition of dominium 
constitutes the basis for the current private law concept of absolute ownership. 
However, this view seems to be unsubstantiated. Bartolus described dominium in these 
terms (perfecte disponendt) to distinguish between dominium and possession and to 
indicate that the dominus had the full power to use, consume, and alienate the 
property. 
Roman-Dutch law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries moved away from 
medieval divided ownership. Grotius, who had a substantial influence on the 
development of Roman-Dutch law of the time (as.well as on the direction of the future 
development of ownership and other property rights) started a process of scientification 
of property law. He disregarded the concept of divided ownership and created a 
hierarchical system of rights. Grotius used the distinction between voile and 
gebreckelicke eigendom to inform his hierarchical system of rights. Gebreckelicke 
eigendom described the situation where ownership was split up in title and use. Both 
3 D 6.3.1; C 11.62.12. 
4 Bartolus on D 41.2.17.1no4. 
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the title holder and the person who had the power to use the property had 
gebreckelicke eigendom. To avoid confusion between the two forms of incomplete 
ownership Grotius called the one right eigendom and the other a gerechtigheid. The 
distinction was made with regard to the value of the rights rather than the benefit 
thereof - the more valuable one being eigendom or ownership and the less valuable 
one being a gerechtigheid or a right (today known as limited real rights). The 
implications of Grotius' distinction between the different forms of gebreckelicke 
eigendom signalled a break with the past and introduced a new era in the way in which 
real rights were perceived. Whereas both rights were previously seen as ownership or 
dominium (diredum and utile), only one was now regarded as dominium and the other 
as something less, namely a (limited real) right. This distinction forms the basis on the 
current distinction between ownership and limited real rights. 
Grotius destroyed the feudal forms of divided ownership and emphasised the 
importance of the individual by reverting to individual, uniform ownership. Although he 
started out from the medieval distinction between dominium directum and dominium 
utile, he used the logical and terminological move set out above to destroy it. Most 
other Roman-Dutch authors did not emphasise divided ownership and to a large extent 
they followed Grotius' distinction between eigendom and gerechtigheden. Grotius also 
created a hierarchical system of property rights by defining voile eigendom as the most 
complete (real) right and all other rights with regard to property as lesser rights. Grotius 
set out the whole system of what we now call real rights. Up to this point in history the 
emphasis was on ownership or dominium, but the system of rights created by Grotius 
can be viewed as the transition of the focus from ownership to property is the sense of 
a system of rights. This indicates that the current private law perception of property 
rights is based, not on Roman law, but rather on the work and influence of Grotius and 
other subsequent influences. 
The French Revolution represents another discontinuity in the natural and logical 
development of property rights. The French Revolution is often regarded as the origin 
of the concept of absolute ownership. However, this view cannot be supported. 
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Feudalism and divided ownership were officially abolished in France as a result of the 
French Revolution. In the changed social order the emphasis moved from society as 
a whole to the individual. However, although individualism was accentuated, ownership 
(or property rights in general) was not regarded as an absolute and in principle 
' 
unrestricted right. The accentuation of individualism must not be interpreted as 
anything more than a shift in the social function of property as a result of the reaction 
against the feudal concept of divided ownership. The French Revolution also 
contributed to the creation and establishment of the distinction between ownership and 
limited real rights. This strengthened the idea that the institution of property is to be 
regarded as a hierarchical system of different concepts and rights. 
The German Pandectists continued with the conceptual work of Grotius. They 
perceived law as a positive science which relies exclusively on its rules, concepts, 
principles and doctrines. Windscheid, one of the most important Pandectists, was 
influenced by Grotius. He also concentrated on creating a hierarchical system of legal 
principles and concepts, but in the case of Windscheid the emphasis was not on 
catering for specific needs of legal practise, but rather on perfecting a system into 
which all legal concepts, rules and principles fitted. The social function of property was 
not regarded as important and the creation and alteration of law was approached as 
a science, uninfluenced by social and political realities. 
Once it was realised that divided ownership was not of Roman origin the Pandectists 
discarded the medieval distinction between different forms of ownership and 
concentrated on creating a uniform concept of ownership. For this they 'reverted' to 
what was supposed to be a Roman concept of ownership and a concomitant 
hierarchical system of property rights. This may be seen as the origin of the idea that 
ownership (and in a broader sense also property) developed in an uninterrupted line 
from its inception in Roman law. The Pandectists regarded vulgar Roman law and 
feudal law (medieval law) as an aberration, and in their view they removed it to restore 
the uninterrupted line of development from classical to modern law. 
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In view of German Idealism, according to which individual freedom was accentuated 
and the autonomy of the individual was accepted as being the focal point of this legal 
theory, ownership was seen as part of the individuars sphere of freedom. The 
Pandectist perception of ownership reflected this and ownership was defined as an 
exclusive, absolute real right. To some extent this was in line with the developments in 
Roman-Dutch law and the French Revolution in that ownership was freed from the 
shackles of feudalism, but the Pandectists defined this development in an abstract and 
scientific manner. The concept of ownership and the distinction between ownership and 
limited real rights formed the basis of the scientification process of the German 
Pandectists. This can be regarded as the culmination of the work and influence of 
Grotius and the French Revolution. However, the Pandectists combined the different 
aspects and created a single theory, based on the freedom and autonomy of the 
individual as a moral concept which underlies the complete legal science. 
The conceptual approach followed by the German Pandectists had a substantial 
influence on the legal systems in most of western Europe and also on the legal system 
in South Africa. In South African law, prior to the implementation of the first democratic 
Constitution, property law was dominated by the conceptualist approach. All property 
related questions were regarded as conceptual and institutional questions and were 
treated in terms of an abstract, scientific, hierarchical system of concepts and 
definitions based on logic. The social function of property was disregarded and the 
different concepts were seen as scientific, neutral concepts unaffected by social or 
political circumstances or questions of justice and reasonableness. 
Ownership in South African private law is described in terms of the comprehensiveness 
of the owner's right. In order to distinguish between ownership and limited real rights, 
ownership is described as the real right that confers the most complete and 
comprehensive sovereignty over a thing. An owner can, within the limits set by private 
and public law, act freely with regard to the thing. Ownership is seen as an exclusive, 
absolute, in principle unrestricted right. All limitations are regarded as temporary and 
exceptional. This definition of ownership has a dual meaning. It signifies the most 
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comprehensive collection of entitlements with regard to a thing, and it indicates that 
ownership provides the owner with the widest possible scope within which these 
entitlements with regard to the thing can be exercised. The first meaning, which is 
referred to as the identity aspect of the concept of ownership, says something about the 
content of the right (the different entitlements of the owner) and the way in which the 
right is structured, while the second meaning gives an indication of how ownership is 
exercised. This is referred to as the exercise aspect of the concept of ownership. The 
identity aspect of the concept of ownership is approached conceptually with reference 
to the hierarchical system of rights. The exercise aspect is approach in much the same 
manner, but the social function of property and the relationship between the owner, 
third parties and the public inform this approach to some extent. The social function of 
property is, however, repressed in the abstract debate on the absoluteness and 
characteristics of ownership. 
The conceptual approach to property contributed to the inequalities in the way in which 
land is held and used in South Africa by disregarding the injustices and inequalities 
embodied in the abstract, scientific approach to property law and by degrading certain 
limited real rights to permits and other lesser rights. The conceptual approach 
disregarded the relevance of reasonableness and the social function of property in the 
abstract, scientific system. In the late 1980's a few South African lawyers started to 
recognise the importance of the social and political function of property. Although they 
initially concentrated on efforts to change the concepts of ownership and other property 
rights, this approach was later discarded in favour of a completely new debate on 
property in which the social role and function of property was accentuated. They did not 
attempt to adapt the concept of absolute ownership to cater for the needs of society, 
but rather moved away·from the conceptual approach and propagated a totally new 
debate on the role and function of property in society. The initiation of the new debate 
on the role and function of property in society is indicative of the fact that the abstract, 
scientific and conceptual approach to property is not able to cater for the social and 
political needs of post-aparlheid society. This debate gained momentum with the 
introduction of the first democratic Constitution and the land reform programme. The 
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introduction of the new Constitution accentuated the need for a socialised or social-
sensitive approach to property law. The recognition of the social and political nature 
and function of property rights meant that property rights are· recognised as creatures 
of their socio-political context and are therefore themselves political in nature. Property 
rights should not be seen as socially and politically neutral concepts that form part of 
a neutral, scientific and logical system. Each decision relating to property is a social 
and political decision that has to be taken and justified for each case with full 
recognition of the context within which the decision is taken and the implications of the 
decision. 
The unsuccessful attempts in Dutch law in the 1970's and 1980's to create a new 
perception of property within the traditional private law context in order to make it more 
socially acceptable illustrate the need for a completely new debate in South Africa on 
the role and function of property in society. A group of Dutch academics attempted to 
redefine the private law concept of ownership in order to provide for the social function 
of property. In essence all these attempts amounted to a differentiation between 
different objects and the nature and extent of the owner's rights with regard to the 
respective categories of objects. The possible reason for their failure may be the fact 
that they remained stuck in the conceptual approach and were unable to initiate a 
completely new property debate outside the confinements of conceptualism. 
The introduction of the 1993 Constitution placed South African property law on the 
doorstep of another possible discontinuity in the development of property. It is pointed 
out that the current South African private law perception of property is not derived 
directly from Roman law, but reflects the various discontinuities and fundamental 
changes in its development. The nature of property rights underwent dramatic changes 
throughout history, and these changes were so fundamental that it cannot be said that 
property rights retained its Roman character. Therefore, there does not seem to be a 
valid justification for the argument that the traditional private law perception of property 
can or need not be changed or abolished in favour of a different perception of property. 
The social, political and economic circumstances in the democratic South Africa 
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necessitates the recognition of the role and function of property in society. A stubborn 
adherence to the traditional conceptual and scientific approach to property would be 
counter-productive, because this might frustrate the implementation of comprehensive 
land reform which aims to limit existing property rights for social and political reasons. 
It might also lead to a constitutional conflict between the judiciary (that wants to protect 
existing property rights against state interferences for social and political reasons) and 
the legislature (that wants to promote the public interest by effecting land reform). The 
introduction of the Constitution, and with that the constitutional guarantee of property, 
places property rights within a new context where the social function of property is 
emphasised. These developments created the ideal situation for South African law to 
undergo dramatic change. 
The nature and extent of constitutional property may differ dramatically from the private 
law perception of property. In the constitutional context property is interpreted and 
protected in view of the social and political context within which it functions. It is 
generally accepted that property rights are created by their social and political context 
and as such they are subject to social and political adjustments. In the constitutional 
context an attempt is made to establish a balance between the interests of the 
individual and the public interest. Property rights in a constitutional context are not 
regarded as absolute, in principle unrestricted rights, but rather as relative rights which 
may be limited in the public interest. Thus, although the constitutional property clause 
affords the individual with adequate protection against unwarranted state interference, 
it also recognises the social function of property and provides for the limitation of these 
rights in the public interest. The state has the authority to regulate the use of property 
in terms of its police power and to expropriate property against compensation in terms 
of its power of eminent domain. The state is therefore not limited to a choice between 
leaving existing property rights unaffected or expropriating them against compensation. 
It is commonly recognised that the state may regulate the use of property (this may 
include measures aimed at effecting land reform) without having to compensate the 
affected individual property holder. Whenever constitutionally protected property rights 
are limited by the state, the courts have to determine whether a proportional balance 
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has been established between the rights and interests of the affected individual and the 
public interest. The proportionality principle is not applied in the same manner or to the 
same extent in all jurisdictions, but it is generally required that some form of the 
proportionality principle be applied when the state infringes upon individual property 
rights. 
A comparative analysis of the position in Germany, the United States of America and 
the Council of Europe indicates that the scope of property in a constitutional context is 
extended beyond the scope of private law (where ownership is seen as the most 
important right and where rights are held (mostly) with regard to corporeal things) to 
include all patrimonial rights. This might include real rights, personal rights, immaterial 
property rights, contractual rights of sale and purchase, customary residential and 
commonage-use rights, statutory rights in terms of land reform legislation, social 
security rights, and so on. A range of different objects are recognised as property in the 
constitutional context. This includes movable and immovable tangible property, 
immaterial property, rights with regard to debts, claims, goodwill and shares in a 
company, welfare rights, licences, permits and other rights held against the state which 
are based on legislation. In each individual case the courts have to decide whether a 
particular right or object qualify for the protection afforded by the constitutional property 
clause. 
The determination of the amount of compensation in the case of expropriation also 
reflects the importance of the social function of property. It is generally accepted that 
compensation need not be set at market value, but.that it may also be less than market 
value, as long as the amount of compensation reflects an equitable balance between 
the interests of the individual and the public interest. The amount of compensation is 
thus determined with due regard to all the social circumstances applicable to a 
particular case. 
In the United States of America compensation is not only required for actual 
acquisitions of property by the state (that is actual expropriations), but also for 
454 
regulations of the use of property which limit the rights of the individual to such an 
extent ·that they resemble expropriations. This category of limitations is commonly 
known as regulatory expropriations or regulatory takings. In order to determine whether 
a regulation qualifies as a regulatory expropriation the court has to determine whether 
an individual is expected to bear a burden which should rather be borne by society. 
Compensation may be awarded if the burden is found to be excessive. 
Contrary to the traditional position in private law, constitutional property does not over-
emphasise personal freedom and autonomy to the exclusion of the public interest. 
Property is rather interpreted and applied in view of its role and function within society 
and the property holder is expected to exercise his/her rights in such a manner that it 
is not detrimental to society. Although no positive duty is explicitly placed on the 
property holder to exercise his/her rights so as to serve the public interest, the 
particular situation in South Africa with regard to the inequitable distribution of land may 
implicitly require such an obligation. (In Germany the Grundgesetz determines that 
property entails obligations and that it must be exercised so as to promote the public 
interest.) 
Section 25 of the South African Constitution has a dual function. On the one hand it 
protects individual property rights against unwarranted state interference, and on the 
other hand, it promotes the public interest by authorising and controlling land reform. 
The property clause attempts to create an equitable balance between the protection of 
individual property rights and the promotion of the public interest. The creation of this 
balance is of cardinal importance, because in the absence of such a balance the 
property clause would be unable to ensure that property is held, used and distributed 
in a manner conducive to the establishment of an open and democratic society based 
on freedom, equality and human dignity. An interpretation of the property clause which 
attributes more weight to the protection of individual property rights than to the 
promotion of the public interest might create a situation where the implementation of 
comprehensive land reform would be virtually impossible. In such a case the courts 
would be in a position to frustrate or impede the land reform, because land reform 
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would be seen as an illegitimate, social and political reason for the limitation of 
individual property rights. On the other hand, an interpretation which favours land 
reform and the public interest might lead to a situation where the rights and interests 
of (existing and future) individual property holders are insecure and vulnerable to 
severe limitation by the state. The judiciary is thus under an obligatiori to ensure that 
a just and equitable balance is struck between the protection of existing property rights 
and the promotion of the public interest. 
Land reform may be interpreted to mean different things in different jurisdictions. A wide 
interpretation of the concept of land reform encompasses a comprehensive public 
programme designed to correct defective land tenure systems and to transform a 
society on a political, social and economic level. Land reform can take many forms, 
including measures aimed at the redistribution of land, the improvement of existing 
systems of land tenure, resettlement schemes, the imposition of a land tax, land 
consolidation for the reorganisation of agricultural units, the provision of housing and 
the restitution of land to people who were unjustly dispossessed. Land reform is a state 
initiative to modify, redirect or change the rights to, use of and relations to the land with 
regard to the way in which land is held and used in a particular jurisdiction. 
Land reform measures serve to promote the public interest, and in most cases the 
implementation of land reform necessitates the limitation of property rights. This might 
lead to conflict between the protection of individual rights and the promotion of the 
public interest. However, the implementation of land reform measures need not lead 
to a constitutional conflict. In most developed countries the traditional private law 
perception of property is discarded in favour of the recognition of the social role and 
function of property and the courts attempt to establish a balance between the 
protection of existing property rights and land reform. In jurisdictions, where no official 
land reform programme is in place, land reform is mostly viewed as a legitimate public 
purpose for both the regulation of the use of property and the expropriation (taking in 
the US) of property against compensation. The amount of compensation is used as a 
means to establish a balance between the interests of the affected individual and the 
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public interest. The social and political nature of limitations aimed at effecting land 
reform is recognised and accepted as legitimate reasons for the interference with 
existing property rights in the public interest. Most of the land reform measures 
implemented in these jurisdictions amount to the control of the use of property and the 
courts generally have no difficulty in declaring these measures to be in the public 
interest. In the US decision of Hawaii Housing Authority v Midkiff and the European 
Court of Human Rights decision in James v United Kingdom6 the respective courts held 
that the expropriation of private property from one individual and the transfer thereof 
to another individual to effect land reform constituted a legitimate public purpose. 
In some developing countries, where an official land reform programme is in place, the 
property clause is interpreted, and the land reform programme implemented in such a 
manner that the possibility of a constitutional conflict is avoided. Both the judiciary and 
the legislature recognise the importance of the social function of property and the need 
to eradicate the inequalities which exist with regard to the use, distribution and 
exploitation of land. In order to avoid unnecessary friction between the judiciary and the 
legislature the land reform programme is drafted so that individual property rights are 
not limited unnecessarily. In Namibia, unlike the situation in Zimbabwe where large 
productive farms are targeted for redistribution, under-utilised land, land held in excess 
of the maximum ceiling imposed on land ownership and land held by foreign nationals 
is used for redistribution. This ensures that the public interest is promoted without 
unreasonable limitation of existing property rights. In Botswana the land reform 
programme aims to provide security of tenure to people living on tribal or state land and 
privately owned land is unaffected by the programme. 
In jurisdictions where specific constitutional provision is made for land reform, the 
implementation of land reform does not seem to cause any problems. 
5 
6 
467 us 229 (1984). 
8 EHRR 123 (1986). 
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The possibility of a constitutional conflict in Zimbabwe has led Roux7 to the conclusion 
that a different model of review should be applied with regard to social reform in post-
colonial countries. He suggested that the planning and implementation of reform 
measures should be subjected to public participation, and that the court's only function 
in these instances would be to ensure that the political process was legitimate. 
In South Africa, where the constitutional property clause provides for the protection of 
existing property rights and authorises and controls land reform, there does not seem 
to be a need for a special model of review with regard to land reform. The Constitution 
creates a framework for the interpretation and protection of property rights. The 
importance of the social function of property is emphasised by this framework. The 
recognition of the inherent social and political nature of property rights imply that 
property rights may be adjusted or limited for social and political reasons. The 
Constitution aims to facilitate the creation of an open and democratic society based on 
freedom, equality and human dignity, and the proper interpretation and application of 
the Constitution may avert a constitutional conflict. Section 7(3) determines that all 
rights in the bill of rights are subject to limitation and section 36, which contains the 
general limitation provision, provides that the rights in the bill of rights may be limited 
only in terms of a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including (a) the nature 
of the right; (b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; (c) the nature and extent 
of the limitation; (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and (e) less 
restrictive means to achieve the same purpose. The limitation of existing rights has to 
reflect a just and equitable balance between the extent of the measures imposed and 
the purpose of the limitation, and ultimately between the interests of the affected 
individual and the public interest. Section 25 requires that a balance has to be 
established between the protection of existing property rights and the promotion of the 
public interest through the implementation of land reform measures. The social function 
of property is emphasised by the provision in section 25(4) which determines that the 
7 Roux 1996 Afr J Int & Comp L 755 at 782 et seq. 
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public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform and to other reforms to 
bring about equitable access to all South Africa's resources. Sections 25(5) to 25(9) 
authorise and control the implementation of land reform measures aimed at the 
restitution of land to people who were unjustly dispossessed in terms of apartheid 
legislation, the equitable redistribution of land and the provision of security of tenure. 
The courts are under a constitutional obligation to interpret and apply the property 
clause within the framework established by the Constitution as a whole, and more 
particularly by the property clause itself. If the courts recognise the role and function 
of property within society and adhere to the constitutional framework for the 
implementation and application of property, the implementation of land reform should 
not cause friction between the judiciary and the legislature. 
The implementation of the 1993 and 1996 Constitutions brought about a new era in 
South African property law. The constitutional protection of property and the 
implementation of the land reform programme changed the nature and content of 
property completely and irrevocably. The traditional view of property rights as scientific, 
abstract concepts within a hierarchical system of rationally related, socially and 
politically neutral rights has been replaced by a new approach to property rights. The 
social function of property within society plays a central role and a variety of different 
rights are afforded constitutional protection. In the new constitutional order the 
perception of property rights as abstract, absolute rights unaffected by social and 
political circumstances has been replaced by a perception of property rights as relative 
rights which may be limited in the public interest or for a public purpose. The social and 
political context within which these rights function is decisive for their interpretation and 
protection. 
A different but related issue is the land reform programme's contribution to break down 
the hierarchical system of property rights. Although the initial measures taken in terms 
of the land reform programme simply upgraded 'lesser land rights' to full ownership, 8 
some of the later reform measures, however, indicate a possible shift in the ownership 
8 In terms of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991. 
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paradigm and seem to afford land rights other than ownership with more or less the 
same protection afforded to ownership. 9 By providing the holders of these rights with 
security of tenure, the gap between ownership and other land rights is narrowed to 
some extent. If the perception of a hierarchy of land rights (where ownership is 
regarded as the ultimate right and all other rights are perceived· as inferior of 
inadequate rights) can be overcome it will be possible to increase the possibilities of 
land reform to a large extent. This will create a situation where rights in/to land CC!n be 
(re)distributed, rather than the land itself. In light of the fact that land is a limited 
resource the distribution of secure tenure rights will alleviate the existing situation and 
appease the land hunger. It may, however, also be argued that by extending full 
ownership to as wide a range as possible of property holders, the distribution of land 
(especially agricultural land) will be more equitable. By merely providing security of 
tenure to different rights holders on agricultural land and not extending the base of 
landowners, the existing situation where agricultural land remains in the hands of 
predominantly white owners, will not be rectified to a meaningful extent. 
Lastly, the new constitutional order ensured that the customary land tenure system is 
kept intact. The dynamic nature of this system fulfills an important social function in 
specific rural areas and the retention of and provision for this land tenure system 10 
placed customary land rights on an equal footing with other property rights. These 
rights are no longer perceived and treated as inferior rights, but are afforded the same 
protection as all other property rights. 
9 
10 
See in this regard the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996, the Communal 
Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act . The 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 
1997 provides labour tenants and other lawful occupiers with statutory security of tenure. 
The Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 does, however, provide for the situation 
where the rights of the labour tenant can be transformed or upgraded to full ownership. 
This reinforces the hierarchy of land rights perception to some extent. 
In terms of the Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 a group of people can 
acquire full ownership of land, but the Act provides for total freedom concerning the land 
hold and land use patterns within the property association. This creates the possibility of 
a situation where customary land 'rights' may be exercised without compromising the 
security of these rights. 
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